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Abstract 
When in the summer of 2013 whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed the scope of the mass 
surveillance programs conducted by the National Security Agency and its international partners, privacy 
activists launched several global online and offline campaigns to protect privacy and resist surveillance. 
Applying methods of social movement frame and discourse analysis, the dissertation seeks to analyze 
the various ways activists have tried to shape the privacy discourse in a post 9/11 ‘Surveillance Society.’ A 
close reading of activist materials and texts over the course of four campaigns – “Restore the Fourth,” 
“Stop Watching Us,” “The Day We Fight Back,” and “Reset the Net” – reveals a set of frame packages, 
which are juxtaposed with the media coverage the campaigns have generated. In subsequent semi-
structured interviews with 21 activists from 14 countries, participants involved in the protest events were 
asked to critically reflect on framing choices, media dynamics and the degree of transnational 
cooperation among various privacy advocacy groups. The dissertation contributes to the field of grass 
roots political communication research by discussing the potentials and limits of anti-surveillance 
frames as well as providing a cultural and oral history of organized resistance against surveillance in the 
post-Snowden world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For years, privacy advocates had been speculating about a possible “Privacy Chernobyl” – a major 
scandal that would put the issue of surveillance on the global agenda and create a mass social 
movement against privacy intrusions committed by governments and corporations.1 In the 
summer of 2013, this speculation became reality. Edward Snowden's leaked documents detailing 
the mass surveillance activities conducted by the National Security Agency and its international 
partners caused – to stick to the nuclear disaster analogy – a temporary meltdown of public trust 
by citizens around the world.2 Effectively, the Snowden documents proved what some observers 
had speculated for years and what others had dismissed as dystopian science fiction, namely that 
a major part of the global communication data network is constantly being monitored. Among 
the NSA's programs exposed by Snowden were PRISM (collection of content shared by 
individuals on social networking sites), XKEYSCORE (retroactively assessing, linking and 
tracking individual names, phone numbers, and search histories) as well as BOUNDLESS 
INFORMANT (visualizing global metadata).3  
 The impact of the revelations was two-fold. On the one hand, thanks to Snowden, terms 
such as 'surveillance' and 'privacy' overnight became hot-button issues debated in legislatures, 
newspapers, and talk shows around the world. Initially the global citizenry was deeply disturbed 
about the pervasiveness of the NSA's programs.4 Having exposed the gargantuan scope of the 
international surveillance apparatus, politicians sought legislative reform both on the national as 
                                                 
1 Cf. Bennett, Colin J., The Privacy Advocates: Resisting the Spread of Surveillance (Cambridge, MA & London: The 
MIT Press, 2008), 200. 
2 Authors’ note: This paragraph was partly reproduced from a previously published article. Cf. Till Wäscher, 
“Framing Resistance Against Surveillance: Political communication of privacy advocacy groups in the 'Stop 
Watching Us' and 'The Day We Fight Back' campaigns,” Digital Journalism 5 (3) 2017, 368. 
3 This thesis is no place for discussing the technological specifics of surveillance measures. For an overview about 
the specifics of various surveillance programs, see for example Jon L. Mills, “The Future of Privacy in the 
Surveillance Age,” in After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age, ed. by Ronald Goldfarb 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015) 191-261, 210-217. 
4 According to the Pew Research Center, in the summer of 2014, 81 % of global citizens excluding the U.S. found 
the NSA actions “unacceptable.” For U.S. citizens, see Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Global Opposition 
to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image” (accessed October 15, 2014) 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-
americas-image/. According to a Washington Post Poll from November 2013, 69% of Americans were “very 
concerned“ or “somewhat concerned” about digital surveillance. “Surveillance in America,” (accessed October 15, 
2014). http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/surveillance-america-washington-post-poll-
november/2013/12/22/1a87c22e-6a8c-11e3-997b-9213b17dac97_page.html. 
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well as the supranational level. Brazil and Germany, in a joint effort, introduced a United Nations 
resolution on the Right of Privacy while the U.S. Congress, in the summer of 2015, after two years 
of deliberation enacted the USA Freedom Act, which curbed, at least for American citizens, the 
indefinite collection of telephone metadata. All of these policy outcomes, however, have to be 
seen in the light of a massive international outcry of civil society actors. The Snowden revelations 
revitalized an almost forgotten genre of contentious politics – privacy activism. Opposition to 
government surveillance had partially informed both political revolutions of the past as well as 
the new left “activism” of the early 1970s. But now, fuelled by the growing concern for digital 
rights, social movement organizations have rediscovered privacy as an issue worth 
demonstrating and campaigning for. 
 And yet to say that activists could easily tap into a growing unease among millions of 
citizens around the issue of surveillance would be distorting the facts. In a sense, Snowden was 
not the turning point for surveillance awareness privacy advocates had hoped for. After the initial 
period of outcry, both indifference and the 'I have nothing to hide' line of argument began to 
drown out privacy concerns. While the Snowden leaks were instrumental in igniting a debate 
about the merits of privacy, in some countries surveillance programs have been actually 
expanded since 2013.5 The number of people sharing personal data on social networking sites has 
not stalled as a result. And terrorist attacks, which on a regular basis shatter the public’s 
collective sense of security, are often followed by political rhetoric that advances the 
normalization of government surveillance. In the recent U.S. presidential election, surveillance 
was not among the top 20 issues mentioned by either candidate; the only thing Donald Trump 
said in this context was that he wanted to vastly increase the surveillance capabilities of the 
United States. In March 2017, in the face of a relatively muted response from civil society, he 
repealed a directive by the Obama administration which would have made it harder for internet 
service providers to sell personal data of their customers to third parties.  
 It is within these conflictive circumstances – commonly referred to as the “Privacy 
Paradox”6 – privacy activists have been operating in the years since the Snowden revelations. 
                                                 
5 For example in the United Kingdom or Germany. Cf. Arne Hintz and Lina Dencik, “The Politics of Surveillance 
Policy: UK Regulatory Dynamics after Snowden,” Internet Policy Review 5 (3) (2016), 1-16; Markus Reuter, 
„Bundesrat winkt BND-Gesetz im Schnellverfahren durch,“ Netzpolitik.org, November 4, 2016 (accessed January 
10, 2017). https://netzpolitik.org/2016/bundesrat-winkt-bnd-gesetz-im-schnellverfahren-durch/.  
6 Claire Cain Miller, “Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act as if They Don't,” The New York Times, November 
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They have to face a public which is partially critical of unchecked and excessive government 
surveillance while at the same time has internalized forms of social media-fuelled self-
surveillance and is not willing to change its online behaviour in any meaningful way. They 
operate within political systems that predominantly produce policy outputs which favour 
security over privacy. And their communication work takes place in a mass mediated ecosystem 
in which surveillance are met with inaccurate coverage by reporters and inconsistent treatment 
by pundits.. 
 Given this challenging climate in which opposition to the global surveillance regime takes 
place, the main objective of this dissertation is to identify, analyse, and critically assess the 
political communication of activists during anti-surveillance campaigns in the first year of the 
post-Snowden world. As a contribution to the larger cultural and media history of resistance to 
mass surveillance, my work will be guided by the following research questions:  
1. How have privacy activists framed resistance against mass surveillance in the aftermath 
of the Snowden revelations?  
A major obstacle for privacy activists working to warn against the perils of surveillance and to 
expound the benefits of privacy is the hard-to-grasp nature of the issues at hand. Surveillance as 
a civil and human rights issue naturally does not lend itself to the same emotionally-charged 
language and iconography that goes hand-in-hand with other pressing issues such as ecological 
destruction or war. Seemingly without any immediate or long-term consequences, surveillance 
remains invisible and abstract for a majority of citizens and internet users.7 Given these 
challenges, this research looks to explore if and how the privacy activist community strategically 
employed discourses, narratives, metaphors, and iconography to raise awareness and mobilize 
citizens. It also aims to outline the specific culturally, historically, technologically, and politically 
charged „collective action frames“8 employed by activists to circumvent the invisibility of 
surveillance? A look at framing is instructive as it reveals how political opportunities (in this 
case, the Snowden leaks), in themselves not a guarantee for movement success, were taken 
                                                                                                                                                                       
12, 2014 (accessed on January 10, 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-they-want-
privacy-but-act-as-if-they-dont.html.  
7 Sun-ha Hong,“Subjunctive and Interpassive ‘Knowing’ in the Surveillance Society,” Media and Communication 3 
(2) (2015),  63–76. 
8 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611–639. 
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advantage of by a network of movement actors.9 Ultimately, by focusing on activists' frames and 
discourses I aim to throw light on a question that David Lyon stressing the importance of frame 
analysis in Surveillance Studies, posed, namely “Why do we think about [issues of surveillance] 
the way we do and why do we speak up about them or remain silent?”10 
2. How have the activists' attempts been portrayed in the media? 
Existing research hints at a general unease of mainstream media outlets in covering both the 
Snowden case and the topic of mass surveillance in general often downplaying its harmful 
effects.11 Despite the potential of new technologies for enabling “mass self-communication”12 and 
“digitally enabled social change,”13 social movements are still dependent on traditional news 
coverage to reach people beyond their core constituencies. Often, battles over the appropriate 
representations of frames ensue between activists and media.14 Paul D’Angelo and Jim Kuypers 
have observed a symbiotic relationship between issue advocates and journalists when it comes to 
framing: “sources frame topics to make information interesting (…) and journalists cannot not 
frame topics because they need sources’ frames to make news.”15 While frame-dominated media 
discourse may not directly change public opinion, examining frames allows us to see which ones 
are most “readily available” and thus, have a “higher probability of being used.”16 While focusing 
on the activist community's attempts at framing, or making sense of the NSA revelations, the 
dissertation will also analyze the media dynamics of the privacy movement.17 
3. How transnational is the current anti-surveillance activist community? 
As Snowden himself has made clear in his manifesto, published in the German magazine “Der 
                                                 
9 Doowon Suh, “How Do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements? Political Opportunity, Misframing, 
Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure,” The Sociological Quarterly 42 (3) (2001): 437–460, 442. 
10 David Lyon, Surveillance after Snowden (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2015), 117. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55. 
13 Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2011). 
14 Cf. Castells, Communication Power, 142; Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & 
Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 
15 Cf. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers, “Introduction: Doing News Frame Analysis,” in Doing News Framing 
Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2010), 1-15. 
16 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95 (1) (1989), 10.  
17 Authors’ note: This paragraph was partly reproduced from my previously published article by me. Cf. Wäscher, 
“Framing Resistance Against Surveillance,” 370. 
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Spiegel”, mass surveillance is a global phenomenon that demands global answers.18 Three out of 
four major anti-surveillance activist campaigns in the aftermath of Snowden have claimed, at 
least in theory, to speak for global citizens and featured a roster of activist organizations from 
around the world. Their involvement not only enhanced the aim and scope of the movement but 
created challenges as well, especially in regard to articulating effective transnational frames that 
resonate globally. As noted by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikking, efforts to provoke a global 
reaction depend on the “ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a 
situation for an audience that is frequently far away”19 Thus, privacy activism is a promising case 
study for examining how local or national frames are lifted to the transnational level, or why 
such attempts fail. As with environmentalism or the anti-war movement, opposition to 
surveillance has the potential for creating a global movement. While the pieces are there – the 
advancement of information communication technologies (ICTs); regular exchanges during 
digital rights themed conferences; and an evolving legal (albeit non-binding) transnational 
framework – the question remains if this will ultimately result in a unified and stable global 
privacy network. 
 The following two underlying assumptions will guide my attempt at answering these 
questions. First of all, I consider communication the most important activity of any social 
movement organization. As James K. Herzog and Robert J. Zuercher have summarized, 
[s]ocial change advocates must develop communications strategies to 
engage in sociopolitical debate, build movements dedicated to enacting 
change, promote their political program to the public, organize action 
among supporters and allies during periods of public contention, and 
maintain advocacy organizations and their accomplishments during 
periods of retrenchment.20  
 
What the late Charles Tilly has described as “repertoires of contention” – a set of “claim-making 
routines”21 by social movement actors, has, thanks to the professionalization of political 
communication work and the emergence of ICTs, evolved into “repertoires of communication.” 
                                                 
18 Edward Snowden, „Ein Manifest für die Wahrheit.“ Der Spiegel, November 4, 2013 (accessed January 10, 2017). 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-119402581.html.  
19 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 16.  
20 James K. Hertzog and Robert J. Zuercher, „Political Communication in social transformation and revolution,“ in 
Political Communication, ed. Carsten Reinemann (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton , 2014), 184. 
21 Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 35. 
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This set of “media practices that social movement actors (…) develop in both the latent and 
visible stages of mobilization has arguably overtaken any other tasks and practices of social 
movements.”22 Without effective media practices a movement cannot maintain the momentum 
and level of mobilization to conduct other forms of organizing. In other words, an activist group 
can stage a street protest but without sufficient (social) media outreach nobody will show up. But 
even for advocacy groups who work behind the scenes, raising awareness by garnering media 
coverage is crucial to generate political pressure. While a great deal of literature has recently 
focused on the activities of privacy activists, there has been no analysis with regard to the explicit 
function of political communication strategies of these groups. 
 Secondly, I consider two key terms of this dissertation, surveillance and privacy, to be not 
only practices, or moral or philosophical values, but also discursively contested concepts which 
are in constant flux, especially since the Snowden revelations. The last four years have been a key 
period in which various sectors of the public – officials, corporations, activists – engaged in a 
discussion over what terms such as 'privacy' and 'surveillance' actually mean. In the resulting 
battle over words, frames and narratives, both sides have at times reached diametrically opposing 
conclusions: While activists have decried the NSA's activities generally as unwarranted mass 
suspicionless surveillance breaching fundamental human and civil rights, the former head of US 
counterintelligence under President George W. Bush has described the practice merely as “non-
intrusive public safety responsibilities of the US government.”23  
Given the abstract and technical nature of online surveillance, privacy activists 
increasingly rely on a set of symbols, metaphors, and images which are necessary to visualize 
otherwise invisible acts of surveillance in the public realm. Further dissemination through media 
outlets largely depend on the activists’ success in creating an effective and vivid anti-surveillance 
vocabulary and imagery. The impact of the Snowden leaks has depended not only on simply 
reporting the details of various surveillance programs but on igniting a global debate about the 
merits and risks of unchecked surveillance. Snowden himself, while obviously taking a fierce 
anti-surveillance stance, initially justified his actions by stating he wanted to start a global 
conversation about the issue. My study aims to illustrate the crucial role privacy activists have 
                                                 
22 Alice Mattoni, “Repertoires of Communication in Social Movement Processes,” in Mediation and Protest 
Movements, ed. Bart Cammaerts, Alice Mattoni & Patrick Mccurdy (Bristol/Chicago: Intellect, 2013), 47. 
23 Michelle Van Cleave, “What it takes: In Defense of the NSA,” World Affairs 176 (4) (2013), 59. 
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played in this conversation. 
 This objective is timely, unique, and relates to current trends in grass roots 
communication research. Recent events such as the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, or the 15-M 
Movement have led to renewed scholarly interest in social movements, based at the intersection 
of collective action and media and communication research.24 While the Snowden revelations 
have led academics from all fields to study surveillance- and privacy-related topics, scholars who 
study grassroots movement are only beginning to address the importance of privacy advocacy 
networks in general and their communication practices in particular. For example, Colin Bennett 
has created a helpful typology and general overview of various privacy advocacy groups and their 
activities.25 Priska Daphi et al. were among the first scholars to analyze the visual dimension of 
anti-surveillance protests.26 Lucas Introna and Amy Gibbons have provided a look into privacy 
activists’ use of online practices;27 and Sun- Ha Hong has analyzed the contemporary public 
discourse on surveillance and the many challenges it poses for opponents to effectively 
problematize the practice.28 However, there has been little scholarly work on how the 
communications practices of privacy activists in general and their framing processes in 
particular, interact with the mainstream media. This is in stark contrast to the rich literature 
dealing with political communication strategies of environmental, anti-poverty, and anti-war 
activists.29 
 With this dissertation I want to both fill this research gap and also create a taxonomy of 
anti-surveillance frames that can form the basis for subsequent research. The pervasiveness of 
data-driven electronic surveillance in our contemporary society will not go away in the 
foreseeable future. Four years into the post-Snowden era, it is clear that the ongoing discovery of 
                                                 
24 See e.g. Cammaerts et al (eds.), Mediation and Protest Movements; Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and 
Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Donatella Della Porta and Alice 
Mattoni (ed.), Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014. 
25 Cf. Bennett, The Privacy Advocates. 
26 Priska Daphi, Anja Le, and Peter Ulrich.“Images of Surveillance: The Contested and Embedded Visual Language 
of Anti-Surveillance Protests,” in Advances in the Visual Analysis of Social Movements, ed. Nicole Doerr, Alice 
Mattoni and Simon Teune (Bingley: Emerald Books, 2013), 55-80. 
27 Lucas D. Introna and Amy Gibbons, “Networks and Resistance: Investigating Online Advocacy Networks as a 
Modality for Resisting State Surveillance,” Surveillance & Society 6 (3) (2009), 233–258. 
28 Hong, “Subjunctive and Interpassive ‘Knowing.’” 
29 Cf. Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill, and Frank Webster, Anti-War Activism: New Media and Protest in the 
Information Age (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins (eds.), Environmental 
Conflict and the Media (New York: Peter Lang, 2013); Nicolas Sireau, Make Poverty History: Political 
Communication in Action (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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new details about the scope of the international surveillance apparatus will continue. Indeed, 
consider, for example, these three news stories published from fall 2016 to spring 2017: Tech 
company Yahoo, working closely with the NSA proactively scanned all of their users emails in 
real time searching for key phrases; documents released by Wikileaks demonstrated how NSA 
programs were able to circumvent encryption software and infiltrate smart devices such as 
television sets; and police officers in New York using means of offline and online surveillance 
systematically monitored Black Lives Matter activists.30 Under those circumstances, the work of 
privacy activists remains a both crucial and relevant object of research. 
 The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I clarify key terms, namely ‘privacy’ and 
surveillance’, which are relevant for the study of privacy activist communication. I also 
summarize the state of the art of the field of Surveillance Studies. The key concept in this field is 
that of a ‘Surveillance Society – a contemporary world, in which surveillance has become an 
organizing principle of everyday life. In fact, surveillance by now is far from being seen as a 
black-and white, top-down practice. The relationship between government agencies, 
corporations, and citizens is far more complex – a phenomenon that makes it significantly more 
challenging for activists to critically address surveillance in their communication work. In other 
words, surveillance is seen as a cultural practice in which a multitude of actors take part. For 
instance, since the emergence of social media, corporate actors have played a key role in the 
expansion of electronic surveillance. Not only have tech companies, willingly or not, collaborated 
with the NSA, but also promoted widespread self-surveillance on social networking sites. 
Corporate surveillance, as will be shown, played a peculiar role in the privacy protest events after 
Snowden – either because activists chose not to address the integral role played by tech 
companies played in the surveillance apparatus or because they temporarily formed alliances 
with the companies. 
 With various forms of surveillance deeply ingrained into society, the ethical value of 
privacy has come under attack. The frames of anti-surveillance activists are not widely shared 
                                                 
30 “Yahoo email surveillance: who approved the secret scanning program?” The Guardian, October 6, 2016 (accessed  
January 10, 2017). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/06/yahoo-email-surveillance-
government-nsa-fisa; Sam Biddle, “WikiLeaks Dump Shows CIA Could Turn Smart TVs into Listening Devices.” 
The Intercept, March 7, 2016 (accessed January 10, 2017). https://theintercept.com/2017/03/07/wikileaks-dump-
shows-cia-could-turn-smart-tvs-into-listening-devices/; George Joseph, “NYPD officers accessed Black Lives 
Matter activists' texts, documents show,” The Guardian, April 4, 2017 (accessed May 10, 2017). 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/04/nypd-police-black-lives-matter-surveillance-undercover.  
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but compete with an increasingly advanced array of arguments, narratives, and justifications 
voiced by surveillance proponents. Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, values such as 
security have gained acceptance at the expense of privacy. It is the security v. privacy conflict that 
marks the front line of the discursive battle between activists and the intelligence agencies. By 
juxtaposing security with not only privacy but other democratic values such as freedom, 
tolerance, and human dignity, privacy activists have sought to circumvent the privacy v. security 
duality. 
 Chapter 2 also conceptualizes anti-surveillance communication as a mode of resistance. To 
enlighten the public about the potentially grave consequences of surveillance is a prerequisite for 
any form of opposition. Historically, each new form of monitoring has led people also to resist. 
Resistance is an intrinsic part of the surveillance society and the activists’ work functions as a 
catalyst for generating outrage against privacy breaches by the state or private firms. Again, 
communication work is crucial for this endeavor, which is also demonstrated in an excursion at 
the end of chapter 2 briefly discussing three historic instances of successful, heavily mediatized 
forms of resistance against surveillance-driven government oppression.  
 Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation. For 
the purposes of my research question I have triangulated discourse analysis with frame analysis 
and semi-structured interviews with activists. The section explains how a close reading of activist 
materials will reveal a set of anti-surveillance frame packages. An essential part of activist 
communication work consists in framing events – offering convincing narratives and 
interpretations of social phenomena. Collective action frames, as conceptualized by Robert 
Benford and David Snow,31 are designed to explain, mobilize and motivate citizen toward a 
specific cause. Whether collective action frames are adapted and reported on by the media, is not 
a given, which makes a careful frame selection process even more important. David Lyon has 
stressed the importance of using appropriate frames to critique current modes of surveillance. 
Activists can either choose to “only note the consequences of and the efforts to restrain what is 
currently occurring with rampant mass surveillance” or also “state clearly what sort of world we 
would like to see.”32 While frame analysis represents a tested approach to systematically identify 
the creation of meaning among activists, semi-structured interviews are another staple method 
                                                 
31 Cf. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements.” 
32 David Lyon, Surveillance after Snowden, 119. 
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for examining social movement communication. Letting key organizers describe their 
communication work in their own words and critically reflect on their framing choices added an 
additional layer of ‘text’ to my analysis. Chapter 3 argues that the combination of frame analysis, 
discourse analysis, and interviews is the most comprehensive methodological approach to 
identity and critically assess anti-surveillance frames. 
 Chapter 4 consists of discourse and frame analyses of four major anti-surveillance 
campaigns in the first year after the Snowden revelations. If Snowden represents a watershed 
moment in the history of surveillance, then looking at the case studies – “Restore the Fourth”, 
“Stop Watching Us”, “The Day We Fight Back” and “Reset the Net” – is important for 
understanding the privacy advocacy movement as a whole. These campaigns were important 
“interpretive ‘moments’”33 – key episodes of collective action framing that may have been 
decisive for future framing efforts.  
The first campaign, “Restore the Fourth”, was the initial grass roots answer to Snowden 
revelations. The protest event was an exclusively American affair both in its scope as well as in its 
framing and is thus treated and interpreted as a counterpoint to the more transnational protest 
events that followed. One such event was “Stop Watching Us” – a series of street protests that 
took place simultaneously in the United States and Germany in October of 2013. Four months 
after the first trove of NSA documents had been released, “Stop Watching Us,” seeking to raise 
awareness via the traditional means of street demonstrations and framing their demands in an 
increasingly global way, represents the first attempt of professionally and strategically gather 
support for privacy causes. After 'Stop Watching Us', the network of activists switched tactics. 
They moved from offline to online protest events and attempted to stage internet blackouts 
rather than protest rallies, as was the case with “The Day We Fight Back.” Finally with “Reset the 
Net” some activists teamed up with online companies to promote the use of encryption software, 
marking a turn from demanding privacy from the government to encouraging individuals to use 
privacy protection measures themselves. Each case study identifies the respective collective 
action frames and then compares it to the media coverage the protests generated. 
 In chapter 5, the empirical part of the dissertation closes with an extensive analysis of my 
interview data. Key representatives of the organizations involved in the campaigns described in 
                                                 
33 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 48. 
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chapter 4, many of them closely involved in designing anti-surveillance communication 
strategies, reflected in the interviews about the successes, failures, and ongoing challenges on 
mobilizing people to defend their privacy. Subsections of the chapter provide additional 
information about aspects of the campaigns that a simple frame analysis could not have 
unearthed. These include general challenges of reaching out to citizens and the media when it 
comes to informing the public about the technologically and morally complex issues of 
surveillance and choosing the right metaphors and imagery; how transnational framing 
processes evolved (or did not evolve) and how national, culture-specific anti-surveillance frames 
compete with global interpretations; how the switch from street rallies to online campaigns 
affected the framing; the use of Edward Snowden as the face of the global privacy movement- 
and how temporarily teaming up with tech companies influenced the overall framing. Along 
with being an additional layer of interpretations provided first hand by the activists themselves, 
these statements provide a valuable oral history of resistance against surveillance in the post-
Snowden world. 
In the conclusion (chapter 6) I tie together and synthesize the various issues raised in the 
case study and interview sections and identify theoretical implications for social movement (and 
grass roots political communication) studies in general.  
  
2. MAPPING THE DISCURSIVE FIELD: RESISTANCE IN A POST 9/11 SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 
 
2.1 The Surveillance Society  
The concept of privacy and the practice of surveillance are deeply intertwined. Privacy, “the 
voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or 
physiological means”34 is constantly at odds with surveillance practices. Surveillance, defined by 
Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson simply as “the collection and analysis of information about 
populations in order to govern their activities”35 makes that withdrawal harder. “The right to be 
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Surveillance and Visibility, ed.  Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson (Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of 
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let alone,”36 to quote the famous dictum by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, is infringed upon 
by surveillance.  
In order to understand the efforts of privacy advocates in todays' world one has to 
understand how surveillance has become an integral part of modern societies. Surveillance is not 
simply a practice conducted by government institutions and corporate actors but is deeply 
ingrained into bureaucracy, culture, and the economy. In fact, thanks to technological progress 
and fueled by the spread of databases,37 surveillance has become one of the defining principles of 
the 21st century. Thus Lyon claims, 
It's not just that a surveillance device is encountered every few minutes 
during the day, but that the word surveillance describes the way that 
organizations now work. (…) The decisive transformation is that surveillance, 
(…) is now the dominant organizational mode of the modern age.38  
 
Historically the rise of surveillance is closely connected to the evolution of modern bureaucracy. 
The rises of nation states, colonialism, modern scientific practices and economic globalization 
have all been tied to the rise of surveillance.39 Without some forms of surveillance society is 
likely to collapse. As Frank Webster notes, “We must know about people if we are to arrange 
social life.”40 It is crucial to bring to the mind the essential part that surveillance plays in state 
administration processes – both domestically and on the international level. As Jason Keiber, 
who has looked at surveillance from an international relations angle, bluntly puts it, 
“[e]verything that a state does from mere administration to the most lethal acts of coercion relies 
on surveillance.”41 This ranges from assessing who is eligible for welfare or health insurance 
benefits to – in the case of the United States – monitoring and eventually killing suspected 
terrorists in a drone strike. The origins of this perspective lie in the Durkheimian and Weberian 
schools of thought, which interpret bureaucratic surveillance as an “administrative response to 
the technical imperatives of a structurally differentiated society.”42 The 'Iron Cage', Max Weber's 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Toronto Press, 2006), 3. 
36 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review  4 (5) (1890), 193. 
37 Cf. Andrew White, Digital Media and Society: Transforming Economics, Politics and Social Practices (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 145-148. 
38 Cf. David Lyon, “Surveillance Technologies and Social Transformation: Emerging Challenges of Socio-Technical 
Change,” in Frontiers in New Media Research, ed. Francis L.F. Lee et al. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 57. 
39 Cf. Haggerty and Ericson, “The New Politics of Surveillance,” 4. 
40 Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 204. 
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metaphor for modern business organization relies on the employers' accumulation of files of his 
employees. By collecting data, a dynamic between capital and labor is established that resembles 
the one between citizens and politicians in a nation state.43 This is echoed in the work of Anthony 
Giddens, who has described surveillance as “a mechanism of societal integration” which “reaches 
its highest point in the age of modern capitalism.”44 In other words, the creation of the state – 
especially the social democratic type that is prevalent in Europe with obligations such as 
elections, social services and welfare45 – and the capitalist system are inextricably linked to 
bureaucratic surveillance. 
 Thus, starting in the late 1970s, scholars and privacy activists begun to use the term 
'Surveillance Society' to warn against totalitarian tendencies of data gathering (especially early 
forms of electronic payment methods).46 A ‘Surveillance Society’ describes “a basic, complex 
infrastructure (…) based on the idea that gathering and processing personal data is essential to 
organizational efficiency.”47 As of now, scaling back the data gathering practices of state 
administrations would be close to impossible without scaling back the state itself. Or in the 
words of Andrew White, “if we want to live in well-organized modern societies, then we cannot 
avoid sophisticated surveillance apparatuses.”48 
The implementation of the 'Surveillance Society’ nowadays includes fusion centers, where 
various forms of personal data are stored; “mission creep”, the misuse of data collection practices 
for other purposes than intended; the attempt to set up total systems of collection of as much 
data as possible; and the requirement of citizens to permanently carry identification documents 
with them.49 It requires an elaborate interplay between agencies, corporations and citizens. Thus, 
Verdo Garrido notes, the “fundamental contribution of surveillance studies (…) is its efforts to 
clarify how global surveillance is not only confined to intelligence agencies' deployment of 
surveillance technologies, but extends also to the very cultural and economic characteristics of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Day, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 5. 
43 Cf. ibid., 10. 
44 As quoted by Ibid., 33. 
45 Cf. Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 221-222. Naomi Klein, in a critique of the close relationship 
between surveillance apparatuses and state administrations has stated accordingly: “Surveillance is the new 
democracy.” As quoted by Lyon, “Surveillance Technologies,” 65. 
46 Cf. Lyon, “Surveillance Technologies,” 59. 
47 Ibid., 60. 
48 White, Digital Media and Society, 164. 
49 Cf. Lyon, “Surveillance Technologies,” 60-61. 
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contemporary society.”50 Surveillance has become “a life-practice,” as Kirstie Ball and David 
Murakami Wood have claimed.51  
For some authors, controlling and disciplining – not merely governing – remain the key 
characteristics of surveillance practices. Thus they favor the term 'Society of Control' rather than 
more neutral connoted 'Surveillance Society'. Surveillance, they argue, has been spread from 
prisons, companies and educational and health institutions to all sectors of society, and “no 
longer limited by walls or schedules.” inserts its repressive influence on all walks of life.52 And yet, 
contrary to what some privacy advocates in their rigorous opposition want to make their 
constituents believe, the purpose of surveillance is not only about 'controlling' but instead 
includes other functions varying from “consumption, entertainment, titillation, health 
promotion, education, governance, accountability, child-rearing”.53  
In fact, as Kevin Haggerty has pointed out, surveillance has not only “positive”54 effects, 
but for some people, being watched is “fun.”55 Indeed, the various forms, functions and effects of 
different surveillance practices make it increasingly difficult to pinpoint to its overarching 
nature. As Haggerty and Ericson have observed, surveillance is nowadays so “diverse, multi-
faceted, and employed in such a panoply of projects that it is almost impossible to speak 
coherently about 'surveillance' more generally.”56  
 Because “[o]rganisation and observation are conjoined twins, ones that have grown 
together with the development of the modern world”,57 the systematic expansion of surveillance 
practices has had profound cultural effects. Indeed, we live now in a “surveillance culture in 
which an increasing proportion of the world's population lives and to which, for a number or 
reasons, many have become inured.”58 While the Snowed leaks have certainly caused outrage 
among citizens, a process of normalization – and not, as was of the case in the past, 
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scandalization59 – of surveillance has been underway for decades. Normalization, as described by 
Lyon, suggests that surveillance is culturally ingrained into society. For example nowadays the 
widespread use of CCTV cameras in public spaces is widely accepted for its alleged crime 
deterrent effects (which have not been exhaustively examined or proven).60 The urban theorist 
Mike Davis has described “urban scanscapes” consisting of the various video monitored public 
places to which urban populations have increasingly grown accustomed to.61 Historically, with 
the fade of communism, “fear of authoritarianism” resulting from surveillance has faded as 
well.62 
 Actively taking part in some sort of surveillance is nowadays part of the daily media diet 
for many citizens. Watching pornography or tuning into daily talk shows, where guests share 
intimate details of their private lives,63 not only satisfy voyeuristic needs but can have effects on 
the valuation of one’s own privacy. Early reality TV shows such as 'An American Family' 
introduced audiences to a “union of domestic life and Orwellian surveillance”.64 Since the 1970s, 
as Meyrowitz points out, “[t]he rapid adoption of television provides evidence of how much 
Americans (...) became fascinated by, and perhaps addicted to, the act of closely watching others 
from a distance.”65 The mass media have certainly contributed to this normalization process as 
recipients routinely watch (or surveil) celebrities, ethnic minorities, delinquents or politicians on 
television. As Sykes notes, “A man can reasonably expect to be left alone in his home, safe from 
prying eyes. But that same man can turn on the television set (…) and find a window into the 
most graphic, embarrassing details of the lives of others.”66 This has two effects: one the one 
hand watching others 24 hours a day (in the case of reality TV in their most private settings 
imaginable) has become culturally accepted; one the other hand precisely because audiences can 
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grasp the dramatic loss of privacy of those depicted in the media (especially celebrities or those 
accused of high profile crimes) this “helps to keep alive the belief in privacy as a valued 
condition.”67  
 In sum, from the perspective of surveillance scholars, the practice is neither inherently 
‘bad’ nor ‘good'. However, in the public debate, discourse participants tend to either condemn 
any forms of surveillance or defend privacy breaches uncritically. The former always “take for 
granted that there is trouble” and that it is “something to be skeptical and suspicious of.”68 Some 
even view any forms of monitoring as essentially inhumane in nature. For them surveillance is “a 
major element in the destruction of the traditionally human in an increasingly engineered, fail-
safe, risk-adverse society.”69 On the other side of the spectrum are “technophiles (…) uncritically 
and optimistically welcoming the new surveillance amidst the challenges and risks of the twenty-
first century.”70 Or as Haggerty has commented on this dichotomy, “Many people welcome the 
increasingly total network of video surveillance, while others make dark comments about 
'1984.’”71 Given the complex role surveillance plays in everyday life, the political communication 
of privacy concerns poses a challenge to activists, as articulating these nuances is hard. What 
exactly mean people when they refer to surveillance and what are its core functions? Here even 
the field of surveillance studies offers no clear answer.  
 
2.2 Competing Frameworks of Surveillance 
1984 
Prior to the 1970s, the dominant source for analyzing surveillance had been George Orwell's 
novel 1984. Because of a lack of scholarly research into surveillance practices, the dystopian novel 
became the leading analytical framework to critically theorize surveillance, reflecting the 
growing interest in the workings of totalitarianism at the time.72 To this day, and especially in 
activist circles, the “spectre of Big Brother is still one that fuels the imagination regarding mass 
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72 Cf. David Lyon, “The Search for Surveillance Theories,” in Theorizing Surveillance, ed. David Lyon, 12-13. 
17 
 
surveillance.”73 Quotes and images derived from George Orwell's work are not only featured in 
virtually anti-surveillance demonstration or media depictions of privacy issues but he is indeed, 
according to David Lyon, the “towering figure of mid-twentieth-century studies of surveillance” 
effectively “supplying the concepts that have dominated at least Western understandings of the 
watchful state.”74 
 However, it is a matter of dispute whether Orwell's book should continue to be treated as 
an actual representation of the surveillance society. Edward Snowden himself has voiced doubt, 
warning “that we should not bind ourselves to the limits of [Orwell’s] imagination”75 and pointed 
out that the new technically highly advanced Internet-based forms of surveillance are far more 
dangerous than 1984 could have imagined.76 Other critics of the Orwellian approach stress the 
fact that the nature of surveillance as of today represents does not represent a 1984-type 
situation, where one powerful state entity is able to surveil and control every citizen. Nor can 
critiques based on the book explain the expansion of actors involved in everyday surveillance. 
Opponents of Orwellian interpretations such as Haggerty and Ericson have criticized the 1984-
totalitarian approach both as a rhetorical device and for its analytical shortcomings, arguing 
“[w]e cannot fall back on easy metaphors to explain these developments. This is not Big Brother. 
In a world already scoured of problems, who needs an omnipresent watcher?”77 Likewise, the 
nature of technological changes of data gathering methods has led scholars such as Lyon to 
describe contemporary practices as “post-Orwellian big data surveillance”.78  
 Others, on the other hand, continue to compare modern surveillance to 1984, reaching the 
conclusion that Orwell in fact had correctly anticipated the rise of a mass surveillance society. In 
their view, the Snowden revelations have made 1984 even more relevant and urgent. According to 
Henry Giroux, Orwell’s “text continues to serve as a brilliant and important metaphor for 
mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance.”79 For Andrew Chadwick, the novel 
remains “highly influential in defining how we conceive of modern surveillance” comparing the 
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two way television sets featured in the novel to the contemporary Internet.80 And Maria Los sees 
structural similarities between current surveillance and Stalinist and Nazi regimes (which had 
informed Orwell’s work), namely “monistic centralization of control, social uprooting, 
atomization and obliteration of the social, as well as the negation (or eradication) of such 
notions as liberty, truth, ethics, and the Self.”81 The only difference between reality and the novel, 
proponents of the 1984 framework argue, is that the capacities of governments (and businesses) 
exceed those depicted in his novel.82 Even though the pertinence of the 1984 framework is 
contested, privacy activists, before and after the Snowden leaks, have looked at surveillance 
through the lens of “Orwellian totalitarianism” (see sections 4.1- 4.3). 
 
Panopticism 
The Orwellian/totalitarian framework which reached its peak in the mid-20th century was 
eventually replaced in terms of popularity by the panoptic model. Although equally criticized, it 
remains the dominant mode of interpreting surveillance and is unlikely to go away soon.83 Based 
on Foucault’s famous analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s prison design which features an architecture 
that allows one unseen prison guard to monitor the whole prison population, the panoptic 
model has a focus on the 'soul training' or disciplinary nature of surveillance.84 
 While it must be credited with highlighting the power relations between those who watch 
and the ones being watched, the panoptic model has come under attack for various reasons. To 
begin with, critics allege that it ignores the many different circumstances and situations in which 
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surveillance is nowadays practiced. As Lyon notes, the original Panopticon was a prison and it is 
thus unclear if it can be applied to society as a whole.85 Foucault meant to introduce the panoptic 
model to explain power dynamics in institutions such as schools, hospitals or factories. But in a 
world where surveillance operates indiscriminately and not exclusively affects, school children, 
patients or workers, the usefulness of the model is increasingly questioned – with “Focault 
continu[ing] to reign supreme in surveillance studies (…) it is perhaps time to cut off the head of 
the king.”86  
 While surveillance continues to reinforce social inequalities, the Snowden leaks have 
shown that current surveillance programs with their 'collect everything' trajectory are targeting 
literally everybody in the social strata – from welfare recipients to the Chancellor of Germany. 
Foucault's focus on delinquents or marginalized groups thus seems at odds with current forms of 
Big Data-fueled surveillance. As Haggerty states:  
Surveillance is not directed exclusively at the poor and dispossessed, but is 
now omnipresent, with people from all segments of the social hierarchy 
coming under scrutiny according to their lifestyle habits, consumption 
patterns, occupations and the institutions with which they are aligned.87  
 
For Haggerty, the Panopticon has become a “cliché” because it simplifies the heterogeneous 
nature while suppressing the many faces of surveillance in the 21st century.88 Most notably, 
resistance against surveillance, and this is crucial for privacy activism, has no place within the 
omnipotent Panopticon framework. 
An alternative to the Panopticon is the Synopticon.89 Rather than being a repudiation, the 
Synpoticon approach complements the analysis of contemporary surveillance by focusing on 
those areas that are outside traditional disciplinary institutions. Synopticism, described as the 
ability of “the many to see and contemplate the few” was developed by Thomas Mathiesen as a 
response to the rise of mass media – a development that Foucault, as Mathiesen points out, had 
been completely ignored in 'Discipline and Punish'.90  The emergence of television but also social 
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media to a certain extend have democratized surveillance. The Internet where everyone can 
watch each other is an even more synpotic medium than TV.  In the synoptic media landscape, 
those few that are being watched, read and listened to– celebrities, politicians, and journalists – 
can shape and discipline the audience through filtering and agenda setting mechanisms based 
on certain ideologies and economic interests.91 As will be discussed below, privacy advocates who 
are trying to mobilize resistance must thus themselves engage in interrupting the synoptic 
surveillance mechanism by entering the mainstream media and become one of the few who are 
watched by the many.  
 A solution to integrate both concepts, Panopticon and Synopticon, is provided by Lyon. 
As he points out, the Panopticon has still value as a concept in certain scenarios, for example 
when examining CCTV surveillance networks, where the people under surveillance have indeed 
no idea when they are being watched by unseen authorities. On the other hand the synoptic 
concepts should be applied in other settings that resemble a multitude of actors involved in 
surveillance.92 Even though they are not explicitly referring to it, for privacy activists the panoptic 
model remains an important framework especially in context of NSA surveillance. Prior to the 
Snowden revelations the NSA programs operated in secret and were indeed invisible. Even after 
the publication of the Snowden leaks, it is not entirely clear who is monitored when and for what 
reasons. Thus, as a model to warn against the negative consequences the panoptic model is still 
highly relevant for the political communication work.  
 
The Surveillant Assemblage 
A partial rebuff of both 1984 and the Panopticon comes in the form of the 'Surveillant 
Assemblage'. Based on the work of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Haggerty and 
Ericson have conceptualized an update to older conceptions of surveillance as “rapid 
technological developments, particularly the rise of computerized databases, require us to 
rethink the panoptic metaphor.”93 According to their 'rhizomatic' approach surveillance in the 
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21st century has become “multiple, unstable and lacks discernible boundaries”.94 It is not confined 
to disciplinary institutions but takes place “everywhere.”95 Indeed, whereas “Orwell focused his 
attention exclusively on the nation-state acting in a simple top-down fashion, (…) surveillance 
now involves private corporations (...) and is a highly decentralized yet globalized 
phenomenon.”96 Surveillance – conducted by a variety of institutions and actors – nowadays has 
“expansive and regenerative qualities” similar to rhizomes which “grow across a series of 
interconnected roots which throw up shoots in different locations.”97 The participation of 
millions of internet users sharing their private data is something that 1984 did not foresee and 
which makes the current situation “decidedly post-Orwellian.”98 
 This means, among other things, that the top-down power structures as described by both 
Foucault and Orwell have been to a certain degree softened. Because of its rhizomatic nature – 
maybe best exemplified by the internet which brings together information from various sources 
and interconnected nodes99 – it enables a heightened degree of “scrutiny of the powerful by both 
institutions and the general population.”100 Violent police officers, corrupt politicians, or drunk 
celebrities who are caught on-camera for behaving inappropriately have felt the effects of   
sousveillance that is also a part of the surveillant assemblage.101 Yet totalitarian tendencies in the 
surveillant assemblage remain. Whether the data about one person is collected by a central state 
agency or an institution's administrative body as in the case of Orwell and Foucault, respectively, 
does not matter if all the information are bundled and transferred to third parties.  
All four concepts about the place of surveillance in modern life discussed above – the 
totalitarian/Orwellian approach, the Panopticon, the Synopticon and the Surveillant Assemblage 
– are valuable frameworks to discuss the potential for resisting (and communicating resistance) 
against surveillance. George Orwell’s novel and its rather simplistic depiction of government 
surveillance has proven over the years to be a potent monument against excessive state 
surveillance. It has thus – and this will be shown over and over in many of the case studies 
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discussed in section 4 – provided a cultural backdrop and metaphor for activists to warn against 
the chilling heights the suppression of privacy and individual rights in a surveillance society can 
reach in the future – or, depending on your interpretation, has already been reached. However, 
solely centering your communication tactics around 'Big Brother'-analogies can also be 
problematic, especially when the very concepts of surveillance and privacy have significantly 
changed over the last decades as suggested by the competing analytical frameworks. 
 The panoptic model should not be completely shunned by privacy advocates either as it 
provides the framework about the effects of constant surveillance. Little research has been done 
about the actual consequences for internet user's online behavior, but it is possible that a certain 
percentage of users, knowing that they leave an ever growing trail of personal data on the web, 
has – consciously or subconsciously – begun to 'discipline' their data practices.102 In their 
communication work, activists have tried to point out that surveillance not only affects privacy 
but also one’s liberty and right to free expression. Privacy advocates therefore use Foucault's 
theory as a basis to explain to the public what actually happens when your privacy is under 
attack. In addition, Bentham's prison architecture, which was previously compared to various 
disciplinary institutions, can be, at least in part, used as a metaphor for online surveillance. True, 
the internet is very rhizomatic in nature and most of the users and businesses are surveilling 
each other. But when in the end, all information or the data doubles end up in the hands of 
unknown officers from the NSA or some of its top secret partner agencies (who have, according 
to reports, massively abused their powers for personal interests103) this again resembles the 
prison guard of the Panopticon.  
 Finally the surveillant assemblage demonstrates that privacy advocates must focus their 
efforts not only on government surveillance but rather on all the various nodes that connect 
contemporary rhizomatic networks of surveillance. This includes social networking companies 
upon whose communication infrastructure the daily activities of social movements and billions 
of users are based. Mobilizing resistance against other actors than the government for privacy 
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breaches is an immensely challenging task, as will be shown in the case studies. In fact, the 
Surveillance Assemblage framework in itself is a critique of traditional privacy activism which  
draw[s] attention to the limitations of traditional political strategies that 
seek to confront the quantitative increase in surveillance. As it is multiple, 
unstable and lacks discernible boundaries or responsible governmental 
departments, the surveillant assemblage cannot be dismantled by 
prohibiting a particularly unpalatable technology. Nor can it be attacked by 
focusing criticism on a single bureaucracy or institution. In the face of 
multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices, struggles 
against particular manifestations of surveillance, as important as they might 
be, are akin to efforts to keep the ocean’s tide back with a broom – a frantic 
focus on a particular unpalatable technology or practice while the general 
tide of surveillance washes over us all.104 
 
Privacy advocates, who focus exclusively on the NSA and other intelligence agencies, are ignoring 
the bigger picture. One can even make the case that at least in Western democracies government 
surveillance is not as problematic as corporate surveillance, because the former has – at least in 
theory – higher motives (protecting civilians from terrorist attacks, making sure tax money is 
redistributed properly, making streets safer, summarized by Chadwick as “social care.”105) The 
products and services of surveillance-based Internet companies have positive side effects as well 
(providing information through search engines, creating tools for communication, offering 
platforms for entrepreneurship) but are subjected to a capitalist logic of selling private data to 
third parties. Their deep integration into the global surveillance nexus should further sensitize 
private advocates to consider surveillance as an assemblage rather than a top-down government 
operation. Andrew White goes even further by suggesting to actively paint state surveillance in a 
more positive light could scrutinize corporate surveillance in the long run.106 But what is the 
specific role corporate surveillance plays and what does it mean for the communication work of 
privacy activists? The next section will briefly discuss the rise of a corporately fueled self-
surveillance culture.  
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2.3 Corporate Surveillance 
“[T]he increasingly central role of the corporation in the practicing of surveillance”107 – deserves 
special attention, as the involvement of internet companies and social networking sites – 
willfully or not – in mass surveillance is a testament to the cultural changes regarding privacy 
discussed above. The 21st century expansion of government surveillance has gone hand in hand 
with increased corporate means of collecting data on customers and internet users. Surveillance 
has become “the business model of the Internet,”108 as technology critic Bruce Schneier put it. 
Indeed, in the last decade we have seen a massive corporatization and privatization of 
surveillance. Market actors have become key stakeholders in the surveillance regime.109 As Heidi 
Boghosian notes, “investigators advocating a robust antiterrorism agenda have pressed 
communications companies to store, and in many cases, turn over unprecedented amount of 
information about citizens’ telephone calls, Internet communications, and daily movements.”110 
Interestingly there are many structural similarities between corporate and state actors when it 
comes to surveillance. As Lyon has observed, intelligence agencies' “activities in fact very closely 
resemble what many other organizations – such as marketing companies – do as well.”111 
For governments around the world, seeking to collect as much personal information as 
possible this is good news. For, when they request user data from private companies, they are in a 
strictly legal sense not collecting personal information anymore. That is, the data provided by 
online and telecommunication companies have long seized to be in the hands of individuals. 
Thus it has become virtually impossible to legally challenge recently exposed programs such as 
PRISM. As Calo explains,  
It is often easier for law enforcement to request your web history from 
Google or AT&T rather than from you. And, generally speaking the law 
treats many categories of information transferred to you from a third party 
like a corporation as less private and hence less well protected by 
constitutional criminal procedure.112  
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The same line of argument is now frequently employed by the staunchest supporters of 
government surveillance. For example, in a remarkable statement, a former Bush administration 
intelligence official has been blaming the mass collection of personal data on companies:  
I find the loss of privacy in today's digital world very troubling – but not 
because of the US government. It's the cookies that enable some Web 
merchant to track what I buy online and send me tailored ads to buy 
more. It's the manner in which the Apple cloud insists on scooping up 
personal calendar and contact information – and I can't opt out my cell 
phone to work. (…) Where is the public outrage about all that?113  
 
With such statements like this public elites are increasingly shifting the responsibility from 
government to corporations, or even extremer, from corporations to their users.114 
 Today's practice of self-monitoring is deeply ingrained into the corporate surveillance 
culture. David Lyon has observed that the promises of freedom offered by social media tools have 
been perverted by intelligence agencies and their collusion with tech companies.115 Privacy as a 
value has not only been eroded by constant government surveillance, but even more so through 
social media use. Analyzing the trend of taking selfies and posting them on social media 
websites, Giroux has observed that the public-privacy dichotomy has effectively been turned 
upside down. Thus, “it becomes much easier to put privacy rights at risk as they are viewed less as 
something to protect than to escape from in order to put the self on public display.” Nils 
Zurawski has described the active role of the consumer in voluntarily providing third parties with 
their own personal data as 'Soft Surveillance'.116 The fiercest critics of Google, Facebook and other 
companies argue that their biggest achievement has been the creation of indifference among 
internet users and providing personal data in exchange for free services.117 As a consequence it 
has become increasingly hard to critique these “confessional social media practices”118 because 
turning against online companies would mean criticizing the digital way of life of millions of 
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citizens. By now, “[c]oncerns [about corporate surveillance] are a hindrance because they conflict 
with the user agreements of popular services (…), which offer users convenience and social and 
functional benefits.”119 As a result, the privacy activist community has not outright opposed 
corporate entities but at times even treated them as allies in the fight against government 
surveillance (see sections 4.3-4.4). 
There is certainly an argument to make that big tech companies can be “a powerful force 
for change in relation to government surveillance because they have a vested interest in ensuring 
that consumers trust them.”120 As global business players they have a natural incentive to protect 
their date from the hands of the government. Yet critics such as Ann Bartow note that this is 
merely a charade. The companies, she argues, want it only to “make it appear as though they are 
standing up for (...) privacy rights” because “they themselves compromise individual privacy 
quite dramatically.”121 By actually offering total privacy the business model of companies such as 
Facebook and Google and others would collapse. Thus they have enormous interest in shaping 
the discourse about users 'privacy' and setting standards that ideally protects their data (or their 
users’ data really) from the government while they can continue to generate revenues and profits. 
As Bartow elaborates, “They want to try to outmaneuver or prevent any individual company from 
using privacy for competitive advantage. (...) This group of companies is trying to set and enforce 
and 'industry standard' for privacy, and one that they prefer and control.”122 
Some privacy activists are optimistic that the market logic of supply and demand will 
eventually lead to stronger individual privacy protections. Indeed, in theory, “large firms are well 
positioned to push back against government surveillance.”123 As will be shown in the case studies 
(section 4) the privacy community has been particularly enthusiastic about the decisions of some 
of the tech companies to introduce default encryption for their services. However, as Ryan Calo 
suggests, the public should not expect that the relationship between companies and the 
government will be antagonistic in the long run. Instead it is “synergistic.” According to this 
model, “[f]irms use government-mandated data and governments leverage private databases and 
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tools. Both firm and government activities erode societal expectations of privacy.”124 To 
distinguish between government and corporate surveillance by now seems absurd – at least 
according to the consensus in surveillance studies, as “the idea that they inhabit essentially 
different spheres, with different mandates, is currently unraveling.”125  
 What does this mean for the communication work of privacy advocates? Zurawski has 
observed “communicative difficulties that exist between data-protection activists and 
consumers.”126 In the past, activists have often times ignored that most consumers experience 
corporate surveillance not as a privacy breach but rather as a functional enhancement of 
everyday social life.127 This would explain why even though the Snowden leaks at great lengths 
detailed the collusion between the NSA and the internet companies, in the four main anti-
surveillance campaigns discussed in these pages, corporate monitoring was either ignored 
entirely or activists were temporarily aligning themselves with tech companies. But given the 
enormous role of corporate actors outlined above, focusing exclusively on government 
surveillance may have been an ill-advised strategy, because “[i]f the government were removed 
from the picture, we would hardly be free from spying.”128 
 
2.4 Security v. Privacy after 9/11 and Snowden 
Two events in recent history have let to further reevaluations of the place of surveillance in the 
21st century: 9/11 and the Snowden revelations. The former, which rather than causing a short-
lived 'moral panic' evolved into a full blown cultural trauma of global proportions, has expanded 
government surveillance dramatically appropriating discourses concerning 'Security' and 
'Fear'.129 While security has always been a factor in legitimizing surveillance, the prospect of 
protecting societies against possible terrorist attacks through mass surveillance has become its 
most efficient rationale. The Snowden leaks on the other hand were instrumental in informing 
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the public about the scope of the current surveillance regime exposing how governments and 
corporate actors have utilized the rhizomatic nature of surveillance for their own benefits. In 
fact, the information disclosed by Snowden has illuminated a new “global political economy of 
surveillance.”130 
 
9/11 and the Rise of the Security Meta-frame 
 After 9/11, government surveillance has increased dramatically. To be sure, thanks to 
technological innovation, surveillance had been on the rise for decades.131 But the assembly of a 
complex surveillance apparatus was “one of the more significant and lasting political legacies of 
the attacks” and marked the beginning of the “politics of anti-terrorism surveillance.”132 In this 
context the visual and iconographical dimension of the 9/11 attacks should not be understated. 
On an emotional level, largely invisible surveillance measures paled in comparison with the 
widely disseminated coverage of the attacks. Or, as Haggerty and Gazso put it, “the risks posed by 
an expanded and intensified surveillance infrastructure are not as immediate and dramatic as 
imploding skyscrapers.”133 In the subsequent debates over security v. privacy memories of 9/11 
became “textual and visual arguments (…) about the legitimacy of various features of the United 
States' post-9/11 security imaginary.” 
 The first step of the expansion of the US-led surveillance regime was the Presidential 
Surveillance Program issued in the aftermath of 9/11 in October 2001, authorizing surveillance of 
telephone calls and emails by or to Americans – all legitimized on shaky and controversial legal 
reasoning.134 The Obama administration then continued the surveillance programs of the Bush 
era. The ongoing “bulk telephony metadata collection program” and the surveillance of online 
communications and social media sites135 were justified under section 215 of the Patriot Act,136 
namely applying the Bush administrations logic “that essentially the entire nation's calling 
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records are 'relevant' to every [international] counterterrorism investigation.”137 Quickly, the new 
mantra in the intelligence community, which blamed itself for not being able to have prevented 
the attacks, became “'Do more, do better, do it differently, and do it now.”138 The underlying logic 
was that unless all data were collected, any form of surveillance would make no sense. That the 
communications of ordinary citizens had to be surveilled was just a minor nuisance of the 
mission to keep citizens safe. As Van Cleave matter-of-factly summarized the rationale of 
intelligence agencies, “Simply put, if you want to know who the terrorists are talking to, you've 
got to check the phone logs. Dot-connecting.”139 NSA surveillance programs, in the words of its 
former director Michael Hayden, were not “sins (…) but efforts by the NSA (…) to deal with these 
new realities [of post 9/11 terrorism].”140  
While it is not surprising that members of the intelligence community apply such 
argumentation, such frames are by now regularly inserted by the politicians from both aisles. 
Dissent, or merely questioning the state of surveillance, has become the exception rather the 
rule: “Post 9/11 American audiences not only condone but expect that their Congressional 
representatives and Pentagon leaders will make sure that the state can spy.”141 
 
Security v. Privacy 
After 9/11 privacy proponents must face a public discourse that is preconditioned by what Vida 
Bajc has coined the “security meta-framing”, namely “a process through which other visions of 
ways of living are evaluated in relation to security.”142 Other values, including freedom, social 
justice, and privacy increasingly do not have a chance to receive the same degree of attention as 
security, which has become “a dominant ordering principle in social life.”143 The underlying goals 
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of a society which succumbs to the security meta-frame are “reducing, minimizing, or doing 
away with uncertainty and complexity”144 and thus naturally invite the implementation of 
various surveillance measures. Moreover, from a logical, moral, and philosophical perspective, 
some have argued that “the idea that the right to privacy is an absolute right seems utterly 
implausible. Intuitively, it seems clear that there are other rights that are so much more 
important that they easily trump privacy rights in the event of a conflict.”145 Generally, 
proponents of the predominance of security, argue that people “value (…) life, bodily integrity, 
and financial security much more than any interests protected by the right to privacy.”146 
 This sentiment is also proudly and openly displayed by surveillance advocates. They argue 
that the value of security is a precondition for competing values or closely connected to them. 
For someone as intelligence officials, government surveillance is a democratic duty of the state.147 
Under this logic, anyone who argues on behalf of privacy issues over everything else is 
threatening the democratic way of life. Surveillance, intelligence elites such as Van Cleave argue 
“enabl[es] defense at home and the advancement of freedom abroad. To say 'hands off,' as some 
shortsighted privacy advocates have been doing, will not preserve our liberties, it will endanger 
them.”148  As he points out in his memoir, for former NSA director Hayden, the practice that 
critics describe as mass government surveillance is merely the collection “of legitimately 
targetable foreign communication.”149 Post 9/11 ‘dataveillance,’150 according to Hayden, is simply 
necessary in world where “[m]odern targets (like al-Qaeda's emails on the World Wide Web) 
were coexisting with innocent (…) messages on a unitary, integrated global communications 
network.”151 In line with the 'nothing to hide'-argument, Hayden goes on to insist that unless one 
is a Yemini terrorist, American citizens have nothing to fear from NSA surveillance.152 The 
legitimization of anti-terrorist surveillance provided by Hayden even goes one step further by 
arguing that surveillance actually enhances privacy: Through so called memorandums of 
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understanding the global NSA surveillance apparatus not only “extend[s] its domestic 
constitutional protections to foreigners”153 but is actually “a plus for US privacy.”154 
 On the whole there are three ways in which surveillance is frequently justified, according 
to Haggerty and Gazso:  
First, surveillance can provide information that can be retrospectively 
analyzed to provide insights about terrorists and their operations. Second, 
surveillance can deter future terrorist attacks. Finally, surveillance will 
allow the authorities to intervene in real-time to thwart terrorist acts 
before they occur.155  
 
The authors were right when in 2005 they predicted the expansion of anti-terrorist surveillance 
throughout the West. By now, surveillance feeds on itself in a never-ending feedback loop. It 
creates demand for additional surveillance in lesser surveilled places; terrorist have changed 
tactics demanding the creation of new forms of surveillance accordingly; innovations in 
corporate surveillance have increased market demand; and, crucially, political resistance has 
been ineffective.156 Heikki Heikkilä and Risto Kunelius have identified 'political realism' as one of 
the driving forces behind the ongoing justification of surveillance. Competing frames are often 
suffocated in the discourse, because “[p]olitical realism downplays the debate on trade-offs 
between security and privacy.”157 
 Even though there is a recent history of terror attacks that, for a variety of reasons, have 
not been prevented by surveillance, the security meta-frame prevails. “The production of a 
national security state,” as Marouf Hasian, Jr. et al. argue, “is a communicative achievement.”158 
The focus on security and the accompanying fear-mongering are part of “communicative 
practices that (…) continue to buttress and maintain an incredibly hegemonic surveillance 
state.”159 The pro-surveillance mantra is fueled by the rhetorical power of the term 'security' that 
has been “constitutively crafted (…) resulting in every broadening security agendas.”160 In fact, 
the authors argue that security is by now so ingrained into the discourse that even privacy 
                                                 
153 Ibid., 416. 
154 Ibid., 411. 
155 Haggerty and Gazso, “Seeing beyond the Ruins,” 180. 
156 Cf. ibid., 184. 
157 Heikkilä and  Kunelius, “Surveillance and the Structural Transformation of Privacy,” 268. 
158 Hasian, Jr. et al., The Rhetorical Invention, 2 (emphasis in original). 
159 Ibid., 182. 
160 Ibid., 4. 
32 
 
activists have gradually come to oppose specific parts of anti-terrorist surveillance rather than to 
challenge the overall meta framing itself: “While some American dissenters may occasionally 
complain about some particular feature of the national security state, they will accept most of 
the communicative, forensic and architectural frameworks that are used to explain why national 
security interests are of transcendent importance.”161 The constant usage of the security meta-
frame demonstrates how the expansion of surveillance has been discursively upheld by 
government and intelligence officials. But how, in turn, have the Snowden revelations affected 
what we know and how we think about current modes of surveillance? 
 
The Discursive Field after Snowden 
While Garrido argues there “was nothing new” about the information shared by Snowden given 
the well-known existence of prior surveillance programs such as ECHELON,162 for Lyon the scope 
nonetheless remains “mind boggling.”163 Snowden himself claimed that the surveillance 
measures put in place after 9/11 have a new quality and grave consequences for individual privacy. 
In his 'Christmas Message' from December 2013, Snowden emphasized the alleged life-changing 
implications of the programs he had uncovered: “A child born today will grow up with no 
conception of privacy at all. They'll never know what it means to have a private moment to 
themselves, an unrecorded, unanalyzed thought.”164  
  According to Lyon, the implications of the leaks require “some serious re-thinking of 
some assumptions about surveillance in the 21st century.”165 Existing surveillance terminology 
might not be sufficient anymore in describing the sort of surveillance that Snowden has 
confirmed through his whistleblowing: 
The Snowden revelations raise questions about the very language commonly 
used to discuss the monitoring and tracking of daily life and responses to 
these practices: surveillance and privacy. Once the distinction between 
targeted and mass surveillance seemed fairly clear. No more. The lines blur 
with traffic between the two; is the person or the profile being surveilled? 
Once privacy was construed primarily as a matter relating to the interests, or 
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rights, of a specific identifiable individual. No more.166 
 
There are two different readings of the impact of the Snowden leaks, both of which are partially 
accurate. The first one is an optimistic interpretation of how Snowden revealed the true nature of 
the global surveillance regime and subsequently fostered a debate about the effects of 
surveillance on society and individuals' lives. He documented a structural transformation of 
privacy and surveillance that questioned decades-old notions of citizens and their place in the 
polity. As Heikkilä and Kunelius have summarized:  
The National Security Agency (NSA) programs expose´ underlined the 
way various sources of data and metadata in anybody’s digital footprints 
could be merged and effectively analysed. The revelations thus made new 
claims about the all-pervasiveness of surveillance and data gathering, 
bringing the question of everybody’s privacy into the center of the debate. 
The public debate extended beyond a wide range of system actors (state 
security agencies, political institutions, internet companies) to the 
everyday moments of life in which people act as consumers, citizens, 
lovers, and friends.167  
 
According to the first reading, Snowden's heroic act exposed a surveillance apparatus that 
previously could act in the shadows and without any public scrutiny. As Lyon has jokingly 
observed, prior to Snowden NSA was an acronym for “No Such Agency,” whereas after Snowden it 
changed to “Not Secret Anymore.”168  
 The other, slightly pessimistic reading suggests that despite the revelations nothing has 
much changed in terms of peoples' reactions and scrutiny.  What the Snowden leaks also 
confirmed is the surveillance state’s ongoing intangibility and invisibility which in part explains 
the overall muted reaction from a majority of citizens. The 'nothing to hide' argument frequently 
brought up in debates is based on the fact that internet users do not immediately feel any 
negative consequences as a result of their online behavior.169 This is all the more problematic 
because the 'nothing to hide' mantra is objectively, among other things, factually incorrect, 
regressive, ignorant of historical events, brazen, limiting, naïve and prevents any form of 
resistance.170  
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Instead of being alerted, most citizens have developed an indifferent stance towards the 
issue, namely what Lina Dencik has coined as 'Surveillance Realism'. Surveillance in the post-
Snowden world (and even before that) is such an essential part of everyday life that “despite 
seeing, recognizing and fearing the fallacies of the system, how it impacts our lives, limits our 
freedoms, and encroaches on our rights, we can no longer imagine society without ubiquitous 
surveillance.”171 What makes this perception so challenging for privacy advocates is that it from 
the outset stifles any meaningful discussion about the merits of privacy in the first place: 
“Surveillance Realism is a state where we no longer question why this should be the case. Rather, 
we accept it as an inevitability of our world – it's part of everyday life.”172 The contemporary 
culture identified by Giroux as “ideological self-righteousness fueled by a celebrity culture and 
elevation of self-interest”173 has further manifested this comfortable alignment between citizens 
and the surveillance state. Not only do people not care about privacy but, as Giroux goes on to 
explain, they increasingly come to see it as an impediment for self-realization. Thus Post-
Snowden, privacy has become a “liability” and “historical relic.”174 
The subsequent media coverage of the Snowden documents have further complicated the 
impact of his revelations. Privacy advocates who had hoped that the mere information about the 
NSA's activities were enough to create a unified public stance against surveillance were proven 
wrong. The mediated debate over the Snowden leaks was as divisive as they were educational. 
Recipients were split about Snowden along ideological lines and depending on what kind of 
news media they followed: As Haisan Jr. has observed,  
On the one hand, those who are frustrated with traditional, mainstream 
journalism support dissident or alternative presses that treat Snowden as a 
heroic member of a reinvigorated Fourth Estate who risked all in the case 
of transparency. On the other hand, readers who buy some of the national 
securitization arguments defend mainstream journalists and characterize 
Snowden as a treasonous villain, a weak and narcissistic hacker who 
naively disclosed some of America's most guarded national security 
secrets. 175 
 
Proponents of the surveillance state have criticized the disclosures and the surrounding 
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sympathetic coverage as dangerous mixture of “truths, half-truths, and untruths.” The 'nothing to 
hide' argument was heavily amplified by mainstream media outlets, with the prevalent and 
dominating dichotomy between terrorism and surveillance being even featured more heavily 
than in pre-Snowden times.176 In addition, as notably demonstrated in the case of British 
coverage of Snowden, media outlets have contributed to the phenomenon of 'Surveillance 
Realism'. In general, while individual journalists remain critical of surveillance (in part, because 
surveillance threatens their occupation), media coverage contributes to normalizing surveillance 
by emphasizing concerns about national security, and minimizing concerns of the importance of 
mass surveillance.”177  
 The dissemination of pro-surveillance sentiments is fostered in part due to structural 
deficiencies of the news media which due to a lack of expertise and manpower continues to rely 
on politicians and officials as sources. As a consequence, surveillance is increasingly being 
portrayed as something only affecting international political elites rather than average citizens 
(see section 4.2) and largely mentioned in the context of terrorism, thus discursively shutting 
down any possibilities of resisting.178 Accordingly, Karen Wahl-Jorgensen's et al. verdict about the 
media's job of reporting on the Snowden revelations is rather damning: The media, they argue, 
are “incapable of critiquing and calling attention to key social issues of vital importance to the 
public. Instead, journalists become – however resistantly or unwillingly – complicit in the 
ideological projects of the very institutions they are supposed to hold accountable.”179 
As was previously stated, in the ecosystem of post-911 and post-Snowden surveillance privacy is 
not only compromised by a vast network of public and private actors, but as a moral value in 
permanent conflict with a security meta-framing that has also significantly affected the 
mediated discourse. Given these circumstances, how is resistance – or mobilizing people to resist 
– even possible? 
 
 
                                                 
176 Cf. Mols and Janssen, “Not Interesting Enough,” 278-280. The authors, examining the Dutch media coverage of 
Snowden, have identified five key media frames including 'Nothing to hide' and 'Privacy is dead.' Cf. ibid., 286. 
177 Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, Lucy K. Bennett & Jonathan Cable, “Surveillance Normalization and Critique,” Digital 
Journalism, 5 (3) (2017), 387. 
178 Cf. Ibid., 393. 
179 Ibid., 400. 
36 
 
2.5 Resistance 
As Ilkin Mehrabov points out, one of the cornerstones of surveillance studies is the analysis of 
resistance, because “to obtain a more realistic overview of surveillance practices it is important to 
map and detect these power struggles, and the ways they are conducted – thus finding cracks for 
more empowering resistances.”180 The Internet is simultaneously the most important means for 
governments and businesses to surveil citizens as well as the prime tool for organizing and 
communicating resistance. After the Snowden leaks, David Lyon has thus called for “fresh 
investigations of the potential of internet communication for questioning and resistance to 
forms of surveillance deemed excessive, unnecessary or illegal.“181 
After all, while monitoring apparatuses are often depicted as all-knowing and impossible 
to confront, history is full of examples of successfully subverting surveillance – individually and 
collectively, and through uprisings, technological means or legal activism (see section 2.6). In 
fact, surveillance and resistance are often inextricably linked: In actual prison settings where 
panoptic surveillance was implemented studies, inmates are not disciplined but to the contrary 
engage in active resistance against such tactics.182 Regular ways for citizens to resist surveillance 
and which are generally encouraged by privacy activists include “to elect more representatives 
who care about privacy;” constitutionally “challenge surveillance practices;” or to “take 
technological steps to protect their privacy” – all summarized by Calo under the term 
'surveillance affordances.'183 Notably all of those affordances and their severe limitations184 played 
a role in the four major activist campaigns in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures. 
 Privacy activism takes place in mass mediated society and is thus first and foremost verbal 
or discursive resistance. Privacy advocates find themselves in constants battles with their main 
opponents – surveillance advocates. Hailing from all parts of societies – but coming mainly in 
the form of law and order politicians – they constantly engage in discourses in which “the 
legitimacy of surveillance practices is managed or repaired.”185 Alternative voices, if 
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communicated effectively, have at least a theoretical chance to limit the dominant discourse's 
playing field. 
 For example, what was referred to by U.S. government officials as “targeted surveillance 
against terrorists on German soil,” an international coalition of privacy advocates has decried as 
“global dragnet surveillance of all non-Americans.”186 What was rhetorically reengineered into a 
“duty for decades,” and described by German officials as necessary protection measures for U.S. 
soldiers stationed in Germany, activists simply called out as suspicionless collection of private 
data – allegedly without the consent or knowledge of Germany's head of state.187 A term that the 
intelligence community, prefers, namely ‘bulk collection’ was ignored by activists who rather 
prefer the term ‘mass surveillance.’188 The NSA programs, euphemized by U.S. officials as “non-
intrusive public safety responsibilities of the US government, subject to careful internal checks as 
well as both judicial and congressional oversight to ensure they do not go beyond those clear 
boundaries,” are in the view of the privacy community simply “Stasi-like”.189 Whereas intelligence 
officials have called Edward Snowden Privacy activists “delusional”190 or a “disaffected youth,”191 
in the activists community Snowden has been declared a hero. 
 
The Privacy Rights Paradigm 
Despite discursively countering the claims of surveillance advocates, the most common weapon 
in the arsenal of privacy activists is to publicly insist on privacy rights. Indeed, privacy rights can 
be seen as the “antidote to surveillance”192 and a “pivotal concept that helps to throw light on 
what is wrong with mass surveillance.”193 Playing the 'privacy'-card has been such an established 
tactic that groups calling for the resistance against surveillance are commonly referred to as 
'privacy advocates.' To be sure, waging a privacy rights-centric legal battle against the excesses of 
surveillance can be a promising strategy to scale back systematic privacy breaches – especially 
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when it comes to getting access to media coverage.194 Applying the language of privacy rights has 
become the leading rhetorical framework for opposing surveillance in the public realm. Even 
John Gilliom, one of the fiercest critics of the privacy rights axiom (as will be shown below) 
acknowledges the “much apparent potential as a language with which to frame our critiques of 
surveillance policy,”195 because it clearly ponders to the sense of individual autonomy which is 
central to modern democratic societies. 
Yet, within the field of Surveillance Studies the legal claim of privacy is increasingly seen 
as out of touch with the realities on the ground when it comes to fighting surveillance. As 
Fredrika Björklund and Ola Svenonius note, while “[t]he idea of privacy used to be quite central 
to surveillance studies”, as of “[t]oday, many scholars rather speak of 'liberties' in general than of 
'privacy'”.196 One could add that it was not that central in the first place, as early 'surveillance 
scholars' such as Max Weber and even George Orwell were arguably never really concerned with 
privacy – a value that “emerged from a complex tangle of legal and cultural milieux”197 that they 
did not study systematically. Increasingly, in the pervasive post 9/11 surveillance net, not so much 
privacy is at stake but liberty: 
The response of those who are worried about surveillance has so far been 
too much couched, (…) in terms of the violation of the right to privacy. Of 
course it's true that my privacy has been violated if someone is reading my 
emails without my knowledge. But my point is that my liberty is also 
being violated (...) by the fact that someone has the power to do so should 
they choose. We have to insist this in itself takes away liberty because it 
leaves us at the mercy of arbitrary power.198  
 
The main critique, articulated by Gilliom, Haggerty, Ericson and others is that privacy claims are 
legalistic, fuzzy, philosophically incompatible with contemporary society, ineffective, and beside 
the point.199 For example, an inner-city black teenager under constant monitoring and the threat 
of bodily harm from racist policemen will not primarily fear a loss of his privacy but rather be 
concerned about racialized power dynamics, in which surveillance at its worst are a matter of life 
or death.   
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But even for mainstream audiences it is often not entirely clear what is meant by 'privacy,' 
as “[d]iscussions about privacy rights often proceed as if privacy is itself a stable phenomenon 
that must be protected from incursions or erosion. Such a conceptualization tends to downplay 
the historical variability and political contestation associated with the precise content of 
'privacy.'”200 In addition, the words 'private' and 'Privacy' mean not only information that should 
be 'private' in the sense of secret or confined to close circle of friends of family members. At the 
same time privacy can be seen as a specific standard of what kind of information is accepted to 
be publicly known and shared.201 This makes 'privacy' a discursive concept per se as it is a 
“dynamic process that undergoes constant negotiation and reorientation as a result of the 
shifting boundaries between private and public realms in a changing society.”202  
Consequently, the question is whether this complex dynamic between personal 
information, citizens, and governments can simply be subsumed under the term ‘privacy.’ Rather, 
when privacy advocates speak about privacy protection, they must ask themselves, for “whom 
and under what conditions.”203 This involves identifying what their potential constituents mean 
by privacy and if and in what circumstances they see their privacy compromised. 
“[C]onceptualizing privacy, therefore, becomes mapping the typography of the discursive 
network.”204 When it comes to mobilizing support for more privacy, activists must not only 
clearly communicate what they mean by evoking privacy but specifically what should be 
protected because, as Solove puts it bluntly: “[P]rivacy does not have a universal value that is the 
same across all contexts.”205 Because privacy should not be considered a value in itself but an 
instrumental value for reaching other ends, activists must constantly inform the public about its 
merits which are, among other, love, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, 
autonomy, freedom, and independence.206 
 Privacy must be grasped as a multi-faceted, multidimensional, and context-dependent 
concept. As Solove concludes, “[t]rying to solve all privacy problems with a uniform and 
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overarching conception of privacy is akin to using a hammer not only to insert a nail into the wall 
but also to drill a hole.”207 Furthermore, because there is no shared basic principle of privacy and 
it is no right in an absolute sense it is even harder to position it against coexisting and rival 
claims of security, freedom of information or transparency.208 
 The often asserted comment that people who have nothing to hide should not worry 
about surveillance (which has been infamously extended and modified by Google chairman Eric 
Schmidt when he claimed that “If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, 
maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place”209) is problematic, as it diminishes democratic 
values such as freedom and autonomy. Yet, as Gilliom points out, of course surveillance has a far 
more dramatic effect on people who are engaged in activities that are seen as deviant or 
delinquent by others.210 The 'nothing to hide'-argument is a powerful and recurring factor in any 
debate over surveillance, precisely because many people remain indifferent to surveillance 
because they appropriately feel they have nothing to hide. Others, on the other hand, dread 
surveillance because they fear it could detect private information or practices of any kind that 
would significantly hurt their way of life. A flaneur and a drug dealer walking through an urban 
environment will have significantly different experiences with, for example, CCTV cameras: “For 
the one, it is a beneficial or inconsequential gaze, for the other a system of detection, judgement, 
and, often punishment aimed at limiting freedom and channeling behavior.”211 
 In fact, the 'privacy rights' paradigm has in such a way shaped the anti-surveillance 
discourse that it has “[left] us almost voiceless if we are asked to speak or think about the 
problem of surveillance without turning the idea of privacy.”212 According to Chadwick the 
continuing popularity of “privacy talk” within discourses is a result of legalism, which “assumes 
that we have meaningful choices in restricting unwarranted surveillance.”213 The aftermath of the 
Snowden leaks have shown that this is both correct and misleading. While there have been some 
minor victories in terms of scaling back the surveillance states through legal means, the sheer 
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size of the surveillance nexus suggests that particular privacy laws are increasingly unfit to 
protect users against surveillance. 
 The reason why insisting on privacy rights may seem “outdated” is because of the changes 
in surveillance that approaches such as the 'surveillant assemblage' (section 2.2) are trying to 
explain. The right for privacy may be considered an “aging legal concept” because it “fails to 
come even close to accounting for the powerful combination of anger, powerlessness, 
domination, and fear” that many victims of surveillance actually have experienced.214 Their 
“military metaphors” (e.g. invasion, or violation of privacy) may not been fitting descriptions for 
online surveillance, which is essentially a mutually beneficial transaction where private data are 
exchanged for communication services and applications.215 On the state level, as pointed out 
earlier, the expansion of surveillance is not always designed to curb liberties or crush personal 
freedom. To bluntly criticize government surveillance with “the ready-available judgement – how 
awful! – may be an oversimplification.”216 
 But what Gilliom calls the 'privacy paradigm' is hard to overcome as it has become a moral 
institution and rhetorical mainstay which brings two problems with it. First, privacy laws do not 
in most cases – because of changes in technology or secret political back room deals – effectively 
protect individuals' privacy. And secondly as a political concept and individual right it constantly 
loses against concerns for safety and security.217 Privacy in today's society is paradoxically both 
valued and ignored by citizens and supported and suppressed by politicians. Besides some of the 
more recent fundamentalist opponents of (online) privacy for whom “transparency” is the new 
mantra of the day, there seems to be a vague consensus that privacy is something worth 
protecting. Yet if you look at the past decade one tends to forget the enormous amount of 
political opposition privacy has faced from a wide range of ideological and philosophical angles. 
As Sykes notes,  
[t]he irony here is that thought some social conservatives regard privacy 
merely as an excuse to undermine traditional values, their counterparts on 
the left bring precisely the opposite charge: that privacy is an instrument for 
preserving patriarchal abuse and oppression. The result is that privacy finds 
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itself whipsawed from both left and right.218 
 
Privacy is historically speaking a relatively new concept. Family life, one's own body and homes 
have been considered private only for the last two centuries, and it is worth mentioning, that 
until the end of the 18th century the average family in Europe, for example, did not have a 
secluded bathrooms.219 While ideas of privacy were certainly revolutionary during the 18th 
century, later privacy ironically often stood in the way of progressive reforms. Attacks on 
Victorian values in the 19th and 20th century were also attacks on the concept of privacy and how 
it was tied to private property. Indeed, for sex reformers, artists and journalists, privacy had to be 
partially eliminated in order to advance society. Being a privacy advocate during that time 
essentially meant you were an elitist snob.220 Feminists in the 1960s continued the left-wing 
opposition against privacy. They sought to expose the sort of abuse and male domination and 
make what was going on in their private living and bedrooms public and thus political. Catherine 
Mackinnon, for example, declared “the right of privacy (…) a right of men 'to be let alone' to 
oppress women one at a time.”221 Even some libertarians, who are to this day among the most 
dedicated defenders of privacy, have criticized privacy protection measures by arguing that there 
is basic right of collecting and sharing information about people that should not be prohibited in 
any way in free societies.222 And communitarians have brought forward critiques of hyper-
individual privacy which claim that too much privacy actually hurts the public interest and 
should be a privilege managed and granted by state authorities.223 
 One has to confront the fact that 'privacy', while certainly a universal value in its own 
right, has – dependent on its political context – some ideological undertones that may not 
resonate with everyone alike. The goal of publicly calling for more privacy may not be done in 
order to protect, say, progressive political groups from organizing an uprising against social 
inequality, but rather to promote the afore-mentioned conservative “hyper-individualism”224 that 
is in line with rejecting universal health care, gun control or unlimited political donations of 
corporations. Hyper-individual notions of privacy “risk a massive misrepresentation of the full 
                                                 
218 Sykes, The End of Privacy, 223. 
219 Soloves, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 1132-1137. 
220 Cf. Sykes, The End of Privacy, 225. 
221 As quoted by ibid., 227. 
222 Cf. ibid., 229. 
223 Cf. ibid., 234-237. 
224 Gilliom, Overseers of the Poor, 121. 
43 
 
impact of surveillance,”225 which according to Gilliom affect not necessarily only Warren's and 
Brandeis' famous dictum but also being able to form meaningful relationships with others.  
 Gilliom even goes one step further arguing that 'privacy'-centered discourses are not only 
excluding the actual victims of surveillance, who have other things on their minds than an 
abstract concept of privacy, but that is actually an impediment to effectively address concerns 
about the role of surveillance in today's society: 
To the extent that the institutionalized mainstream languages of surveillance 
and privacy appear nonsensical to citizens like this, or fail to recognize their 
concerns, the languages work as vehicles of exclusion. An to the extent that 
these languages discount and hamper what many of us would want to say 
about surveillance, their continued monopolization of the public discourse 
may serve to both suppress and distort public dialogue on these important 
issues.226 
 
Instead activists must come up with a new language addressing surveillance, one that reflects on 
the shifting political power dynamics and fear-inducing capabilities of mass surveillance.227 
What is needed, Gilliom argues, is “to build a critique of surveillance that is based in the realities 
and demands of everyday life.228 
 
Conditions for popular and individual resistance 
Now, given today's difficult political and cultural environment outlined above, what are the 
potentials of resistance against the growing surveillance apparatus and defending the relatively 
weak position of privacy? And how can privacy advocates as the main antagonists of surveillance 
expansion sensitize the public through their communication work? And how should they deal 
with the 'privacy paradigm' that, as explained above is, paradoxically, at the same time 
“increasingly irrelevant and ever more crucial?”229 
 Westin, in 1991, created a typology of privacy concerned citizens. 25% of them were 
'privacy fundamentalists', who rejected any attempts of surveilling public and private areas of 
life; 57% belonged the pragmatic majority, who adjusted their position on surveillance according 
to particular circumstances and the goals of surveillance programs; and 18% were “the 
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unconcerned” who did not worry about surveillance at all.230 Grenville offers a typology of 
resisters, which depends on the level of actual surveillance awareness. The “path to resistance” 
consists of four steps that predict resistance or acquiescence, namely “knowledge of surveillance, 
recognition of the experience of being monitored, trust (or mistrust) of the monitors, and finally, 
the sense of whether or not one has any control over his or her personal information.”231 The 
group most susceptible to calls for resistance (or individual acts of resistance) against 
surveillance are the so called 'informed resisters', who predominantly come from wealthier and 
higher educated backgrounds. Then there are 'alienated sceptics', which usually come from 
poorer backgrounds, who are not very aware of surveillance, yet have the distinct feeling that 
they have effectively lost control over their data and any attempt at resistance fails because of a 
lack of practical information. The last category are the 'status quo satisfied', vaguely concerned 
middle-class citizens who have no problem with sharing their data and third parties using it.232 
The last type of citizens seems to be on the rise, as this category seems to basically apply to every 
user of commercial social networking sites. Indeed, the prevalence of 'status quo satisfied' 
citizens, “somewhat knowledgeable and somewhat resistant”233 seems to explain the 'privacy 
paradox' that is the result of most polls on surveillance. This typology reveals also that most 
citizens – whether for the right or wrong reasons – are either not fully aware of surveillance 
(which given the extensive press coverage of the Snowden leaks is unlikely); has not the 
impression to be under surveillance; generally trusts the government and businesses, and 
generally feels to be in control of their information – or has largely given up hope to regain 
control. 
 The main potentials or surveillance resistance, argues Gilliom, are not to be found on the 
collective but rather on an individual level. Customers deliberately giving false information to 
supermarket cards; drivers covering license plates to circumvent speed traps; and welfare 
recipients underreporting personal revenues – these are all 'weapons of the weak' that in the end 
promise more effective ways to deal with the consequences of surveillance than advocacy or 
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activist campaigns.234 According to Gilliom, individually subverting the surveillance regime is a 
far more realistic approach as citizens should eventually come to terms with the fact that 
surveillance will not go away in the near future. While there are some victories by advocacy 
groups here and then they ultimately pale in comparison to the continued expansion of 
surveillance abilities by the state and private businesses. Given the important place of 
surveillance in today's society, “[r]esistance must be understood as taking place within that 
context and not something which can prevent or undo it in any systematic way.”235  These two 
main forms of resistance, popular and individual, are also dramatically different framed by its 
subjects. Whereas public advocacy campaigns adhere to the 'privacy rights paradigm', citizens 
that individually outsmarted government monitoring programs did so because they affected 
their lives in very practical and concrete ways that went way beyond notions of privacy.236 There 
is no comprehensive data outlining the scope of those individual attempts at escaping the gaze of 
the government but the few case studies that exist such as Gilliom's are a testament that despite a 
perceived widespread indifference there are potentials of resistance hidden in the everyday 
practices of individuals. The slowly but steady growing user base of anonymized search engines 
such as duckduckgo,237 users typing in fake search cues in popular search engines to distort their 
search data profiles, or the use of encryption technology are other examples of individual 
resistance that may be more effective and immediate than a yearlong effort of changing the data 
laws or the time consuming process to demand to release one's personal data profile from an 
Internet company or a government agency (for the activists focus on encryption see section 4.4). 
   
Global dimensions of privacy resistance 
Surveillance is increasingly seen as being part of a bigger power dynamic responsible for political 
violence, environmental destruction, and social inequality. As Giroux puts it in his call for action: 
“[t]he time has come to build national and international movements capable of dismantling the 
political, economic and cultural architecture put in place by the new authoritarianism and its 
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post-Orwellian surveillance industries.”238 
The conditions for defending privacy in the post-Snowden era become even more 
complicated when you consider the global and transnational level. It cannot be ignored that 
surveillance is both result and part of a globalized capitalist society and co-determines which 
groups and individuals have access to the global political and economic system or not.239 
Through “security and military functions, policing, and institutions such as the carceral and 
health and welfare systems” a “global surveillance society” has formed in the last decades.240 
Clearly, with surveillance being more and more conducted via the World Wide Web, “any inquiry 
into contemporary mechanisms of surveillance has to include their global dimension.”241 Much 
like climate activism, where the reversal of global warming can only be addressed 
transnationally, the ultimate goal for the global privacy activist network must be to reach some 
sort of global consensus about how and if, at all, personal data should be collected.  
 While the United States and the NSA in particular has clearly established itself as a global 
surveillance hegemon in the years following 9/11, there is a global regime of government 
surveillance at work, which includes many other international players as well. As Keiber points 
out, “much of the US surveillance apparatus is actually a product of cooperation and negotiation 
with other states and is fostered by [international] norms and institutions.”242 If surveillance was 
the prerequisite to the modern nation state as indirectly outlined by Weber or Giddens, then 
surveillance plays an important role in shaping the international system as well. Obviously, 
resistance to global regimes of surveillance has to happen on an international level as it is the 
only way to effectively challenge the U.S. led global surveillance hegemony: “While privacy 
concerns may seem increasingly quaint in the digital age, global publics will surely clamor for 
more accountability and transparency.”243 
 But the general difficulty of finding a common ground for transnational social movements 
(as outlined in 5.3) can be observed in the case of anti-surveillance activism as well. After all, 
'privacy' – a contested, blurry, maybe not really fitting concept as was pointed out earlier – has 
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different meanings and implications in different national and cultural contexts both in political 
and technical terms. Not only is there in developing countries “even less commonality of 
democratic practice” but “technological differences mean that levels of development and of 
public understanding are also at variance with those of (…) the most 'advanced' countries in the 
global North.”244 
 There is a consensus that “[s]urveillance is now a global issue” that “is not used merely to 
watch” but is regularly turned “into the tool of oppression and destruction.”245 In fact, 
surveillance in the 'Global South' – where it is often connected to political violence, torture, and 
other human rights violations – provides the privacy movement with powerful instances of 
government abuses. Indeed, a look at surveillance regimes beyond the Western world may lead to 
the interpretation that Orwells' dystopian fiction has already become reality as it has forestalled 
the “expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism that has characterized the 
first decades of the new millennium.”246 In some countries of the South which are particularly 
plagued by high levels of social inequality such as Brazil or Mexico privacy has de facto become a 
commodity that the majority of citizens simply cannot afford247 – and where wealthy citizens 
who live in gated communities must themselves engage in surveillance of their surroundings to 
guarantee their safety and thus ultimately their privacy.248 But after all, as of yet there has been 
little to none comparative surveillance research conducted beyond the Western hemisphere.249 
Researching surveillance in the 'Global South' is of real importance given, among other reasons, 
the economic rise of China and India, increased mobility of information as a byproduct of 
globalization, and the role of foreign governments and corporations interfering in domestic 
affairs in part through surveillance means.250  
According to study referenced by Zureik, in China, Brazil, Mexico, and Spain – states that 
have been built upon “traditional societal orientations”251 – privacy does by far not play a role as 
big as in other western countries such as Germany or the United States. The still staggeringly low 
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rate of internet penetration in Africa,252 suggests that there are more pressing issues than 
internet surveillance such as housing, clean water, or electricity. The very idea of privacy might 
be ethnocentric, as “mainstream scholarly discourse on privacy tends to privilege liberal 
individualistic understandings (…) since the conventional concept (…) has evolved within the 
sociopolitical values of Western democracies.”253 This is not to say 'privacy' is absent in some of 
the countries of the South mentioned above, but that there are other, in part radically different 
notions of privacy. China is a great example. There, the English word privacy has not only an 
appropriate single word translation but it is the product of an ongoing negotiation process 
between increasing notions of western-style individualism and traditional Chinese values.254 
But even within the Western realm there are various embedded national narratives 
regarding surveillance. For example video monitoring is discussed and accepted differently in 
European countries with a communist past.255 In France and Spain, privacy as a basic right is 
arguably not as much in demand as in North America.256 On the American continent there is 
apparently more potential for resistance against surveillance in the U.S. than in Mexico or 
Brazil.257 In addition, notions of privacy seem to differ between specific ethnic groups in the 
United States, where evidence suggests that the concern for privacy is higher among whites and 
comparatively low among Hispanics.258 A distinct U.S. American approach is to leave the 
protection of their citizens’ privacy in corporate hands rather than, as it is generally the case in 
Europe, to rely on the government to do so.259  
In sum, there is a general awareness among privacy and surveillance scholars that “varied 
national experiences dictate a nuanced approach to studying privacy as a value, an approach that 
must recognize the political cultures of societies concerned.”260 Privacy advocates engaged in 
informing the public and communicating privacy concerns must acknowledge that there exists “a 
host of reasons relating to national culture, class, technological development, political views, 
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and identification with or alienation from the dominant culture”261 when it comes to resisting 
surveillance. Whether a person ultimately becomes an 'informed resister', 'alienated sceptic' or 
remains satisfied with the status quo is in part determined by cultural and national 
peculiarities.262  
 
2.6 A Short History of Privacy, Surveillance, and Resistance 
The following section takes a condensed look at some of the historical foundations of 
surveillance and resistance to surveillance. For reasons of space and a lack of research into these 
matters on a truly global scale this section will focus on three historical phenomena/periods in 
the Western world, namely the American Revolution, chattel slavery and the following era of 
racial discrimination against Blacks, as well the in many ways remarkable resistance against early 
forms of surveillance and population control in West Germany and the Netherlands in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This is of course a random selection and I am aware of the legitimate concern that it 
may be highly problematic to compare occurrences of surveillance across continents and time 
periods while also leaving out developments in other parts of the world, namely the 'Global 
South'. David Murakami Wood has stressed the “immense cultural and geographic variety of 
surveillance societies both in historic and contemporary contexts,”263 that is the result of different 
cultural perceptions of deviance and delinquency. However, as will be shown, my overall analysis 
can benefit from a closer look at these three, well-documented historical examples of 
surveillance and resistance. Not only have these periods arguably contributed to the production 
of archetypes of resistance to surveillance that are visible to this day, but it is also illuminating to 
look at the ways earlier victims of surveillance framed their resistance. In fact, as will be shown in 
the case studies section, post-Snowden privacy activists have explicitly and constantly referenced 
the very same historical events to foster opposition to modern day surveillance. In this way this 
section seeks not only to give a short, if uncomplete, overview about the history of surveillance 
resistance but is also designed to help readers to better understand the historically informed 
contemporary anti-surveillance frames described and analyzed in the subsequent chapters. 
 There is no clear scholarly consensus as to when the history of privacy actually starts. 
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While the term 'Privacy' is relatively new, privacy as a concept is first mentioned in the Bible, 
which introduced concepts of taboo and shame resulting from a lack of privacy.264 As a political-
theoretic concept it is first mentioned by Aristotle, when he made the distinction between 
private (oikos) and public (polis).265 And as a legal concept it was developed by chief justice 
Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court and in 1880 picked up by Supreme Court Justices 
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warrens concept of “The Right to Privacy”, “that gives an individual 
the power to control absolutely the limits of publicity about him- or herself.”266 However, how the 
concept of privacy developed in other parts of the world other than Europe and the United States 
is much less clear. Other scholars focusing on other regions of the world have pointed out that 
the idea of privacy is a relatively new one. For example Stott Despoja notes that even in a highly 
industrialized country as Australia privacy as a notion and a law did not exist until the late 1960s; 
only international pressure from OECD member states finally brought privacy legislation to the 
country in the 1980s – enhanced by fierce public resistance to the introduction of an electronic 
identification card.267  
 However, even though historians have often noted, that in before the 19th century, there 
was no bodily privacy in everyday life,268 it is common-sense to assume that privacy is valued 
across cultures, species and times. As Wagner DeCew notes, the universal character of 'privacy' 
when it comes to the “concealment of the female genitals, seclusion at moments of birth and 
death, the preference for intimacy for sexual relations (…), restricted rules of entry into homes by 
nonresidents, and the secrecy of group ceremonies.”269 While it is true that in England, in the 
500-year Pre-Tudor period, arbitrary search, seize, and arrest practices were generally accepted, it 
was only because they affected a very small number of citizens. However, when in the late 13th 
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century authorities began to assign guards and other persons with policing powers and the right 
to search suspected individuals in their homes, Englishmen began to protest.270 
 Four centuries later in the American colonies suspicionless search and seizure practices 
would evolve into sophisticated surveillance regimes that ultimately contributed to the 
triggering of the American Revolution. Ironically, as the first settlers on the continent, Puritans 
had escaped Europe because of religious persecution and surveillance271 but upon arrival almost 
immediately established a “surveillance society”272 themselves. Due to the relatively small size of 
New England communities surveilling each other to minimize criminal activities quickly 
transformed into an instrument to suppress outsiders and ethnic minorities.273 Religion played a 
role in both fostering surveillance and the need for privacy. Puritans had to confess in public but 
at the same time wanted to be alone to pray. Resistance was more subtle and unorganized. For 
example, laws designed to prevent people from living alone were widely ignored274  
 The greatest challenge to the colonists' privacy, however, arrived in the mid-18th century. 
Because the British Crown was in desperate need for money to finance the French and Indian 
War, starting in 1755, British soldiers – backed by so unlimited and unregulated search warrants 
called 'writs of assistance' – began arbitrarily searching businesses and homes to collect taxes. 
The issue of taxation, generally considered to have caused the American Revolution, was thus 
connected to privacy breaches.275 Frederick Lane has noted how closely the idea of privacy was 
related to the eventual establishment of the first democracy in modernity: “Concern over the 
privacy of personal communication was hardly the only issue that drove American colonists to 
rebellion (…). But privacy in general, as critical component of human freedom, was reflected in 
virtually every complaint levied by the colonists against King George III in their Declaration of 
Independence.”276 According to Thomas H. Clancy, in 1761, the suspicionless search practices 
were for the first time publicly questioned – personified by the Patriot lawyer James Otis, who 
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defended Boston merchants opposing writs of assistance277 and who also coined the catchphrase 
“Taxation without representation is Tyranny” that would become the battle cry of the Revolution.  
Quickly, the colonists began to equate the surveillance tactics employed by the British 
with the total absence of political freedoms. As Andrew Taslitz points out, the “dispute over 
search and seizure policy was thus at the very heart of the passions and political theory 
motivating the Revolution.”278 Violently entering the homes of colonists to collect taxes was not 
merely a nuisance but resembled the very same 'Tyranny' their forefathers had escaped centuries 
earlier. As William Cuddihy puts it, the American public “associated the general warrant with 
violent British efforts to subjugate them politically.”279 After the Revolutionary War the Founding 
Fathers included protections against the search and seizure practices in the form of the Fourth 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights.280 Although 'Privacy' was never explicitly mentioned by the 
Colonists nor can be found in the Constitution,281 the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791 
and has served as the basis for most privacy claims ever since.282 By winning Independence and 
adapting the Fourth Amendment, the patriots had finally rid themselves of the 'Slavery'283 – in 
the sense of the total absence of political freedoms – that the tax surveillance of the British had 
posed onto them. 
 Of course arbitrary searches and seizures – along with a new arsenal of dehumanizing 
surveillance techniques – were and remained part of the American experience in the era of 
antebellum era and beyond. In fact slavery – the involuntary servitude variety, not merely British 
oppression – in the American Colonies relied in principle heavily on the same measures.284 Only 
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within the last decades have scholars begun to analyze the daily ordeal of African slaves through 
a particular lens of Surveillance Studies. In order to control the slave population and enhance its 
'productivity' and obedience, “the master class was forced to develop not just methods of terror 
but also a haphazard system of identification and surveillance. The result was in many ways the 
earliest imprint of modern everyday surveillance.”285 As Simone Brown points out, the slave ships 
of the Middle Passage were functional predecessors to Jeremy Bentham’s famous panoptic prison 
designs.286 Slaver's vessels, auction blocks and plantations were specifically designed spaces to 
monitor the 'chattel' and suppress rebellions. Surveillance technologies of the time included 
slave passes required to be carried around when leaving the plantations, overseers and slave 
patrols whose job it was to watch slaves in the field and capture runaways, and wanted posters 
and newspaper advertisements designed to identify slaves on the run.287 According to Christan 
Parenti these means of control “fed into the development of modern technologies of 
identification and registration.”288 For example the metal tag that each slave, whose status 
allowed him to temporarily leave his plantation, had to wear, can be seen as the first iterance of 
numbered identification cards in America. 
 However, even within this “surveillance regime of slavery”289 there was room for 
resistance, including escape, killing the masters, or stealing goods.290 On the highly surveilled 
naval vessels, slaves would stop eating, killing themselves, or attempting to collectively sink the 
ship.291 On the Underground Railroad, abolitionist would countersurveil the activities of slave 
patrols to ensure free passage for runaway slaves.292 Just as the modes of antebellum slavery were 
the blueprint for current forms of surveillance, the resistance laid the groundwork for modern 
ways of subverting the gaze of authorities. For example, Parenti has described the slaves who 
frequently manipulated of their identification passes as “antebellum hacker[s]” and “information 
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outlaw[s] who could crack the code of the planters' security system.”293 Besides individual acts of 
resistance the issue of slavery and racialized surveillance led to a growing abolitionist movement 
– one of the first instances of a transnational advocacy network294 – and the Civil War. But once 
slavery was outlawed with the passing of the 13th amendment,295 the southern states quickly put 
subtler surveillance regimes in effect designed to make African Americans 'stay in their place'. 
The plantations of the antebellum years were eventually replaced by heavily surveilled 'white 
controlled spaces'.296 In the roughly 150 years that followed the U.S. government surveillance of 
racialized others continued – from the secret COINTELPRO program that monitored the 
activities of civil rights activists including virtually all black student leaders to the recent, heavily 
surveilled Black Lives Matter movement.297 Frederick Lane has noted that “[a]t its core, the 
history of America is the history of the right to privacy.”298 While the surveillance of colonists by 
the British and the surveillance of slaves and black citizens represent different historical and 
structural modes of controlling populations, they are ingrained into the U.S. (and the global) 
consciousness and aptly informed the post-Snowden protests against government surveillance. 
 A third often overlooked historical iteration of  organized surveillance resistance were the 
censuses undertaken by the Dutch and West German governments in the 1970s and 1980s.299 
What makes especially the German case so interesting is that it was, as Matthew Hannah has 
pointed out at, “the earliest major social movement aimed directly at core features of the 
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'information age'”.300 It can thus be seen as legitimate predecessor to the protests in the wake of 
the Snowden leaks.  
 When the German federal government attempted to conduct a census in 1983, widespread 
opposition followed.  However, the first attempt was canceled not because of popular resistance 
but because it was deemed unconstitutional by Germany's highest court. After going back to the 
drawing board the Kohl administration, with the help of an ad agency, launched another census 
in 1987 which again faced a wave of opposition by civil society actors but eventually went as 
planned. Supported and spun by Germany's left-leaning media (taz, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter 
Rundschau), government intrusion and privacy became hot-button issues. In the April of 1983, 
when the anti-Census discourse reached its peak, a politically heterogeneous coalition of more 
than 300 spontaneous citizens' initiatives consisting of 10,000 people had formed voicing dissent 
and planning strategies for boycott.301 Four years later, the network of citizens' initiatives grew to 
1,500302 with large street protests held in Berlin and Hamburg with thousands of participants.303 
When the census was finally conducted, up to 2 percent of citizens outright boycotted it despite 
threats of financial penalties looming over them while millions turned in purposefully 
incomplete or erroneous forms.304 Resistance included not only peaceful protests but also 
physical attacks on enumerators and terrorism: in at least three cities register offices were fire 
bombed.305 
 By giving their personal data to enumerators at their door steps, citizens not only feared 
for their individual privacy, but for their collective political rights. Parts of the populace feared 
that a continuation of the mass-scale demonstrations of the 1960s and 1970s against war, nuclear 
power, and the destruction of the environment would be compromised by giving away their 
data.306 Vivid memories of being 'kettled' at demonstrations – surrounded by police officers and 
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only being allowed to leave after showing identification307 – motivated many West Germans to 
boycott the census. In many ways the emergence of the West German system of surveillance 
resembled the one the United States put in place after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (see section 
2.4). The census in Germany was perceived to be in the same vein as the 'Emergency Laws', 
'Orders on Radicals', and 'Employment Bans' as well as search tactics that were executed as a 
response to the left wing terrorist attacks of the 1970s.308  
 History-inspired collective action frames were employed as well by the anti-census 
activists. The Nazi-era was an especially rich backdrop to articulate anti-surveillance sentiments. 
By pointing out how the National Socialists had used early forms of statistical computing and 
population metrics to suppress dissent and ultimately foster the 'Final Solution', activists sought 
to discredit government collection of data in general. As an op-ed in taz proclaimed, “Statistics is 
already closely connected to the National Socialist Movement.”309 The census boycott movement 
also was one of the first instances were a distinct 1984 protest iconography along with the images 
of bar codes were used to “dramatiz[e] the elimination of privacy”310 – a visual and discursive 
strategy that has become a staple of privacy activists and was also heavily applied in the post-
Snowden protests against the NSA. Ethnic groups were concerned as well. As the then Chair of 
West Germany's Central Council of Sinti and Roma put it, framing her opposition to the census 
in both historical and Orwellian terms: “1984 has been in existence for Sinti and Roma since 
1933.”311 
 After the census was conducted a long period without notable instances of privacy 
activism followed in Germany. However, in part due to widespread opposition the German 
government has never again attempted to statistically encompass the population in the same 
way. Indirectly the census boycotts of the 1980s led to a resurgence of German privacy activism in 
the last decade. As a reaction to data retention policies and the government's ability to infiltrate 
private hard drives through 'federal Trojans a new coalition, “Freiheit statt Angst” ('Freedom 
instead of Fear') formed. It managed to mobilize their constituents for the largest anti-
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surveillance protest in 2008 consisting of 50,000-70,000 people,312 who in turn inspired and 
overlapped with the subsequent German branch of the 'Stop Watching Us' campaign in the 
aftermath of the Snowden leaks (see section 4.2). 
 What these three examples – the American Independence struggle, the era of Antebellum 
slavery and eventual abolitionism, and the West German census boycott – show is that 
opposition is inherent in any surveillance regime. They also demonstrate that besides individual 
acts of physical resistance, changes in the law and meaningful 'privacy legislation' require public 
discourse and therefore sophisticated means of political communication. In the run-up to the 
American Revolutionary War slogans such as Otis' “No taxation without representation” and a 
subsequent publicized debate between 'Federalists' and 'Anti-Federalists' about the design of the 
constitution (including the Fourth Amendment) were crucial. Slavery and the surveillance of 
Blacks eventually led to a transnational debate over the merits of abolishing the 'peculiar 
institution'. And the census controversy in West Germany was fueled by a myriad of headlines 
and opinion pieces in newspapers and dailies only exceeded by the media fallout of the Snowden 
leaks. Together, they acted as historical precedents for contemporary forms of privacy advocacy 
and are heralded in the activist community. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMMUNICATION 
 
The verdict is still out, whether the global network of anti-surveillance activists can be 
considered a true social movement – meaning if it is as equally important in terms of scope, 
endurance and institutionalization as, for example the grass roots struggles against social 
inequality, environmental destruction or war. On the one hand, the Snowden revelations have 
elevated privacy concerns to new heights. The campaigns analyzed in these pages are clearly a 
testament to the increasing size and sincerity with which these groups are currently tackling the 
issue, therefore suggesting that the Snowden leaks have in fact created a movement.  
 On the other hand, opposition to surveillance is in many cases articulated by coalitions of 
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groups, which temporarily become active on behalf of privacy issues and then move on to 
different causes. While the public concern for privacy has indeed a long tradition, it is no match 
for the rich history of established social movements. As Colin Bennett has summed it up (pre-
Snowden), “there is no concerted worldwide privacy movement that has anything like the scale, 
resources, or public recognition of organizations in the environmental, feminist, consumer 
protection, and human rights fields.”313 
However, even if the campaigns presented in the case study section rather consists of 
loose coalitions of individual groups, for the sake of placing this study in the social movement 
research tradition, the collective of activists described in these pages will be conceptualized as a 
social movement. Thus, this study will apply a stripped down definition of social movements, 
namely that the network of privacy activists constitute “a collectivity of actors who want to 
achieve their goal or goals by influencing the decision of a target.” 314 
This dissertation seeks to qualitatively examine the impact of privacy advocacy 
communication practices. Within social movement research the validity of textual analysis and 
interpretation, despite its comparatively lower rate of reliability is generally favored over 
quantitative survey methods.315 The analysis will mainly be concerned with anti-surveillance 
discourses and frames strategically disseminated by international privacy advocacy 
organizations, with an additional, albeit much smaller, focus on media representations of those 
frames. In this chapter, a general overview will be given of the study of social movement 
communication and how it informs the chosen methodological framework to study 
communication strategies of privacy activists. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to explain why 
the triangulation of three qualitative methods – discourse analysis, frames analysis, and semi-
structured expert interviews – are the best way of researching anti-surveillance communication.  
Why focus on the activists' output of discourses, frames, and arguments rather than to 
exclusively look at the mass media representations, for example TV reports or newspaper 
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editorials? It is fair to say that systematically scanning media archives may very well produce 
significant insight into the overall discourse about surveillance and privacy in the post-Snowden 
world. By way of contrast, if you want to take a look at the attempts of privacy advocacy groups' 
attempts to discursively raise awareness and generate resistance against surveillance one should 
focus on the primary sources provided by these groups.  
 While activists are certainly experts in their field and command a great deal of knowledge 
about, for instance, privacy laws or encryption technologies, this does not mean that every 
instance of 'text' they publish will be cited widely by media outlets. To the contrary, as was laid 
out in the previous chapter, they have to face an at times seemingly overwhelming pro-
surveillance lobby as well as high levels of indifference among citizens. Exclusively focusing on 
media reports would simply do the activists’ work of raising awareness and shaping the discourse 
no justice. Merely conducting a media content analysis, while certainly giving meaningful insight 
into the frequency and representation of privacy protest in media discourse, would be “unable to 
shed light on how social movements attempt to influence news coverage.”316 In this respect, the 
choice of analyzing movements’ discourses and frames should be regarded as an attempt to 
counter the much criticized focus “on the signifying practices of the media, neglecting the ways 
in which movements create and distribute social and political meanings.”317  
To contribute to the study of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and their 
communication practices in particular is important for several reasons. First, the significance of 
SMOs in the political process is growing. As Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg have 
pointed out, in the last decades, publics have tended to trust the work of NGOs more than the 
activities of governments or businesses. Indeed, while trust in political parties and corporations 
has dwindled away, NGOs have received enormous gains in public trust.318 SMOs in their 
“democratic function” play a special role in contemporary 'counter-democracies' with its various 
means of political participation that go beyond casting a ballot.319 Social movement 
communications are an often neglected field of study for both sociology and communication 
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studies. This can be traced back both to the tendency to only see political parties or politicians as 
legitimate objects of political communication research as well as a general lack of 
interdisciplinary interest. As Bart Cammaerts et al. have observed, “political sciences and 
political sociology often have been blind to what media and communication studies have to offer 
and, vice versa, many media and communication scholars are so media-centric that they have 
failed to extend their thinking to political and social movement theory.”320 
Communication lies at the heart of each movement’s activity and is in many cases 
inseparable from taking action. As will be shown in this chapter, arguably the most important 
part of any campaign conducted by activist groups are communicating demands to the public 
and the political system. The prerequisite for articulating those demands are framing processes, 
attempts to make sense of the issue and attract reactions from the public and the media. It is 
framing that translates communication into acting. 
  
3.1 Frame Analysis in Social Movement Studies 
As David Lyon argues, framing analysis is particularly crucial to understand the role of 
surveillance and privacy in the Post-Snowden world: “The issue of framing really applies to the 
whole question of surveillance in the twenty-first century. How do we think about these large 
and looming questions?”321 By looking at the frames used by privacy activists during four key 
moments, and following Lyon’s suggestion, I want to examine “the very language commonly used 
to discuss the monitoring and tracking of daily life and responses to these practices: surveillance 
and privacy.”322 
As important discourse participants SMOs are in the business of meaning construction. 
They have the power to effectively shape the representation of issues as well as critically interpret 
information.323 As “producers, and distributors of cultural codes”324 one of their key tasks is to 
produces frames. Framing, as defined by Benford and Snow, is “an active processual 
phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction.”325 Manuel 
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Castells on the other hand, also focusing on the communication repertoires of non-state actors, 
offers a lingo-neurological definition describing frames as “neural networks of association that 
can be assessed from the language through metaphorical connections.” Reality construction 
through framing mainly involves interpretation of current and past political, social, and cultural 
developments and trends with the specific goal of mobilizing activists and citizens. For this 
purpose Benford and Snow have coined the term collective action frames – “action-oriented sets 
of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social 
movement organization.”326 Or, in the words of R. Kelly Garrett the main goal of such frames is 
“to justify activist's claims and motivate actions using culturally shared beliefs and 
understandings.”327  
 Framing provides the overarching context for social movements to conduct their 
communication practices. In 'organizationally enabled campaigns', the most common current 
form of organizing protests as described by Bennett and Segerberg,328 successful communication 
strategies depend on frames which are precise in their given contexts yet at the same broad 
enough for individuals to appropriate. Easily adoptable frames can save organizational resources 
and lead to increasing levels of public engagement.329 On the contrary, contradictory or overly 
convoluted frames can have negative effects in terms of their mobilizing potential. 
 There are specific subtypes of collective action frames with regard to their particular 
functions and mobilizing effects. Benford and Snow have identified three core framing tasks of 
SMOs: “diagnostic framing”, the process of identifying the problem and the actors to blame; 
“prognostic framing”, the process of articulating the solution to the problem;330 and 
“motivational framing”, the process of articulating the reasons for people to become active and 
participate in their campaigns. All three tasks are designed to ultimately create a consensus 
among an initially heterogeneous group of potential constituents and mobilize as many of them 
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as possible.331  
Prior to Benford & Snow, Göran Therborn, without using the term frame, described these 
processes in general as 'ideological mobilization': the “setting of a common agenda for a mass 
people – that is to say, summing up the dominant aspect or aspects of the crisis, identifying the 
crucial target, the essence of evil, and defining what is possible and how it should be achieved.”332 
In the same vein McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly have stressed the importance of identifying “new 
threats and opportunities by one or more parties to an emerging conflict and the reimagining 
opportunities by one of the legitimate purposes attached to established social sites and/or 
identities.”333 Although Benford and Snow, Therborn, and McAdam et al. do not reference 
Kenneth Burke, their work on social movement frames can be seen as built on A Grammar of 
Motives. Burke claimed that all “statements about motives” are concerned with “Act, Scene, 
Agent, Agency, Purpose”:  
In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that 
names the act, (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another 
that names the scene (the background of the act, a situation in which it 
occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) 
performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the 
purpose.334 
 
In a social movement context  this means that in process that Burke has called 
“identification,” activists describe the current state of the world, define problems, and offers 
solutions.335 While Burke’s work is seldom applied to social movement communication he was 
among the first to examine “how interpretive frames exploit the resources of terminology to 
direct the attention and form the attitudes that motivate action.”336 
Timing is of importance here, as the first protests serve as key “interpretative 
'moments'”337 that will set a precedent for the framing of all the future campaigns. As Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikking point out, “[s]truggles over meaning and the creation of new frames of 
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meaning occur early in a protest cycle,”338 setting the stage for future discourses and protest 
events. In the case anti-surveillance activists this meant that in the formative period of 
summer/fall 2013 – the immediate aftermath of the Snowden leaks – privacy activists had to 
 a) Identify the key problems that result from a lack of privacy as well as inform the public 
about the main perpetrators of excessive surveillance. Activists had to explain to the public or 
their own member base the detriments privacy violations can have on them individually (e.g. 
embarrassment, financial harm, or, more generally, a loss of privacy) as well as collectively, e.g. 
authoritarian control over society, limitations on public discourse, or sorting processes that result 
in discrimination of whole parts of the population (diagnostic framing). 
 b) Articulate demands to effectively reverse or stop mass surveillance practices and restore 
privacy. For example, privacy advocates have promoted privacy-enhancing technical means to 
guard their constituents' individual privacy such as email encryption or anonymous web 
browsing tools. Others tend to focus on the bigger picture and favor grand scale political 
solutions such as new privacy legislation that will protect society as a whole from the abuses of 
state and corporate surveillance (prognostic framing). 
 c) Convince their constituents and the public that they have to oppose surveillance and take 
action. Essentially this third step involved warning against future disadvantages if the problem of 
surveillance will not be tackled soon. This poses a special challenge to privacy advocacy 
organizations because the consequences of surveillance – at least in western democracies – have 
not yet fully revealed itself and usually lie in the future. Just as climate change activists, privacy 
advocates must warn the public about potentially devastating consequences for future 
generations if citizens do not start engaging right away. Therborn has classified these framing 
efforts as “mobilization by anticipatory fear” which take place in protest campaigns, in which 
“the future has predominantly taken the form on an imminent threat flowing from current 
tendencies, which has called for pre-emptive action in the present”339 (motivational framing). 
 For example, big data practices may lead to the widespread creation individual 
personalized data profiles. Nobody knows exactly what will happen with these records in the 
upcoming decades, who is going to owe them, and if they are going to be used for politically 
coercive means in the future. Here, anti-surveillance activism shares with other movements the 
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so dilemma Anthony Giddens has described in the context of global warming:  
[S]ince the dangers posed by global warming aren't tangible, immediate, 
or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, 
many will sit on their idle hands and do nothing of a concrete nature 
about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being 
stirred to serious action will, by definition, be too late.340  
 
Designing Frames 
The careful development of frames is crucial for SMOs, as the degree of flexibility, or rigidity and 
therefore the “interpretive scope”341 largely determines how they resonate in the public realm. 
One recent example of a flexible yet topically determined “master frame”342 was the Occupy 
Movement’s focus on the global division of society into billionaires and the rest of “the 99 
percent”. Without high degrees of hierarchical organization this frame and its accompanying 
slogan managed to act as an umbrella for the concerns of people from around the world to rally 
against diverse topics such as banking regulation, students' debt, or the homeless population. A 
movement's slogan is in many ways the prerequisite and effective signifier for a comprehensive 
frame and thus instrumental for any mobilizing effort.343   
 Credibility is the key when it comes to frames that will resonate with the larger public. 
Simply put, to be working, frames have to be grounded in reality of the constituents. Unless 
SMO's will provide specific examples, which are closely connected to living environments and 
cultural reality of their constituents, framing processes will fail. As Benford and Snow put it: 
The issue here is not whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are 
actually factual or valid, but whether their empirical referents lend 
themselves to being read as 'real' indicators of the diagnostic claims. 
Can the claims be empirically verified? Is there something out there 
that can be pointed to as evidence of the claim embedded in the 
framing? Hypothetically, the more culturally believable the claimed 
evidence, and the greater the number of slices of such evidence, the 
more credible the framing and its broader appeal.344 
 
For privacy activists this means they have to face the challenge of mobilizing citizens, who, in 
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large parts, do not feel immediately threatened by current data practices of governments and 
companies. Surveillance, in a moral context, for most citizens, does not appear to be fitting in a 
clear “right or wrong”-frame as it is arguably not “culturally central” to the survival of the planet 
and human life.345 As mentioned above with regard to motivational framing, because current 
examples of negative consequences of surveillance tend to be rare, some “culturally believable” 
claims are made about surveillance abuses from the past. Therborn has called this “mobilization 
by revival”346 while Mayer Zald has pointed out the “cultural contradictions and historical events 
in providing opportunities for framing.”347 According to Charles Tilly, “political entrepreneurs 
draw together credible stories from available cultural materials, (…) create we-they boundaries 
(…) and maneuver to suppress competing models.”348 These stories also influence the choice of 
communication and protest means as well. Stories – just like diagnostic framing processes – also 
sketch out characteristics of supporters and enemies with clear poignancy thus significantly 
contributing to the “collective identity necessary for contention.”349  
 Drawing on the work of Lynn Owens and Francesca Polletta, Marc Steinberg and Patricia 
Ewick have highlighted the defining features of movement storytelling.350 'Origin stories – closely 
related to motivational framing but rather concerned with the motivation of the activist 
organization itself – deal with the main reasons or incidents that have led to the formation of the 
group. These narratives usually include notions of moral imperatives that have forced the 
particular organization to take action. Simultaneously such types of stories describe the 
movement’s history as well point at the reasons for engaging in the future. However, this focus 
has the imminent danger of alienate especially younger generations who do not share the same 
values and historical experiences as the movements’ veterans: “[I]t is possible that these stories, 
while providing for members' continued cohesion, dampen such recruitment.”351 In the U.S. the 
origin stories for the privacy movement are informed by Colonial history and the Civil Rights era; 
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in Europe by totalitarianism of the 1930’s and 1940’s; in Latin America by military coups of the 
1960’s; and in the MENA region by the recent Arab Spring uprisings (see section 5.4).  
 Other key condition for effective framing are “centrality,” “experiential commensurability,” 
and “narrative fidelity.” Whereas credibility is based on empirical aspects of the framing claims 
these three dimensions should be in line with the feelings and daily experiences of the potential 
constituents.352 Framing in general, as pointed out by Castells is based on elementary human 
emotions such as hatred, fear, and elation.353 The communication of privacy activists to a certain 
degree relies on the framing of fear as well. Examples include painting a horrifying picture about 
the nature of the current (or future) surveillance state. Utilizing fear and overstating possible 
dangerous outcomes is a fixed part of any activist groups' repertoire.354  
 
Collective Action Frames in the Media 
How do frames get disseminated and reach larger audiences? In the end, all framing attempts by 
social movements are happening within a mass media surrounding.355 After all, even when media 
organizations not always receptive or downright ignorant with regard to protest events,356 they 
are usually designed to gather media attention.357 As a result most protest events are organized by 
“event-mediated social movements,”358 which constantly seek media attention. William Gamson 
and Gadi Wolfsfeld have identified three purposes of mass media coverage for social movement 
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organizations: mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement.359  
 In the context of privacy advocacy activism this means that news reports on their 
activities have the potential to not only alert their base but also parts of the population, which 
have not been aware of privacy abuses. Large scale demonstrations, if covered by the media, 
convey and make visible that there is a part of the population which is concerned about the issue 
and thus makes discourses seem more urgent. Media coverage can also significantly boost the 
privacy networks base of supporters if the framing and the portrayal of a campaign remains 
sympathetic to the cause. Yet, on average, the general chances for social movement actors to get 
media attention remain bleak.360  
Movements and media constantly engage in a “battle of images and frames.”361 These 
frames are either picked up by media outlets and are being reinforced or they are distorted and 
opposed by counter frames coming from within the media.362 A common form of distortion is 
the conventional, predictable, and stereotypical way in which most outlets usually cover 
collective action. Rather than to report on the actual demands and the issue at hand, news media 
“are usually limited to a few archetypes such as the rioter, the picket, or the performer”, which to 
a great deal influences “the reception of social movements within a broader audience.”363 Todd 
Gitlin has shown in his seminal study of the communication strategies of the Students for A 
Democratic Society that the media tend to focus on more outlandish personalities within the 
movement which makes it harder for matter-of-fact and issue-centric persons to raise their 
profile both within the movement and in the media realm.364 This dynamics has unwanted 
consequences as a spiral of “ever-more extravagant and dramatic actions – regardless of their 
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contribution to the challenger's goals”365 is set in motion. Ridiculing individual privacy activists 
was also part of the coverage of some of the grass roots campaigns against surveillance (see 
sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
 Other times, for example, the urgent, cheerful and overly optimistic tone of a protest rally 
– as several of the anti-surveillance case studies will show as well – is through media coverage 
transformed into a counter frame of failure, futility and indifference. Here, the “rhetoric of 
change” designed to frame and identify political opportunities (e.g. the importance of the 
Snowden leaks) clashes with the “rhetoric of reaction” of the mainstream mass media, which 
tend to focus on allegedly jeopardizing effects of a campaign. While the organizers frame their 
campaigns along the line of urgency, agency and possibility, some media outlets will downplay 
their efforts.366  
On the other hand SMOs can reframe dominant media discourses. Ideally, according to 
this “reframing effect”367 a mediatized protest campaign lets new challengers enter the 
discourses. Demonstrations, for example, offer the opportunity for dissidents to provide 
alternative interpretations of a given issue and mobilize more people with diverging opinions to 
do the same.368 ICTs have drastically improved the chances of social movement frames to be 
disseminated to an unprecedented number of people, as “framing processes are dependent on 
the flow of carefully crafted movement information, (…) across networks over which these 
frames can be propagated.”369 Rather than to rely on the media, SMOs have gained the ability to 
'reprogram' the dominant communication networks. As a direct reaction to the at times 
distorting nature of media coverage, through means of online communication, activists have 
“take[n] the construction of the message into their own hands.”370 In other words, “commercial 
and public mass media no longer have a monopoly over the visual representation of protest.”371 
Within social networks, the editorial control over their messages has never been greater which 
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has also significantly increased the legitimacy of these agents of “self-mass communication.”372 In 
fact, as recent online-only campaigns such as the grassroots protests against the controversial 
copyright legislation SOPA and PIPA and the successful fight for net neutrality in the U.S. have 
shown, you can mobilize millions of citizens with little or no traditional media coverage. Social 
media networks and other online communities have thus significantly enhanced the activists' 
ability to remain control over the framing of their protests. 
 As will be shown in the context of offline campaigns (which still rely on the mainstream 
media coverage) and online protest events (which to a far lesser degree do so) this 
simultaneously solves and creates new problems regarding collective action frames. However, 
traditional media coverage remains crucial, simply for the fact that Internet users have equal 
access to serious news sources as well as conspiracy theory-laden offerings without any empirical 
base.373 Despite the positive effects of ICTs, in the struggle against surveillance abuses the media 
remain “the primary symbolic and information battlegrounds”374 for debate. 
 
Transnational Framing 
Historical events such as the Reformation, the Abolitionist Movement, and Anarchism are all 
examples of successfully orchestrated transnational activist campaigns. Recently transnational 
movements have increased in numbers and scope.375 Through “coordinated performances staged 
in different countries around the world”376 activists try to lift national concerns to a transnational 
level. There, social movement actors may even have greater chances of achieving overall change, 
as the opportunity structures in terms of finding allies and bringing together fragmented publics 
improve, as Jeffrey Ayers has suggested 377 Even seemingly unrelated recent events in the Middle 
East, Europe, the United States, Turkey, and Brazil became transnationally linked through 
“practices and discourses, ideas and actions that travelled from one moment in history to 
another and from one country to another, through mechanisms of diffusion that combined many 
sources of inspiration and many sites of adaptation.”378 Surveillance activists have tried to evoke a 
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similar transnational protest moment in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations. Modelled 
after the global occupy movement, which starting in New York (and, in turn, was inspired heavily 
by the Arab Spring) spread over to countries around the world, the privacy movement has 
created symbols, slogans and tactics which can be applied in various national contexts.  
But social movement framing faces additional challenges if the issue at hand is not 
confined to national borders but instead global in nature. Transnational framing or “the ability 
to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is 
frequently far away,”379 is a key task of any transnational movement actor. Global mass 
surveillance conducted by governments around the world through a global communications 
network, the Internet, is a textbook example of a problem of truly global proportions. Granted, 
enabled through ICTs geographically segregated activist groups can communicate and organize 
much more effectively than before. Yet this also creates problems as these international and 
sometimes ideologically heterogeneous rosters of activists have to find a common ground. As 
Sidney Tarrow notices in regard to transnational protest campaigns, “[a]cting collectively 
requires activists to marshal resources, become aware of and seize opportunities, frame their 
demands in ways that enable them to join with others, and identify common targets.”380  
Transnational activist campaigns have to face two hurdles. First, ideologies, history, and 
culture may vary drastically across national borders. And secondly, activism and advocacy in 
particular is often aimed at changing or creating legislation through national governments, 
which despite the growing institutionalization of international politics are still the major source 
of power. Agreeing on global policy changes and pushing for them on the international level is 
often times close to impossible.  
 While privacy has been defined as an international human right since 1948, in the case of 
internationally coordinated anti surveillance campaigns, this means to consider possibly 206 
potential different privacy cultures. The protection against privacy intrusions certainly has a 
universal character; yet in some societies privacy as a concept might from western countries in 
significant ways.381 In this context activists face the dilemma of having to create new global 
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frames that address the international dimension at hand, while simultaneously keeping in mind 
the local particularities of the members of its network.382  
 On the other hand, framing processes are instrumental in establishing transnational 
networks in the first place, as the articulation of a common theme not only transforms the 
international discourse but contributes to the growth of the base of constituents. Thus 
transnational framing processes also “become catalysts for the growth of networks.”383 In 
addition, shifting a protest campaign to the transnational level might prove beneficial to some 
local concerns. Joining a worldwide campaign offers the opportunity for smaller national groups 
to become recognized as a part of the larger 'Global Justice' movement. By joining a transnational 
coalition, “[v]oices that are suppressed in their own societies may find that networks can project 
and amplify their concerns into an international arena, which in turn can echo back into their 
own countries.”384 Thus the benefits of cohesive transnational framing “can dignify, generalize 
and energize activists whose claims are predominantly local, linking them symbolically to people 
they have never met and to causes within the power structures of their own countries.385  
 However, ultimately, scholars such as Tarrow remain skeptical and stress the limitations of 
transnational framing efforts, as they so far have not been translated into global identities, truly 
global movements, and even frequent transnational encounters.386 Likewise Castells, despite his 
optimistic description of a global 'Network Society,' has admitted that social movements in 
general still “tend to be fragmented, localistic, single-issue oriented, and ephemeral, either 
retrenched in their inner worlds, or flaring up for just an instant.”387 Despite the emergence of 
global media conglomerates and other international networks, national differences “are not 
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going to fade away in a process of indifferentiation, marching anew toward universal 
modernization.”388 In fact, as Keck and Sikkink assert, in most cases advocacy networks around 
transnational conflicts will not form, and in the rare cases the do form, they will not successfully 
tackle the problem.389 Donatella della Porta and Alice Mattoni are not entirely sure, too, and pose 
the legitimate question, why the targets of transnational protests in the wake of the financial 
crisis of 2008 were mainly national institutions: Did the world witness “just a convergence of 
reaction to a global economic crisis” or indeed a “common struggle that unified people in a 
variety of countries around the world?”390 Finally, Tarrow has observed that when transnational 
activism is working, it is despite the fact that activists and citizens have not developed a global 
identity. Rather it is motivated by and the result of national concerns and “people who are simply 
following their domestically formed claims into international society”391  
 Using the example of the global justice movement, Tarrow points out the various 
obstacles that still stand in the way of creating a protest culture that deserves to be called 
'transnational'. The first one contains the actual background of individual activists, whose 
“transformation into rootless cosmopolitans”, even if aspired, can never be completed due to 
national backgrounds.392 This has consequences for the actual evolution of movement networks. 
Early protests against the International Monetary Fund were contrary to popular belief not 
'global' or even transnational and as of now the term 'Global Justice' rather describes an idea that 
might bring various national factions together but it has not led to a powerful institutionalized 
player in the realm of international politics. Even within the European Union with its high 
degree of intra-national institutionalization, most protests usually still take place at the national 
or even local level. In total, “global thinking among elites and mass publics [is] less widely 
diffused than many have claimed.”393 Speaking in global terms is easy; to transform the idealistic 
rhetoric of a 'transnational movement' into action remains difficult, when most actors still have 
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to deal with the confinements of their national political system.  
 The few attempts of truly transnationally coordinated campaigns often fail because of 
apparent contradictions between activists from different part of the worlds. What in fact has 
been happening in recent years is that activists have globally framed domestic claims or 
launching local protests against international actors.394 Usually, at the most, the outcomes are 
transnational coalitions that form around current events and afterwards disintegrate or only exist 
as 'paper coalitions'. Just because an issue “trigger[s] remarkably similar opposition in a number 
of countries” does not mean that it is a transnational movement.”395Many of these pitfalls, as 
shall be seen, are also noticeable in transnational privacy campaigns, which took place 
simultaneously in different countries (see sections 4.2- 4.4).  
 
Visualization of Protest Frames 
Visual features contribute immensely to the framing of a campaign – both discursively and 
practically. Mediated through news outlets or social networks, protest signs, puppetry, or 
televised arrests are “define the terms of political possibility and create terrain for political 
acts.”396 The importance of visual communication has grown in the last decades due to the 
emergence of ICTs and online social networking sites. This has led to a whole new 
“communication culture” – a normative set of rules how organizers disseminate protest media 
and apply them in strategic ways.397 For scholars such as della Porta and Mattoni the very essence 
of social movement communication is the “diffusion of protest imageries”.398 The effectiveness of 
a particular protest symbol depends on the context of the nature of the event and its platform as 
well as the accompanying discourse. Activists have to adjust their imagery whether these 
platforms are “concerts, human rights reports, magazine photojournalism, graffiti, legal cases, 
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documentary films, online videos, or a thousand other such domains.”399  
 Making something previously ignored or unknown visible was at the heart of every major 
uprising since the 1960s. Thus the success of a campaign stands and falls with the 
implementation of its visual strategy. As Doerr et al. point out, “[a]ctivists articulate visual 
messages, their activities are represented in photos and video sequences, and they are ultimately 
rendered visible, or invisible, as the result of a planned, explicit, and strategic effort, or 
accidentally, in an unintended or undesired manner.”400 In fact, acting and visually 
communicating have been inseparably linked in everyday social movement practice. Once an 
image has entered the public realm it becomes part of the social and political reality.401 For 
example, the incident that set the U.S. civil rights movement in motion was not an isolated 
individual act of civil disobedience but a carefully and strategically planned campaign with a 
focus on its visual components. When in December 1955, civil rights activist Rosa Parks refused 
to give up her bus seat for a white person (Parks was far from being the first black person to do 
so) she and her fellow activists had mainly the strategic appropriation of the media depiction of 
her arrest in mind. Accordingly the widely disseminated photographs of her arrest and her 
subsequent mug shot were then utilized to mobilize citizens around the country. The depiction 
of Parks and her treatment at the hands of the authorities became a visual symbol of what was 
wrong in terms of race relations in the U.S. – and a blueprint for all visual protest campaigns that 
followed402  
Similarly privacy activists are constantly searching for new means of visualizing 
surveillance With regard to visual privacy activism Daphi et al. note that images play a key role 
“mak[ing] the invisible (e.g. surveillance) visible and thus have considerable political power.”403 
The authors demonstrate this in the context of the German privacy movement, where their 
analysis of protest media, flyers and signs have identified a liberal and left/radical current, 
which, among other things, compares government officials to prominent Nazis.404 
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 With regard to the importance of social networking sites hinted at earlier, web 2.0 
applications, and smartphones, where sharing an image has become a matter of seconds, protest 
images have gained further importance. Accordingly della Porta reasons that in the long run this 
will change the very nature of social movement communication itself: “If the Web 2.0 with its 
opportunities and limits, does indeed facilitate the spread of information transmitted via images 
even more than words we can expect different styles of communication – especially (…) among 
those movement activists that use new technologies more.”405  
There is another important dimension of visual communication, namely in the context of 
transnational campaigns: Just like pictures can be send around the world in real time the 
meaning of visual symbols can transcend national borders as well. As Thomas Olesen has 
observed in the context of the now iconic video of the dying Iranian protestor Neda, images are 
part of “process of dramatic cross-border diffusion in which local/national events attain 
universalized meanings for audiences in a global public sphere.”406 Olesen calls this process 
“meaning adaptation” which describes “how local/national events change meaning as they are 
disembedded.” The privacy movement as of yet lacks such shocking imagery as dying protestors, 
sites of ecological destruction, or war casualties407 which in part explains the heavy reliance of 
historical and fictional references mentioned above. Still to research surveillance resistance 
iconography is much needed as it gives insight into the “formation of injustice-symbols in the 
global sphere” and its “dramatic and emotional character”408   
Online videos have become arguably the most powerful instruments of visual 
communication in the last years. Especially the video network YouTube has become an 
invaluable asset for organizers: “Easy to upload, free of gatekeepers censoring one's content, and 
having the potential of reaching a huge community of viewers, YouTube is an appealing site for 
activist social movements to exploit.”409 In the wake of the growing popularity streaming 
platforms a new form of protest media has emerged. The 'mobilization video' is  
characterized by explicit calls for action, urging viewers to engage by 
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joining protest actions in the streets or to take action online by 
redistributing the call for offline action personal networks. The genre of 
mobilization videos follows a certain set of dramaturgic rules that bring 
together discursive resources and historical events to set up a number of 
given spaces of action for the viewer.410  
 
In three of the major anti-surveillance campaigns discussed in section 4, mobilization video 
played crucial roles and were thus included in the analysis. 
 Yet, disseminating protest-related visual means of communication is far from being a 
one-way street, in which PR-savvy media staffers of social movement organizations develop 
professionally crafted symbols which are then uncritically embraced and shared by their 
constituents. The top-down approaches by Marxist critics of the “culture industry” can simply 
not be applied when it comes to analyzing the reception of activists’' visual communication 
strategies.411 Just like recent cultural studies school of thoughts have repeatedly demonstrated 
that recipients have significant agency and do not uncritically consume the output of mass media 
outlets, protest participants and members of the public critically reflect, question or individually 
appropriate images. In the age of social media, users effectively make protest media their own by 
remixing it – putting in different cultural contexts and sharing it with their peers. This often 
times means that the original producers of the images to a certain degree lose control over their 
visual communication strategy. Activist groups have increasingly acknowledged this and now 
frequently ask recipients to use their templates to create their own memes, which essentially 
function as “inclusive discourses.”412 Anti-surveillance activism with its member base being 
partially rooted in the internet and tech-savvy online community, as will be shown in the 
upcoming chapters, is a good example of the free flowing exchange of visual protest media 
between organizers and individual participants.  
 
Effects and limitations of framing 
 How effective are activists then in reaching their goal of framing an issue in such ways 
that their member base and parts of the public decide to act? And even when a certain level of 
collective, or connective, action is reached, for example in form of an offline- or online 
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demonstration, what are the actual ramifications? These questions touches upon the material 
critiques of discourse analysis as critics will point out that not discourses or frames will affect 
power relations but ultimately business interests and economic realities. In the case of social 
movements the answer is not clear cut. As Earl and Kimport summarize the current take on 
movement outcomes,  
research on social movements has struggled to pin down the exact 
impact of social movements in general or specific mobilizations in 
particular on social change. It is not that researchers cannot document 
that social movements were organizing and acting, and that social 
change temporarily followed, but rather it is hard to show with real 
social scientific veracity that social movements and not other things 
that were also occurring lead to social changes of interest.413 
 
The international privacy movement provides a valid example for this ambiguity. The 
aforementioned passing into law of the U.S. Freedom Act was widely celebrated by activists and 
advocates as a major victory for the movement. Yet it is not clear if 'pressure from below' was the 
main reason for its passage  or other factors such as, say, a Libertarian turn inside the Republican 
Party. One can only guess how much influence members of advocacy networks or protestors on 
the streets had on the power dynamics in the U.S. congress. The effects of online protest 
campaigns, on the other hand have to a certain degree by now become very well measurable. The 
blueprint for a successful campaign was the anti-SOPA protests which mainly took place in the 
online realm. In the case of the anti-SOPA campaign millions of page views, tweets, and reposts 
effectively transformed into a certain number of calls and emails to members of congress, who 
under direct pressure from their constituents changed their voting behavior. Many activist 
organizations have actually ceased in recruiting people to stage offline demonstrations, precisely 
because there is no measurable effect on achieving social change. As a consequence many social 
movement organizations have effectively turned into advocacy groups, which tend to focus on 
lobbying effects behind the scenes rather than to mobilize people for demonstrations. Yet while, 
focusing on back room deals with representatives and regulators may be more efficient in 
yielding concrete, short-term results, in the long run activists and advocates have to refocus their 
efforts on the public as well. As without pressure from below – mobilization through effective 
and powerful frames – these groups might eventually lose their mandate to speak on the behalf 
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of their constituents. 
 
3.2 Discourse Analysis in Social Movement Research 
Closely related to overarching frames are discourses and narratives  – essentially what George 
Marcus, in the context of social movements, has called the “activist imagery.”414  Especially on 
social networking sites activists share images, which are “discursively infused with meaning.”415 
As a matter of fact, Castell’s concept of 'Communication Power' is built around discourses and 
the new technological surrounding in which they take place: “In the network society, discourses 
are generated, diffused, fought over, internalized, and ultimately embodied in human action, in 
the socialized communication realm constructed around local-global networks of multi-modal, 
digital communication, including the media and the internet.”416  
What is the relationship between discourses and frames? In the relevant literature there is 
often times no coherent distinction between 'frames', 'discourses' and even 'ideologies'. As Hank 
Johnston has observed, “[c]ultural discourses often include frames, and some discourses can be 
characterized as the broadest kinds of frames. Ideologies often do the same things frames do – 
and are sometimes called frames.”417 While there is no consensus, for this study 'frames' are 
considered concrete themes applied and officially sanctioned by movement organizers with the 
intent to mobilize, as included in the definition by Benford and Snow at the beginning of this 
chapter. Discourses, for the purpose of this study, are understood as surrounding and preceding 
elements in the generation of collective action frames.418  
Discourses, “sets of statements which constitute an object”,419 are essential for achieving 
any kind of social change. The presumption here is a basic relationship between politics and 
language that can be traced back to Aristotle. The Aristotelian zoon politikon has the ability to 
speak and thus engage in deliberation which in turn is transformed into political action.420 In his 
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classic study, Foucault famously described how social descriptions were instrumental in creating 
categories of mental health and illness. For Foucault, these scientific categories were the result of 
discourses.421 Social movement discourses have the same potentials. For example thanks to the 
communication efforts of anti-whaling activists whales are nowadays being referred to as 
'intelligent individuals' rather than, as was the case before, 'monsters' or 'natural resources.'422   
SMOs significantly contribute to discourses that are “an inherent and irreducible element 
or facet of all social phenomena and all social change.”423 Thus, the assumption here is that 
scaling back the global surveillant assemblage (or expanding it) “takes place through dialectical 
interconnections between existing structures and the strategies of social agents.”424 Or in other 
words, the communication practices of privacy advocates contribute to the constructions of 
notions of privacy as well as anti-surveillance sentiments. With the exception of some critics 
among politicians and journalists, without their political communication efforts there would be 
hardly any ideas about the value of privacy present in the public arena.  
 For Norman Fairclough, political discourses “adres[s] the question of what to do in 
response to problematic events and circumstances.”425 While the issue of 'effectiveness' of 
discourses will be discussed at greater lengths below, it can be forestalled that the greatest 
impact of social movement discourse is to make arguments and interpretations visible that were 
not in the public consciousness before – 'statements' or 'texts', which once they are 'out there', 
have become part of reality.426 In the literature there is an “increasing consensus”427 that major 
social shifts should be examined through, among other methods, discourse analysis. 
 Beyond such rather general characteristics, discourse analysis is a fitting tool to examine 
communication practices of social movements. In the case of activists, changing society 
effectively means changing the nature of the discourse. As Deva Woodly notes,  
for political challengers who set out to transform policy, shifting the 
mainstream public discourse is the best – and in most cases the only – way 
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to achieve lasting change. (…) [A] movement that effectively alters the 
terms of discourse can overcome considerable opposition and structural 
disadvantages to achieve sustained, meaningful change.428 
 
Movement discourse, Woodly further explains, has the power to indirectly influence politics by 
“rewriting the common understandings present in the discursive field upon which political 
possibilities are considered.”429 It is relevant to look at movement discourses it is “discourse 
through which people can make claims, articulate senses of justice, and express their 
identities.”430  
 To be sure, eventually, dominant discourses can lead to the passing of laws but until then 
both discourses and actual political decisions will exist side by side. Woodly gives two convincing 
accounts of this paradox, namely the marriage equality movement which was picking up steam 
and convincing many Americans (ultimately resulting in the nationwide legalization of same-sex 
marriage) despite many states initially passing laws banning it, and the living wage movement 
which despite achieving many legislative victories, failed to discursively mobilize many 
supporters and gaining a noticeable presence in the public arena.431 The power of movement 
discourse, thus, lies in creating “political acceptance”, meaning that it “takes on national 
importance so that it is routinely covered by the media, attended to by the public, and addressed 
by elected officials.”432 Thus especially social movement discourse – just as collective action 
framing – is concerned with a possible state of affairs that lies in the future. They “do not only 
describe what social reality is but also what it should be.”433 In this regard, as Steinberg argues, it 
is a common mistake to focus the analysis of change in the cultural or political landscape instead 
of “the discourse processes themselves as bearers of meaning.”434  
In the context of social activism, discourses are effectively “battles over meanings and 
definitions of reality, which play out within and among social movements, and among their 
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friends and foes, often in the public sphere.”435 Communication work in social movements 
mainly happens through the creation of discursive 'texts' in particular speaking out publicly. 
Public speech acts may be still the most effective weapon in the arsenal of any activist, as they 
“create (…) common political understandings of what is at stake in a political issue as well as what 
the polity can do to answer those stakes.”436 The first two instances of post-Snowden protests 
against the NSA were street demonstrations where activists gave public speeches and thus had 
the ability to extensively frame anti-surveillance sentiments. In the subsequent exclusively online 
campaigns public speech was largely missing, making it arguably harder for activists to influence 
the surveillance discourse (see sections 4.3-4.4).  
To effectively identify the units to sample, one has to map the 'discursive field', “the 
mutually recognized sets of genres through which people communicate intelligibly about a social 
situation or issue.”437 As in the field of privacy movement discourse, the interrelating genres 
include generally politics, law, and culture, respectively – which level of privacy citizens can 
expect from the state; what are the philosophical and legal frameworks upon which notions of 
privacy rests; and how privacy rights are culturally and historically affected and constructed.  
 In addition, discourses take places in particular moral contexts, “relevant circumstances 
(…) determined by the arguer's concerns or values.”438 Anti-surveillance movement discourse is 
frequently debated within two main competing circumstances –in which privacy movement 
discourse takes place – an allegedly insecure post 9/11 world full of terrorism threats v. an alleged 
mass surveillance society threatening the personal liberties of citizens (see section 2.4). They 
simultaneously are the foundation for “circumstantial premises” – “ways of representing the 
world” that act as “premises into reasoning about what we should do”439 and which guide the 
proposed solutions: An intelligence official in charge of protecting the populace contributes to 
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the discourse under different circumstances and duties and calls for different measures than a 
privacy advocate. Or in the words of Fairclough: “agents may disagree on the right action partly 
because they define the context of action in radically different ways (…) in relation to different 
and often incompatible values or concerns.”440 
 The basic structure of discourses is one of subjects and objects. Subjects construct 
representation of reality with the use of “coherent system[s] of meaning”441, namely rhetorical 
devices such as metaphors or imagery.442 Subjects of a discourse are defined by van Dijk as 
“political actors – individuals (…), political institutions and organizations, engaged in political 
processes and events.”443 The subjects in the case of my analysis are thus privacy advocacy 
organizations, whose role in the political system and for the privacy discourse in general have 
been discussed above.  
 Objects are central as they are representations of political issues that are essentially 
brought to life by including them in the discourse in the first place; Ian Parker goes even so far as 
to assert that “[m]any of the objects that discourses refers to do not exist in a realm outside 
discourse.”444 One example would be the idea that an Orwellian 'Big Brother' –type totalitarian 
surveillance state has been established with the goal to strip off citizens’ privacy. The object – a 
mass surveillance society is then communicated through a 'system of meaning' – the 'Big 
Brother'-trope.  
 
Anti-Surveillance Metaphors  
Describing NSA surveillance as 1984-like is not so much a metaphor but rather a metonymy, 
defined by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson by its “referential function, that is, it allows us to use 
one entity to stand for another.”445 Rhetorical devices, especially metaphors deserve special 
scrutiny in any given discourse. For some scholars, representations including metaphors are the 
main focus of any Discourse Analysis, as they “provide premises in arguments for actions.”446 
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Metaphors (and metonymies) are thus especially adequate to construct representations of reality: 
Like discourses, 
Metaphors have entailments through which they highlight and make 
coherent certain aspects of our experience. A given metaphor may be the 
only way to highlight and coherently organize exactly those aspects of our 
experience. Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. 
A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of 
course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the 
metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be 
self-fulfilling prophecies.447 
 
The potential of metaphors to 'create realities' lies, according to an Aristotelian definition, in 
introducing “a strong and vivid expression that can create powerful images and change minds by 
comparing one thing with another.”448 For the analyst the choice of metaphors also reveals details 
about the intentions and value system of the discourse participant.449 Like arguments metaphors 
and other rhetorical tools are also highly dialectical as they “are always available from other 
discourses, and the space this gives a speaker to find a voice from another discourse, and even 
within a discourse they oppose is limitless.”450 For example, comparing data to oil, proponents 
and opponents of corporate surveillance have appropriated industrial and environmental 
discourses to call for either exploitation (‘mining’) or protection of data.451 Because surveillance is 
intangible in nature it particularly attracts the use of wide variety of metaphors. 452 
 
Transnational Discourses 
While Discourse Analysis is usually applied to the analysis of 'Western' discourses it is 
nonetheless also appropriate for discourses that take place in the 'Global South'.453 In fact, 
'macro'-social movement Discourse Analysis usually “concentrates on the global meaning of texts 
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and on their interpretation.”454 This includes examining movements' coalitions and mobilizing 
strategies by “utiliz[ing] textual analysis to show relationships between what is talked about and 
written about in movements and broad cultural templates.”455 Transnational discourses feature 
peculiar characteristics because “people involved in cross-cultural communication clearly 
construct discourse to suit the communicative needs of an international audience” and “adapting 
their native identities to a common plan.”456 How this “interaction between linguistic and 
cultural factors”457 works (or is absent) within transnational anti-surveillance campaigns is 
shown in the case studies in sections 4.2 - 4.4. It has to be noted that – very similar to 
transnational frames – taking a discourse to a global level complicates matters. In general, while 
in the wake of globalization specialized international/transnational discourses have evolved and 
responded to global problems, “local constraints and specific cultural aspects still represent a 
relevant conditioning factor (…) strictly depending on the different cultural linguistic and legal 
environments in which it takes place.”458 
 
Selecting Texts and Materials 
Sampling the relevant 'texts' is – besides the process of analyzing – the most important and 
delicate task of a Discourse Analysis. Without texts there is no discourse.459 Texts defined as 
“verbal records of language”460 or, more specifically, “delimited tissues of meaning reproduced in 
any form that can be given an interpretative gloss,”461 must be part of the discourse at hand and 
produced by subjects (usually speakers, authors, or organizations) that have a legitimate 
mandate to speak for the particular issue at hand. In a social movement context, usually 
“manifestos, records of debates at meetings, actions of political demonstrators, newspaper 
articles, slogans, speeches, posters, satirical prints, statutes of association, pamphlets,”462 are 
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considered as relevant texts. In fact, discourse analysis is the leading method to examine texts in 
social movement studies, namely to understand how they “are composed and draw on existing 
discourses in order to communicate particular meanings.“463  
Internal and organizational documents are among the most promising sources as they 
often are the direct result of deliberate internal discourse.464 The task here is to identify key texts 
that are “important” for a number or reasons: popular reach, written in particular moments in 
time, or related to events of interest. Other criteria include the position or the standing of the 
author in the discourse as well as practical matters such as availability and the ability to 
effectively sample a text body. The more people or constituents are reached with a text the better 
and more objective a discourse analysis arguably becomes, as wide distribution usually 
“increase[s] confidence in generalizability”465 of the interpretative results. A pro privacy 
demonstration attended by 10 people has most likely no effect on wider audiences nor produces 
a sufficient number of accompanying texts. However, this does not mean that such an event, or 
the texts produced for it are irrelevant. In the end the author has to be able to rationally defend 
his choice466. As Phillips and Hardy explain, 
the challenge is not to find texts but deciding which texts to choose (and 
to justify that choice to reviewers). The difficulty for discourse analysts, 
then, is how to identify a manageable, relatively limited corpus of texts 
that is helpful in exploring the construction of the object of analysis.467 
 
No Discourse Analysis can include the complete field of relevant actors as a whole. By default, 
“some actors and subject positions will remain invisible.”468 Those voices that are being included 
in the analysis are usually given privilege over those left out. Here, the influence of the analyst 
becomes most apparent.469  
  
Protest events as discursive sites 
One way to gain generalizability is to analyze texts from all participants of a specific event (as 
demonstrated in the case studies chapter). This is efficient for two reasons. First, events itself “in 
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their semiotic aspect are texts, including spoken as well as written texts, electronic texts, and  
'multimodal' texts which combine language, image, music, body language etc.”470 Hank 
Johnston's reading of Steinberg's research on movements in the 19th century suggests links 
between protest events and discourses because “what was written (…) influenced protest action, 
which in turn influenced what was talked about again.”471 Secondly, events are research sites, 
which “make the subject of inquiry easily visible.” Just like texts and speakers, such event-based 
case studies “that focu[s] empirically and analytically (…) on a single instance or variant of some 
empirical phenomenon”472 – have to be carefully selected.  
Other important criteria include criticalness, deviancy, and uniqueness of the given 
case.473 In the case of privacy activists, whose daily work increasingly takes place behind the 
scenes, the rare instances of protest events make their work visible in the public arena. Case 
studies, in social movement research, generally “focus on and seek to illuminate (…) a set of 
movement processes,”474 in the context of a “social event or happening.”475 In the end, the protest 
events, which I have selected as case studies will provide the opportunity to acquire “a holistic – 
that is richly or thickly contextualized and embedded – understanding”476 of the anti-
surveillance discourse. 
 
Potentials and limitations of social movement discourse analysis 
Ironically, when it comes to analyzing the data and reaching a conclusion, each discourse analyst 
becomes herself or himself active in shaping the discourse of the given topic. Especially in 
contrast to quantitative research, notions of validity and reliability must be – if not completely 
abandoned – at least seen in a different light given the very foundation of which Discourse 
Analysis is built upon. While the narrative extracted from the analysis must be convincing, 
understandable and legitimate, validity “is not relevant when epistemological and ontological 
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assumptions maintain that there is no 'real' world other than one constructed through 
discourse” and reliability “is nonsensical when one is interested in generating and exploring 
multiple – and different – readings of a situation.”477  
Whether discourse analysis can be applied to identify strategic potentials for the success 
of social movement actors is another question. Isabella Fairclough, in her 'Political Discourse 
Analysis' approach is convinced that the method is able to identify efficient modes of political 
action and strategy – and thus may be particularly able to use in a social movement context. 
Similarly, Lase Lindekilde stresses that Discourse Analysis can at its best explain, “why certain 
arguments are chosen over others in a particular context.”478 Because speech contains 
argumentation it is necessarily strategic and rational. Any argument, “understood as a social and 
rational activity of attempting to justify or refute a certain claim, and aiming to persuade an 
interlocutor (…) of the acceptability (…) of a claim”479 is designed to influence other people’s 
beliefs and actions.480  
 The three dimensions of arguments – logical, dialectical, and rhetorical481 – further stress 
the strategical nature of every argument brought forward in a discourse. Privacy advocates’ main 
argument has been backed in a 'logical', i.e. sufficient, acceptable and relevant way: The 
Snowden leaks, documents coming directly from the NSA, are undisputed facts which have 
greatly increased the rational persuasiveness of their claims. Privacy movement discourse is also 
highly dialectical as it critically refers to the arguments of surveillance proponents. For example, 
by explicitly rebuffing or debunking security/fear frames designed by pro-surveillance 
politicians, pundits, and other officials their “[a]rgumentation involves dialogue because it 
always arises in response to some difference of opinion, some expressed or anticipated doubt or 
criticism.”482 Finally anti-surveillance discourse attempts to be rhetorical – that is positively 
rhetorical in the sense of being effective and persuasive rather than deceiving. The latter kind of 
negatively connoted rhetoric or spin is commonly attributed to politicians or parties rather than 
to social movements. Privacy activists, for example by evoking the possibility of a totalitarian 
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future without any privacy, nevertheless certainly try to “tap into widely shared feelings, desires, 
instincts or sensitivities.”483  
 Yet the most effective approach to design an argument is to combine dialectical and 
rhetorical devices. This pragmatic pairing of reasonable yet effective claims was coined by van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser as “strategic maneuvering.”484 An example would be privacy movement 
discourse that incorporates both reasonable legal claims such as international privacy rights and 
more emotionally-charged cultural references such as 'Big Brother' that mutually reinforce each 
other. 'Inter-discursivity', however, the “mixing [of] existing discourses in new ways” most 
famously embodied by the civil rights movement which effectively combined Christian and 
human rights discourses,485 remains as one of the promising sources when it comes to drafting 
key arguments aimed at social change. 
 However, Isabella Fairclough is careful not to equate strategies with discourses, as in the 
end strategies have only a discursive dimension, in the sense that arguments voiced within a 
given discourse are usually voiced strategically.486 In sum, activist must ask themselves “if the 
action that is being advocated really leads to achieving the [preferred] goal?”487 Even when the 
outcome of a debate is closer to the positions of elites, activists have nonetheless contributed a 
“reasonable disagreement resolution”488 which might be the basis for further discourses. 
 Other authors argue that the research goal of a Discourse Analysis in a Social Movement 
context – especially when compared to Frame Analysis – is not so much to answer 'why'- but 
rather 'how'-questions. While discourse analysis may be able to shine light on reasons of a 
movement's failure or success (parameters which are hard to assess in the first place), it is rather 
“characterized by an intensive focus on movement-related texts to identify patterns, linkages, 
and structures of ideas.”489 Thus, in the case of privacy advocates it is not necessarily the task of 
the discourse analyst to explain the failure or success, of mobilizing constituents to resist 
surveillance but instead to ask how such groups express opposition to surveillance or the 
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protection of privacy rights by using “broader cultural symbols.”490  
 
3.3 Interviews in Social Movement Research 
Combining discourse and frame analysis with semi-structured interviews is a proven choice to 
methodologically enhance any study of Social Movement organizations or actors engaged in 
contentious politics. The underlying premise is here that a “[m]ultitude of methods 
acknowledges that all methodologies are limited.”491 Especially when looking at particular protest 
events, social movement research should apply a variety of qualitative methods including 
interviews in order to grasp the scope of the movement’s activities as a whole.492  
Adding interviews to the methodological toolbox has two main benefits for a social 
movement researcher. First and foremost, interviews are an important source for additional 
information and understanding about a movement or protest event. In general, della Porta 
stresses, “interviews constitute a fundamental tool for generating empirical knowledge through 
asking people to talk about certain themes.”493 Combining discourse and frame analysis with 
interviews shields the researcher against common critiques that the former methods lack 
empirical rigor. From a neo-positivist perspective, the recorded statements of activists constitute 
actual facts about protest events or campaigns.494 Thus, interviews do give the researcher an 
additional layer of empirical information about a campaign or movement actor.  
As Kathleen Blee and Verta Taylor point out, “[interviews] provide greater breadth and 
depth of information, the opportunity to discover the respondent's experience and interpretation 
of reality, and access to people's ideas, thoughts, and memories.”495 This was true for my own 
research as well, as I elaborate in section 5: By interviewing key people of the privacy movement I 
received crucial insights into many dimensions of their activities that were previously unknown 
to me and helped in making sense of the movement as a whole. This included accounts of the 
organization of particular protest events as well as their prelude and aftermath, internal 
discussions about framing tactics and mobilization strategies, and personal reflections on the 
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successes and failures of particular campaigns. Further they illuminated periods of 'abeyance' – 
periods of time “when there is little visible movement activity.”496 To ask organizers about 
specific framing activities proved particularly fruitful. In this regard, as Staggenborg points out, 
interviews are often needed to understand strategic choices, and to explain movement 
mobilization and outcomes.”497 By interviewing privacy activists, I learned more about why 
certain frames were applied and what the motivations and deliberations behind those frames 
were.  
 This is particularly true for campaigns that have not necessarily produced a large body of 
official texts or featured a roster of organizations that are rather obscure or small.498 Without 
talking directly to representatives of privacy advocacy groups in, say, for example, East Africa or 
Eastern Europe, I would have not been able to adequately assess the scope and aims of their daily 
work as well as their degree of participation within transnational protest networks. Thus 
interviewing members of these kinds of organizations that “are difficult to locate, generate few 
documents, or have unclear or changing memberships”499 were indispensable for my research. 
Collecting information from activists through interviews is especially important in the context of 
online protest events. As opposed to offline protests, and this will be shown in the case study 
chapter, the former tend to produce less activist media and official documents and thus make 
both the overall context as well as specific framing choices less obvious. By selecting the right 
activists, or 'key informants', the researcher can “obtain descriptive information that might be 
too difficult and time-consuming to uncover through more structured data-gathering 
techniques.”500  
 In sum, besides being an additional source of information, interviews “are of fundamental 
importance for the study of motives, beliefs, and attitudes, as well as the identities and emotions 
of activists.”501 While interviews can give insights into media tactics and practices, the 
information expressed by activists in my case went beyond simply examining their 
communication strategies. In fact, in many cases representatives of privacy advocacy groups 
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shared emotions and feelings about the state of the movement as a whole, voiced frustrations 
about the pitfalls of activism or even made off-the record comments, that although I cannot 
quote them, provided an intimate look into personal dimensions of organized grassroots 
contention. By conducting interviews with activists I could tap into a different set of data – 
“individual and collective visions, imaginings, hopes, expectations, critique of the present, and 
projection of the future on which the possibility of collective action rest”502 – which was not 
revealed in official pamphlets and press releases. The interview format offers activists to 
essentially engage in what Clifford Geertz has coined as 'thick description' and hence gives them 
“a chance to openly express their opinions on the issue at hand.”503 
 Equally important, interviews can counter the individualized interpretations of both the 
researcher and the movement leaders. Interviews present activists with the opportunity to 
describe protest events and campaigns “in their own words rather than in the words of the 
researcher”.504 While official texts should speak for themselves, the multitude of involved actors 
and the surrounding media coverage have the inherent potential to distort what actually 
happened and what the stated goal and tactics were. By letting the activists recount certain 
events or periods of time, my analysis in many cases became less subjective. In some instances, 
activists that I interviewed challenged and corrected my own interpretations and a priori 
assumptions. 
But interestingly, interviews do not only “minimiz[e] the voice of the researcher”505 but 
also put the published statements of opinion leaders within a movement into perspective. In 
general, one must be skeptical of the officially sanctioned statements from movement leaders 
and not equate them with the organizational discourse as a whole.506  As Blee and Taylor note, 
The propaganda and internal documents of social movement 
organizations (…) are often produced by official leaders and those who are 
articulate, educated, and confident about the historic importance of their 
movement activities. (…) Interviewing is one means of counteracting the 
biased availability of documentary material about social movements 
whose activities and understandings would otherwise be lost or filtered 
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through the voices of others.507 
 
By interviewing privacy activists, I learned that officially sanctioned narratives and frames were 
not only the product of intense deliberations and debates within highly heterogeneous networks 
but that organizers were sometimes highly skeptical about framing choices. At other times, when 
official narratives were repeated by interviewees I was at least able to challenge and scrutinize 
them by asking follow-up questions. For example, one element of some of the protest events that 
I was particularly interested in was the actual degree of transnational cooperation and solidarity. 
Following della Porta's advice of confronting interview partners with written statements 
and asking them to comment and reflect on their own individual role,508 I quoted a list of 
international NGOs that supposedly took part in that campaign and asked interviewees about the 
level of interaction with those groups – which, as laid out in section 5.3, at times yielded 
surprising results. Other suggested techniques such as offering own interpretations, asking 
hypothetical questions, or 'playing devil's advocate’ were applied as well.509 
While interviewees do offer a unique perspective their answers should not be taken at 
face-value. As proponents of methodological triangulation stress in the context of social 
movement research, interviews should only be one means of gathering data about a particular 
movement. Used on its own, interviews can generate distorted, inaccurate, or situational data, 
especially when interviewees retroactively exaggerate or diminish certain aspects of their work.510  
In order to gather a valid set of statements from social movement actors, two dimensions 
have to be taken into account: the role of the interviewer, the sample of interviewees. In my case 
I approached the activists and conducted the interviews as an outsider. Stephen Croucher and 
Daniel Cronn-Mills advice researchers to consider their “position in relation to what [they] are 
studying”511 and how this affects the questions that are asked and what kind of answers one 
receives. Not being intimately involved into the everyday life and work of privacy advocacy had 
the benefit of challenging beliefs and practices as only a non-participant could have.512 As a 'non-
participant' I was able to directly inquire about the successes or failures of some specific actions 
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or campaigns. I learned in the course of several interviews that asking about specific campaigns 
and assigning importance to them validated their life choices. However, at the same time, 
critically questioning some of the decisions and aspects of a campaign may have angered some 
interviewees. While my outsider perspective enabled me to ask question that go beyond the 
legalistic and technological framework of  the privacy community, there may have been limits of 
my understanding both of how invested my interview partners were in their work and how 
limited their resources are to effectively tackle issues such as online privacy or surveillance. In the 
end I tried to walk the fine line between being generally informed about the privacy advocacy 
community while at the same time being distanced enough to be able to independently study the 
subjects as Croucher and Cron-Mills have suggested. The former is necessary to better interpret 
the received statements and putting them in context. The more a researcher is involved in the 
social movement campaigns himself the harder it becomes to interpret statements from a 
distance. Ultimately it is a balancing act between avoiding of being too close and too 
subjective.513 
 It is equally important to aptly sample the activists that are interviewed and ask them 
'right' questions. In order to prepare for the latter, della Porta recommends to combine an 
“inductive approach with a deductively driven hypothesis.” Thus I applied the general knowledge 
about political communication of social movement organizations as outlined in this chapter. On 
the other hand possible respondents for semi-structured interviews were “chosen in a deliberate, 
but rarely random, sampling process” guided by the principle of “completeness.”514 As della Porta 
suggests, the social movement researcher should begin by making assumptions about the 
organizational or professional role of an interviewee. For example, because I predominantly 
talked to communications staffers of privacy activists groups I made the plausible assumption 
that they were able to reflect on the role of political communication and how it is has become 
crucial for both mobilizing constituents. 
 Overall, instead of quantitative or qualitative questionnaires the goal here was to assemble 
a comparatively small number of respondents515 and – guided by the research questions – extract 
enough information to be able to give a close as possible depiction of the movement as a whole. 
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To achieve a sense of 'completeness' (if that is possible given the heterogeneous nature of almost 
any movement or advocacy network) I tried to interview as many 'informers'516 as possible. As 
opposed to mere participants of a protest event or campaign, access to informers enabled me to 
listen to experts in their field who were active in key organizing roles not just merely bystanders 
at a rally. As Miller notes, “[t]he goal of the sampling is to secure a spread of individuals that 
represent all of the types or groups that are significant for the phenomenon or topic under 
construction.”517 Kevin Gillan and Jenny Pickerell, have stressed the importance of accurate and 
transparent sampling in the context of social movement research context. In what they describe 
as “the conundrum of who can represent a process that was necessarily collective,“ they pose the 
question of 
How would we select from a movement which numbers conservatively in 
the tens of thousands? And in particular, how would we justify this not 
only intellectually but also in terms honouring a movement that prided 
itself on its collectivity. Clearly here we are touching on a fundamental of 
social research, in which concerns about representativity need to be 
addressed for the project to be considered valid and reliable. 518 
 
In my case I interviewed a small, highly involved selection of representatives of key privacy 
organizations involved in the campaigns that I had previously examined closer as case studies. 
While this sample was far from being able to speak for all activists their statements nevertheless 
mirror certain sentiments prevailing in the international privacy advocacy community. To 
convince the reader that this is plausible my interview section make great use of quoting as many 
collected statements as possible, so in the end it is up to the reader to make a judgment.519 
Lastly and most importantly, once the data has been collected, one has to decide how to 
analyze the statements. It is at this step that the methodological triangulation comes specifically 
into effect. Because, in the realm of case study-based social movement research, not only are 
semi-structured interviews being applied separately (just as only discourse analysis or frame 
analysis) not sufficient to fully explain which communication practices were applied at a protest 
event. But instead of merely supplement the other methods, in-depth interviews offer the 
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researcher to integrate discourse and frame analysis into the stage of coding and critically 
question some of the previously identified discursive positions or frames. Della Porta essentially 
makes the point that the process of reading, interpreting, and connecting of observations, when 
analyzing interviews, essentially reflects the method of discourse analysis.520 Similarly, Blee and 
Taylor note that in the coding process, a focus can be on identifying “underlying themes, central 
ideas, core meanings, and the structures of narration”521 – which closely resembles the process of 
discourse or frame analysis. Johnston, too, acknowledges that interview statements should be 
analyzed as discourse, even if it is monologic instead of interactive.522 And Phillips and Hardy 
argue, that, even if the statements of interviewees do not actually reflect actual discourse 
(because the interview is guided by the interests of the researcher), at least “they can provide a 
legitimate source of data, especially if complemented with other texts.”523 In the end, interviews 
complement discourse and frame analysis because they are a great way for “overcoming the 
limited information contained in written sources.”524 Or as Mark Headley and Sara Clark argue, 
ultimately the place of interviews in the micro level discourse of social movement, along with 
discourse and frame analysis conciliate the weaknesses of each individual method, as “the 
presence in the text of individual voices (…) strikes a balance between tendencies to reify social 
movements as things unaffected by human agency, on one hand, and to reduce social 
movements to actions of individuals on the other.”525 
 
3.4 Research Design and Methodology 
The following qualitative analysis of anti-surveillance collective action frames of four key anti-
surveillance protest events is based on three datasets. In a first step, frame packages – sets of 
main organizing ideas, which inform the articulation of its particular core frames, and their 
exemplars526 were identified by conducting an inductive frame and discourse analysis of key 
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texts and materials surrounding each event. The materials that formed the basis for the analysis 
included, among other things, texts published on the campaigns' websites, online petitions, 
campaign logos, official press releases, web banners, and transcripts of speeches and 
mobilization videos. Because the campaigns were different in scope and structure, each case 
study section will specify which materials were considered. 
In general my frame categories are “based on a plausible assumption that [the officially 
published materials] are representative of the master frames.” Inductively identifying frames 
always involves subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher.527 Yet the analysis is 
focused on official materials and speeches published and voiced by “frame sponsors” – advocates 
“who use frames for strategic purposes.”528  Ultimately, as Gamson and Andre Modigliani point 
out, each framing analysis should attempt “to present enough rich textual material so that 
readers can form their own independent judgements on the validity of [the] argument.”529  To 
demonstrate the “systematic exposition of frame content,”530 I also created a frame matrix for 
each case study.531 
In a second step, each case study will examine how the frames were reproduced in 
newspapers and online media. For this purpose I searched the LexisNexis Academic news 
database for all items mentioning the particular protest campaign in the days leading up to the 
protest, the day of the protest, and its immediate aftermath. The framing devices that were 
reproduced in the news article — either by directly quoting or paraphrasing the activists’ texts 
and materials or adopting their overall interpretive package or corresponding exemplars — were 
counted. I thus follow Baldwin Van Gorp’s suggestion that “a statement or element originating 
from an external source and the prominence the journalist gives to it in a news story … have to 
be included in the analysis.”532  For example, The Nation in its reporting on the “Stop Watching 
Us”-campaign compared the public outcry over NSA surveillance to the reactions to the Church 
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Committee of the 1970s which investigated surveillance of civil rights activists.533 It therefore 
adopted the “History of Surveillance” package identified in the frame analysis. (detailed in 
section 4.1). The Toronto Star evoked transnational solidarity by quoting a member of the 
American Civil Liberties Union who noted that “Americans upset about domestic surveillance, 
and foreign allies … are coming to a head simultaneously.”534 Accordingly, the news item was 
counted as having adopted a “Global Dimension” frame (see sections 4.2- 4.4). The percentages 
of news items referencing each frame package were summarized and will guide the discussion of 
how collective action frames in the context of anti-surveillance activism were reproduced, 
adopted, multiplied ignored, or distorted.535 
Finally, to deepen the analysis in a third step, interviews were conducted with 21 privacy 
activists from 14 countries. As criteria for selecting the interviewees they had to work for 
organizations, which were part of one or more of the campaigns analyzed and/or had to be 
directly or indirectly involved in the communication work of their organizations. Their answers 
were transcribed and anonymized. Because in some countries only one legitimate privacy 
activist group exists, and some of them are essentially one person operations, to preserve 
anonymity, all references to countries of origin/residence, gender, and age were removed. They 
were thus identified by an alphabetical code, ranging from 'Interviewee A' to 'Interviewee U.’ 
Using a semi-structured questionnaire, interviews were conducted in the period between the 
winter of 2015 and fall of 2016 using audio and video calls over Skype, Google Hangouts, and 
Jitsi. 
 
4. CASE STUDIES 
 
4.1 “Restore the Fourth” / “1984 Day” 
On July 4th, 2013 the first activist response to the Snowden leaks took place in the United States. 
Mainly coordinated through message boards on the social news website Reddit, in more than 80 
                                                 
533 Cf. Zoe Carpenter, “Privacy Advocates Turn up the Heat on the "Business-as-Usual Brigade,” The Nation's Blogs, 
October 25, 2013 (via LexisNexis). 
534 Mitch Potter, “Public's NSA fury to descend on Washington; Europe's anger over spying echoed in protest 
planned for National Mall Saturday. “ The Toronto Star, October 26,2013 (via LexisNexis). 
535 Author’s note: The methodology is also based on my previously published article. Cf. Wäscher, “Framing Against 
Surveillance,” 372. 
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American cities (as well in Munich, Germany)536 people took to the streets to protest NSA 
surveillance. The date for the protest event was not selected randomly; by holding rallies on the 
federal holiday of Independence Day, the organizers deliberately linked the contemporary 
struggle for privacy to Colonial history. The name of the movement, “Restore the Fourth,” was 
based on the activists’ belief that the Snowden leaks had violated the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, which guarantees protection against unwarranted search and seizure practices 
(see section 2.6), and that it was time to strengthen and reapply the amendment to modern 
communication practices. More specifically, the three core demands were to reform section 215 of 
the controversial Patriot Act; the creation of an oversight committee to keep checks on 
surveillance programs; and initiate accountability measures for public service figures involved in 
domestic spying activities.537  
In the words of the organizers, the goal was to articulate “opposition to the 
unconstitutional surveillance methods employed by the US government, especially via the NSA 
and its recently-revealed PRISM program.”538 The organizers had high expectations and hoped to 
set off a new wave of privacy activism across the United States and the world. Two activists from 
the digital rights group Fight for the Future, Tiffiniy Cheng and Evan Greer, in an opinion piece 
for the Huffington Post, called “Restore the Fourth” “a turning point for opposing mass 
government surveillance. [The protests] are the beginning of a large outcry that will continue 
until we hear real answers and real accountability.”539 A follow-up protest event launched by the 
                                                 
536 Cf. Heather Kelly, “Protests against the NSA spring up across U.S.” CNN.com, July 5, 2013 (accessed January 6, 
2016) http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/04/tech/web/restore-nsa-protests/. It is unclear exactly how many cities 
participated in the first “Restore the Fourth” Protest. A subsequently released call for donations mentioned only 
50 cities. See “Restore the Fourth: Secure your Privacy.” (accessed January 6, 2016) 
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/restore-the-fourth-secure-your-privacy#/.   
537 The exact wording in the 'Restore the Fourth': press release: “1.Enact reform this Congress to Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, the state secrets privilege, and the FISA Amendments Act to make clear that blanket 
surveillance of the Internet activity and phone records of any person residing in the U.S. is prohibited by law and 
that violations can be reviewed in adversarial proceedings before a public court; 2.Create a special committee to 
investigate, report, and reveal to the public the extent of this domestic spying. This committee should create 
specific recommendations for legal and regulatory reform to end unconstitutional surveillance; 3.Hold 
accountable those public officials who are found to be responsible for this unconstitutional surveillance.” 
“National Organization of Restore the Fourth AMA,” Reddit.com, July, 2, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016) 
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1hijib/we_are_the_national_organization_of_restore_the/ (from 
here on out referred to as RT4 AMA.) 
538 RT4 AMA 
539 Tiffiniy Cheng and Evan Greer. “Dear NSA: We’re Throwing You a 4th of July Party, and It’s Gonna Be Big.” The 
Huffington Post, July 4th, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tiffiniy-
cheng/restore-the-fourth-amendment_b_3544740.html.  
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same activist network (notably smaller in terms of scope, turn-out, and the amount of press 
coverage it generated) took place exactly one month after 'Restore the Fourth'. Because this time 
the set date was August 4th, 2013 (8/4 in American English notation, hinting at 1984) and making 
Orwellian notions of surveillance its central theme, it was aptly titled “1984 Day.” 
 The following section summarizes and analyzes the anti-surveillance narratives and 
frames employed by the loose coalition of the “Restore the Fourth” (RT4) network and its 
accompanying media coverage. The main sources for the analysis include the social news site 
Reddit’s 'AMA' (“Ask me Anything”) thread which was set up by the national RT4 committee to 
inform the public, answer questions, and act as a communication hub; official press releases and 
media distributed by the organizers, transcripts of speeches of activists participating in four of 
the largest rallies, namely in Washington, D.C. (“Restore the Fourth”), New York City (“Restore 
the Fourth” and “1984 Day”) as well as San Francisco (“1984 Day”); protest art distributed online 
and displayed at protest events; and media reports on the events resulting mainly from a 
LexisNexis database search. A close reading of these materials will reveal a set of particular anti-
surveillance frames packages and devices as well as give insights into the general communication 
strategy of the organizers. 
Even though “Restore the Fourth” was set-up on short-notice, as a prime example of an 
attempt at “digitally enabled social change”, it managed to garner considerable momentum 
thanks to the large Reddit-community. On the AMA page user ‘douglasmacarthur,’ Social Media 
Coordinator and Interim Press Coordinator of RT4, explained the evolution from talking on 
message boards to setting up a physical nationwide protest network: 
Being grassroots and volunteer and online and working to a short deadline 
– less than a month between the 4th and when this was first being put 
together by then-anonymous college-aged strangers – puts up a lot of 
obstacles but we're willing to deal with whatever we have to in order to get 
this done and our ability to self-organize has increased considerably, and 
that's a big part of why we've gotten so much large scale promotion 
together in these critical last few days.540 
 
Restore the Fourth officials in the Reddit threat also sought to clarify the movements’ goals. As 
Reddit user Mike13815, Marketing Coordinator and lead organizer of RT4’s Buffalo, New York 
branch elaborated, “Restore the Fourth” tried to open certain discursive spaces while closing 
                                                 
540 RT4 AMA 
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others. By bringing large numbers of people to the streets, the organizers wanted to the steer a 
perceived anti-privacy discourse in a different direction: “Our purpose isn't to protest. Instead, 
our rallies/protests are to gain support and visibility for our goals. Making the Fourth 
Amendment a ‘Hot Button Issue’ come election time is well within the realm of possibility. The 
hope is to make any opposition to the idea of privacy 'Political Suicide.'”541 In the words of 
douglasmacarthur what “Restore the Fourth” set out to create was “not just protests but a long-
term infrastructure to take part in legal action, political lobbying, and the like.”542 The street 
demonstrations were merely a first step “to promote the issue itself.”543  
The organizers identified a lack of awareness as the key problem fellow privacy activists 
had been facing in the past. With “Restore the Fourth”, the organizers tried to get the issue of 
privacy beyond the filter bubble of Reddit and other social networking sites. While the 
mainstream media were covering the NSA leaks they did not get the whole picture, according to 
douglasmacarthur:  
Hanging out on Reddit and political blogs may give you the impression 
everyone is talking about this. But they aren't, a certain demographic is 
and we need to mobilize these people to spreading it to the American 
people as a whole. We want [cable networks] CNN and FOX and MSNBC 
to stop covering the less important aspects of this and start covering the 
scandal, the illegality.544  
 
In fact, the largest rally was held in Washington, D.C. precisely “to be more visible than some of 
the other protests, and [to have] the ability to engage lawmakers more effectively”545 as the 
official Outreach Coordinator scarletsaint explained. Yet, the organizers were careful not to 
equate large street turnouts with effects on the surveillance discourse. The goal was not merely to 
generate headlines (though this was still feasible) but also to influence discourse on the micro 
level as douglasmacarthur pointed:  
[T]his isn't the kind of thing where we focus just on getting the biggest 
crowds possible. You can get a million people to a single location for a 
protest and accomplish nothing (and it's happened). The point is to 
spread the word, and you don't need a traditional 'protest' to do that. You 
don't need to travel anywhere or use an event that is listed on the site. If 
                                                 
541 RT4 AMA 
542 RT4 AMA 
543 RT4 AMA 
544 RT4 AMA 
545 RT4 AMA 
101 
 
there's nothing nearby, consider just downloading some of our literature 
and printing it off and letting some people at your local 4th of July 
festivities know about this thread to our privacy and to the constitution.546 
 
Ultimately the RT4 protests on July 4th were designed to act as launching pad for 
institutionalized, permanent opposition to government surveillance. While having been inspired 
by preceding grassroots protests such as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, organizers wanted 
to avoid pitfalls and mistakes these movements had made. In order to create a permanent public 
presence against government spying, MacArthur explained, 
Several things need to happen. For one, you need a broad and hopefully 
diverse base of support. For two, you need a concrete set of demands to 
define ‘change.’ For three, you need to set up not just a protest and other 
promotional work, but an actual organization that will keep you in the 
news long-term and provide the resources for people to take direct action 
(i.e. legally) repeatedly and persistently. OWS [Occupy Wall Street] and 
the Tea Party each brought a lot of attention to themselves at first but 
changed little by failing do to those three things. Groups that have had 
more influence – like the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] and the 
NRA [National Rifle Association] – have succeeded at those three things. 
We have the first two and are preparing for the third. We're not going to be 
just another protest. We're going to make this into a much bigger deal.547  
 
Collective action frames in “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 Day” 
Both campaigns featured four distinct frame packages, “American Patriotism,” “Non-
Partisanship,” “Constitutionalism” and “Orwellian Totalitarianism” (see table I). 
 
                                                 
546 RT4 AMA 
547 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
“Restore the Fourth”/”1984 Day” 
Frame Package Core Frame Core Position Exemplars  
American Patriotism NSA surveillance programs violate 
core American values such as 
freedom, liberty and independence 
and are an affront to the founding of 
the United States 
Americans who love their home country 
should oppose government surveillance 
because it is un-American.  
Call for “for a new American 
revolution declaring our 
independence from the 
surveillance state” (Restore the 
Fourth March NYC) 
Non-Partisanship The opposition against government 
surveillance transcends opposing 
ideologies and party lines. 
Regardless of political affiliations, 
conservatives, liberals, and progressives 
should join forces because surveillance 
affects everyone. 
“[We] don’t] care how you feel 
about Democrats or gays or 
public sector union leaders so 
long as you don't read their 
email without their permission.” 
(Reddit) 
Constitutionalism The only way to effectively scale back 
the NSA’s surveillance regime is to 
strictly adhere to the constitution and 
the 4th amendment in particular, 
which had been violated in the past. 
Each intelligence agency should be 
restricted by a literal reading of the 4th 
amendment: “The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,[a] against 
- “Restore the Fourth!” 
-“Bill of Rights-luya”-chant at 
the Restore the Fourth March 
New York” 
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TABLE I: Frame matrix detailing dominant anti-surveillance frames in the “Restore the 
Fourth” and “1984 Day” campaigns. 
 
American Patriotism 
The dominant interpretive package for the “Restore the Fourth”-framing was to portray opposing 
government surveillance as a patriotic duty. By scheduling the protest event to take place on a 
national holiday celebrating the United States' independence from colonial rule, the organizers 
tried to utilize Americans’ attachment to their homeland to create a powerful anti-government 
surveillance narrative. As Jonathan Trueblood, coordinator for the Iowa City and Cedar Rapids 
RT4 march elaborated:  
Obviously the Fourth of July is a day we remember our independence as a 
country, and it's kind of a reminder of the constitution, (...) [s]o we try to 
make it a mix about these sad things going on and the trampling of our 
rights, but we still do have these rights and it's not too late, we can still 
make a change and take action to restore them to what they once were.548  
 
Indirectly national coordinator douglasmacarthur suggested that “Restore the Fourth” was a 
continuation of the American Independence movement, because “[t]he people who wrote the 
Fourth Amendment were essentially a protest group.”  
 The official RT4 logo (see image I), featured an American eagle covered behind a lock 
underlined by the caption 'Secure Your Privacy' and the official hashtag #restorethefourth. 
Colored in red, blue, and white as well as being framed by 50 stars the logo is purposefully 
designed to resemble key features of the American flag. Other user generated media distributed 
online include similar images quoting the Fourth Amendment in full (see image II) or 
articulating core demands (see image III) with the Star Spangled Banner prominently displayed 
in the front or back. One user/activist even created an image of the American flag and replaced 
                                                 
548 “'Restore the Fourth' rally in Cedar Rapids Thursday to protest government surveillance.” The Gazette, July 1, 2013 
(accessed January 6, 2016). http://www.thegazette.com/2013/07/01/restore-the-fourth-rally-in-cedar-rapids-
thursday-to-protest-government-surveillance.  
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated.” 
Orwellian 
Totalitarianism 
NSA surveillance is a form of 
indiscriminate mass surveillance 
resembling the dystopian fiction of 
‘Nineteen Eighty-For’. 
NSA and its international partners 
engage in totalitarian, “suspicionless 
mass surveillance” that will either lead to 
totalitarian society or has already 
surpassed level of surveillance depicted 
in ‘Nineteen Eighty-For’. 
“George Orwell's novel 1984 is a 
chilling vision of what might lie 
ahead if we don't take action.” 
(Occupywallstreet.com) 
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the stars representing the states with the logos of various U.S. intelligence agencies and 
surveillance programs (see image IV). 
 
 
IMAGE I: Restore the Fourth Logo 
 
Within the online community of Reddit the decision to stage the first major protest answer to 
the NSA surveillance program during a holiday became a source of contention for some users. 
But as the communication staffers explained, they wanted have an anti-surveillance discourse 
coincide with the celebration of the history of the United States. As douglasmacarthur 
elaborated:  
One criticism we’ve gotten about the date is that we’d be ‘competing’ with 
the celebrations. But we aren’t’ competing with them. We are integrated 
with them. The 4th of July is already about what we’re protesting. What 
better time to fight for your rights or inform others of the need to than 
when you’re already celebrating the ones you have? (…) Our National 
Coordinator sells fireworks for a living… that’s how damn connected to the 
4th of July this is.549  
 
                                                 
549 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
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IMAGE II: User generated protest flyer for “Restore the Fourth” 
 
Independence Day – at least in the eyes of the organizers – was seen as a discursive opportunity 
to address government surveillance. People were encouraged to transform their traditional 
backyard barbecues into meetings to discuss privacy and surveillance matters: “What do you do 
while you BBQ and drink beer? You talk to your friends! What better thing to talk to them about 
than the future of the nation they’re currently celebrating? Set it up so you can BBQ and drink 
beer with them while you discuss the constitution and hand out literature.”550 Local organizer 
tried to launch protest events and marches in close proximity to historical landmarks. For 
instance, as Reddit user FiletOfBaby from Philadelphia proclaimed: “[W]e’ll be loud and proud 
standing amongst the graves of patriots and revolutionary era soldiers in Washington Square 
                                                 
550 RT4 AMA. 
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Park. The symbolism in this city is just too palpable.”551 In a symbolic gesture, the RT4 chapter in 
NYC marched to Federal Hall, where the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was 
signed. The New York march also saw the birth of the protest caption “The answer to 1984 is 
1776”, an inter-discursive slogan that combined historical and literary framings and would be 
featured prominently in subsequent campaigns. 
 
IMAGE III: “Restore the Fourth” protest art 
Asked whether peaceful, non-violent protest would be effective to target government 
surveillance, Marketing Coordinator Mike13815 replied on Reddit that “[w]e owe it to the 
foundation of America, and democracy itself, to first attempt resolution through official channels 
and methods.”552  In part, by linking anti-surveillance sentiments to feelings of patriotism, the 
organizers wanted to create an inclusive platform and separate themselves from protest groups in 
the past that were highly critical of the United States itself.553 To a Reddit user concerned about 
                                                 
551 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
552 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
553 Maybe personified best was this stance by a Vietnam veteran who attended the follow-up event '1984 Day' in New 
York City. He explained his participation in the protest by saying “I'm a former United States marine. I was a rifle 
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participating in “Restore the Fourth” and being labeled unpatriotic, douglasmacarthur 
recommended to “[e]xplain to them that any genuinely anti American elements (…) associated 
with protest movements aren't present in this one, and that people petitioning their government 
and the constitution are the two most patriotic things there are.”554 Part of the strategy to 
mobilize people was to remind them of successful movements in the past including the 
American Revolution and, to a lesser extent, the Civil Rights movement. To Reddit users who 
expressed cynicism towards the idea of reforming the surveillance regime of the United States 
through activism, Raleigh organizer oracle989 replied:  
It's easy to feel like you can't change anything, but that's the argument for 
inaction that many movements before have faced. Civil Rights protestors 
in the 50s and 60s surely faced that sentiment, as did the revolutionaries in 
the 1770s. It's what those who run these surveillance programs want you to 
say. It's the reaction they hope you have. Don't give them the 
satisfaction!555   
 
 
IMAGE IV: “Restore the Fourth” protest art (2) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
instructor in Vietnam in 1961. I'm disabled, I have bilateral hearing loss. I love the country, I love the people, but 
the government is criminal.” And another protestor at the same event added: “If this doesn't apply anymore 
(shows protest sign quoting 4th amendment) then this is not the United States of America anymore.” “1984 Day: 
Why People Are Protesting The NSA.” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUbZw9sNX8Q.  
554 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
555 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
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Protestors and activists marching on the streets adapted the patriotism angle suggested by the 
organizers.556 For Tim Carr of the Media Reform NGO ‘Free Press’ opposing surveillance was a 
patriotic duty. Whistleblowers like Edward Snowden were not traitors but patriots. Speaking to 
the protest crowd in New York City he shouted “I'm wearing red, white, and blue today because I 
believe that protest against government abuse of power is the ultimate form of patriotism.“557 
Former whistleblower Thomas Drake, who in 2005 had exposed secret NSA spying programs, 
framed in his appearance (the only 'Restore the Fourth'- speech that was broadcast nationwide 
by NBC) the current state of surveillance also in patriotic terms. He called “for a new American 
revolution declaring our independence from the surveillance state” urging listeners to “reflect on 
how the United States has become the very kind of secret, undemocratic, authoritarian and 
imperialist nation against who we fought the first American Revolution.” With current systems of 
government spying, Drake concluded, “our flag now flies upside down,” while “the blanket of 
national security is suffocating the liberty of the people.”558 In the minds of many “Restore the 
Fourth” participants, including Sue Udr, Executive Director of Defending Dissent Foundation, 
their privacy activism was just “doing what our founding fathers wanted us to do.”559 
 Congressman Alan Grayson, representing Central Florida in the House of Representatives, 
suggested in statement that was read out loud at the “Restore the Fourth” event in Washington, 
D.C.  that the Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, even though written more than 200 
years ago, should be applied to modern day technologies: “The founding fathers had no 
spaceships, they had no computers, they had no helicopters. We have all of these things that 
have been created through 200 years and more of progress. Has that changed anything 
fundamental in the way that we should be governed?”560  
 When RT4-director Andrea O'Neill made her closing remarks at the D.C. rally with the 
audience chanting 'U-S-A!' in the background she let the protest crowds know “that today is not 
                                                 
556 Of course, patriotism is a way to frame any kind of protest, particularly in the U.S., and the post-Snowden privacy 
movement was far from being the first to do so. Cf. Simon Hall, American Patriotism, American Protest: Social 
Movements since the Sixties. Philadelphia and Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
557 “Restore the Fourth March NYC” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRDigVuWqUE.  
558 “Thomas Drake (NSA whistleblower) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 
2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7_xLvhUSq8&feature=youtu.be (emphases added). 
559 “Sue Udry (Defending Dissent, MCCRC) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 
2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXtAe4C1apA.  
560 “Statement by Rep. Alan Grayson (D-FL) to DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 2016) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5Ec4UlcBRg.  
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only about the fireworks and the concerts but it is also the day that we celebrate our declaration 
of freedom from tyranny. Let's continue to hold the ideas up that our forefathers fought so hard 
to bring us.”561 Even Medea Benjamin, Co-Founder of left-wing anti-war NGO Code Pink 
described herself as “one of the patriots out here today”562 when she addressed the crowd in D.C. 
and talked about the fate of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning 
praising them as being “the very essence of what it means to be an American citizen.”563 And 
Mudusar Raza, representing the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) quoted founding 
father Benjamin Franklin and pleaded for applying the Fourth Amendment to online and phone 
communication.564 His colleague from CAIR, Government Affairs Manager Robert McCaw, gave 
the audience a dense summary of the history of the United States and the Fourth Amendment. It 
is noteworthy that an organization representing the group that has been arguably been affected 
the most by government surveillance after 9/11 joined the activists in their expression of 
patriotism and support for the Constitution:  
The 4th of July honors that triumphant day in 1776, when the Continental 
Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. Let's celebrate that. 
Asserting the right of America's 13 colonies – that they were free and 
independent from the tyranny of British rule. Our nation's Founding 
Fathers rejected the absolute despotism and the long train of abuses and 
usurpations of American colonial citizen rights and rules of law. Sounds 
kind of familiar, right now, doesn't it?565  
 
Interestingly in a direct response, the NSA reacted to the protests by co-opting the patriotism 
frame. In a press release the agency stated that  
[t]he Fourth of July reminds us as Americans of the freedoms and rights 
all citizens of our country are guaranteed by our Constitution. Among 
those is freedom of speech, often exercised in protests of various kinds. 
NSA does not object to any lawful, peaceful protest. NSA and its 
employees work diligently and lawfully every day, around the clock, to 
protect the nation and its people.566 
                                                 
561 “Andrea O'Neill (Restore the Fourth DC) closes out DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 
2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q36qlZh-0Rw&feature=youtu.be.  
562 “Medea Benjamin (Code Pink) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 
2016).https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxrvjKj5pAE&feature=youtu.be.  
563 Ibid. 
564 Cf. “Mudusar Raza (CAIR-MD) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVqs-6GN0kc&feature=youtu.be.  
565 “Robert McCaw (CAIR) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013,” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsKk1TeESOc&feature=youtu.be.  
566 National Security Agency. 2013. “Statement on planned Fourth of July demonstrations,” July 3, 2013 (accessed 
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Non-Partisanship 
Another key aspect of “Restore the Fourth” was to frame privacy as an issue that transcends 
ideology and party lines. Somewhat interrelated with the “Patriotism” frame but a frame package 
in its own right, non-partisanship was one of the cornerstones of the movement. As RT4 board 
member douglasmacarthur explained to the tech blog Mashable.com: “There are some people on 
the left saying we're an offshoot of the Tea Party and there are people on the right saying we're an 
offshoot of Occupy, [but] I say, 'no we're not, we're an offshoot of both of them and an offshoot 
of neither of them.”567 Craig Aaron from FreePress described the “Restore the Fourth”-rally in 
Washington D.C. as “a nonpartisan effort uniting strange bedfellows from across the political 
spectrum. Because this is not about right and left (…) this is about right and wrong.”568 RT4-
assistant director Scott Somerville urged the same crowd to “[r]emember the common bonds that 
bring us here” and “to set aside our respective differences (...) [f]or government surveillance, 
intimidation, and subversions is never good for a free republic.”569 Alex Dempsey from RT4 San 
Francisco described the movement in his speech on “1984 Day” as “just regular people (...) 
crisscrossing the isle so many times we look like an old heel sock, (...) libertarians, conservatives, 
tree huggers (...) united by (...) [the] believe in liberty.”570 And CAIR-representative Robert McGaw 
shared the following anecdote to stress the non-partisan nature of opposing government 
surveillance:  
I was told by a fellow colleague from another civil rights organization 
'there might be a good chance that the Feds [the FBI] are intercepting my 
phone calls and emails. But I'm absolutely sure that your organization and 
that the Muslim community is under surveillance.' I had one simple 
response in reply: 'We are all under surveillance!'571  
 
According to the “Restore the Fourth” organizers, movements from the recent past had failed 
                                                                                                                                                                       
January 6, 2016). https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/3jul13-4th.shtml.  
567 As quoted by Alex Fitzpatrick. “Thousands to Join 'Restore the Fourth' Anti-NSA Rallies.” Mashable.com, July 2, 
2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). http://mashable.com/2013/07/02/restore-the-fourth/#1jPTq5BC8kqa.  
568 “Craig Aaron (Free Press) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyGUcqjnBko (emphasis added). 
569 “Scott Somerville (Restore the Fourth) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” (accessed January 6, 
2016) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UpeEa0moSVQ&feature=youtu.be.  
570 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 2” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtJj0cpo5Q0 (emphasis added). 
571 “Robert McCaw (CAIR) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” (emphasis added). 
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because they were politically one-sided. Occupy Wall Street, douglasmacarthur explained in the 
Reddit AMA was “based on an economic doctrine most Americans – for better or worse – 
disagreed with” and thus “heavily comprised of lefties.”572 In contrast, RT4 presented itself as a 
sane, politically centrist alternative to previous protests. 
 In order to avoid the pitfalls of a politically divided national discourse, the goals of the 
movement had to be scaled down and ultimately to a certain extend became depoliticized. How 
surveillance has been affecting communities of color, dissidents, or foreigners was not a 
dominant issue.573 “Restore the Fourth” essentially became a single-issue movement, trying to act 
as an umbrella for groups and actors from all political walks of life. “[B]ecause we are so focused 
on keeping [the protest] (...) single-issue and what we're defending (the 4th amendment) is 
widely popular,” douglasmacarthur explained, “we believe we will be able to keep it diverse.”574 Or 
in other words, the organizers did not “care how you feel about Democrats or gays or public 
sector union leaders so long as you don't read their email without their permission.”575 As the 
movement described itself, “We aren't anti-war or pro war. We aren't anti-tax or pro-tax. We don't 
care who can or can't marry who. We want the US government to stop spying on its citizens 
without a warrant or probable cause. That's it.”576 Confronted by Reddit users of avoiding to talk 
about the political dimensions of surveillance, douglasmacarthur replied by stressing that “what 
we're avoiding is partisanship, and political issues other than the one we're fighting for.”577 
Remarkably, this strategy worked. “Restore the Fourth” as well as later “Stop Watching Us” (see 
sections 4.1 and 4.2) managed it indeed to bring together Occupy and Tea Party members, whose 
positions on the role of government differed fundamentally. As one protestor in San Francisco 
                                                 
572 RT4 AMA. 
573 For a scathing critique of the apolitical approach of the 'Restore the Fourth' master frame see this comment by a 
Reddit user, whose account and user name is deleted by now: “Why is there such a big push to ‘restore’ things 
and ‘take the country back’? Restore it to what? Give it back to whom? Your movement pretty much fits the 
dictionary definition of regressive/reactionary political thought, and sounds almost identical to what 
mainstream conservative pundits and groups like the Tea Party have been saying for years. How is this different? 
How is it better? Activists and other ‘undesirables’ have been dealing with such surveillance for a long time: 
people active in the Civil Rights movement were spied on in the 50s (as were communists), hippies and counter-
culture folks in the 60s, anti-nuclear activists in the 70s, environmentalists in the 80s, etc. Do you forget that 
conservatives were gleefully pushing for surveillance of Muslims after 9/11? They helped create this monster. A 
phrase like ‘Restore the 4th’ completely fails to address these issues. It even fails to acknowledge that people have 
been dealing with this problem for over half a century now.” RT4 AMA (emphasis in original). 
574 RT4 AMA. 
575 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
576 RT4 AMA. 
577 RT4 AMA (emphasis in original). 
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put it, “If you know me, you already know my stances on abortion, marriage, immigration, and 
more; but these are all beside the point for [the] protest.”578 
 In at least one instance the inclusiveness of the 'Non-partisan' frame led to friction 
between liberals/centrists and Tea Party sympathizers. One such incident happened at a “Restore 
the Fourth”-rally close to the NSA's newly built Data Center in Bluffdale, Utah. When the first 
speaker of the event mentioned that the protestors acted upon God's calling, cursed the 
electricity of the Data Center, and predicted that “God is going to bust it apart,”579 many liberal 
secular activists left the event. The remaining crowd, apparently consisting of fundamental 
Christian activists, then bowed down and prayed for privacy. 
 With framing opposition to NSA surveillance in patriotic and bi-partisan terms, “Restore 
the Fourth” managed to mobilize a politically heterogeneous network of actors ranging from 
conservative to liberal, and from left wing groups to war veterans. On the downside, the focus on 
U.S. history and the U.S. constitution naturally excluded privacy advocates from other parts of 
the world to join. “Restore the Fourth” certainly inspired activists in other countries (notably on 
the same day in Munich, Germany, supported by individual members of the Pirate Party, privacy 
advocates with Edward Snowden masks had gathered in front of the U.S. consulate); but there 
was neither willingness on the side of organizers to include international perspectives nor 
transnational frames580 – this would notably change in the following campaigns. Overall, 
watching the protests and listening to “Restore the Fourth”-activists, one could get the idea that 
NSA surveillance primarily affected U.S. citizens when the opposite was the case. 581  
                                                 
578 “Ten Most Popular Restore the Fourth Protest Links.” Irregular Times, July 4, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). 
http://irregulartimes.com/2013/07/04/ten-most-popular-restore-the-fourth-protest-links/.  
579 Kristen Moulton, “Protesters march on NSA's Utah Data Center. The Salt Lake Tribune,” July 4, 2013. (accessed 
January 6, 2016). http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/56543985-78/nsa-data-utah-
center.html.csp.  
580 On the other hand “Restore the Fourth” seemed to be somewhat inspired by international protests movements. 
In her opening remarks at the Washington, D.C. rally, “Restore the Fourth”-member Louise Brooks noted that 
“[o]ur friends in Libya, Tunisia, and Turkey, Brazil, and most recently Egypt are making real changes in their 
government and that is something that Americans can do. We must jump off the couch, turn off the news, get 
into the streets, and demand our rights as citizens of the United States.” “Andrea O'Neill (Restore The Fourth DC) 
speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7AXCqkAQ60&feature=youtu.be.  
581 Exceptions included the “Restore the Fourth” rally in Philadelphia which featured a speech by a Syrian refugee 
urging the American public to “[p]lease save our Constitution and save our rights, so I can become an American 
citizen, just like you;”  and the '1984 Day' event in San Francisco where an activist from New Zealand showed 
solidarity by linking the event to an anti-surveillance demonstration in Auckland. Cf. Curtis Skinner, 
“Philadelphia Marchers Protest Surveillance. Popular Resistance,” July 5th, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). 
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As an opinion piece on the leftist blog site Dissident Voice summarized, the Snowden 
affair had evolved into an international crisis, involving, among other things, spying on millions 
on non-American citizens and several countries engulfed in a diplomatic crisis over refusing or 
granting asylum for Snowden. Just as the events in the lead up to the American Revolution were 
transnational (a 'foreign' power, Great Britain, spying on American colonists), now the U.S. acted 
as imperialist, international surveillance behemoth.582 But these were notable exceptions. The 
communications team of “Restore the Fourth” defended their focus on the U.S. Constitution by 
saying it would inspire people in other countries:  
The work we do is all online so in so far as citizens of other countries see it 
and learn from it and use it to pressure their own government to exercise 
its diplomacy, we think that's great. We focus on the 4th Amendment 
though which is part of a contract between the US government and its 
citizens. Foreign citizens are protected not by the 4th but by the 
protections granted to them by their own government and by the 
diplomatic weight their governments exercise to protect them from 
international ones, so in a political sense that is the means foreign citizens 
need to use.583 
  
Constitutionalism 
The fixture on the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution was another core frame applied in 
the communication of the event. To the patriotic and nonpartisan frames a third, strictly 
legalistic layer was added by the organizers. Focusing on one constitutional principle (see, for 
example, the protest art distributed online, image V) had not only the effect of evoking patriotic 
feelings or reaching across the political spectrum but also to streamline and clarify the 
communication of the core demand. Or as Marketing Coordinator Mike13815 put it: “[T]he 
message is clear, concise, and easily understood/replicated. We are tackling this by using the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
https://popularresistance.org/philadelphia-marchers-protest-nsa-surveillance/; “Rally for Privacy Awareness 
‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 1” (accessed January 6, 2016) . 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgQEGDS4oyE. 
582 “Restore the Fourth, The Beginning is Near,” Dissident Voice, July 5, 2013 (indexed by LexisNexis). 
583 Still, while the activists did not condone the (legal) surveillance of foreigners, what had particularly troubled 
them was that the Snowden revelations had shown that U.S. citizens were just as likely to be targeted by the NSA. 
Kate Crawford from the Massachussets chapter of the ACLU, started her appearance at the “1984 Bricnic” in 
Boston with the following joke: “NSA walks into a bar. Orders a beer. Bartender says 'foreign or domestic?' NSA 
says 'What's the difference?'” “bricnicpart1” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L2HJMSwIlcE.  
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actual text of the Fourth Amendment as our position.” 584  
Indeed, the whole campaign was rooted in legalism in the narrowest sense: As the name 
“Restore the Fourth” suggested, the existing legal frameworks, namely the Bill of Rights had 
already settled privacy as one of the cornerstones of individual rights and only needed to be 
'restored,” namely applied as conceptualized by the founding fathers (see for example protest art 
quoting the Fourth Amendment or claiming the Constitution was “deleted” by the NSA, see 
images V and VI). In addition recently passed legislation – which had violated the Constitution 
in the opinion of the activists – had to be scaled back. The most concrete and practical demand 
brought forward by RT4 activists was to urge their representatives to repeal the Patriot Act. For 
example at the “Restore the Fourth”-rally in Buffalo postcards were distributed among attendees 
to be signed and send to their congressmen and -women:  
Dear Senator X/Y, In light of recent events regarding the National Security 
Agency and the covert surveillance of American people; I would like you to 
be aware of the opinion of those whom you are elected to represent. As my 
elected representative I would like you to voice my convictions in front of 
Congress regarding the Patriot Act. The time has come to repeal the 
Patriot Act since it is no longer being utilized to protect the American 
people, but rather to hurt their civil liberties. The NSA's massive metadata 
collection justified by the Patriot Act is a clear violation of our Fourth 
Amendment rights Please inform me as to your practical response towards 
addressing the issue. Thank you.585 
 
But while the “Constitutionalism” frame certainly sent a clear message to the public, it created a 
new set of problems. While the surveillance programs exposed by Snowden had been certainly 
secret and thus arguably lacking accountability and legitimacy, the answer to the question if they 
were illegal or unconstitutional was far from settled in the public discourse.586 When asked 
                                                 
584 RT4 AMA (emphasis added). 
585 “Restore the Fourth Postcard” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/192jBy8qRkGsawbga2x78ci6BDBlqrKKI6nDWutvbiXs/edit.   
586 This is not the place to discuss the legality of the NSA surveillance programs. But as of December 2013, the 
question was far from settled. By then two U.S. District Judges reached fundamentally different conclusion about 
the constitutionality of NSA surveillance as exposed by Snowden. Cf. Andrew Cohen, “Is the NSA's Spying 
Constitutional? It Depends Which Judge You Ask,” The Atlantic, December 27, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/12/is-the-nsas-spying-constitutional-it-depends-which-
judge-you-ask/282672/. To make things more complicated, one law professor described the programs as being 
both “legal” and “unconstitutional.” Laurs K. Donohue, “NSA surveillance may be legal — but it’s 
unconstitutional,” The Washington Post, June 21, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsa-surveillance-may-be-legal--but-its-
unconstitutional/2013/06/21/b9ddec20-d44d-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html?utm_term=.7bad5dbf12e1.  
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about why the NSA programs had been approved by the (secret) courts in the first place, Interim 
Press Coordinator douglasmacarthur had to reply with lengthy treatises on constitutionality, 
legality, legitimacy, and secrecy of laws.587 Also the focus on the Fourth Amendment – 
intentionally or not – appealed to citizens concerned with the status quo of another, highly 
controversial amendment, namely the Second Amendment, granting the rights to bear arms. In 
sum, synthesizing this web of legal issues into a single slogan (“Restore the Fourth”) was an 
effective political communication strategy; however at the same time it was a simplistic answer to 
an increasingly complicated nature of the security state after 9/11.  
 
IMAGE V: “Restore the Fourth” protest art quoting the Constitution. 
 
However, activists showing up at events around the country embraced the “Constitutionalism” 
frame package. Activist/protest performer 'Reverend Billy' (from the Stop Shopping Choir) 
dramatically asked the demonstrators at the 'Restore the Fourth'-rally in New York City to  
Go back to the constitution. Put those words in your body. All of those 
amendments. Say it again and again and again. We want to sing for you 
right now the First Amendment [Freedom of Speech] because the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment come together to make a DNA 
                                                 
587 “The court system doesn't (and couldn't) pre-approve every particular thing the government does.(...) The PRISM 
scandal hasn't been fully accounted for by the justice system because it was secret. What court approval it did 
have was from secret courts, which is a whole issue in and of itself. (…) Additionally, while the rule of law and the 
balance of powers requires such discretion about how the constitution is applied to ultimately be up to the 
courts, that doesn't make every court decision right. The Supreme Court has made decisions endorsing the 
constitutionality of slavery. The constitution is the constitution and in so far as the courts continue to give legal 
sanction to unconstitutional programs we need to use the various legal and political means available to improve 
the court system.” RT4 AMA. 
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of freedom that is unstoppable! 588  
 
 
IMAGE VI: “Restore the Fourth” protest art (3) 
 
The reverent later closed one of his anti-surveillance sermons with the phrase "Bill of Rights-
luya!”589 Former congressman Dennis Kucinich addressed the protesters in Washington, D.C. as 
“Friends of the Constitution” and noted that he always carried a miniature version of it in his 
pocket because it was “under threat from our own government.”590 Congressman Alan Grayson 
underlined the “continuing vitality of the US constitution today” as well as “the beauty of the 4th 
amendment.”591 RT4 leader Andrea O'Neill warned that the “degradation of our Fourth 
Amendment rights can ultimately lead to the degradation of our other civil liberties.”592 Mudusar 
Raza from the Council of American-Islamic Relations compared to what he felt was an erosion of 
basic rights in the US to the Third Reich. Adapting and modifying Martin Niemöllers famous 
poem, Raza summarized the three core frames into one:  
When they came for my Second Amendment rights I didn't say anything 
because I wasn't a gun owner (...) When they came for Third Amendment 
rights, I didn't mind troops in my house because I supported the war, and 
damn it I was a patriot. When they took away peoples' Fifth Amendment 
rights I didn't say anything because those people they were kind of shady 
and I was involved in anything I'd be okay and damn it I was a patriot. 
When they came for my first amendment I didn't say anything, well, 
                                                 
588 “Restore the Fourth March NYC” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRDigVuWqUE.  
589 “Restore the Fourth March NYC”  
590 “Statement by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) to DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013”  (accessed January 6, 
2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUDqIeZAKYU&feature=youtu.be.     
591 “Statement by Rep. Alan Grayson (D-FL) to DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013.”  (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5Ec4UlcBRg.  
592 “Andrea O'Neill (Restore The Fourth DC) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” 
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because, again, I supported the war and damn it I was a patriot. When they 
came for my Fourth Amendment and took away my home without due 
process I couldn’t say anything because I had lost my first. That's what 
happened in Nazi Germany. Are we going to let this happen here? (...) 
Restore the Fourth!593 
 
Sanho Tree, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, argued that the Declaration of 
Independence stipulated the consent of the governed and thus secret programs such as PRISM 
were illegal594 And documentary filmmaker Cullen Hoback argued “that you can be damn sure 
that [were the Founding Fathers alive] they would want the Fourth Amendment to be applied 
online”595 while another speaker, Mark Mason, called for a “Bill of Rights 2.0.”596  
Within the circles of organizers trust in the purifying power of the Constitution was 
sufficient – both in their political messaging and as the concrete solution for scaling back the 
surveillance regime. Focusing on other factors, such as corporate surveillance applying 
increasingly sophisticated means to track people's daily activities and thoughts, was beside the 
point. Asked by a Reddit user whether laws would be enough to protect peoples' privacy, 
douglasmacarthur’s reply is remarkable for its technophile enthusiasm and ignorance about the 
embeddedness of tech companies into to the surveillance regime:  
Yes. While new technology is a big part of this, I think it’s overstated. 
(...)The world has – proportionate to population, and in terms of the long-
term trend – gotten less violent over time and rights have been respected 
more, even as our means to be violent and to oppress each other have 
gotten greater. Cultural philosophy and the rules and standards we set out 
for ourselves and each other in how we relate to each other are the 
variable, and have great power to make sure technology is harnessed for 
good instead of evil.597  
 
Another issue that the organizers, at least initially, wanted to not talk about was Edward 
Snowden (this would change significantly in the campaigns following “Restore the Fourth”). 
Focusing on the plight and politics of Snowden would distort the message, some organizers 
feared. For RT4 Raleigh, NC coordinator oracle989 “the issue [was] bigger than Snowden, (...) 
                                                 
593 Mudusar Raza (CAIR-MD) speaks at DC "Restore The Fourth" rally, 7/4/2013.” The Niemöller quote went on to 
become a staple in subsequent anti-surveillance protests. 
594 Cf. “Sanho Tree (IPS) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_jqG73lsAo&feature=youtu.be.  
595 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 5” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_ZJ5UPdAF8.  
596 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 2.” 
597 RT4 AMA. 
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bigger than any one person, (...), bigger than any one group. We can't control the media, but 
what we can do is control our group's message, and we've been very consistent in that thus far. 
Whenever Snowden comes up, we just pivot back to the 4th and our rights.” 598 It is noteworthy 
that in this earliest case of Post-Snowden activism Snowden himself as the source of information 
about the secret surveillance programs was seen as an obstacle rather than an asset in getting the 
message out. Harvey Anderson, senior vice president, business and legal affairs at Mozilla, the 
free-software community that supported the campaign, also believed that the attention Snowden 
was receiving was a “big distraction to avoid focusing on the invasions that have actually been 
occurring.”599 
 
Orwellian Totalitarianism 
While for the first 'Restore the Fourth' event in July 2013 (constitutional) history had been the 
main frame package for communicating resistance to government surveillance, one month later 
it was literary fiction. On “1984 Day,” activists once again gathered in several U.S. cities to 
publicly make clear that “1984 is a warning, not an instruction manual”600 as Andrea O'Neill of 
Restore the Fourth D.C. told the press. The organizers were optimistic that the previous protest 
had raised a significant amount of awareness and the world was ready for a second wave of 
protest that would further turn the tide in favor of the privacy community. Optimistically the 
official press release described “momentum that even critics say may be unstoppable.”601 
However, the turnout on August 4th was significantly lower than on July 4th both in terms of 
individual activists and participating cities; while “Restore the Fourth” was widely covered by the 
media, coverage of “1984 Day” was not (see table II). 
 The main event took place in San Francisco, where participants gathered in a public park 
and shared quotes of 1984 as well as gave speeches; New York City, where about 400 protesters 
                                                 
598 RT4 AMA. 
599 As quoted by Grant Gross, “Civil rights groups plan July 4 protest against NSA surveillance.” PC World, July 2, 2013 
(accessed January 6, 2016). 
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/466471/civil_rights_groups_plan_july_4_protest_against_nsa_surveillan
ce/.  
600 As quoted by Dan Roberts, “Activists stage second national day of protest against NSA's domestic spying,” The 
Guardian, August 4, 2013 (accessed January 6, 2016). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04/national-
day-protest-nsa-spying.  
601 “Restore the Fourth to Hold Day of Action against NSA Spying on August 4th for ‘1984 Day’” (accessed January 6, 
2016). http://www.restorethe4th.com/press/. 
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met in front of the headquarters of telecommunication company AT&T, which has been an 
integral part of the U.S. surveillance infrastructure; and Boston where activists organized a picnic 
in proximity to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), thus naming it ‘bricnic'. 
 While participants at 'Restore the Fourth' rallies across the U.S. had already embraced the 
“Orwellian Totalitarianism” frame package,602 this time warning against a totalitarian, unchecked 
surveillance state as depicted in 1984 was the core frame in their articulation of protest. In a 
second press release, RT4 organizers pointed out that without a continuation of protest, an 
unfettered, government sanctioned spying apparatus would eventually lead to the erosion of civil 
liberties and democracy: 
George Orwell's novel 1984 is a chilling vision of what might lie ahead if we 
don't take action. While the technology used in the novel is different, the 
basic principles are the same. And while we may not live in a society like 
Orwell described this year, or next, that is only because of the vigilance we 
have shown in preventing it, and now that vigilance is needed as much as 
ever.603 
 
It was a bleak vision of things to come and to prevent its realization, RT4 had “to warn Americans 
what might happen if they let themselves believe national security requires disregarding privacy, 
individual rights, and the rule of law.”604 While demonstrators in New York City carried a large 
sign with the caption “1984 Rising,”605 for some protesters Orwell’s novel was already a reality. 
That “1984 is really here,” RT4 Utah head Lorina Potter argued at a protest in Salt Lake City, 
“should scare each of you to the bones”.606 A Vietnam veteran at the New York '1984 Day' lashed 
out at the state of his country, painting a grim picture of current state of affairs, and indirectly 
criticizing the legalistic approach of “Restore the Fourth”:  
They [the government] are going to say that they are not spying but they 
are going to keep spying even when they tell you they are not going to spy 
because we live in a fascist country. This is fascism fast forward. You have 
                                                 
602 For example, the protest crowd at “Restore the Fourth NYC” enthusiastically joined performance activist 
Reverend Billy in his chanting of “Big Brother is watching but little sister is listening!” “Restore the Fourth March 
NYC” (It is unclear, what he is referring to by “little sister”). 
603 “It's 1984 Day: On August 4th, The Fight for the Fourth Continues” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
http://occupywallstreet.net/story/its-1984-day-august-4th-fight-fourth-continues (emphasis added). 
604 Ibid.  
605 Cf. “1984 Day: Why People Are Protesting The NSA” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUbZw9sNX8Q.  
606 Dennis Romboy, “Utahns rally against government spying on '1984 Day',” Deseret Morning News, August 4, 2013 
(accessed January 6, 2016). http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865584090/Utahns-rally-against-government-
spying-on-1984-Day.html.  
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no rights. Your Bill of Rights and your Constitution is not worth the paper 
it is written on. I mean let's stop kidding ourselves.607  
 
A citizen by the name of Sheela Goldmacher, who quoted the famous party slogans of 1984 (“War 
is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is strength”) reminisced about being intrigued reading 
the book as a high school student. But now in her eighties she “never dreamt I was alive to see the 
country become Orwell's nightmare.”608 Whistleblower and former AT&T employee Mark Klein, 
who had exposed the collaboration between the government and the telecommunications 
company shared with the audience in great detail how he, in a secret room, had discovered a “Big 
Brother Machine,” designed to copy the entire online data stream. He later added he believed he 
lived in a “police state” waging – echoing 1984’s concept of perpetual warfare – “imperial war”609 
everywhere. And whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, famous for his leaks of the 'Pentagon Papers' 
and who was headlining the event in San Francisco, warned his audience that with ongoing 
surveillance and persecution of whistleblowers the United States were “on the way to the death of 
humanity.”610 While the day was not there yet, Ellsberg voiced concern that after another earth 
shattering moment like 9/11 people could be – based on electronic databases collection metadata 
– be put in detention camps as Japanese-Americans had experienced during World War II.611 
 While 'Big Brother'-analogies have traditionally been a part of privacy activism and were 
featured in following campaigns as well, '1984 Day' was the first instance, where privacy 
advocates almost exclusively relied on this frame. It offered a rare glimpse into how individual 
citizens made sense of Orwell's dystopian fiction and culturally appropriated the novel in 
relation to personal experiences of being under surveillance. By adapting the general dark tone 
of the book and its interpretation of global capitalism and imperialism, organizers and activists 
formulated arguments against the contemporary surveillance regime that ranged from matter-
of-fact to bordering on conspiracy theories.612 The enduring popularity of 1984 as the go-to 
                                                 
607 “1984 Day: Why People Are Protesting The NSA” (emphasis added). 
608 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 1” (emphasis added). 
609 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 4” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4QMfa07Nro.  
610 “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 6” (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_r697CXeeU (emphasis added). 
611 Cf. “Rally for Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 6.” 
612 Indeed, a group that was particularly attracted to join privacy activist organizations before and post-Snowden 
were conspiracy theorists, threatening to delegitimize the overall cause, as one of the activists, interviewed for 
this study, noted (interviewee Q): “Internally (...), this is something that we guard against ourselves because most 
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literary analysis of surveillance is a testament to Orwell's skill at unearthing social control in 
totalitarian societies; yet as 'Big Brother'-analogies have increasingly come under scrutiny by 
privacy scholars and activists themselves, questions remain if the 'Big Brother' frame is able to 
sensitize larger parts of the population for the abuses of government spying (see discussion in 
section 5.6). 
 
Discussion 
 Period 
Restore the Fourth 
7/3-7/6/2013 
1984 Day 
8/3-8/6/2013 
   Newspaper articles 11 (19,64 %) 3 (42,85%) 
Web Blog articles 43 (76,78%) 4 (57,14%) 
Magazine articles 0 (%) 0 (%) 
Web Magazine 
articles (Web 
publications) 2 (3,57%) 0 (%) 
      
Total (n) 56 (100%) 7 (100%) 
      
TABLE II: Overview of LexisNexis search results for the “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 
Day” campaigns. 
 
In sum, “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 Day” were important first milestones in post-Snowden 
privacy activism. By using four interpretive packages, “Patriotism,” “Non-Partisanship,” 
“Constitutionalism,” and “Orwellian Totalitarianism” organizers and participants established 
framing categories that partially inspired later campaigns. To examine how the frames were 
reproduced in newspapers and online media, I searched the LexisNexis Academic news database 
for all items mentioning the terms “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 Day” in the days leading up to 
the protest, the day of the protest, and its immediate aftermath (the two days after the protest). 
An “All News” search for the term “Restore the Fourth” narrowed down to the source categories 
Newspapers, Magazines, Web magazines, and Blogs for the period July 3-6, 2013; and an “All 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of the people who were talking about this stuff before Snowden, many of them were people who believed in other 
conspiracy theories as well. It is just that this is a conspiracy theory that was conclusively proved correct. So it 
gives conspiracy theorists hope. It makes them very excited. And so it is an organizing question within grass roots 
surveillance reform groups of how to deal with people who believe in other conspiracies like that the September 
11th attacks were orchestrated by people in the U.S. government for example. We are careful to deal only with this 
particular conspiracy and to not get distracted by other issues that are important but are not our issues.” 
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News” search for the term “1984 Day” using the same search parameters for August 3–6, 2013 
yielded a combined total of 63 news items.1 See Table II for more details and a comparison of 
media coverage of both events. 
Figure I shows the extent to which collective action frames were adopted in the media 
coverage of 'Restore the Fourth'/'1984 Day.' Clearly, the “Constitutionalism”-frame package was 
most widely adapted by media outlets reporting on the campaigns. The “Restore the Fourth”-
core frame proved to be an easy digestible slogan that unsurprisingly was widely replicated by 
journalists. In the United States, with its vivid culture of constitutional reverence, inserting 
Verfassungspatriotismus613 into the political communication strategy around the constitution, 
made it possible for organizers to link historical struggles for independence with contemporary 
privacy activism. The “Constitutionalism”-package was also closely tied to the “Non-
Partisanship”-package (which was largely ignored by media reports), as 'Restore the Fourth' was 
able to unite an ideologically highly heterogeneous range of people under the banner of the 
Fourth Amendment. But “Restore the Fourth” not only wanted to mobilize constitutionalists but 
utilize the love for the home country as well. The “American Patriotism”-frame package was 
referred to by more than a third of all outlets covering the campaign. It is a decades, if not 
centuries-old tactic to frame one’s political goals as being in the interest of the country. The 
“Patriotism” and “Constitutionalism” frame packages were more viable than literary fiction as 
the comparatively low adoption rate for the “Orwellian Totalitarianism” frame shows.  
The bleak vision painted by the activists neither resonated with citizens nor media 
outlets. The extremely pessimistic and dystopian assessment of the surveillance state is not 
grounded in the everyday life of people. Also, the critique of capitalism and imperialism which 
lies at the heart of 1984 does not necessarily show what effects surveillance has on individuals 
and is subverted further by a lack of will to talk about corporate surveillance. 
In hindsight it is also noteworthy which interpretive packages and framing devices were 
not used in these first instances of activism. Transnational frames, portraying surveillance as a 
global problem, were naturally absent in a campaign focused on patriotism and the U.S. 
constitution. 
                                                 
613 Namely, the variety of the “American creed” or “covenanted patriotism” that inspired Jürgen Habermas to 
introduce the concept in the 1980s as a particular European or German form of patriotism. Cf. Jan-Werner Müller, 
Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton  University Press, 2007), 6-7.  
122 
 
 
FIGURE I: Ratio of frame adoption of news outlets covering the “Restore The Fourth” 
and “1984 Day” protest events (combined). The columns represent the percentages of 
news items that referred to, covered, or adopted the respective anti-surveillance frames 
in their reporting of “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 Day.” 
 
With rare exceptions614 speakers at the events did not mention the history of government 
agencies monitoring Civil Rights groups in the 1960's and 1970s, which would play an important 
role in the framing of the next protest event, “Stop Watching Us.” Presumably this was in order to 
not alienate conservative citizens and risk losing the campaigns' nonpartisan character. While 
individual activists lauded the sacrifices of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden, Daniel 
Ellsberg, and Thomas Drake, and the latter two also participated as speakers, to focus on Edward 
Snowden as an inspiration for resisting surveillance was partially discouraged by the organizers. 
Notably, with one exception,615 the role of online companies in the global surveillance regime was 
generally ignored both by official communication channels as wells as by individual activists. In 
his closing remarks at the “Restore the  Fourth” march in NYC, RT4 chair Ben Doernberg urged 
                                                 
614 See the speech of Julian Sanchez from the Cato Institute at the 'Restore the Fourth'-rally in Washington D.C. 
“Julian Sanchez (CATO Institute) speaks at DC ‘Restore The Fourth’ rally, 7/4/2013”  (accessed January 6, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rt3iYTCoSE&feature=youtu.be.  
615 Documentary filmmaker Cullen Hoback warned the '1984'-rally in San Francisco that “spy systems that are 
enabled largely by tech companies are basically posing the greatest civil liberties crisis of our time.” “Rally for 
Privacy Awareness ‘1984’ on 8/4 Restore the Fourth SF - Part 5.” 
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the crowd to send an email to the official Gmail-address and join their Facebook group, adding 
“we know it's ironic, but it is a good way to keep in touch.”616 
 
4.2 “Stop Watching Us”617 
On October 26, 2013 between 2,000 and 5,000 people gathered at the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C. to once again demonstrate against excessive governance surveillance. The 'Stop 
Watching Us'-Campaign, hailed by the organizers as “largest rally yet against NSA surveillance,” 
took place roughly four months after “Restore the Fourth.” The official goals of the campaign 
were essentially the same, namely to “[e]nact reform this Congress to Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, (...)[c]reate a special committee to investigate, report, and reveal to the public the 
extent of this domestic spying,” and “[h]old accountable those public officials who are found to 
be responsible for this unconstitutional surveillance.”618 Flanked by a massive grass roots 
lobbying offensive of 118 citizens contacting 50 representatives in Congress in person, the 
overarching objective of the demonstration was to articulate to public officials “[t]his is what 
[surveillance] means to me, this is how it impacts my life,”619 as a spokesperson for the advocacy 
group Public Knowledge put it. 
 Based on a close reading of a preceding mobilization video, the subsequent main protest 
event in Washington, D.C., and accompanying press materials I again identified four different 
anti-surveillance frame packages. The first interpretive package “History of Surveillance” 
reflected the organizers’ choice to evoke history. It differed from the “Patriotism” package used in 
“Restore the Fourth” by not only referencing Colonial History but by particularly focusing on the 
more recent Civil Rights history. These references were essentially what Gamson & Modigliani 
have described as “exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn).”620 The 
second package, “Orwellian Totalitarianism” had already been used in “Restore the Fourth” (see 
preceding chapter). By repeatedly referencing 1984, activists once again tried to insert “narrative 
fidelity”621 into their anti-surveillance claims. The third package is titled “Global Dimension.” In 
                                                 
616 “Restore the Fourth March NYC.” 
617 Author’s note: This section is an expanded, modified, and partly reproduced version of a previously published 
article by me. Cf. Wäscher, “Framing Against Surveillance.” 
618 “Stop Watching Us” homepage (accessed February 22, 2016). http://stopwatching.us.  
619 Cf. Washington Internet Daily Vol 14 (208), October 28, 2013 (via LexisNexis Academic). 
620 Gamson and Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion,” 15. 
621 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 622. 
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stark contrast to “Restore the Fourth” the organizers framed the mainly U.S.-based events as part 
of a larger transnational movement and connected NSA surveillance to human rights abuses in 
the Global South. Here the activists applied transnational frames, as discussed in section 3.1. The 
final package, “Celebrity Activism,” consisted of framing resistance against surveillance as heroic 
acts of individual activists, which should be seen as role-models for collectively voicing dissent. 
The decision of the organizers to heavily feature the personality of Edward Snowden – largely 
ignored by the RT4-protests – can be interpreted as motivational frames as their quasi-celebrity 
status was used to inspire and mobilize resistance against surveillance. For an overview of the 
four frame packages see table III. 
The basis for the 'Stop Watching Us'-campaign was a video of the same name that was posted on 
YouTube as a prelude and information hub for the rally on October 26, 2013. Produced by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), arguably the United States biggest and influential digital 
rights advocacy group, and directed by filmmaker Brian Knappenberger it is essentially a three-
minute talking heads mini-documentary interrupted by animated graphics and scans of the 
documents leaked by Snowden. Underscored by dramatic music, celebrities such as, among 
others Oliver Stone, John Cusack, and Maggie Gyllenhaal, as well as activists and scholars 
address the viewer to take action against “mass suspicionless surveillance.”622 The first part of the 
film is mainly concerned with informing the audience about the range of the Snowden leaks and 
how “every American is at risk of getting caught up in the NSA dragnet,”623 as Stone puts it at one 
point in the video.  
 Being part of a campaign that seeks to mobilize as much citizens as possible, the 
statements voiced in the video reflect a sense of urgency. Stressing their importance, Rep. John 
Conyers calls the Snowden files “a wakeup call”, while whistleblower Kirk Wiebe remarks, that 
“we truly as a nation are at a crossroads”.624 Yet the video portrays government surveillance as a 
constant in recent U.S. history and explicitly characterizes current NSA tactics as a continuation 
of illegal practices conducted by former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and former President 
Richard Nixon.  
                                                 
622 EFF.org, “Stop Watching Us: The Video”(accessed February 22, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGmiw_rrNxk. 
623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid. 
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TABLE III: Frame matrix detailing dominant anti-surveillance frames in the "Stop 
Watching Us" campaign. 
 
As Cusack points out, surveillance “was wrong then and is wrong now.”625 And Stone adds that 
“history tells us we need to watch the watchers,”626 drawing connections between historical 
instances of surveillance such as Watergate, COINTELPRO, 627 and PRISM. 
 While the video has received roughly 1.2 million clicks on YouTube (as of May 2015), the 
actual protest rally in Washington, D.C. consisted of several thousand protestors.628 By its own 
account, the event was organized jointly by a network consisting of more than 100 international 
advocacy and civil rights organizations, movements and political interest groups.629 This 
network was both non-partisan and international in its composition as it contained groups 
ranging from the conservative-libertarian FreedomWorks to the far-left International Socialist 
                                                 
625 Ibid. 
626 Ibid. 
627 For an overview about the FBI’s spying programs aimed at activists and African-American dissidents see Charles 
Gallagher and Cameron Lippard, “COINTELPRO Counter Intelligence Program),” in Race and Racism in the 
United States: An Encyclopedia of the American Mosaic, Volume 1: A-E, ed. Charles Gallagher and Cameron D. 
Lippard (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2014), 277. 
628 While 'Stop Watching Us'-organizers counted 4,500 participants, the British newspaper Daily Mail reported a 
headcount of 2,000 people attending the protest. Cf. Ryan Gorman, “Protesters swarm Capitol Hill on 12th 
anniversary of data collection laws authorizing NSA spying,” Mail Online, October 27, 2013 (via LexisNexis). 
629 See http:/.stopwatching.us for a list of participating organizations (as of May 2015, contrary to press reports, only 
little over 60 organizations are listed there). 
‚Stop Watching Us‘ 
Frame Package Core Frame Core Position Exemplars  
History of Surveillance 
in the U.S. 
NSA surveillance as exposed by 
Snowden must be placed in a long 
tradition of government spying on 
citizens that started in Colonial 
Times. 
Historically, surveillance has ultimately 
targeted dissenters and minorities. Thus, 
there is no doubt current NSA 
surveillance programs will stifle political 
activism, dissent and free speech in the 
future. 
- Activist drawing connections 
between Palmer Raids, 
McCarthyism, Watergate, 
COINTELPRO, and PRISM (C-
SPAN 2013) 
Orwellian 
Totalitarianism 
NSA surveillance is a form of 
indiscriminate mass surveillance 
resembling the dystopian fiction of 
‘Nineteen Eighty-For’. 
NSA and its international partners 
engage in totalitarian, “suspicionless 
mass surveillance” that will either lead to 
totalitarian society or has already 
surpassed level of surveillance depicted 
in ‘Nineteen Eighty-For’. 
- ‘Unplug Big Brother’-protest 
sign (AFP, 2013) 
Global Dimension Due to the nature of the Internet, 
Surveillance is a global practice that is 
not only affecting US citizens but 
people all over the world that can only 
be tackled on a global scale. 
Authoritarian regimes in the ‘Global 
South’ demonstrate how surveillance can 
lead to serious human rights violations. 
If global surveillance isn’t resisted in the 
U.S. and around the world it will lead to 
autocracy worldwide. 
- “It's not just Americans being 
caught in this dragnet. We need 
to stand up for the rest of the 
world too,"  (AFP, 2013) 
Celebrity Activists We know about the scope of formerly 
secret contemporary surveillance 
programs because of whistleblowers 
and activists. 
The heroic sacrifices of whistleblowers 
and the courage of activists exposing the 
surveillance state should be celebrated 
and inspire citizens to resist surveillance. 
- “Thank you Edward Snowden”-
protest signs (C-SPAN 2013) 
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Organization and from the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative to Brazil's Centro de Cultura Luiz 
Freire.  
 
IMAGE VII: “Stop Watching Us” poster with “(eye)conographical” logo. 
  
Orwellian Totalitarianism 
 The main symbol of the event, which was also featured in the video, was an aptly designed 
eye with a hand sign, signaling to stop, instead of a pupil (see image VII). This '(eye)conography' 
is noteworthy for two reasons: First, as an obvious representation of surveillance and the demand 
to put an end to it. And secondly, it is an apparent nod to George Orwell's 1984, in which the 
penetrating eyes of leader/symbol 'Big Brother' plays an important role.630 Individual protestors 
picked up the Orwellian theme by carrying posters of laptop screens with the inscription 
“Unplug Big Brother”.631 Organizers handed out signs with the sentence “Stop Watching ___” to 
be completed by participants to highlight their individual concerns regarding surveillance, which 
                                                 
630 See for example the following passage: “On coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and 
on the wrappings of a cigarette packet--everywhere. Always the eyes watching you (...). Asleep or awake, working 
or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed--no escape.” George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 
(accessed February 22, 2016). http://www.orwell.ru/library/novels/1984/english/en_p_1. 
631 “Anti-NSA protest calls for end to US spying,” Agence France Presse, October 26, 2013 (via LexisNexis).  
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reflects a recent trend in connective/collective action, namely the “organizationally enabled 
(hybrid)” of protests with its “emphasis on loosely tied coalitions and personalized framing of 
issues.”632 The rally in Washington, D.C. was started off by inviting an 11-year old participant to 
the stage who read out a quote from Orwell’s essay “Politics and the English Language.”633 Activist 
Josh Levy demanded that citizens “must be able to speak and assemble without Big Brother 
watching everything we do.”634  
 
History of Surveillance 
In addition to these iconographic elements, the history of controversial surveillance measures in 
the United States contributed to the overall framing as well. The timing of the protest event 
coincided with the 12-year anniversary of the passing of the Patriot Act which has been the base 
for what privacy activists for years had criticized as excessive mass surveillance.635 A petition 
drafted by the organizers, which called  for “[e]nact[ing] reform (...) to Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the state secrets privilege, and the FISA Amendments Act”636 was signed online by 
575,000 citizens and handed over to Republican Congressman Justin Amash. But speakers at the 
rally went back even further, detailing the illegal surveillance measures of the government from 
colonial times all the way through the Civil Rights era.637 A quote by Senator Frank Church, who 
in the 1970s had led the famous committee named after him into the FBI's surveillance of Civil 
Rights activists, was displayed by the organizers on the official website.638 Detailing historical 
incidents of spying on political dissidents and activists in order to stress the potentially 
devastating effects of surveillance in the future was a common theme of many speakers entering 
the main stage.  
                                                 
632 Bennett and Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action, 11-12. 
633 “Politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia” “Rally Against NSA Surveillance”, C-
SPAN, October 26, 2013(accessed February 22, 2016). http://www.c-span.org/video/?315880-1/rally-nsa-
surveillance.  
634 FreePress, “100,000 Demand End to NSA Spying at StopWatching.Us,” Savetheinternet.org, June 13 (accessed 
February 22, 2016). https://www.savetheinternet.com/press-release/104364/100000-demand-end-nsa-spying-
stopwatchingus.  
635 In fact, the repeal of section 215 of the Patriot Act has been the key political groal for privacy advocates in the 
United States, as of May 2015.  
636 “Stop Watching Us” homepage. 
637 C-SPAN, “Rally Against NSA Surveillance.” 
638 “[The National Security Agency's] capability at any time could be turned around on the American people, and no 
American would have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, 
telegrams, it doesn’t matter. There would be no place to hide.” Cf. “Stop Watching Us” homepage. 
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 For example, in his rap performance, Shahid Buttar, Executive Director of the Bill of 
Rights Defense Committee, referenced events such as the Palmer Raids of the early 1920s, abuses 
during the era of McCarthyism and alleged government involvement in the surveillance-related 
assassinations and attacks on Civil Rights- and environmental activists:  
Back in the day during World War I/ It was the FBI v. Free Speech holding 
the gun/ Hard fought constitutional rights on the run/ the Palmer raids 
the first but not the last one/ Fast forward 40 years to the real Red Scare/ 
McCarthy did a number but the FBI they were there/ like the NSA thought 
they were everywhere/ and knew what you wore to bed/ they prosecuted 
people for the thoughts in our heads/ they tried to drive MLK [Martin 
Luther King] to suicide/ no one even knows why brother Malcom died/ 
Fred Hampton killed in his own house inside/ they even bombed activist 
Judy Bari's car and lied/639  
 
The host of the event, Kymone Freeman of the National Black LUV Festival, reminded the 
protest crowd that through monitoring his daily activities, former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover 
had tried to blackmail Civil Rights leader Martin Luther King into not accepting the Nobel Peace 
Prize and committing suicide: “This was surveillance!”640 Freeman, in accord with his audience, 
went on to pay homage to whistleblower Edward Snowden by adding him to a long line of 
deceased dissidents, activists and artists such as Emma Goldman, Martin Luther King, Abbie 
Hoffman, John Lennon, Fannie Lou Hamer, Huey P. Newton, Aaron Swartz, Marcus Garvey, 
Howard Zinn, Pat Tillman, Tupac Shakur, many of whom were victims of government 
surveillance themselves. But in 2013, Freeman concluded, surveillance was not merely targeting 
dissidents or radical African-American activists: Now, he claimed, “we are literally in the same 
boat. (...) We are all black. (...) Whether you like it or not. (…) (…) Because if there is one thing of 
equality in America it's surveillance! It is for everyone!”641  
 The former Republican Governor of New Mexico, Gary Johnson, and the former 
democratic U.S. Representative from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich, both evoked colonial history in 
their strong objection to state surveillance. Johnson compared the ability of the British to search 
the houses of the colonists without a warrant to the practices authorized by the Patriot Act.642 
                                                 
639 C-SPAN, “Rally Against NSA Surveillance.” 
640 Ibid. 
641 Cf. ibid. 
642 “Let us not forget that one of the chief complaints against the British government which led us to the 
Revolutionary War was the fact that the British used general warrant in search for (...) everything and anything. It 
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The 'Stop Watching Us'-homepage also featured the famous quote by Founding Father Benjamin 
Franklin saying that “[t]hose who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”643 
 Gary Johnson went on to reference the Holocaust as a reason to repeal the Patriot Act: 
“The greatest fear that I have is that nothing will change. There is a general apathy for what is 
happening because 'it is not about me'” said Johnson and went on to cite the same quote of 
Pastor Niemöller that the representative from the Council of American-Islamic Relations had 
previously included in his speech at a “Restore the Fourth” rally.644 Another NSA Whistleblower, 
Russ Tice, even more directly compared the ongoing surveillance to methods applied in the 
Third Reich and was spotted carrying as sign mocking the U.S. intelligence agency as “NSSA.”645 
The slogan first seen at RT4-protests reappeared at the “Stop Watching Us” event: “The answer to 
1984 is 1776.”646  
 
Celebrity Activism 
Besides applying the “History of Surveillance” frame, the Stop Watching Us campaign heavily 
relied on the “Celebrity Activism” – frame package. In addition to the testimonials by Hollywood 
actors and other celebrities mentioned above, the event was also a celebration of whistleblowers 
in general and Edward Snowden in particular. Whistleblowers such as Daniel Ellsberg (who had 
made an appearance at “1984 Day” and was once again connecting the whistleblowing on the 
military during the war in Vietnam to the present), Kirk Wiebe, Mark Klein, and Thomas Drake 
were featured in the video, while Drake made an appearance at the rally and addressed 
protestors. However, the undisputed “big star of the day” as The Guardian called him,647 was 
naturally Edward Snowden. By the fall of 2013, Snowden, who had given the event his “stamp of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
sounds a lot to me like the patriot act.” Cf. ibd. 
643 Cf. “Stop Watching Us” homepage. 
644 Cf. C-SPAN, “Rally Against NSA Surveillance.” 
645 Cf. “Thousands of activists march on Washington to rally against NSA spying.” ActivistPost.com, October 27. 
(accessed February 22, 2016). http://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/thousands-of-activists-march-on.html.  
646 Cf. “#StopWatchingUs rally against mass surveillance: Live Updates,” RT.com, October 26-28, 2013 (accessed 
February 22, 2016). http://rt.com/usa/nsa-rally-mass-surveillance-786/.  
647 Jim Newell, “Thousands gather in Washington for anti-NSA 'Stop Watching Us' rally,” The Guardian, October 26, 
2013 (accessed February 22, 2016). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/26/nsa-rally-stop-watching-
washington-snowden.  
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approval,”648 had become the most important symbol of the privacy movement as a whole. This 
was obvious during the rally when many demonstrators carried signs depicting Snowden's face 
and the writing “Thank you, Edward Snowden”.649 While, due to his exile in Russia, not being 
able to attend the rally, Snowden as the de facto face of the campaign was in close contact with 
the organizers. In a highly emotionally charged moment, Jesselyn Radack, National Security and 
Human Rights Director of the Government Accountability Project and a former whistleblower 
herself as well as defense attorney for other whistleblowers, read out a statement by Snowden. In 
his address, Snowden (whose father had joined the protestors in D.C.) essentially gave an 
interpretation of his own leaks and the campaign, which he described as “an American moment 
in which ordinary people from high school to high office stand up to a dangerous trend in 
government.”650 As will be shown in the dissection of the media coverage of the event, having a 
prominent spokesperson such as Snowden, with his celebrity-like whistleblower status, was 
essential for the political communication strategy of the event. 
 
Global Dimension 
A final component of the 'Stop Watching Us'-framing was to present the struggle against 
surveillance as global problem that is not confined to the United States – the “Global 
Dimension”-frame package. Although the primary goal of the campaign, the repeal of various 
controversial U.S. surveillance laws, was clearly confined to national borders, the participating 
advocacy organizations painted the picture of a – at least in theory – transnational movement 
which had to face a problem of global proportions. For example, Dennis Kucinich tried to evoke 
international solidarity by translating the “Stop Watching Us”-slogan into German, Spanish, 
French and Portuguese and addressing the like-minded protestors in other countries. “It's not 
just Americans being caught in this dragnet. We need to stand up for the rest of the world too,” 
Craig Aaron, CEO of the Media Reform NGO Free Press told the crowd in a statement that was 
widely disseminated by international news outlets.651 Along with excerpts from the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, the official 'Stop Watching Us' website featured a quote from the 
                                                 
648 As reported by journalist Erin McPike in her coverage for CNN. Cf.  Segment “Anti-NSA Rally Targets 
Washington” CNN Newsroom, October 26, 2013, 4:00 PM EST (via LexisNexis Academic Research). 
649 C-SPAN, “Rally Against NSA Surveillance.”  
650 Ibid. 
651 Agence France Presse, “Anti-NSA protest calls for end to US spying.” 
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Chinese artists and activist Ai WeiWei, who had been under constant surveillance by the Chinese 
authorities for years, expressing his disbelief that “American citizens allow[ed] this [form of mass 
surveillance] to continue.”652 The international context also provided the opportunity for the 
activists to confront the public with the chilling effects that surveillance has traditionally played 
in authoritarian states. For instance, Tunisian-American human rights activist Waffa Ben 
Hassine shared with the audience in Washington, D.C. her experience with government 
surveillance in her country's capital Tunis: “[W]hen you have [physical and digital forms of 
surveillance] mixed together – oh, I'm gonna tell you, you're going to live in fear. And you won't 
be expressing yourself. (...) If we don't stop this right now we're going to live in fear.”653 And 
Naomi Wolf, Co-Founder of the American Freedom Campaign, also enthusiastically stressed the 
universal character of anti-surveillance protests, linking human rights struggles in dictatorships 
to campaigns such as “Stop Watching Us” in democracies. “Today”, she proclaimed, “we are all 
Americans, we are all Egyptians!”654 
  
Discussion 
As in the analysis of “Restore the Fourth” and “1984 Day,” to examine how the frames were 
reproduced in newspapers and online media, I searched the LexisNexis Academic news database 
for all items mentioning the terms “Stop Watching Us”  in the day leading up to the protest, the 
day of the protest and its immediate aftermath (the two days after the protest). An 'All News' 
search for the term “Stop Watching Us” narrowed down to the source categories Newspapers, 
Magazines, Web Magazines, and Blogs for the period from 10/25/2013 to 10/28/2013 yielded a 
total of 50 news items (see table IV). 
The event attracted media coverage from around the world as well as by some U.S. 
newspapers and television news shows.655 The organizing network's strategy to kick off the 
campaign with a celebrity-fueled online video resulted in a mixed reception. Only one national 
                                                 
652 Cf. “Stop Watching Us” homepage 
653 C-SPAN, “Rally Against NSA Surveillance.” 
654 Ibid. 
655 Newspapers and news agencies from Australia, Thailand, Ireland, New Zealand, Iran, Pakistan, Namibia, 
Lebanon, Canada and China covered the campaign. In the U.S. the campaign was covered by the national TV 
networks MSNBC, CNN, and NBC (as well as three local NBC and CBS affiliates), the newspapers Washington 
Post, The Christian Science Monitor and The Daily Advertiser, as well as by the Gannett News Service and the 
online publication Washington Internet Daily. 
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network, MSNBC, aired segments of the video, while only five other outlets reported on the video 
at all.656 While, to a certain degree, the video helped to raise attention for the issue, it made the 
campaigns susceptible to the pitfalls of celebrity-activism.657  
 Period 
Stop Watching Us 
10/25-10/28/2013 
  Newspaper articles 20 (40%) 
Web Blog articles 29 (58%) 
Magazine articles 1 (2%) 
Web Magazine 
articles 0 (0%) 
    
News report 38 (76%) 
Opinion piece 12 (24%) 
Total (n) 50 (100%) 
    
TABLE IV: Overview of LexisNexis search results for the "Stop Watching Us" campaign. 
 
In contrast, to build the main protest event around the personality, expert knowledge and, 
ultimately, plight, of whistleblower Edward Snowden was a reasonable decision, as the statement 
by Snowden was widely quoted and fulfilled the need by mainstream media outlets of being able 
to present a face and symbol of the highly bipartisan, multifaceted, and heterogeneous protest 
network. That Snowden had decided not to remain anonymous proved to be highly beneficial for 
the campaign. By the time of “Stop Watching Us” in October 2013, Snowden had “become the 
public face of raging international debate over surveillance.”658 In addition, Snowden, due to his 
spectacular escape from the U.S. ultimately settling for asylum in Russia, had become a 
                                                 
656 One of those five, the leading publication covering the U.S. advertising industry, Advertising Age, lauded the 
video for including respected scientists, scholars and whistleblowers, but criticized it for letting celebrities 
comment on the NSA scandal: “[F]or some reason Stop Watching Us decided to celebrify this video by mixing in 
some famous talking heads. So brace yourself for stern soundbites from Phil Donahue, Maggie Gyllenhaal, John 
Cusack, Wil Wheaton and, perhaps most weirdly and inappropriately, professional conspiracy theorist and 
history-fictionalizer Oliver Stone.”  Simon Dumenco, “Can Oliver Stone (?!) Convince Americans to Protest 
Against the NSA?” Ad Age, October 24, 2013 (accessed February 22, 2016). http://adage.com/article/the-media-
guy/oliver-stone-convince-protest-nsa/244939/.  
657 As Tsaliki et al. point out, celebrities attached to activism campaigns can raise public awareness for the issues at 
hand. At the same time, those who closely follow celebrities tend to be the least politically engaged. Cf. Liza 
Tsaliki, Christos Frangonikolopouls and Asteris Huliaras, “Introduction: The Challenge of Transnational 
Celebrity Activism: Background, Aim and Scope of the Book,” in Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global 
Politics: Changing the World?, ed. Liza Tsaliki, Christos Frangonikolopouls and Asteris Huliaras (Bristol/Chicago: 
Intellect, 2011), 7-25. 
658 “The Surveillance State and its Discontents,” Foreign Policy, No. 203 (2013), 65. 
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transnational activist himself and was a globally recognized representative of the privacy activist 
community.659 
 However, it has to be noted, that not all coverage was positive and supportive of “Stop 
Watching Us.” For example, the Washington Post described the demonstrators as a mix of “gray-
haired activists and policy wonks (...) dominated by postgrad vibe – beards, glasses, shaggy hair – 
of techies on their day off from the cubicle farm.”660 One particular piece, written by Olivia Nuzzi 
for the blog site NSFW Corp., was frequently mentioned by the activists that I interviewed (see 
section 5.2) as having distorted the impact and goals of the event. Instead of an energized, 
optimistic protest crowd this subjective account described the gathering as “a scene that looks 
like a community search for a missing child.”661 In the tradition of what Todd Gitlin has described 
as the media's “selective amplification”662 of weirder individual elements a protests, in her report, 
the journalist seemed to focus on odd, unconventional, or even drunk individual protestors, such 
as an activist whose protest sign is knocked out of his hands by the wind and “hits him in the 
face.” The piece goes on to make fun of one of the core demands of the rally (“I come across an 
older man wearing a cape and holding a sign above his head, 'PROTECT THE 4th 
AMENDMENT!' This is a man who wants to protect the 4th Amendment, I think to myself. My 
suspicions are confirmed when he explains that 'we need to protect the Fourth Amendment!'”663) 
and closes with the observation of protesters step[ping] on the flyers of Edward Snowden's face, 
many of which now litter the ground.”664 
                                                 
659 As Scheuerman has observed, “Even if earlier civil disobedients hinted at our increasingly global condition, 
Snowden takes it as a given, as his appeals to international law attests. Revealingly, Snowden's actions not only 
have had worldwide political ramifications, but he is also more attuned than his historical predecessors to 
prominent global political and legal innovations, some of which offer a launching pad for checking unjust state 
action.” William E. Scheuerman, “Taking Snowden Seriously: Civil Disobedience for an Age of Total Surveillance,” 
in The Snowden Reader, ed. David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2015), 83. 
660 Amy Argetsinger, “Registering on the grid: The tech-savvy coalesce to send the NSA a message,” 
Washingtonpost.com, October 26, 2013 (via LexisNexis Academic). 
661 Olivia Nuzzi, “We're all on the same team.” NSFW Corp, October 31, 2013 (accessed February 22, 2016) 
https://www.nsfwcorp.com/dispatch/watching-stop-watching-us/.   
662 Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, 186. 
663 Nuzzi, “We're all on the same team.” 
664 Ibid. 
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FIGURE II: Ratio of frame adoption of news outlets covering the “Stop Watching Us” 
protest events. The columns represent the percentages of the total of 50 news items that 
referred to, covered, or adopted the respective anti-surveillance frames in their 
reporting of “Stop Watching Us.” 
 
Also, the focus on Snowden overshadowed the framing attempts of lesser known speakers. 
Relatively absent from the media coverage were other core frames, especially the “History of 
Surveillance”-package. As journalist Rania Khalek observed, news outlets largely ignored the 
historical frames designed to portray surveillance as a practice that mainly targets racial 
minorities.665 The LexisNexis analysis confirms this: Only six news items (12 percent of all the 50 
outlets which covered the rally) applied the ‘History of Surveillance’-package in their reporting. 
For a campaign that heavily relied on Orwellian iconography and ‘Big Brother’ metaphors, the 
‘Orwellian Totalitarianism’-package, with an adoption rate of only 16 percent, was not widely 
used either – a trend noticeable in “Restore the Fourth” as well. (See figure II) 
Instead, external factors beyond the grasp of the organizers influenced the media 
coverage. Shortly before the campaign, media outlets widely reported on the Obama 
administration’s phone-tapping of international leaders such as Angela Merkel. While this fueled 
the public outrage among people already critical of the NSA activities (for example, some 
demonstrators carried giant cell phones to reference the incident), many outlets in their 
                                                 
665 Cf. Rania Khalek. “Activists of Color Lead Charge against Surveillance, NSA.” Truthout.com, October 30, 2013 
(accessed April 10, 2015). http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19695-activists-of-color-atforefront-of-anti-nsa-
movement.  
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reporting of the protest event focused on the diplomatic affair. In these cases, the “Stop 
Watching Us”-protest was only a side note mentioned in passing of a diplomatic scandal. The 
issue of surveillance was portrayed as a spy game among politicians rather than a civil or human 
rights issue.666  
 
“Stop Watching Us” Germany 
Notably, while “Stop Watching Us” featured an international roster of participating NGOs, the 
only country that saw simultaneous street protests under the same banner was Germany. On July 
27, 2013, organizers in Germany already had set up anti-surveillance demonstrations in at least 20 
cities also labeled “Stop Watching Us.” But inspired by announcements of the large rally in 
Washington, D.C., German privacy activists decided to stage a follow-up on the same day as their 
U.S. counterparts, October 26, 2013. Organized by individual local chapters, the German offshoot 
featured protest events in six cities (Cologne, Munich, Hannover, Heidelberg, Lübeck, and 
Michelstadt).667 While the first wave of “Stop Watching Us”-protests in July brought between 
10,000 and 15,000 people to the streets, the second wave was notably smaller each mobilizing 
only hundreds or less, with the Cologne rally being the largest one.668 
 An in-depth look at the framing of the “Stop Watching Us” Cologne event is crucial as it 
offers a rare glimpse at the transnational dimension of anti-surveillance activism in the post-
Snowden world. A close reading of the organizers and activists speeches at the rally shows how 
activists from Germany were inspired by, adapted, and modified the “Stop Watching Us” slogan, 
                                                 
666 As Bruce Schneier has pointed out, espionage is fundamentally different from surveillance. Cf. Data and Goliath, 
183. 
667 Cf. Kai Biermann, „Demos gegen Überwachung am Samstag,“ Zeit Online, October 25, 2013. (accessed February 
22, 2016). http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-10/demo-stop-watching-us.  
668 Media coverage about the German version of 'Stop Watching Us' was sparse. One of the few accounts, an op-ed by 
the left-leaning die tageszeitung mocked the sparse turn-out for 'Stop Watching Us' in both Washington and 
German cities: “Privacy issues cannot mobilize people in the United States. Unsurprisingly, only a few thousand 
people showed up in front of the Congress to protest against mass online surveillance by the NSA. Given this 
level of ignorance people in 'old Europe' shake their heads in disbelief. Over here highly mobilized masses join 
the the 'Stop Watching Us' rallies. Apparently the biggest one was seen on Saturday in Hannover. According to 
the police 50 people showed up.” Original version: “Datenschutz lockt in den USA niemand hinterm Ofen hervor. 
Deshalb mag es auch nicht überraschen, dass am Samstag in Washington zu einer Großdemonstration unter 
dem Motto Stop watching us gerade mal ein paar tausend Menschen vor das Kongressgebäude kamen, um gegen 
die massenhafte Internetüberwachung durch die NSA zu protestieren. Über so viel Ignoranz kann man im alten 
Europa nur den Kopf schütteln. Hier strömen die hochsensibilisierten Massen zu Stop watching us -Demos. Die 
größte wurde am Samstag offenbar in Hannover beobachtet. Die Teilnehmerzahl laut Polizei: 50. taz, die 
tageszeitung, October 28, 2013, p. 1 (via LexisNexis Academic). 
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thus offering a fascinating perspective about the potentials but also limits of transnational 
protest cultures. Moreover a look at the German protests demonstrates how even a global issue 
such as global online surveillance is predominantly framed in national, at times even hyperlocal 
terms (for the conflict between local and transnational frames see section 5.3 which also includes 
accounts of interviewees about the collaboration, or rather lack thereof, between German and 
U.S. activists). 
 From the outset, the key demands of the German 'Stop Watching Us' network, as 
summarized by activist Florian Wächter at a rally of the Cologne chapter were international in 
scope and did not significantly differ from those at U.S. anti-surveillance rallies.669 In contrast to 
U.S. demonstrators, whose core demands were directed at U.S. policy makers, the scope of the 
German activists was by default more international and directed at international institutions. For 
example, in his speech, Andrej Hunko, Member of Parliament and European Policy speaker for 
the Leftist Party, similarly evoked international law as a proper instrument to tackle mass 
surveillance arguing that  
We need to return to applying international law. That is why I have 
sponsored a bill in the Council of Europe to include whistleblower 
protection in the European convention of human rights. This way future 
Edward Snowdens or Bradley Mannings exposing criminal activities will 
be protected under the European convention on human rights while being 
members of the military or intelligence agencies.670 
 
The focus on whistleblowers in general, and Edward Snowden in general, was one of the frame 
packages that the German branch of “Stop Watching Us” had in common with its American 
counterpart. For example, Hunko, echoing one of the key slogans from the U.S. event, started his 
speech by “sending greetings to and expressing solidarity with Edward Snowden, the 
whistleblower whom we own knowing so much about the extent of current surveillance. From 
Cologne, I'm sending cordial greetings to Edward Snowden!”671 A member of the Pirate Party, 
                                                 
669 The German 'Stop Watching Us' coalition’s demands were “to inform the public about all intelligence programs 
and to reveal all secret treaties and laws concerning surveillance and collaboration between international 
intelligence agencies. We call for an end to all national and international mass surveillance. No to PRISM, 
TEMPORA and other programs. No data retention in Germany, Europe, and worldwide. Protection of all 
whistleblowers. Asylum for Edward Snowden!” “Florian Wächter - StopWatchingUs-Bündnis.” (accessed February 
22, 2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N-dO-3k_c0 (translated from German). 
670 „Andrey Hunko - Bundestagsfraktion die LINKE“ (accessed February 22, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5HUI2HRqGg (translated from German). 
671 Ibid. 
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Daniel Schwerdt, at the inaugural “Stop Watching Us” rally in Cologne had reminded the protest 
crowd of the level of sacrifice and conviction Snowden had shown:  
We owe (...) Snowden for knowing about the greatest surveillance scandal 
in history. He gave up his life, his family, his freedom, and his homeland 
and risked his life to share his insights. For that he deserves the upmost 
respect. Edward Snowden is a hero; he deserves political asylum [in 
Germany]. Instead he was chased around the globe. (...) Thanks to 
Snowden we now know for sure [about the state of mass surveillance] – 
something for which we were previously denounced as wearers of tin foil 
hats. (...) Thanks to Edward Snowden, we don't have to warn against 1984 
anymore, because totalitarian surveillance is already here.672 
 
And yet, similarities in terms of framing between the U.S. and German protests ended here. 
Other than a general, not very specified commitment to international human rights conventions 
and a strong adaption of the “Celebrity Activism” frame none of the frame packages created for 
the U.S. “Stop Watching Us” protest were present in Germany and vice versa. To an extent this is 
not surprising: One cannot expect a German activist to evoke U.S. colonial or Civil Rights history 
to mobilize the German public. But as will be shown below a clear absence of common 
transnational frames resulted in a protest event that ignored the global dimension of the NSA 
leaks in favor of individualized, hyperlocal anti-surveillance narratives. It was thus a textbook 
example of what Tarrow has described as bringing the local to the global and the other way 
around – instead of creating a truly transnational communication strategy (see section 5.3). To 
be sure this to a certain extent is a recurring feature of every transnational activism campaign. In 
the case of “Stop Watching Us Germany,” however, few, if any attempts at linking national or local 
frames to transnational anti-surveillance discourses were made. 
 The majority of speakers called for new national data protection laws or policy initiatives 
such as making it easier for opposition parties in the German Bundestag to set up parliamentary 
committees to investigate surveillance abuses, impose moratoriums on existing surveillance laws, 
or making it easier for members of parliament to call on the Supreme Court. Activist Eva Stöwe673 
reminded the audience of Article 1 of the German Constitution, protecting human dignity, while 
                                                 
672 „Rede von Daniel Schwerd auf der #StopWatchingUs Demo in Köln, 27.7.2013 (accessed February 22, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERzf6g0a1AI (translated from German). 
673 „Eva Stöwe - StopWatchingUs-Bündnis“ (accessed February 22, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LygjDEzKVH0 (translated from German). 
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Frank Samirae of the German Pirate Party674 called for applying articles 4, and 41 of the 
constitution of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, guaranteeing protection of personal data 
and written communication. Here the “Constitutionalism” frame applied during the “Restore the 
Fourth” protests were evoked but on national or regional level, respectively – notably absent were 
global legal initiatives.  
 Others activists chose local examples of surveillance that seemingly had nothing to do 
with the practices exposed by Edward Snowden. Monika Heim, a committee woman 
representing Germany's Industrial Union of Metalworkers compared NSA programs such as 
TEMPORA or PRISM to workplace surveillance: “We may have guessed that the state does not 
want us to use the internet freely. But what some of you may not know is that surveillance at the 
workplace has a very long history. As a committee woman I have long fought against our bosses 
looking over our shoulders and controlling each step of the way.”675 Likewise, an unnamed 
speaker complained about unannounced ticket inspections in regional mass transit, arguing 
that this was another face of the current mode of “surveillance” which had to be opposed. 
“Instead of looking at what goes on in Washington, Brussels, or Berlin,” he explained “I want you 
to take a look at our home, our city of Cologne. Surveillance begins at our door steps. For 
example on your way to work (...) For two years now you have to expect to get into so called core 
area controls (...) where all commuters must show valid tickets.”676 The activist went on to 
mention other peculiarities of the modern surveillance regime including the enforcements of 
open warrants, tax collections, and anti-smoking laws in bars, concluding “There is no 
escape.”677  
 In sum, with the exception of a strong focus on the personality of Edward Snowden, 
there were no coordinated exchanges or strategies between the events in Washington, D.C. and 
Germany. As a result, instead of a global response the two events mainly framed opposition in 
national terms evoking national and cultural exemplars (in the German case even hyperlocal 
ones). Granted, to a certain extent this is a feature of every transnational protest event. 
                                                 
674 “Frank Samirae - StopWatchingUs-Bündnis” (accessed February 22, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7D_kHpmiLqA (translated from German). 
675 „Monika Heim - IG Metall“ (accessed February 22, 2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMJYthu_LOE 
(translated from German). 
676 “#SWU” (accessed February 22, 2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqgOeHZfBU0 (translated from 
German). 
677 “#SWU” (translated from German) 
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Especially in offline campaigns where organizers from different countries do not physically meet 
on the ground this is obvious. However, it is remarkable that two events staged under the same 
banner bear so little similarities in discursively opposing a problem that is by definition global in 
scale. In comparison, how would internet protest against surveillance fare which from the outset 
made it possible for internet users from all over the world to join? The international privacy 
community had exactly that in mind and for its next big campaign decided to fight back 
globally. 
 
4.3 “The Day We Fight Back”678 
 While “Stop Watching Us” was mainly an offline demonstration supported by online 
means of organizing, “The Day We Fight Back”, which took place four months later in the spring 
of 2014, was planned as a pure online protest event. The goal was to “engage that politically 
aware, slightly more technical community in getting involved in the legislative battle,” as Rainey 
Reitman, the Electronic Frontier Foundation's activism director, put it.679 The prototype for this 
kind of digitally enabled change had been the anti-SOPA and PIPA protests of January, 2012, 
which had helped to shut down controversial copyright legislation to be enacted by the U.S. 
Congress. Back then, over 115,000 websites had joined a coalition led by digital rights group Fight 
for the Future (FFTF) and participated in a partial 'blackout' of the Internet. This, in the end, had 
led to a total of ten million potential voters contacting their representatives to voice their concern 
regarding the proposed bill. Thus the “Day We Fight Back” coalition sought to emulate the 
success of the anti-copyright campaign by encouraging websites and internet users to participate 
in the “collective flexing of internet muscle.”680  
  
 
 
                                                 
678 Author’s note: This section is an expanded, modified and partly reproduced version of my own article. Cf. 
Wäscher, “Framing Against Surveillance.” 
679 Adi Robertson, “The Day We Fight Back: Can an Internet Protest Stop the NSA?” The Verge, February 10, 2014 
(accessed February 22, 2016).  http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/10/5398638/the-day-we-fight-back-asks-the-
internet-to-fight-surveillance.  
680 Jenna Wortham, “Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills Began as Grass-Roots Grumbling,” The New York Times, 
January 19, 2012 (accessed March 16, 2016). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/public-outcry-over-
antipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.html?pagewanted=1&ref=technology. 
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TABLE V: Frame matrix detailing dominant anti-surveillance frames in the “The Day We 
Fight Back” campaign. 
 
It is important to note, however, that this time the goal was not primarily to block legislation 
endangering privacy but instead to push for the passing of the U.S.A. Freedom Act, a bill 
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (as opposed to The FISA Improvement Act, which would 
have retroactively legalized the collection of phone meta data). Similarly, internet users from 
other countries were urged to push their political elites to enact reform of privacy laws as well – 
or, in the case of many third world countries, to introduce any meaningful privacy laws at all. In 
the run up to the event, as a template, parts of the privacy community had collectively drafted an 
international set of '13 Principles', which “clarify how international human rights law applies in 
the current digital environment, particularly in light of the increase in and changes to 
Communications Surveillance technologies and techniques.”681 
 Notably 'The Day We Fight Back' applied three out of the four frame packages that had 
informed “Stop Watching Us,” namely “Orwellian Totalitarianism,” “Global Dimension,” and 
“Celebrity Activism.” With the exception of participating website Reddit, which prominently 
displayed a picture and quote of Founding Father Benjamin Franklin on their homepage, the 
“History of Surveillance” package was absent. (For the frame matrix of “The Day We Fight Back” 
see table V, a slightly modified version of table III, in which new frame exemplars have been 
added). 
                                                 
681 Necessary and Proportionate, “International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance,” (accessed March 16, 2016). https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text. 
‚The Day We Fight Back‘ 
Frame Package Core Frame Core Position Exemplars 
History of Surveillance 
in the U.S. 
NSA surveillance as exposed by 
Snowden must be placed in a long 
tradition of government spying on 
citizens that started in Colonial Times. 
Historically, surveillance has ultimately 
targeted dissenters and minorities. Thus, 
there is no doubt current NSA 
surveillance programs will stifle political 
activism, dissent and free speech in the 
future. 
- Banner with quote by 
Benjamin Franklin on Reddit-
Homepage              
Global Dimension Due to the nature of the Internet, 
Surveillance is a global practice that is 
not only affecting US citizens but 
people all over the world that can only 
be tackled on a global scale. 
Authoritarian regimes in the ‘Global 
South’ demonstrate how surveillance can 
lead to serious human rights violations. If 
global surveillance isn’t resisted in the 
U.S. and around the world it will lead to 
autocracy worldwide. 
- Activists drawing 
connections between NSA 
surveillance and the Green 
Movement in Iran 
(Alimardani 2014) 
Celebrity Activists We know about the scope of formerly 
secret contemporary surveillance 
programs because of whistleblowers 
and activists. 
The heroic sacrifices of whistleblowers 
and the courage of activists exposing the 
surveillance state should be celebrated 
and inspire citizens to resist surveillance. 
- Mini-documentary of 
Swartz as mobilizing video 
(Luminant Media 2014) 
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While “Stop Watching Us” had already featured an international roster of participating 
privacy advocacy groups, the “Fight Back”-network was noticeably more transnational in its 
scope and direction. The nodes in the network included, among others, Argentine's Asociación 
por los Derechos Civiles and Vía Libre Foundation, Australia's Citizens Not Suspects, Colombia's 
“Internet sin Chuzadas”-campaign, France's La Quadrature Du Net, and Uganda's Unwanted 
Witness. All of these groups, on the basis of the 13 international principles, joined the event to 
mobilize resistance against forms of surveillance in their home countries.682  
“The Day We Fight Back” -events scheduled around the world included crypto parties and 
hackathons in Bogota, Belgrade, and Graz; speaking events in San José, Sao Paolo, Galway, 
Ireland, Trivandrum, India, Karlsruhe, Germany, and Johannesburg; and demonstrations in 
Ontario, Copenhagen, San Juan, Stockholm, as well as in eight American cities.683 The organizers 
explicitly declared that “The Day We Fight Back” was a campaign “of both Americans and the 
citizens of the whole world.”684 Only if the “global tribe of technologists” would come together 
they could “defeat mass surveillance”685 worldwide. 
The cornerstone of the campaign was to popularize the twitter hashtags #StoptheNSA and 
#TheDayWeFightBack as well as to convince popular web properties to insert the “Day We Fight 
Back”-banner into their social media websites.686 By clicking on the banners internet users were 
then redirected to the organizers homepage where they could get instructions on how to contact 
their representatives. While the organizers used the same 'Eyecon'-logo as the “Stop Watching 
Us” event (see image VIII as well as section 4.2), internet users were encouraged to create their 
own online media. A press release published by one of the participating advocacy groups, Access 
Now, stressed the decentralized approach of the campaign: “This moment is whatever we, the 
broad community of people who care about the Internet, make of it. Post a comment with a link 
to every NSA-related story. Make and share a meme. Build a website. Organize an event.”687  
                                                 
682 Cf. “The Day the World Fought Back,” Legal Monitor Worldwide, February 11, 2014 (via LexisNexis). 
683 Cf. “The Day We Fight Back, A List of Events Happening on The Day We Fight Back” (accessed March 16, 2016). 
https://thedaywefightback.org/events/. See also “The Day The World Fought Back.” 
684 “The Day We Fight Back, On Anniversary of Aaron Swartz's Tragic Passing, Leading Internet Groups and Online 
Platforms Announce Day of Activism Against NSA Surveillance” (accessed March 16, 2016). 
https://www.thoughtworks.com/news/on-anniversary-of-aaron-swartzs-tragic-passing-leading-internet-groups-
and-online-platforms-announce-day-of-activism-against-nsa-surveillance.  
685 “The Day We Fight Back, On Anniversary of Aaron Swartz's Tragic Passing.” 
686 Participating web sites included, among others, Reddit, tumblr, imgur, and duckduckgo. 
687 Katherine Maher, “The Day the World Fought Back” (accessed March 16, 2016). 
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IMAGE VIII: Official “The Day We Fight Back” “(Eye)conography.” 
 
For example, internet users could use the “Eyecon”-logo to make their social media profile 
pictures unrecognizable. Graffiti artists in Bogota, Colombia painted a mural adopting the 
‘Eyeconography’ and calling for “no mas espionaje masivo.”688 And hundreds of protestors in 
Manila, Philippines staged a demonstration against the domestic Cybercrime Prevention Act of 
2012.689 The Iranian activist group ASL 19 provided the best example of the “Global Dimension” 
package. The organization translated the ‘Eyecon’-logo and catchphrase into Farsi and connected 
NSA surveillance to the Green Movement in Iran:  
[W]hen the world takes a stand for privacy rights in the wake of Edward 
Snowden’s NSA leaks, we should not forget the practices that have always 
existed, and continue to prosecute and imprison Iranians. While we stand 
up against countries like the United States, Canada, and the UK for their 
violations of our privacy rights, ASL19 urges the world not to forget the 
circumstances in a country that does not require revelations to reveal the 
unjust state of privacy and human rights.690 
 
Yet, while the free flowing of ideas and activities under the “The Day We Fight Back” banner 
                                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/02/11/the-day-the-world-fought-back. 
688 As seen on the official #StoptheNSA-twitter page (accessed March 16, 2016). 
https://twitter.com/ChonAlatorre/status/479288946074329088.  
689 Cf. Maher, “The Day the World Fought Back”. 
690 Mahsa Alimardani, “Iran on the Day to End Mass Surveillance,” Global Voices Advox. February 11 (accessed March 
16, 2016). http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/02/11/iran-on-the-day-to-end-mass-surveillance/.  
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stressed the nonhierarchical character of the protest day, the organizers still tried to insert a 
leading narrative into the event. While Edward Snowden had been the face and voice of the Stop 
Watching Us-campaign, this time it was recently deceased activist Aaron Swartz.691 As one of the 
architects of the immensely successful anti-SOPA and -PIPA campaigns and because of his recent 
suicide (which many believe was related to immense pressure resulting from an FBI investigation 
concerning his activism), Swartz posthumously became one of the symbols for the fight for a free 
and open internet. As the official press release stated, “If Aaron were alive he'd be on the front 
lines, fighting back against these practices that undermine our ability to engage with each other 
as genuinely free human beings.”692 A mobilization video posted the day before the event 
featured excerpts from the documentary about Swartz “The Internet's Own Boy”, directed by 
Brian Knappenberger, who had also directed the “Stop Watching Us”-mini documentary. In order 
to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of internet campaigns, the promotional video showed 
Swartz in a lecture in which he reminisced on the successful anti-SOPA efforts as well as voicing 
concerns about government surveillance. However the latter issue is only mentioned in passing: 
“It is shocking to think that the accountability is so lax that they don't have basic statistics about 
how big the spying program is. The answer is 'We are spying on so many people, we can't possibly 
even count them' – then that's an awful lot of people. (...) That's pretty, I mean that’s scary that 
what it is.”693 Centering the “Day We Fight Back” on Swartz was clearly not only meant to simply 
honor his achievements but to directly link it to the greatest success of the digital rights 
movements up to this day. Yet, while anti-copyright protests and concerns for online surveillance 
are somewhat connected (as both are parts of the digital rights sphere of activism) there are no 
direct links between net neutrality and warrantless spying on regular citizens. Additionally, 
posthumously using Swartz as the face for an anti-surveillance campaign was far from an obvious 
choice. While he strongly opposed internet surveillance in general, he did not live to see the day 
of the Snowden revelations. 
 
 
                                                 
691 “On Anniversary of Aaron Swartz's Tragic Passing, Leading Internet Groups and Online Platforms Announce Day 
of Activism Against NSA Surveillance,” (accessed March 16, 2016). https://thedaywefightback.org/press/. 
692 “The Day We Fight Back, On Anniversary of Aaron Swartz's Tragic Passing.” 
693 Luminant Media, “The Day We Fight Back” (accessed March 2016, 16).  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJ194S7KjRg.  
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Discussion 
To examine how the frame packages were reproduced in newspapers and online media, I 
searched the LexisNexis Academic news database for all items mentioning the terms 'The Day 
We Fight Back' in the day leading up to the protest, the day of the protest and its immediate 
aftermath (the two days after the protest). An 'All News' search for the term 'The Day We Fight 
Back' narrowed down to the source categories Newspapers, Magazines, Web Magazines, and 
Blogs for the period from 10/02/2014 to 10/13/2014 yielded a total of 62 news items. (See table VI).  
As was the case with the media coverage of “Stop Watching Us,” the “Celebrity Activism”-
package focusing on the plight of one activist, Swartz, was the most frequently adopted by the 
media outlets, followed by the “Global Dimension” package with adoption rates of 33 and 23 
percent, respectively. Less than ten percent of the indexed news articles adopted the “Orwellian 
Totalitarianism” package (See figure III). 
 Period 
The Day We Fight Back 
2/10-2/13/2014 
  Newspaper articles 6 (9,68%) 
Web Blog articles 49 (79,03%) 
Magazine articles 1 (1,61) 
Web Magazine articles 6 (9,68%) 
 Type of Article   
News report 44 (70,96%) 
Opinion piece 18 (29,03%) 
Total (n) 62 (100%) 
    
TABLE VI: Overview of LexisNexis search results for the "The Day We Fight Back" 
campaign. 
 
Notably, “The Day We Fight Back” generated an overall media coverage that was far more 
unfavorable than preceding campaigns. To place the protest in the same tradition as the anti-
SOPA fight proved to be especially problematic. Before the campaign even started there was a 
high amount of pressure on the organizers to repeat the success of its spiritual predecessor, 
which as many commentators pointed out in the prelude to the event, would be close to 
impossible. When the results were in – the numbers of placed calls and emails to politicians, of 
participating websites, and likes, shares and hashtags on Facebook, Twitter and other social 
networking sites – the subsequent media coverage in the U.S. was partially dismissive. While the 
145 
 
coverage had been sparse in the days leading to February 11, now some outlets constructed a 
narrative of indifference, futility and failure. While the numbers were clearly not even close in 
comparison to the anti-SOPA campaign, they were nevertheless respectable and demonstrated 
that parts of the internet community were indeed highly concerned about government 
surveillance.694 Yet for some publications, the “Day We Fight Back” was clearly a “flop.”695 The 
New York Times, in its “The Caucus”-Blog initially declared that the campaign “succeeded in 
capturing a large amount of attention online”696 on February 11, but then later that day mocked 
the event as “The Day the Internet Didn't Fight Back.” TheVerge.com noted in their assessment of 
the campaign that while “SOPA had millions of opponents,” the “NSA had [only] thousands.”697 
And Mashable, another of the main tech reporting websites (specifically targeting the tech- and 
internet savvy crowd “The Day We Fight Back” wanted to reach), declared that “nothing about 
[the campaign] felt like an uprising,” and  “no one knew it existed.”698 Instead of a collective, 
global response to the NSA controversial practices, "[i]t was just another day on the Internet.”699 
 In a blog post for The Huffington Post, one of the key organizers of “The Day We Fight 
Back,” David Segal of the digital rights advocacy group Demand Progress, addressed the, in his 
opinion, distorted and unfair press coverage. While he acknowledged that public opposition 
against surveillance was “moving more slowly than all of us would like,”700 the media were in part 
to blame. Even though the campaign in terms of raising awareness and alerting policy makers 
                                                 
694 According to organizers Senators and Representatives received a total of 555,000 emails and 89,000 calls while 
245,000 people from around the world signed the 13 principles petition. Cf. “The Day We Fought Back: By the 
Numbers” (accessed March 16, 2016). https://thedaywefightback.org/the-results/. See also Damon Poeter, “The 
Day We Fight Back Generates Nearly 100k Calls to Congress,” PCMag.com, February 13, 2014 (accessed March 16, 
2016). http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2453387,00.asp.  
695 Lance Ulanoff, “We Were Supposed to Fight Back Yesterday? Didn't get the Memo,” Mashable.com, February 12, 
2014. (accessed March 16, 2016). http://mashable.com/2014/02/12/the-day-we-fight-back-
fail/#:eyJzIjoidCIsImkiOiJfbjdlOHJ1ejF2aXgydHprb2cwNmNfIn0. 
696 Michael Roston, “Antisurveillance Campaign Adds Itself to Washington's Datebook,” The New York Times Blogs 
(The Caucus), February 11, 2014 (accessed March 16, 2016). http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/stop-
the-nsa-social-mediacampaign/.  
697 Adi Robertson, “Not many of us actually fought on the Day We Fight Back,” The Verge, February 13, 2014 
(accessed March 16, 2016). http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/13/5408034/not-many-of-us-actually-fought-on-
the-day-we-fight-back.  
698 Lance Ulanoff, “We Were Supposed to Fight Back Yesterday?”  
699 Ibid. 
700 David Segal, “What the Mainstream Media Doesn’t Understand About the Road to a Society without Mass 
Surveillance,” Huffington Post, February 25, 2014 (accessed March 16, 2016). 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-segal/what-the-mainstream-media_1_b_4855823.html.  
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turned out to be “as substantial as our most optimistic projections”701 it was unfavorably 
compared to the anti-SOPA protests.702 The latter was the result of years of hardship and 
organizing while in comparison “The Day We Fight Back” was more of an ad-hoc protest day and 
thus even more impressive given the relative short amount of time in which it was put together. 
Directly referencing the New York Times piece, Segal claimed that the mainstream media “just 
doesn't get how activism works.”703 While the dynamics between media and activists have been 
strained in general in the past, Segal's blog post is further evidence for a complicated relationship 
between digital rights advocates and mainstream media outlets when it comes to privacy and 
surveillance issues.  
 
FIGURE III: Ratio of frame adoption of news outlets covering the “The Day We Fight 
Back” protest events. The columns represent the percentages of the total of 62 news 
items that referred to, covered, or adopted the respective anti-surveillance frames in 
their reporting of “The Day We Fight Back.” 
 
                                                 
701 Segal, “What the Mainstream Media Doesn't Understand.” 
702 For the stark contrast between self-perception of the campaign by the organizers and the assessment of the 
media see also David Segal, “The Day We Fought Back,” TheHill.com, February 21, 2014(accessed March 16, 2016). 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/198859-the-day-we-fought-back.  
703 Segal, “What the Mainstream Media Doesn't Understand.” 
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The participation in the campaign of an industry lobbying group named ‘Reform Government 
Surveillance’ created problems as well. The group consisted of several big online companies, 
including Facebook and Google, which had joined forces to “to address the practices and laws 
regulating government surveillance of individuals.” 704 Google CEO Larry Page said on the 
coalition's site that the security of users' electronic data “is undermined by the apparent 
wholesale collection of data, in secret and without independent oversight, by many governments 
around the world. It's time for reform and we urge the U.S. government to lead the way.”705 
Initially the organizers had been optimistic that “the stance taken by the technology firms 
provided a public boost to ‘The Day We Fight Back,’”706 But the Snowden leaks, particularly in 
regard to the NSA's PRISM program, had highlighted the dubious role of online companies in the 
global surveillance regime, making them a problematic partner to begin with. This is not to 
imply that privacy activists, who have participated in campaigns such as “The Day We Fight 
Back,” are a homogenous group uncritical of the business practices of big internet companies. Yet 
the temporary “Day We Fight Back”-alliance between activists and corporations has arguably 
upheld what Seda Gürses et al. have criticized as the “ultimately artificial separation of industry 
surveillance from government surveillance.”707  
Thus when 'Reform Government Surveillance' publicly declared their decision to be part 
of “The Day We Fight Back,” this had severe consequences for the media coverage of the event. 
The majority of reports focused not on the campaign itself but instead on the consequences of 
government surveillance for the business of online companies. Technocratic and legalistic 
language, such as the coalitions' call to “codify sensible limitations on [the government's) ability 
to compel service providers to disclose user data”708 pushed the main interpretative frame 
packages aside. Instead many of the news items focused on the online companies instead of the 
activist groups and included statements from Silicon Valley executives Marc Zuckerberg or Eric 
Schmidt, who both in the past have publicly questioned the very concept of online privacy 
                                                 
704 “Reform Government Surveillance 2014” (accessed March 16, 2016). 
https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/.  
705 As quoted by Stephen Braun, “Technology firms urge changes to US spying,” The Associated Press, February 11, 
2014 (via LexisNexis Academic). 
706 Ibid. 
707 Seda Gürses, Arun Kundnai and  Joris Van Hoboken, “Crypto and Empire: the Contradictions of Counter-
surveillance Advocacy,” Media, Culture & Society 38 (4) (2016) 576–590, 586. 
708 “Reform Government Surveillance 2014.”  
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itself.709 While the organizers were initially “thrilled”710 by the participation of those companies 
because they could easily reach millions of internet users, Google and many other companies 
decided not to display the 'Eyecon'-banner on their network of websites or participate in the 
blackout. Instead Google merely wrote a blog post and sent an alert to its public policy email list; 
Yaho published a tumblr post, and Microsoft, without mentioning the campaign by name, posted 
a rather unspecific call for reforming surveillance programs. Thus, some blog sites, such as 
Dailydot sensed “a feeling of creeping disappointment from certain activist corners.”711 What the 
organizers may have underestimated was that “[t]he fight against the NSA has very different 
implications than does the battle these firms successfully waged against SOPA in 2012. Therefore, 
it's no surprise their tactics and level of commitment are also vastly different.”712 
In sum, with mixed results, the international privacy community had switched tactics. 
Applying some of the same frame packages as “Stop Watching Us”, “The Day We Fight Back”, 
tried to capitalize on the outrage the Snowden leaks was still generating, this time directly 
addressed internet users online. Because the campaign failed to generate the levels of 
mobilization of the anti-SOPA protests of 2012, it was unfavorably compared against the latter. 
The U.S. Freedom Act, one of the main goals of the campaign, would eventually be passed one 
year later, but it is impossible to measure the impact “The Day We Fight Back” on that legislative 
outcome. Overall file sharing and net neutrality were more important to internet users – at least 
this was the narrative parts of the technology reporters were pushing – ultimately ignoring the 
organizers’ frame packages identified in this chapter. With “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop 
Watching Us” activists had tried to using street protest to raise awareness and push for legal 
reform and with “The Day We Fight Back” the privacy community had attempted to do the same 
online. But meanwhile, the global surveillance complex continued to collect data on citizens 
around the world. What would happen if you could bring people to make it harder to be 
surveilled? What if you could change their online behavior or improve their internet safety in 
meaningful ways? Then you would not need offline protests whose impact was hard to measure 
                                                 
709 See for example Goodman, “Future Crimes,” 89. 
710 Sledge, Matt. 2014. “Google Backs Major Effort to Rein in NSA,” The Huffington Post, February 11, 2014 (accessed 
March 16, 2016).  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/11/google-nsa-freedom-act_n_4767621.html.  
711 Aaron Sankin, “The Day We Fight Back: A lost battle, a new war,” The DailyDot, February 13, 2014 (accessed 
March 16, 2016). https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/day-we-fight-back-companies-google/.  
712 Ibid. 
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or online campaigns that were mocked in the media. A year after Snowden had appeared on the 
scene an antidote against mass surveillance appeared on the horizon and it could make 
arguments over turn out rates of protest campaigns obsolete: encryption. 
 
4.4 “Reset the Net” 
With 'Reset the Net' privacy activism in the post-Snowden world went full-circle. Exactly one 
year after the whistleblower had leaked classified NSA documents to the press, the privacy 
community wanted to commemorate the one-year anniversary and once more take a stand 
against surveillance. Spearheaded by the Digital Rights group Fight for the Future, on June 5, 
2014, “Reset the Net”  raised awareness for encryption as a way to make it harder for governments 
to spy on internet users. While “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” were (digitally 
enabled) offline protests, and the online campaign “The Day We Fight Back” was partially 
flanked by street demonstrations, “Reset the Net” was confined to the promotion of a set of 
privacy tools online. In doing so, privacy advocacy groups once again teamed up with online 
companies, forming an initial coalition of more than 20 organizations.713 Together they urged the 
public to – as outlined in the official press release – “install privacy and encryption tools and 
secure [your] personal digital footprint against intrusive surveillance.”714 Companies were 
encouraged to enhance the privacy features of their own applications and services, while 
individual users, through the gateway of the “Reset the Net” homepage, could conveniently 
access and adapt end-to-end encryption tools. 
On the whole, “Reset the Net” applied five anti-surveillance frame packages. The first one, 
“Encryption”, was to call on the public to take their privacy in their own hands. Secondly, a 
specific “Freedom”-package was constructed to give the somewhat abstract and technical nature 
of encryption political meaning. 
                                                 
713 Along with Fight For the Future participants included “reddit, CREDO Mobile, Imgur, Greenpeace, Libertarian 
Party, FireDogLake, Thunderclap, DuckDuckGo, Disconnect.Me, Demand Progress,  Access, Free Press, Restore 
the Fourth, AIDS Policy Project, PolitiHacks, OpenMedia, Free Software Foundation, Bill of Rights Defense 
Committee, Code Pink, Popular Resistance, Participatory Politics Foundation, BoingBoing, Public Knowledge, 
Amicus, New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, Progressive Change Campaign Committee, 
Student Net Alliance, and the Center for Democracy and Technology.” Fight for the Future, “Press Release: 
Companies & Organizations Announce Plan to ‘Reset the Net,’” May 5, 2014 (accessed April 15, 2016). 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/84832597325/press-release-companies-organizations-announce.    
714 Ibid. 
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Table VII: Frame matrix detailing dominant anti-surveillance frames in the “Reset the 
Net” campaign. 
 
A third frame package indicated that effective resistance against government surveillance could 
only be achieved through a coalition between internet users, activists, and tech companies 
(“Intersectoral Cooperation”). Finally, the remaining two packages were remnants of prior 
campaigns such as “Stop Watching Us” and “The Day We Fight Back.” The “Celebrity Activism”-
framing was used again to get attention from the mainstream media, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent, the campaign portrayed surveillance as a global problem (“Global Dimension”; see table 
VII).  
As was applied to the preceding campaigns I have conducted a close reading of official 
campaign materials published by the organizers (mainly from FFTF but also documents released 
by EFF), including the official website, a mobilization video, and press releases. As was done in 
the preceding case studies, to include media reactions to “Reset the Net,” the chapter will be 
concluded with an overview of how newspapers and blogs as indexed by LexisNexis have 
‚Reset the Net‘ 
Frame Package Core Frame Core Position Exemplars  
Encryption The use of encryption software by 
individual users is the only feasible 
way to resist the NSA’s mass 
surveillance 
If encryption becomes a widespread  
industry standard mass surveillance 
becomes too costly for intelligence 
agencies, who instead will then focus on 
targeted surveillance of individuals or 
groups. 
“[U]se crypto to hit the NSA the 
hardest.” (Reset the Net press 
release) 
Freedom Mass online surveillance threatens the 
freedom of all citizens. Thus the only 
way to preserve the freedom the 
Internet is offering, is to install 
encryption software. 
Only by browsing the world wide web 
privately internet users can live out their 
true personalities according to their 
political beliefs, which in turn creates 
social progress. The only immediate 
means to safeguard their identities and 
internet freedom is the use of 
encryption. 
 
Surveillance “violates our right 
to be ourselves, and undermines 
freedom of speech and 
democracy.” The safer the web, 
“the better [and] freer [the] 
world.” (FFTF press release) 
Intersectoral 
Cooperation 
Protection from the NSA’s spying 
programs can only be achieved in an 
alliance between civil society actors 
and big tech companies 
Encryption must become an industry- 
wide standard. If the big online 
companies agree to make encryption a 
default in their products, the days of 
mass government surveillance will be 
numbered. 
 
“People and companies all over 
the world will come together” 
(Edward Snowden) 
Celebrity Activists We know about the scope of formerly 
secret contemporary surveillance 
programs because of whistleblowers 
and activists. 
The heroic sacrifices of whistleblowers 
and the courage of activists exposing the 
surveillance state should be celebrated 
and inspire citizens to resist surveillance. 
"We know that encryption 
works - the proof is in the fact 
that the U.S. government still 
doesn't know what documents 
Edward Snowden took.” (FFTF 
press release 
 
Global Dimension Due to the nature of the Internet, 
Surveillance is a global practice that is 
not only affecting US citizens but 
people all over the world that can only 
be tackled on a global scale. 
Authoritarian regimes in the ‘Global 
South’ demonstrate how surveillance can 
lead to serious human rights violations. 
If global surveillance isn’t resisted in the 
U.S. and around the world it will lead to 
autocracy worldwide. 
Snowden: campaign marks “the 
beginning of a moment where 
we the people begin to protect 
our universal human rights with 
the laws of nature rather than 
the laws of nations.” 
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adopted or ignored the frames created by the activists. 
 
Encryption 
The basis of the first frame package “Encryption” was to imply that the only way to really be safe 
from government surveillance was to get familiar with privacy-enhancing tools. Whistleblower 
Edward Snowden strongly supported this general idea and acted as a spokesperson for the 
campaign. According to Snowden proposing “technical solutions” was the right way to “shutting 
down the collection of our online communications.” Because the U.S. Congress was either not 
willing to reign in on surveillance or there was no democratic consensus for the abolition of the 
NSA programs, Snowden was “excited” to be part of the campaign because it “mark[ed] the 
moment when we turn political expression into practical action.” By June 5th, with the launch of 
“Reset The Net” gone were the days where you had to “ask for your privacy.” Now it was time to 
“[t]ake it back.” 715  
Although activists strongly deny this (see interview section 5.8), and it may not have been 
their intent, this frame subtly implied that political grassroots protests – protest marches, letters 
to representatives, online blackouts – were not enough in achieving freedom from online 
surveillance. The idea appealed to common sense. Through “oppos[ing] mass surveillance by 
adopting encryption technology”716 activists and users could bypass the long and uncertain 
political process by making it impossible or at least significantly harder for government agencies 
to get access to their data.717 With “Reset the Net” the activists, it seemed, had discovered a new 
way “to win against surveillance.” While the campaign website acknowledged that “there are tons 
of ways to fight back against NSA surveillance,” this time notably absent were calls to take it to 
the streets. Instead in a more concrete call to action FFTF suggested the following actions: 
Are you a musician or performer? Shout out privacy tools from the stage. 
Do you have a website, blog, or tumblr? Run our splash screen. 
                                                 
715 Reset the Net, “Edward Snowden's statement in support of Reset the Net,” June 4, 2014 (accessed April 15, 2016) 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/87793640365/edward-snowdens-statement-in-support-of-reset-the-net.  
716 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
717 I will not discuss the practical effectiveness of encryption technology in greater detail. However, it has to be 
noted that there is controversy regarding the consequences of using privacy enhancing tools especially in 
authoritarian regimes. While encryption certainly can be an indispensable tool for communicating safely, there is 
evidence that users who use encryption may quickly become targets of surveillance because they seem to be 
hiding something. Cf. Michael Kassner, “Does using encryption make you a bigger target for the NSA?” 
TechRepublic, July 1, 2013 (accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/does-using-
encryption-make-you-a-bigger-target-for-the-nsa/.  
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Everybody’s got friends on Facebook & Twitter. Join the [crowdspeaking 
plattform] Thunderclap. Are you a student? Learn how to organize at your 
school, and get your school to add NSA-resistant privacy to its services. Do 
you work in a political organization or NGO? Distribute the privacy pack 
to your members.718  
 
Technologist Bruce Schneier supported the focus on encryption and summarized the campaign's 
basic approach: “The NSA and others do mass surveillance because it's easier than targeting. 
Initiatives like Reset the Net force governments into targeted surveillance. That's how we win.”719 
Further, the campaign encouraged social media users to share and commit themselves to the 
following pledge: “Mass surveillance is illegitimate. I'm taking steps to take my freedoms back 
and I expect governments and corporations to follow in my footsteps and take steps to stop all 
mass government surveillance.” By promoting encryption the campaign would help to “turn off,” 
“shut down,” or make surveillance “too expensive to continue,” as suggested in a series of 
suggested tweets compiled by the organizers.720 
The campaign was also designed to get corporate players on board and convince them to 
“improv[e] their own security for users or promoting privacy tools to their members.” Organizers  
claimed to have set up “Reset The Net” having drawn lessons from the leaked NSA documents. 
Based on an understanding how programs like PRISM functioned, the way how to resist such 
government intrusions had become clear. “Now that we know how mass surveillance works,” the 
press release stated, “we know how to stop it”721 – again subtly implying that a full year of 
grassroots organizing and protesting was not the way to stop mass surveillance.  
 Struggles for legal remedies were not completely off the table but apparently halted for 
the time being. In its diagnostic framing the “Reset the Net” mobilization video noted that 
governments were surveilling and thereby effectively imprisoning internet users. “We have to 
stop them,” the narrator says. “But how?” the voice continues, when “[t]hey seem so vast and 
                                                 
718 “Reset the Net” homepage (accessed April 15, 2016). https://www.resetthenet.org/.  
719 Ibid. 
720 “#ResetTheNet Sharing Resources” (accessed April 15, 2016) 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/87209442640/resetthenet-sharing-resources. In fact, buried under a list of 
suggested privacy tools featured on the Reset the Net homepage there are “[i]mportant notes” warning that these 
tools are insufficient if you actually feel that you are under surveillance: “if you believe you may be the specific 
target of surveillance, these [Pidgin and Adium] aren't the tools for you. (...) [Other programs] like all software, 
cannot fully protect against a targeted attack on your person or electronics.” “Reset the Net” homepage. 
721 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
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powerful?”722 As the CEO of a CREDO Mobile stated, a company, which participated in 'Reset the 
Net', “until we win real reform, we will encourage users to adopt encryption tools to protect their 
personal communications from government abuse.”723 The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
agreed, implying that the political process was simply taking too long to instigate change, as their 
press release concluded: “Don't wait for your privacy and freedom. Start taking it back.”724 
Instead of collectively pushing for anti-surveillance legislation, “Reset the Net” wanted to “take 
back control of (...) personal and private data one website, one device, one Internet user at a 
time,”725 Likewise Erik Martin, General Manager of the social news site Reddit suggested to “use 
crypto to hit the NSA the hardest.”726 In the eyes of the organizers this was a viably strategy. 
Encrypting your online communication was necessary now because “legal and architectural 
changes happen very slowly,”727 as Joe Hall of the Center for Democracy and Technology added. 
Let alone, the most interesting statement quoted in the official “Reset the Net” press release 
came from Steve Anderson, Executive Director of OpenMedia.org:  
At the end of the day, we’re going to have to create accountability for 
governments that are spying on their citizens. And it’s sad that people feel 
they need to route around what their government is doing – this shows just 
how far governments have grown out of touch with their citizens. It’s so 
important that people speak out in any way they can about surveillance, 
and using encryption technologies is one way to do that.728  
 
For once, while Anderson stresses that ultimately governments need to be held accountable, in 
his quote he also paints a grim picture of the current political landscape in which it has become 
impossible to scale back the surveillance state through collective action and legislative means. It 
is particularly noteworthy that in this context of political stagnation the only remaining way to 
“speak out” is using encryption. The act of covering your tracks online becomes a political speech 
act, not only because the government cannot track you anymore but the increasing adaption of 
privacy software would essentially send out the message of 'Look what my country has become!' 
                                                 
722 Fight for the Future, “Reset the Net: June 5th, 2014” (accessed April 15, 2016). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKk8MHFLNNE.  
723 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
724 Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Join Us on June 5th to Reset the Net” (accessed April 15, 2016). 
https://www.eff.org/es/deeplinks/2014/05/join-us-june-5th-reset-net.  
725 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
726 Fight for the Future, “Reset the Net: Let's get started,” April 10, 2014 (accessed April 15, 2016). 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/82336183609/lets-get-started.  
727 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
728 Fight for the Future, “Press Release,” (Emphases added). 
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The notion that traditional contentious politics simply do not work anymore in the 
context of surveillance is an interesting subframe that is worth examining at greater detail. In 
their analysis of one year of surveillance activism after Snowden, the organizers found that that 
“politicians ha[d] done nothing to rein in mass spying.”729 Again, by promoting technological 
solutions, the organizers’ political communication work seemed dismissive of political 
approaches, which were characterized as long-term, ineffective, and non-practical as opposed to 
immediate, effective, and hands-on. In an email text, drafted by the FFTF communications team 
and distributed among constituents, the focus on encryption was lauded as “[f]inally (...) 
something you can do about [mass surveillance] that will make a difference right now.”730 The 
outlook on the political system and its potential in fostering change are realistic, if not close to 
cynical. As the email draft explains: “Despite the massive public outcry, a whole year after the 
revelations Congress has done nothing. The NSA is still tapping our phones and computers, while 
politicians endlessly debate our rights away. We have no choice to take matters into our own 
hands.”731 
 
Freedom 
But the framing went one step further. In a different frame package designed to explain and 
make sense of the political dimension of encryption, the organizers over and over stressed the 
concept of freedom. The first line of the voice-over of the mobilization video is “The Internet is 
Freedom.” Accordingly, if the internet is under surveillance then there is no freedom. 
Consequently, installing encryption software was promoted as a “powerful step to turn off 
government spying and turn on freedom.” With this strategy the internet would remain “safe, 
open, and free,” whereas continuing to communicating online without those safety measures 
would eventually turn the Internet into a “prison.”732 In a suggested tweet the organizers claimed 
to “[s]top the oppression”733 by joining the campaign. A quote by Tim Berners-Lee, one of the 
inventors of the World Wide Web which participants were supposed to share on Facebook, 
explained that “[u]nwarranted government surveillance is an intrusion on basic human rights 
                                                 
729 “Reset the Net Infographic” (accessed April 15, 2016). https://cms.fightforthefuture.org/reset-net-infographic/.  
730 “Reset the Net” homepage. 
731 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
732 Fight for the Future, “Reset the Net: June 5th, 2014.” 
733 “#ResetTheNet Sharing Resources.”  
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that threatens the very foundations of a democratic society.”734 And in a widely distributed email 
draft FFTF declared that surveillance “violates our right to be ourselves, and undermines 
freedom of speech and democracy.” The safer the web, “the better [and] freer [the] world.”735  
 The most elaborate explanation, however, of why encryption as a form of resistance was 
important and why it guaranteed 'freedom' was included in a section on the “Reset the Net”-web 
site titled “Why should I care about privacy, when I have nothing to hide?”736 It has to be noted 
that the post was not specifically written for the campaign but had been created earlier, in April 
2014, as a list of bullet points directed at individuals to voice in a private debate over the merits of 
privacy. However, the organizers inserted the article into the homepage, presumably to 
strengthen the political implications of their 'encryption is freedom' message. In a nutshell FFTF 
argued that without privacy there is no freedom and hence no way to achieve social change:  
None of the freedom and progress we’ve won over the past century would 
have been possible without the freedom to change things (starting with 
our own lives first) that privacy gives us. Imagine a world where you were 
constantly being judged by everyone around you, suffering immediately, 
or years down the road, for anything you did or said that was unusual, 
unpopular, or against the rules. In that kind of world, social and economic 
progress grinds to a halt, because everyone’s afraid to rock the boat!737  
 
By using encryption, people living in a surveillance society as outlined by the Snowden 
revelations, could continue to live out their personalities and thus enable social progress:  
Gay rights. Interracial marriage. Medical marijuana. None of these would 
exist now if people were unable to break the rules in the privacy of their 
own home, building momentum and legitimacy until they could show the 
world what change looked like, that it wasn’t so scary, and that it could 
make the world a better place.  We owe massive amounts of social and 
economic progress to privacy. Think about it. Don’t take it for granted.738 
 
                                                 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Fight For the Future, “Why should I care about privacy, when I have nothing to hide?” (accessed April 15, 2016). 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/84339091350/why-should-i-care-about-privacy-when-i-have.  
737 Ibid. 
738 Ibid. Clearly, this is the most detailed, concrete and politicized argument in the mainly technological-practical 
campaign materials. Yet it raises important questions: While the paragraph argues that privacy is needed as a first 
step before “show[ing] the world what change looked like” it could be interpreted as downplaying the role of 
collective action played in establishing these rights. What is not mentioned is that activists in these fields 
publicized their demands – facing oppression and political violence – instead of remaining in their private 
comfort zones. Civil and women’s rights activists and others achieved their goals because they mad privately 
experienced oppression public. 
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The post then goes on to give one specific historical example – prohibition – to demonstrate how 
individual resistance eventually led to its abolition: “You probably wouldn’t even be able to drink 
alcohol in the US, if people couldn’t privately defy prohibition. Remember that, the next time 
you crack open a cold beer on a hot day.”739 The bootleggers and flappers of the roaring twenties 
were essentially 'encrypting' their alcohol consumption and 'hacking' prohibitions, the text 
suggests.740  
Finally, the 'freedom'-frame is reflected in a more concrete description of the NSA's 
surveillance powers and its potential abuses: “Right now, the NSA’s access gives it the power to 
secretly undermine the work of journalists and elected leaders around the globe, intimidating 
sources and tipping elections. This capability to subvert democratic systems is a time bomb.”741 
While the overall post is a much-needed explanation of why encryption is worth pursuing from a 
democratic point of view, it also contradicts the core message, namely that encryption will push 
the NSA to switch from mass to targeted surveillance. Journalists and Politician, in the context of 
the quote cited above, are potential victims of targeted surveillance, against which mass-
marketed encryption tools hardly offer protection. 
 
Intersectoral Cooperation 
According to the third major interpretive package of the campaign, “Intersectoral Cooperation”, 
in order to fully establish widespread protection from surveillance, activists had to work hand in 
hand with internet companies. “[P]eople and companies all over the world will come together,”742 
Edward Snowden had made his hopes public in the days leading up to “Reset the Net.” According 
to the jointly announced plan,743 major tech firms had to be pushed by users to insert encryption 
into their services. The result would be a powerful coalition of activists and companies 
positioned to resist government surveillance and ensure an encrypted, open, and free Internet. A 
key part of “Reset the Net” as depicted in an infographic was that “web companies push privacy 
upgrades to protect users' rights”(see image IX). What the campaign essentially promoted was an 
                                                 
739 Ibid. 
740 Notwithstanding its self-serving premise, the example certainly makes sense, because the officials' inability to 
enforce prohibition played a part in its downfall. What is not mentioned, however, is the role of mass social 
movements, especially women in repealing prohibition. 
741 Fight For the Future, “Why should I care about privacy?” 
742 Reset the Net, “Edward Snowden's Statement.” 
743 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.” 
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consumerist response to surveillance. Internet users could “push companies to do the right thing 
and voting with [their] own feet, by evangelizing the best secure tools.”744 To be clear, the tools 
initially promoted by “Reset the Net” were not produced by the big internet companies but rather 
open source alternatives. That is why one of the main objectives for FFTF was to advise the public 
on its uses:  
Most of us haven’t tried using privacy tools yet. We use the Internet and 
feel icky knowing the government is watching and recording our every 
move. But the reality is that it’s easier than you think to take a few simple 
steps and protect your privacy and the privacy of your loved ones. The 
more of us that use basic encryption tools, the safer we all are.745  
 
Additionally, users should ask the big tech firms to care more about securing their users' privacy. 
The thinking was that “[i]f we can get the Internet’s most popular websites and apps to step up 
security, the NSA is in serious trouble.” “Reset the Net” also launched a “Twitter Brigade” to 
convince the companies that encryption was not only beneficial for the users but also in their 
own interest: Because “[w]ho knows? To limit the damage the NSA has done to their reputations, 
[tech companies] might listen.”746 For example, one suggested tweet asked “Hey @Google, 
require Android apps in the Play Store to add SSL w/ cert pinning, to protect privacy 
#ResetTheNet.”747 
 
IMAGE IX: “Reset the Net” Infographic 
 
Just as was the case with “The Day We Fight Back” eventually Google joined the campaign as the 
                                                 
744 Fight for the Future, “Let's get started.” 
745 “#ResetTheNet Sharing Resources.” 
746 Reset the Net, “Twitter Brigade” (accessed April 15, 2016). 
http://resetthenet.tumblr.com/post/84338081775/twitter-brigade.  
747 Ibid. 
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biggest and most prominent player in the campaign. In a post on their corporate blog, 
announcing their support for “Reset the Net” Google promised to provide users of their popular 
email service Gmail with stronger encryption features and released a code for its web browser 
Chrome allowing encryption (under the working title “end-to-end”). In hindsight, however, this 
project must be considered an empty promise designed to co-opt the “Reset the Net” campaign 
and create the illusion of significantly improving their users’ privacy.748 
 
Celebrity Activism 
The fourth frame package, “Celebrity Activism,” played an important, albeit subordinated role in 
the framing of the campaign. The protest event was scheduled to honor the one-year anniversary 
of the Snowden leaks and was heavily endorsed by Snowden himself, which led one publication 
even dubbing it “Edward Snowden Day.”749 His backstory and his statement contributed to the 
legitimacy of the event. Several media outlets used the occasion of ”Reset the Net” and the 
anniversary of the Snowden leaks to recap what had been exposed in June 2013 and how the 
debate over surveillance had evolved since then, thus managing to bringing surveillance and 
privacy issues back into the public discourse and news cycle.750 If there had been any uncertainty 
whether Snowden was merely a neutral provider of information or an activist himself, “Reset the 
Net” proved that he was the latter. Co-signing his second major activist campaign after “Stop 
                                                 
748 Because Gmail’s business model is to algorithmically scan all incoming and outcoming emails for keywords and 
market their content to third parties, Google has no rational business interest in promoting real end-to-end 
encryption that would block itself from identifying the content of the emails. Thus, not surprisingly, the 
company never followed through on their promise. In their initial blog post from June 2014, they announced to 
make encryption extensions optional. In a follow-up blog post from December 2014, the company announced 
that after an initial round of bug fixing “End to End” was still in a very early alpha stage of development. Finally, 
in February of 2017 Google quietly abandoned the “end-to-end” altogether, announcing it was no longer a 
“Google Project”. Cf. “Transparency Report: Protecting emails as they travel across the web,” Google Blog, June 3, 
2014 (accessed April 15, 2016) https://googleblog.blogspot.de/2014/06/transparency-report-protecting-
emails.html;  “An Update to End-To-End,” Google Security Blog, December 16, 2014 (accessed April 15, 2016).  
https://security.googleblog.com/2014/12/an-update-to-end-to-end.html;  Lucian Armasu, “Google Abandons 
'End-To-End' Email Encryption Project, Invites Community To Take It Over,” Tom's Hardware, February 27, 2017 
(accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.tomshardware.com/news/google-abandons-end-to-end-email-
encryption,33745.html.  
749 Lambert Strether, “June Fifth: 'Edward Snowden Day' Except Not. Yet,” Naked Capitalism, June 7, 2014 (accessed 
April 15, 2016). http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/06/june-fifth-edward-snowden-day-except-yet.html.  
750 See for example Levi Sumagaysay, “NSA spying and the Edward Snowden leaks, a year later.” Silicon Beat, June 6, 
2014 (accessed April 15, 2016) http://www.siliconbeat.com/2014/06/05/nsa-spying-and-the-edward-snowden-
leaks-a-year-later/; Aaron Sankin, “The media genius of Edward Snowden,” The Daily Dot, June 5, 2014. (accessed 
April 15, 2016). http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/edward-snowden-glenn-greenwald-nsa-media-strategy/.  
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Watching Us,” he urged the public “to join us on June 5th.”751 To set the stage and depicting the 
surveillance apparatus as having gone awry, Snowden was quoted in the official EFF press release 
with his characterization of NSA chief Keith Alexander and his “obsessive” mission to collect as 
many personal data as possible.752 A statement of the Libertarian Party in which it urged to shut 
down the NSA, grant Snowden a presidential pardon, and award him the American Medal of 
Freedom was included in Fight for the Future's press release.753 Snowden’s successful attempt of 
fleeing Hong Kong and distributing his leaks to reporters was one of the best examples of the 
crucial role encryption in resisting the surveillance state. As  FFTF claimed, “We know that 
encryption works – the proof is in the fact that the U.S. government still doesn't know what 
documents Edward Snowden took.”754 
 
Global Dimension 
Finally, the organizers portrayed encryption as a global remedy for a global problem. Far from 
being confined to U.S. borders, “[t]he NSA [was] exploiting weak links in Internet security to spy 
on the entire world, twisting the Internet we love into something it was never meant to be: a 
panopticon.”755 The roster of participating organizations was mostly US-based but included well-
established transnational NGOs and institutions such as Greenpeace, Access Now, the AIDS 
Policy Project, The Pirate Party, and Amnesty International although it is unclear to which 
degree these groups were included in the planning and conceptualization of the event. For 
example, Greenpeace and Amnesty International, did nothing more than lend their name to the 
campaign. They did not release individual press materials so the connection between their areas 
of expertise – environmental and human rights activism – remained unexplained to the public. 
Encryption obviously is an important protection measure for activists around the world, and 
Greenpeace and Amnesty International at other times have been outspoken advocates against 
online surveillance because it endangers environmental and human rights activists in the face of 
government repression. But those links were not elaborated presumably because the campaign's 
goal was to tackle mass surveillance rather than targeted surveillance of individual activists. The 
                                                 
751 Reset the Net, “Edward Snowden's Statement.” 
752 Electronic Frontier Foundation,” Join Us on June 5th to Reset the Net.” 
753 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.”  
754 “#ResetTheNet Sharing Resources.” 
755 “Reset the Net” homepage 
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software companies involved in “Reset the Net” were also mostly based in the U.S. but their 
products or implementations of encryption options would have effects for internet users around 
the world. 
As the EFF in their press release in support of “Reset the Net” made clear, “[s]urveillance 
affects everyone, in the United States and internationally”756 and therefor encryption was by 
definition a transnational issue. Likewise FFTF’s vision was one of “people all over the world (...) 
work[ing] together to use encryption everywhere and make it too hard for any government to 
conduct mass surveillance.”757 While there had been limits to the communication between 
international privacy advocacy groups during “Stop Watching Us” and “The Day We Fight Back,” 
encryption was presented as a universal anti-surveillance language that would ultimately solve all 
problems of transnational framing attempts.  
For instance, the Canada-based Iranian activist group ASL19, who had also participated in 
'The Day We Fight Back', joined the campaign to put a spotlight on how encryption software 
helped Iranian Internet users circumvent censorship and political oppression.758 With all the 
focus on technical solutions, the organizers stressed the fact that privacy was a human right and 
asked followers to share a post displaying the logo of the United Nations and a quoting Article 12 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”759 Edward Snowden, apparently disillusioned 
with de facto implementation of human rights standards, saw encryption as the cure against 
surveillance transcending national borders and laws. In his statement he embraced the technical 
solutions promoted by “Reset the Net” for their ability to “put an end to the mass surveillance 
programs of any government.” In what was perhaps the most radical techno determinist framing 
of the campaign, Snowden declared that widespread adaption of encryption software would 
mark “the beginning of a moment where we the people begin to protect our universal human 
rights with the laws of nature rather than the laws of nations.”760  
 
 
                                                 
756 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Join Us on June 5th to Reset the Net.”   
757 Fight for the Future, “Press Release.”  
758 ASL19, “Reset the Net,” June 5, 2014 (accessed April 10, 2016).  https://asl19.org/en/blog/2014-06-05-reset-the-
net.html.  
759 “#ResetTheNet Sharing Resources.” 
760 Reset the Net, “Edward Snowden's Statement.” 
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Discussion 
To examine how the frames were reproduced in newspapers and online media, I searched the 
LexisNexis Academic news database for all items mentioning the term “Reset the Net” in the days 
leading up to the protest, the day of the protest, and its immediate aftermath (the two days after 
the protest). An “All News” search for the term “Reset the Net” narrowed down to the source 
categories Newspapers, Magazines, Web magazines, Blogs, and Newswire for the period June 4-
7, 2014, yielded a combined total of 26 news items. See Table VIII for more details on the media 
coverage of the event. 
 Period 
Reset the Net 
6/4-6/7/2014 
  Newspaper articles 3 (12 %) 
Web Blog articles 18 (69 %) 
Magazine articles 0 (0%) 
Web Magazine 
articles (Web 
publications) 3 (12%) 
News Wire 2 (8%) 
Type of Article  
News report 14 (54%) 
Opinion piece 12 (46%) 
    
Total (n) 26 (100%) 
    
Table VIII: Overview of LexisNexis search results for the “Reset the Net” campaign. 
 
In their reporting on “Reset the Net,” newspapers and blogs widely adopted the first three 
aforementioned frame packages (“Encryption,” “Celebrity Activism,” “Intersectoral Cooperation”) 
while ignoring the remaining (“Global Dimension,” “Freedom”) (see figure IV). As had been the 
case with “Stop Watching Us” the “Celebrity Activism”-frame package was most widely adapted 
by the media outlets covering “Reset the Net.” Snowden, by now a full-fledged member of the 
privacy activist community decided to support the campaign with personal statements 
supporting the other main frame package, which was also covered widely, namely “Encryption.” 
The organizers were successful in introducing encryption software to a great number of internet 
users and media recipients. Encryption, which can be either highly sophisticated or easy to use 
depending on the level of protection consumers are seeking, was presented as a simple remedy 
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for the highly complex and pervasive nature of online surveillance. Though it is impossible to 
measure how many internet users switched to encrypting their online communication because 
of “Reset the Net',” the campaigns biggest achievement was to raise awareness that such technical 
solutions exist. Despite various attempts to explain the motivation behind the use of encryption 
software (“Freedom”), the campaign nevertheless focused on technical solutions at the cost of 
politically or legally challenging the surveillance regime.  
 
Figure IV: Ratio of frame adoption of news outlets covering the “Reset the Net” 
campaign. The columns represent the percentages of news items that referred to, 
covered, or adopted the respective anti-surveillance frames in their reporting of “Reset 
the Net.” 
 
The idea that encryption was the only meaningful and effective way to resist and eventually end 
mass surveillance was widely reproduced and expanded in reports and opinion pieces.761 The 
Christian Science Monitor declared that thanks to “Reset the Net” individuals finally had the 
“power (…) to guard [themselves] against government surveillance”. Quoting a tweet from Twitter 
                                                 
761 However, anecdotal evidence shows that general audiences may have been alienated by the crypto-driven focus of 
the campaign. Instead of making privacy and surveillance issues more tangible the rhetoric may have produced 
the opposite. See for example this statement by Paul Jacob, president of the Liberty Initiative: “I don't know on 
which version the current Internet is said to be. Internet 4.0. Web 3.1. HTML something-or-other? You may 
notice: I'm not a tech guy. (...) [F]olks at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (...) have proclaimed today, June 5, 
'Reset the Net' Day. (...) Well, according to the EFF activists, and according to Snowden himself, there are many 
things you can do Encryption is one of them. My advice. Don't ask me about it. Consult experts. Let's think more 
carefully about life under the eyes of our overlords.” Paul Jacob, “Washington: Reset the Net?” Common Sense, 
June 5, 2014 (via Lexis Nexis). 
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user the piece implied that at last it “[l]ooks like we can actually do something instead of 
complaining about mass surveillance.”762 And the blog site The Daily Dot, on the occasion of 
“Reset the Net,” profiled a publisher of encryption software (Virtru) claiming that only such 
products would “lea[d] to a real privacy renaissance.”763 Prior campaigns such as “Restore the 
Fourth” or “Stop Watching Us” were just people 'complaining', while “Reset the Net” would 
actually achieve something, the article implied. The individual encrypting his or her 
communication was more powerful than people coming together to challenge government 
surveillance through collective action.  
Other articles also combined their embrace of encryption with a critique of traditional 
activism. An opinion piece on the blog network Gigaom applauded the technological approach 
and compared it unfavorably to preceding campaigns, in particular “The Day We Fight Back.” 
Echoing Snowden’s proclivity of technological solutions, the author identified a new found 
“realization that ordinary people can and should push back in a meaningful way.”764 “The Day We 
Fight Back” had been merely a case of 'clicktivism' as voiced in a lengthy quote by the web 
consultant Mark Stockley:  
Highly organised government surveillance will not be challenged by the 
most dilute form of modern technical homeopathy, changing our Twitter 
avatars [...] I argued at the time that our only viable defense, the only way 
to really Fight Back, would be by adopting or contributing to projects that 
improve our use of encryption. Fancy let's-all-join-hands graphics aside, 
Reset The Net is exactly that. It's everything that I wanted The Day We 
Fight Back to Be. In a word, useful.765  
 
While such articles reproduced and promoted the basic “Encryption” frame package, it also, with 
broad brush strokes, criticized prior campaigns. Simply raising awareness was not considered to 
be useful anymore. Instead, the campaign and surrounding media coverage suggested that taking 
privacy matters in your own hand was “more meaningful than a million temporary avatar 
                                                 
762 Jacob Axelrad, “Reset the Net: What is it and what does it mean?” Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 2014 
(accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/Tech/2014/0605/Reset-the-Net-What-is-it-
and-what-does-it-mean-video (emphasis added). 
763 Patrick Howell O'Neill, “Meet Virtru, an easy email encryption tool with roots in the NSA,” The Daily Dot, June 5, 
2014 (accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.dailydot.com/debug/virtru-email-encryption-android-app/ (emphasis 
added).  
764 David Meyer, “A year into the Snowden leaks, here's something useful we can all do,” Gigaom, June 5, 2014 
(accessed April 15, 2016). https://gigaom.com/2014/06/05/a-year-into-the-snowden-leaks-heres-something-
useful-we-can-all-do/.  
765 As quoted by ibid. (emphases added). 
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changes.”766 Others, wary not to alienate traditionally minded activists, came up with neologisms 
to marry individual technical protection from surveillance with traditional contentious politics. 
EFF activist Jillian York for example called for a new “mass encryption movement” and compared 
“personal encryption to the safer sex movement.”767  
 However, while the encryption frame was widely adapted in the news coverage, the 
decision to team up with online companies was met with mixed results, in some cases even 
downright ridicule. On the one hand the cooperation with Internet firms, especially Google, 
generated interest in the campaign itself. Google joining “Reset the Net” dominated the press 
reports and headlines. A typical example was “Reset the Net: Google joins anti-surveillance 
campaign” as an article in The Week UK was titled. The first two paragraphs were dedicated to 
the role Google played in the campaign, including quoting extensively from the companies’ own 
explanation of how encryption works. One cannot help but notice the irony of a company, 
known for automatically scanning all of their users email for advertisement purposes, talk about 
the merits of secure email exchange:  
When you mail a letter to your friend, you hope she'll be the only 
person who reads it ... That's why we send important messages in sealed 
envelopes, rather than on postcards. Email works in a similar way. 
Emails that are encrypted as they're routed from sender to receiver are 
like sealed envelopes, and less vulnerable to snooping – whether by bad 
actors or through government surveillance – than postcards.768  
 
As was the case in the press coverage for “The Day We Fight Back,” Google, not so much the 
activists themselves, (or, in this case, there was no distinction between the two anymore) received 
media attention. Barely mentioning the campaign itself, press reports celebrated Google for 
“making moves to let users know how seriously it takes email-security”769 and their Gmail 
version “which will give users a remarkable level of privacy”770 (but never saw the light of day; see 
                                                 
766 Ibid. 
767 As quoted by Patrick Howell O'Neill, “It just got a lot harder for the NSA to spy on your Web activity,” The Daily 
Dot, June 5, 2014 (accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.dailydot.com/debug/reset-the-net-tumblr-wordpress-
wikipedia-ssl-encryption/. 
768 “Reset the Net: Google joins anti-surveillance campaign,” The Week UK, June 6, 2014(accessed April 15, 2016). 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/google/58852/reset-the-net-google-joins-anti-surveillance-campaign.  
769 Jacob Axelrad, “What Google's 'End-to-End' encryption means for you; With its new End-to-End encryption 
service, Google wants to make e-mail safe from prying eyes,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 4, 2014 
(accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/Responsible-Tech/2014/0604/What-Google-s-
End-to-End-encryption-means-for-you.  
770 Douglas A. McIntyre, “Google Encrypted Gmail; The Official Announcement,” 24/7 Wall Street, June 4, 2014 
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footnote 748). That as one blog post mentioned in passing, “the big tech firms (…) [had] 
collaborated with the National Security Agency”771 in the first place, was not seen as red flag.  
Google's decision to relatively late throw their support behind the campaign and making 
vague commitments can be interpreted as a brilliant move to co-opt the movement. One year 
after the Snowden revelations and the subsequent press coverage, which had been particular 
devastating for tech companies, “Reset the Net” offered an opportunity to show users that Google 
and other companies (once again represented by their umbrella lobbying group Reform 
Government Surveillance) supposedly cared about their users’ privacy. As one news report stated, 
Silicon Valley has come a long way boosting privacy and cybersecurity 
since reports in June 2013 disclosed that the National Security Agency was 
collecting data from Internet companies. Tech companies including 
Google, Twitter and Yahoo commemorated a year of news reports detailing 
secret government surveillance Thursday by supporting campaigns that 
both pressure government privacy reform and raise consumer awareness 
about cybersecurity.772  
 
FFTF organizer Evan Greer further elaborated on the encryption focus of the campaign by saying 
that the NSA has “the ability to conduct surveillance on the scale they do today because we send 
so much of our data over the Web unencrypted.”773 While that is certainly the case, one might 
add, that part of the problem is that some of the companies, especially Google collect the data in 
the first place – a fact that had been completely omitted from the campaign and its 
communication strategy. This dubious stance created contradictions best exemplified by an 
article on the blog site Common Dreams. In the spirit of “Reset the Net,” the article stated that 
the editors had taken significant measures to better respect the privacy of its readers. This 
included not only removing third-party trackers from Facebook and Twitter but also a tool 
provided by “Reset the Net's” most valuable ally: Google Analytics. The editors removed it 
because it “tracks your every move after you leave our properties“ and was “too intrusive.”774  
                                                                                                                                                                       
(accessed April 15, 2016). http://247wallst.com/apps-software/2014/06/04/google-encrypted-gmail-the-official-
announcement/.  
771 Lewis Parker, “'Reset the Net' campaign will help you take back your privacy from the NSA,” The Daily Dot, June 
5, 2014. http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/reset-the-net-snowden-nsa-privacy-encryption/.  
772 Tom Risen, “Cybersecurity Boosted After Snowden NSA Revelations,” USNews.com, June 5, 2014 (accessed April 
15, 2016). http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/05/cybersecurity-boosted-after-snowden-nsa-
revelations.  
773 Betsy Isaacson, “Reddit, Google And Others Join Anti-NSA Campaign,” The Huffington Post, June 4, 2014 
(accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/04/encrypted-internet_n_5434032.html.  
774 Jon Queally, “Washington: 'We Are Resetting the Net to Shut Off Mass Surveillance,'” Common Dreams, June 5, 
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One outlet was highly dismissive of the whole idea of getting Google on board for any pro-
privacy campaign. The op-ed is a scathing critique of “Reset the Net’s” basic outline, and while 
certainly not representative for all of the coverage, sums up a major contradiction in the overall 
framing:  
See, despite all its highfalutin' rhetoric, Reset the Net is deeply flawed. 
The reason: the campaign is not against online surveillance, just 
government surveillance. It has nothing to say or critique about the 
massive for-profit dragnet operations run by telecoms and Silicon Valley 
megacorps that target every woman, man and child in the United States 
and beyond. Reset the Net doesn't mention private sector surveillance at 
all, acting instead as if it simply does not exist. You won't find a word 
about corporate surveillance on Reset the Net's website. Nor is it 
mentioned in an animated cartoon pasted on the group's homepage that 
explains what the organization is trying to achieve. To Reset the Net, 
government is the ultimate big brother enemy -- an enemy that can only 
be stopped with the help private Internet companies like Google. And how 
can these companies -- which themselves stay in business by spying on us 
on line -- help to defeat surveillance? By offering encryption apps -- even 
if the encryption is only between our computers and smartphones and 
their football field-sized server farms. To Reset the Net, Silicon Valley is 
our friend. Every other tech industry -- including telecoms -- are to be 
mistrusted. (...) A movement against online surveillance that relies on 
Internet megacorps makes absolutely no sense. (...) Take Google, Reset the 
Net's biggest and most powerful backer. Google runs the largest private 
surveillance operation in the history of mankind. (...) Reset the Net is silent 
on all of this. It criticizes the NSA and other government spook agencies, 
but doesn't have anything to say about our hyper-connected culture and 
the creepy for-profit surveillance business model that underpins it. Reset 
the Net doesn't seem to mind that we're constantly spied on -- it just 
doesn't want the government to exploit and piggyback on the commercial 
surveillance capabilities built into our computers and handsets. Put 
another way: Reset the Net is outraged by our government's capability to 
wantonly vacuum up our personal info, and yet it unconditionally trusts 
powerful Surveillance Valley megacorps when they do the same thing on 
an even greater scale as a normal part of doing business.775  
 
But also in the surveillance studies literature these campaigns fostering the crypto-driven anti-
surveillance discourse have drawn criticism. “Reset the Net” presented a more hands-on 
                                                                                                                                                                       
2014 (accessed April 15, 2016). http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/06/05/we-are-resetting-net-shut-
mass-surveillance (emphasis added). 
775 Yasha Levine, “Reset the Net wants to end NSA snooping, is fine with Google snooping,” PandoDaily June 7, 2014 
(accessed April 15, 2016). https://pando.com/2014/06/06/reset-the-net-wants-to-end-nsa-snooping-is-fine-with-
google-snooping/ (emphases added.). 
167 
 
approach to tackling government surveillance and marked the end of gradual shift from more 
traditional collective action modeled after both civil rights protests and newer forms of digitally 
enabled activism to an individualistic, if not to say neoliberal, market-oriented approach. The 
push for encryption shifts the responsibility from guaranteeing privacy from the state to the 
individual.  
 Gürses et al. have pointed out that campaigns like “Reset the Net” have a misguided focus 
on combating mass surveillance whereas targeted surveillance – which as the organizers 
acknowledged in their own press materials cannot necessarily be stopped by mass-marketed 
encryption software – becomes acceptable.776 This marks a dramatic shift from prior campaigns, 
for example “Stop Watching Us,” where historical examples of targeted surveillance of Civil 
Rights activists were woven into the core framing. A second point Gürses et al. make is that the 
encryption movement is deeply embedded into the political and technological mainstream 
without questioning and ideological underpinnings of the current surveillance regime. In fact, 
“Reset the Net” made the deliberate decision to barely talk about why certain groups were more 
endangered than others by surveillance. Rather it presented encryption as a way to 'end' mass 
surveillance, therefore making political arguments obsolete. As the prominent role of Google in 
the campaign and the subsequent media coverage shows, “Reset the Net” was indeed actively 
seeking the input of one of the biggest players in the current surveillance apparatus. Omitting 
corporate data collection undermined their more politicized arguments (especially in regard to 
the “Freedom” frame). An inherent contradiction between partnering with corporate surveillance 
businesses while simultaneously pushing for privacy overshadowed the political communication 
strategy. 
 In fact, as Gürses et al. also point out, the solutions against mass surveillance now come 
from some of the very same companies that had been an integral part of the NSA surveillance 
apparatus. The crypto-driven anti-surveillance discourse also tends to ignore the role 
surveillance plays for geostrategic and military endeavors of the U.S. in the Middle East and 
Global South.777 To be fair, “Reset the Net” tried to offer a global perspective on surveillance, 
presenting encryption as both a way to circumvent censorship in, say, Iran as well as Internet 
users in the U.S, eventually transcending national borders and providing Internet safety and 
                                                 
776 Gürses et al., “Crypto and Empire,” 580 et seq. 
777 Ibid. 
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freedom for citizens around the world. The key actors involved in “Reset the Net” had 
participated, in one way or the other, in all preceding campaigns in the first year of the post-
Snowden world (particularly groups like FFTF, RT4, and EFF). All of these groups had vast 
experience with organizing more politicized grass roots protests on the ground and thus the 
technological-driven online-only “Reset the Net” can be seen as a valuable supplement to more 
traditional forms of protests. A more pessimistic reading, however, suggests that “Reset the Net” 
was in part motivated by frustrations of both the unresponsive political system and the limited 
potentials of more traditional anti-surveillance protests. 
TABLE IX: Overview about all frame packages applied in “Restore the Fourth/1984”, “Stop 
Watching Us”, “The Day We Fight Back” and “Reset the Net” campaigns. 
 
Over the course of one year and four protest campaigns a network of international privacy 
activist applied a total of 10 frame packages to mobilize resistance against NSA surveillance (see 
table IX; for an extended discussion see chapter 6). The type of frames ranged from 
cultural/historical (“History of Surveillance,” “Orwellian Totalitarianism”), political (“Patriotism,” 
“Non-Partisanship,” “Freedom,” “Celebrity Activism”), and legal (“Constitutionalism”) to 
transnational (“Global Dimension”) and technophile (“Encryption,” “Intersectoral Cooperation”).  
How and why did some of the key activists involved in the campaigns come up with those 
frames and what did they think of their framing choices in hindsight? In my interviews I 
specifically addressed the frame packages outlined in this chapter and inquired about their 
assessment of the overall communication strategy in the first year after the Snowden leaks. Their 
Frame Package 
Framing 
Task Frame Type Campaigns (Frame Adoption Rate) 
“History of Surveillance“ Diagnostic Cultural “Stop Watching Us” (12%),  
“Orwellian Totalitarianism“ Diagnostic  Cultural 
“Restore the Fourth/1984 Day” (14%), “Stop Watching Us” 
(16%), “The Day We Fight Back” (8%) 
“Constitutionalism“ Prognostic Legal “Restore the Fourth/1984 Day“ (84%) 
“Global Dimension“ Prognostic Transnational 
“Stop Watching Us” (24%), “The Day We Fight Back” 
(22%),  
“Reset the Net” (0%) 
“Encryption“ Prognostic Technophile “Reset the Net“ (62%) 
“Intersectoral Cooperation“ Prognostic Technophile “Reset the Net“ (58%) 
“Patriotism“ Motivational  Political “Restore the Fourth/1984 Day“ (35%) 
“Non-Partisanship“ Motivational  Political “Restore the Fourth/1984 Day“ (11%) 
“Freedom“ Motivational  Political “Reset the Net“ (4%) 
“Celebrity Activism“ Motivational  Political 
“Stop Watching Us” (40%), “The Day We Fight Back” 
(32%), “Reset the Net” (69%) 
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answers touched upon, among other things, the role of Edward Snowden, national vs. 
transnational frames, the involvement of internet companies and the dynamics between media 
outlets and activist organizations. 
 
 
5. ACTIVISTS’ REFLECTIONS ON THE CAMPAINGS 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, the daily communication work of privacy advocates takes place in a 
climate of indifference and the growing normalization of surveillance as a cultural practice. In 
my interviews I specifically asked the activists to give accounts of their attempts to counter the 
pro-surveillance discourse propagated by government officials, tackle the 'Privacy Paradox', and 
address the general trend of 'surveillance realism'. It turns out the activists were very well aware 
that they are fighting an up-hill battle with their reactions ranging from optimism to a sense of 
helplessness and defeat. They are constantly reflecting and figuring out new ways to engage the 
public and inform it about the perils of mass surveillance. Before I got into the details of their 
communication strategies – the role of Snowden, online vs. offline protests, local vs. 
transnational narratives – I was curious to hear their thoughts on the general state of privacy 
activism and the potentials of effectively reaching out to the public. Interviewee B’s statement 
summed it up best: “There is still a lot of work to be done in terms of communicating the day-to-
day impacts of surveillance on regular citizens.” 
 
5.1 Communicating Against Surveillance 
 As is the case with all recent social movement organizations (see chapter 3) 
communication work was arguably the most important activity the privacy advocacy community 
was engaged in. If they fail to get media attention they eventually fail as an organization. In the 
words of interviewee O:  
We see media work and public communications as absolutely essential 
to achieving [our] goals. Without media (...) there is no leverage, there 
is no way of exerting pressure on decision makers unless you have the 
media on your side. That is our observation. Not even mentioning 
people. I mean there is no way you will mobilize anybody without 
having the issue high on the media public agenda. Whatever you want, 
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talking to the politicians directly or putting pressure through 
mobilizing people like people sending emails or people who will go and 
protest – in all those scenarios you need media as your stepping stone 
to get further. (...) We can use the Internet; we can use our own 
communication tunnels like our website or our social media. But 
without communication there will be no way of reaching out to the 
people to whom we want to offer some solutions. So in both these areas 
media are essential all the much more in the first one where we want to 
have an impact on institutions and decision makers. 
 
Combating Indifference 
Indifference for privacy matters was one of the main problems activists acknowledged during the 
interviews. However, as interviewee A pointed out, this was something activists from various 
fields had to face and was just part of the job. Surprisingly A did not believe that privacy was an 
issue that was particularly hard to raise awareness for than other topics. When I asked A about 
the notion of a 'privacy paradox' and confronting him with a poll by the Pew Research Center 
detailing how large parts of citizens in the U.S. were concerned about surveillance but not willing 
to change their online behavior, he dismissed polls in general, arguing that “people seem to be 
inconsistent and (...) what factors influence them (...) seem to change all the time. Indifference, 
interviewee A concluded, was something that “every organization is dealing with – not just 
surveillance and privacy.” The Snowden leaks had certainly raised awareness and had made the 
job easier for activists (see chapter 1). Now a small but significant part of the public was 
beginning to show interest in the issues of surveillance and privacy. The main challenge now was 
to organize individual dissenters into forming a community. The notion that a majority of people 
did not care was misleading according to interviewee E:  
One thing that we do see happening is a lot of people come to us and say 'I 
think it is very important', they read a lot about it, it is really at the top of 
their minds and they all feel as if they are the only ones [whereas] they all 
feel as if the rest of society is saying 'I've got nothing to hide.' The 
Snowden leaked have helped a lot – not at the moment itself and not 
within the first few months but gradually since then and with all the hacks 
and leaks and everything people are seeing it like 'Oh wow, if this can be 
done, then other people can do so as well.' And it has changed in the 
opposite direction that people are now saying to me 'Yeah, the government 
is checking everything we are doing, right?' So it is really strange between 
'I have nothing to hide' and 'Everyone is checking everything I do.' (...) 
Since last year, we hired a community builder and [who] is organizing all 
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those people who are all saying 'I'm the only one who thinks this is 
important' and to show them it is not true. There are a lot of people very 
much interested. 
 
On the downside the immense scope of the Snowden revelations not only evoked awareness and 
concern but also a feeling of helplessness – one of the core elements of the 'Privacy Paradox':  
And the other part is to try to give people concrete perspectives on what 
they can do themselves because we were comparing our discussion a bit to 
the discussion that you have in the environmental area. People tend to 
think the problem is so huge; there are so many large players, 'I cannot 
change my behavior in a way that will meaningfully affect this problem so 
I won't do anything because I'm just frozen.' And we want to make sure 
that people who do think this is important don't freeze. We want to them to 
stay in action. (...) There are all these steps you can take, all these little 
steps that keep you involved and make sure that you don't give up hope. 
 
Thus, one of the core tasks was to motivate, encourage, and spread optimism to citizens who 
were in principle aware of the scope of the surveillance regime. Yet the problem persisted of 
transforming awareness into action and understanding what was really going on. In a climate in 
which most citizens and online users did not directly experience the consequences of 
surveillance the tactics was two-fold. Some organizations, as interviewee B criticized, exclusively 
focused on an “alarmist-type approach – like 'the world is ending tomorrow, you need to save 
your data, everything is going to spying on you,'” while more nuanced approaches included 
“more effective tactics such as looking at the practical implications it has on people and what it 
means for them day-to-day.” But as it turned out, according to various interviewees, the privacy 
community as whole had not found a tried and tested approach that seemed promising and 
effective. For example, interviewee C explained:  
We try to all be involved in our communication strategy and how to 
approach our public and how to get to the citizens with a clear 
message.(...) One of the things we are discussing is how we can approach 
citizens that have no clue about these issues and how to make them not 
only care but take action. That is an issue that we don’t have an answer yet. 
We try to make public events where we discuss in panels with experts and 
we are trying to invite anyone who wants to participate and ask questions. 
That’s one way of approaching that issue. Trying to make spaces so people 
can come and they can express their concerns and we can try to explain in 
a clear way how these issues affect them. 
 
Yet, despite a general level of interest and awareness, ignorance was still the main hurdle all 
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privacy activists had to face. Interviewee J acknowledged the problem but could not offer an 
effective solution:  
I recognize that the main obstacle (…) is not convincing policy makers, 
not even convince the market and those who create consumer products 
– it’s to convince the general public [about the consequences of 
surveillance]. I think there needs to be [a conversation] that starts with 
how [people] behave, which platform they use of social media so there 
really becomes a gap in the market for the equivalent that is privacy 
(...). It is peoples' lack of concern so maybe the problem to solve really 
is how we frame it.. Maybe we are entering an already framed debate 
where we are arguing for something that we should put beyond the 
spectrum of those who carry great power.  
 
As outlined in section 2.4, interviewees were not only concerned about indifference among 
citizens but also about defenders of the surveillance state. In their communication work activists 
regularly encountered “people constantly selling counter-messages”, as interviewee G put it. This 
included not only officials but large parts of the citizenry. The privacy activist community would 
need to go a long way to make people understand what was at stake. Interviewee N’s statement is 
both a testament to a failure of having effectively communicated the perils of surveillance and 
the need to constantly educate the public: “The whole system works against us and getting to 
understand that has always been a challenge because they say [surveillance] has gotten nothing 
to do with me.' They don't get it.” By ‘they’ interviewee N meant the majority of citizens, who may 
or may not be aware of the negative consequences, but, for the sake of convenience, chose not to 
care about privacy aspects:  
[T]he biggest obstacle is] ignorance. [People] are absolutely ignorant 
about these issues. I always go back (…) Maslow's hierarchy of needs. 
People get the advertising from the major corporations that say ‘get the 
latest digital [gadget] – here is the convenience. And that is all they are 
told. And people go, “I don't want to be the only one without a fit bit. Oh, 
a fit bit can tell me if I slept’ – my god look in the mirror and you'll see the 
bags under your eyes.  
 
The only remedy was “informing the public with a balanced and complete understanding.” But 
indifference embodied in the infamous 'I have nothing to hide'-argument not only posed a 
concrete challenge for the communication strategy but questioned the very legitimacy of privacy 
advocates. If citizens felt they had nothing to hide, then privacy activism seemed to make no 
sense. Individual activists warning against negative consequences looked like conspiracy 
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theorists. As interviewee M explained, “You cannot see how your privacy is invaded online except 
you are being blocked or harassed. So most people they say 'I have nothing to hide.' They don't 
care and people who are saying that they do care and they have something to hide look like 
paranoids, (…) hackers and weird kind of people with weird stuff on their computers.” Some 
organizations such as the one interviewee E was working for had created and published specific 
talking points to be used in private conversations. Also communication staffers wanted to change 
the debate from focusing on the victims of overwhelming mass surveillance to examples of 
successful individual resistance to the surveillance regime:  
On our website we have given answers you can give to somebody when the 
other person at a party says 'I have nothing to hide.' (…) But also we are 
now thinking of maybe doing something else and that is listing all the 
different examples of what you would like to protect. All these articles or 
little anecdotes of people who have had a lack of privacy in some sense 
and that it affected their lives – it could be really big or really small. By 
making this collection of things that you'd like to protect then we would 
change the framing from something negative in to something positive. It is 
not something that you want to keep out but something that you want to 
protect – for example your family, your children. 
 
Individual, positive, uplifting – instead of collective, grim and helpless – those were the 
approaches several activists described as having the best chances of mobilizing citizens. On the 
other spectrum, however, some activists had actually given up on the idea of being able to 
mobilize people because they themselves had realized that there were no tangible negative 
consequences of mass surveillance – unless you belonged to specific group. In fact, one of the 
activists, interviewee K from Latin America, – based on his work experience – seemed to confirm 
that indeed regular people should not be concerned about surveillance. At least in the context of 
K’s home country surveillance was indeed only affecting a relatively small number of public 
officials and journalists:  
We have informally talked with some police members and they say 'It's ok 
– we only use it against bad people and criminals. We don't use it for 
surveillance. Why are you talking about it? Are you going to protest? 
There is nothing wrong here.’ (...) It doesn't seem that the state has a 
policy of surveilling people. It is not kind of a political obscure directive on 
surveilling people. (...) You don't have the sense that is happening for all 
the citizens for population control or management of the people. Which 
is, in my opinion, different from the United States and Europe and the 
United Kingdom. (...) It is more about [controlling political] opposition 
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than a policy for all the population. 
 
Yet, in the assessment about the situation in Europe, interviewee O, agreed with this analysis. 
The 'Privacy Paradox' (see section 1) was like any other pressing social issue of the day, in that 
people were ignorant about the possible consequences that lied in the future. Thus, nothing 
about the unwillingness of a majority of people to care about a loss privacy was paradoxical. 
Especially in a social media ecosystem dominated by handful of powerful corporations this was a 
reality every privacy advocate had succumb to:  
I don't think we have a solution that will be able to mobilize people so they 
change their behavior. There is no paradox. It is simply related to the fact 
that consequences of losing freedom or loosing privacy or losing control 
over data differ in time and are less likely to happen. It is not certain that 
you will be personally affected in a negative way because you shared your 
data or because you allow for surveillance in the name of security. So 
because of that people are less inclined to act upon that threat here and 
now when such action would mean that they lose some benefits here and 
now – like they wouldn't be able to use Google anymore, use Facebook 
anymore, they would have to encrypt emails which is always a nuisance, 
they would have to use less intuitive or less comfortable interfaces. [So 
most of the times internet users don't understand] (…) the impact that 
this might have on them in the future. It is very tricky. Not many people 
will be so forward looking and so mature in analyzing their position to do 
so. And this is exactly the same thing that happens with smoking, alcohol, 
speeding, whatever reckless behavior people engage in you have the same 
what you call paradox but I think it is in the human psychology, it is not 
paradoxical at all. It is actually how we function. 
 
Limits of anti-surveillance communication 
According to this realistic, if not cynical evaluation of the limited potentials of reaching people, 
privacy activism, was essentially a niche product which naturally excluded and alienated large 
parts of the population. Sometimes O and fellow activists were simply preaching to the choir:  
[Our] perception at [our organization] is that we appeal to people who are 
very [aware of surveillance and] not to everybody. We don't fool ourselves 
that we can convince John Smith or (...) the average user of internet 
services to change their behavior, because it is unlikely. We appeal to 
people who already have the feeling that their freedom is in danger or they 
perceive that politics became problematic and already see this subtle 
negative impact of surveillance on their freedom. (…) And with these 
kinds of people we can probably build a conversation by saying 'Ok you 
have deep understanding of this potential negative impact. Let's now talk 
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about how you can handle your privacy or data better.  
 
Interviewee T talking about activism in Germany, shared the same assessment:  
It is hard talking about intelligence agencies – people won't listen because 
they don't feel as being in the crosshairs of such institutions. They don't 
feel as if they are affected [by surveillance]. (...) To educate and reach 
people – many of them Facebook users – about surveillance is close to 
impossible. Only people that are activists themselves understand this 
because for them it is tangible. 
 
Starting information campaigns, utilizing clear examples, was one of the ways activists at least 
tried to contain widespread ignorance about the consequences of a loss of privacy. Another 
related approach was to foster and sponsor events to open up discursive spaces. Information was 
seen as the key to perhaps incline citizens taking an interest in privacy issues. Interviewee C:  
It is difficult to make people realize that these issues affect them even 
though they don’t perceive it on their day by day basis. But we tried to 
make reports in which we try to talk in the clearest way that is possible – 
[for example] infographic material (...) published on social media. We are 
working with that strategy to try to send a clear message to people so they 
can be informed and have knowledge how these issues affect them. That’s 
our strategy now – publishing reports with each of our investigations that 
are available on our website. So basically that the one side and public 
events campaigns are on the other. (...) So we try to in our events at least 
when it is possible to bring a lot of people from different sectors together 
so we can try to open the debate. 
 
Even though the Snowden leaks had provided the activists with an influx of new and damning 
information about the enormous size of the global surveillance apparatus, gathering everyday 
examples about the effects of surveillance on regular people was difficult and time consuming, as 
interviewee O explained,  
The repertoire of [relatable anti-surveillance narratives] is not rich (...) at 
all. We try to collect it, we monitor media. That is a big part of what we do 
every day. So we monitor press and we try to retrieve these kinds of case 
studies from the press, we try to get them from other NGOs working on 
other issues like migrant issues (…). The problem with surveillance is 
[that] it can affect every human life, right? Wherever you can go – 
[whether it is] banking, finance, migration, public security, education, 
wherever you go you can find some stories or find some problems. So it is 
both good and challenging in the sense that this is extremely broad and 
therefore quite difficult to monitor. (...) It is a big struggle (…) to get the 
case studies that will trigger peoples' imagination and will change their 
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perception of privacy and surveillance (…) as opposed to these direct 
benefits coming from, for example internet services.  
 
Based on a sparse supply on everyday examples, general ignorance, and talking to a ‘lost’ 
generation of self-surveilling social media users that some activists, such as interviewees R and S, 
had basically given up on convincing the public of the importance of privacy. Instead they had 
refocused their efforts on lobbying policy makers. Even though they kept working on “creat[ing] 
storytelling which can be accepted by a wider audience, not only by the geek community” they  
had [made] a transition in the last two years from an activist organization 
to some kind of expert organization. (...) [Now] we prefer to speak through 
our analysis, through data that we are analyzing, collecting, and in some 
form visualizing and we really like to speak through legal language. And 
that made much bigger results than communicating as an activist 
organization. 
 
Likewise, interviewee G suggested, sometimes the most effective way to fight for privacy was by 
not involving the public at all – especially when facing a tough pro-surveillance stance from 
policymakers. In G’s opinion, public communication campaigns against controversial legislation 
were counterproductive in comparison with well-timed behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts. 
Exclusively public campaigns were susceptible to failure because pro-surveillance politicians 
would go at great lengths to uphold their stance: 
[T]he most effective lobbying strategy is to lobby politicians directly 
before something has become a public issue. Once a public commitment [is 
made] they often almost get emboldened by a campaign against it. Once 
they have made a public commitment to something they will try to talk 
about how they are looking strong and resisting, (…) and they will going 
to push forward with their strategy and it can be terrible. (…) When 
[politicians] get the chance to talk about security [they] will be quite 
enthusiastic about the idea of it becoming controversial so that they can 
make a big deal of taking national security so seriously they are willing to 
crush people's privacy.  
 
Under those circumstances some activists were pessimistic about the potentials and impacts of 
public anti-surveillance protests. For example, interviewee D, who had participated in both 
“Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” was “very torn about the importance of [those 
campaigns] in terms of effectiveness.” For a variety of reasons, D felt that the privacy community 
had not been successful in mobilizing a critical mass of people. The campaigns felt somehow 
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anti-climactic. His  
ultimate conclusion, unfortunately, was that it was just like a fairly 
small sliver of society that cared significantly about these issues. (...) I 
think it was kind of a disempowering experience in a way for a lot of 
people because you always hope...if you are somebody who says 
'They've been spying on us the whole time' and everyone says you're 
crazy or you're paranoid, you hope that when this gets revealed 
everyone will rise up and there will be a huge ground swell. 
 
But the ‘Privacy Chernobyl’ had generated a far more muted response as expected. Just like after 
nuclear catastrophes, after an initial period of outrage things had gone back to normal fast. 
Surveillance – just like nuclear power – was eventually accepted as a necessary evil (or nuisance, 
rather) to ensure convenience. In D’s opinion, the effects on actual policy outcomes had been 
minuscule at best:  
I don't mean to be overly negative about it (...) [b]ut I'm not sure that 
anyone in the NSA or the government was particularly concerned or has 
second thoughts about anything as a result of what we did. I haven't seen 
any evidence really that they were [concerned]. As far as I know the “Stop 
Watching Us” protest – I don't know if it has ever been mentioned by a 
Congress person. (pause) I'm just not sure. 
 
As a consequence, interviewee D had left the privacy activism circuit because he felt burned out. 
D had developed a realistic, almost cynical view on the potential of activists to scale back the 
surveillance apparatus:  
At this point I just think that surveillance is a symptom of much bigger 
problems and as long as capitalism is around and the government is 
around they are just going to collect every piece of information about 
everybody that they possibly can and it is all going to get misused and sent 
all over the world and I just don't think that civil society is going to be able 
to change that until there is either a really drastic personal impact on 
people. (...) I don't think it is possible for people to fight it on an 
individual level. I don't think there is a way to use the internet or live in 
modern society without leaving a data trail. And I don't see much evidence 
that surveillance is in the top 30 issues in the United States, maybe the top 
50. Right now I don't see any clear path to changing that. 
 
If anything, the campaigns launched by the activists had contributed to a general, diffuse, 
unmeasurable climate of anti-surveillance sentiments among young online users which may or 
may not have made politicians more sensible for privacy claims:  
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I would say it's hard to know how the specific things that we did tied into 
it. It think there was a very clear sense that young people and the internet 
were upset and I'm not sure how much of that is attributable [to 
mediatized protests] Maybe people didn't write articles specifically about 
what we did but (…) there was a general kind of sense of the terrain (…) 
and maybe that wouldn't have been as clear without the [protests] on the 
ground.  
 
Interviewee H, who was also involved in all of the major protest events of that period, shared this 
realistic outlook, being particularly disappointed about the lack of a long-term impact and 
strategy. H pointed out that ”we did drive the news cycle and, I think, a cultural conversation. 
But,” comparing activism to surfing, “if the metric of success is change of the underlying policy 
we did not get on the board and we flipped around and got hit in the head” Even worse, no 
lasting protest infrastructure had been formed as a result of the campaigns:  
And you would hope (...) that the networks would be at least connected 
and poised to take action when the next leak happens. I found in my 
limited experience that I'm very disappointed by the extent to which that 
does not happen. People seem for whatever reason either to need a 
flashpoint to which to respond or very focused attention and cultivation. I 
would almost describe it as a civil society failure more than a challenge 
confronting activism because it seems deeper than merely activism. 
 
Particularly troubling for interviewee H was the lack of cooperation that went beyond coming 
together at 'flashpoint' events. Apparently none of the campaigns launched after the Snowden 
revelations had translated into an enduring U.S., let alone transnational activist coalition:  
Networks are ultimately like a combination of relationships and space. 
Building relationships through shared space and cultivating it. The 
relationships I think are still there. All the people who were represented in 
those organizations they still all exist. They are all still active. How often 
do they come together? I don't know if they have come together since the 
‘Stop Watching Us’-rally. (...) [F]inding ways for the casual participants to 
stay connected, to stick – that is the essential struggle and challenge. 
Because people will come out and then they just disappear. [Some 
coalitions and groups] just came and it went. It is gone.  
 
On the whole, fighting for privacy and against government surveillance was a cumbersome 
activity which rarely yielded immediate tangible results – even in purely advocacy circles not 
directly involved in protests. Understandably some of the interviewees revealed signs of 
frustration and anger towards both the privacy community and the political system. Take for 
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example this account of interviewee N, who for decades had been active in the struggle against 
privacy breaches by the government and private businesses in North America. Meeting with 
stakeholders, doing consultations, and publishing reports was “frustrating. (...) How long can 
you maintain your (...) enthusiasm for something, when you feel so completely defeated, 
ignored.” The process of convincing officials of the merits of privacy often felt futile. N gave an 
example:  
There is a significant national issue. There will either be a (…) commission 
which is a series of meetings and they call witnesses and prepare a report 
and it will take several of years and millions of dollars and the report will 
sit on a shelf. Senate committees, parliament committees, very much the 
same thing: a law will be created, the senators will have a committee, and 
parliament will have a committee. Evidence will be given (...) and then the 
committee wraps up, does its report, submits it to parliament – nothing 
changes because in our political system they don't have to do anything. 
[You keep] beat[ing] your head against a brick wall – how long can you do 
that and keep getting a bumpy head? And just keep doing it. There comes 
a point where you say 'Why bother? No one is listening. Nothing is 
happening.’ 
 
Asked about the legacy of recent anti-surveillance protests, interviewee T from Germany spoke in 
an equally defeated tone:  
Data protection, one's immediate sphere of privacy – these are things that 
are still tangible for people [and worth protecting] but I don't think [there 
will be any large scale protests] against intelligence agencies in the future. 
When I look at the very recent surveillance laws – nobody staged street 
protest because of that. A couple of hundred people gathered in front of 
the Parliament. But other than that nothing will happen. We had our big 
chance in 2013, maybe the following year. It did not work out. I thought it 
was a very interesting experiment. I learned a lot. (...) But it did not turn 
out the way [activists] had thought it would. 
 
5.2 Media Relations 
Three out of the four main anti-surveillance campaigns which took place in the first year after the 
Snowden leaks were basically designed to 'raise awareness' through media coverage. Along with 
mobilizing their base and recruiting new members, the goal of each “Restore the Fourth,” “Stop 
Watching Us,” and “The Day We Fight Back” was to inform the public about the dangers of 
unchecked surveillance and stage online and offline protest events with the intent that media 
outlets would cover them and multiply their message to a wider audience. Even “Reset the Net,” 
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with its far more practical approach of informing users about encryption tools, relied on a 
network of websites and blogs, traditional media outlets, and tech journalists to popularize its 
core message.  
 As will be shown in this section, the relationship between privacy activists and the media 
is complicated. One the one hand, especially because of the large amount of attention the 
Snowden leaks generated, journalists and media institutions have been receptive for privacy 
matters – arguably as never before. Almost every activist that was interviewed for this study has 
acknowledged this.778 For instance, Interviewee I, an activist significantly involved in all four 
campaigns, has called the Snowden leaks “an indicating moment when suddenly all the 
journalists and reporters and people we've been trying to get to pay attention to this for years 
were suddenly all paying attention to it and talking about it and critiquing it.” In a world, where 
surveillance innovations and accompanying privacy breaches surface on a daily basis, privacy 
activists and advocacy groups have become the go-to sources for journalists seeking analysis and 
technical know-how. However, on the other hand, the highly technical and complex nature of the 
current international surveillance regime has, in the eyes of many interviewees, created 
problems in terms of accurate media representations of their work and their campaigns. When 
asked about their general assessment of their experiences of working with the media, reactions 
differed widely. Some were generally satisfied; others were slightly annoyed by the journalists’ 
lack of theoretical and technological understanding; and others accused the media of willfully 
distorting their image and goals. 
 
Relationships with journalists 
 In general, journalists heavily rely on the expertise of privacy activists and their knowledge 
about digital rights and technology. As interviewee E, claimed, “[Journalists] are very much 
receptive to our work.(...) Every time there is something (going on) with the Internet, they will 
call us.” Yet to reach this status of perceived expertise his/her organization had to carefully pick 
their battles and tightly control their political communication. This included not responding to 
every press inquiry:  
                                                 
778 With the exception of one privacy activism group in Scandinavia, all interviewees stressed the importance of 
working with the media. Interviewee J of said organization, although saying that "”i]f we are asked to help then 
we are obviously there” voiced a deep mistrust of “bigger media which is owned by special interest groups which 
run a particular narrative even if they do so very subtly - it is more sophisticated.” 
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In the beginning it was [hard to get the media's attention]. [But] very soon 
people understood what we were actually talking about... we were not 
fearmongering or making up stories but what we did – we focused really 
narrowly on the issues we work on. There are a lot of issues that people 
will tend to call us for and we would just say 'I'm sorry, we can't respond to 
that because we only want to say things about stuff we really do know and 
talking about. 
 
Especially after the Snowden leaks, but also due to the emergence of various new 'Big Data' 
phenomena, some organizations felt in fact overwhelmed by the increasing number of media 
requests. The solution was to ignore requests which are not part of their core expertise or 
delegate them to external sources. This way their main asset – being the leading voice in all 
privacy and digital rights related matters – was not compromised:  
[J]ournalists knew that they could trust us and that we weren't going to 
comment on every little thing that is happening. This is still our problem 
(…) because there are so many things happening that are on the fringes of 
our focus and it is really hard not to comment on them because we all 
think it is very interesting and very important. 
 
Concerned about an accurate portrayal of themselves and the issues they talk about, many 
organizations now carefully choose between media requests. Activists usually make use of a 
network of journalists they can trust, often having vetted them for years. Ideal candidates are 
able to grasp the technological nature of online surveillance as well as have a basic understanding 
about the role of SMOs and NGOs in the political system – a rare combination. As interviewee A, 
a U.S. activist, put it: “I would say that in general we find the journalists who are willing to 
portray and listen to civil society groups and really get their opinions and we know who they are 
and who are doing their homework and who actually are interested in the facts.“ In addition, 
reporting on government surveillance requires a commitment to investigative and adversarial 
journalism that can be in conflict with the more 'balanced' form of journalism prevalent in many 
mainstream outlets in the U.S. and Europe. Good reporting on privacy issues requires time and 
money, an increasingly scarce resource especially in print journalism. For interviewee A, the ideal 
reporters to work with  
are not interested in providing balanced reporting for the sake of 
balance. Rather they are seeking people who are actually are willing to 
listen and learn from people from outside the normal halls of power. So 
I would say, yes, [good reporting on our issues] depends on the outlet 
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and how much time they are given.  
 
In contrast, “if the reporter is just new to the issue then they’ll go with whatever people are 
saying and these people tend to be the most powerful people who will be promoting their own 
interests.” An activist from Europe, interviewee M, confirmed this. Preferred journalists had to 
be internet-savvy, trustful, informed about surveillance matters, and ideally had a long-term 
relationship with the organization: “We have some journalists who are used to work with us. We 
know they know our subjects. They know how the Internet works. (…). But it is still a very small 
part of [all] journalists.” 
Ideally privacy activists and selected journalists would form long-term relationships. 
Especially with regard to new privacy legislation, a process that takes months or even years, 
journalists appreciate the expertise and long-term analysis of privacy advocacy groups. For 
example, the organization of interviewee E, had made a habit of strategically informing its 
network of journalists and building mutually-beneficial relationships:  
[W]e were making these appointments with journalists and trying to tell 
them 'so for the next coming months '[this is going to happen]', because 
we were always within this legislation processes, we could tell them what 
would be happening in a few months from now or in a few weeks from 
now, 'this is going to be a big subject.' And because of that actually 
happening, today I got an email from a journalist from one of the biggest 
newspapers telling me 'Hey, (...) could we sit down again and talk about 
what projects are going to [happen] because they know that this is how we 
work and that we do know what... that they can trust us. 
 
Yet the relationship between privacy activists and journalists was not a one-way street. 
Interviewee K, representing a Latin American privacy advocacy group, portrayed the relationship 
to the media in general as a symbiotic, mutually beneficial one, stressing the point that the facts 
reported by journalists formed the basis for their everyday work: “We sometimes have news of 
the surveillance state because of the media coverage on [surveillance issues]. We learn from them 
too. They usually spare (…) some space on their webpages and newspaper writing an article about 
these things.” Another activist, interviewee N, was thrilled about the increasing media attention 
their privacy advocacy work was receiving. Part of the reason for the growing interest was that 
some journalists had realized that they were working at the frontline of the surveillance state. 
Journalists knew very well that they were the first to feel the impact of unchecked government 
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spying on their right to freedom of expression:  
Increasingly the media is interested and that is tremendous. It is essential 
but it is tremendous. They have called on us many times for a variety of 
privacy related issues that lapse in civil liberties. (...) I can be the 
mouthpiece [for privacy causes] and the media increasingly appreciates 
that. They are starting to getting it though because it is starting to 
affecting them personally and professionally. (...) Media members are 
realizing, not only are their colleagues in other countries being silenced 
and murdered, but they are [also] being silenced. The ones who are left 
[after rounds of cuts and firings in the media industry] (...) are starting to 
get scared (…) and pay more attention. 
 
Media critiques 
Still, especially in long-term campaigns, whether it was raising awareness for privacy in general 
or specific campaigns to promote encryption, maintaining media attention was hard. “The most 
difficult thing is [when] we hit the wall of the political will of the media,” interviewee M 
explained. In the past they had temporarily “changed the direction of the media” with a 
campaign, working closely with a handful of selected journalists. But once the issue reached a 
critical mass of attention, more and more new journalists took interests who were new to the 
topic and did not “understand anything and [hadn't] followed (...) the campaign and we [had] to 
start again from zero after three months of (...) campaign[ing].” 
 As a result, reporting on the issues at hand – surveillance and privacy – only scratched the 
surface instead of being translated into general critiques of the surveillance society. Thus 
Interviewee K scolded the media for only talking about surveillance in the narrowest sense. In K’s 
Latin American country, which was ripe with political scandals involving corruption, unlawful 
monitoring of political opponents, and overstepping of intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, reporters should more frequently get the bigger picture:  
The [coverage of the] scandals does not [criticize] the state of surveillance. 
The problem is the scandal. But when you see the coverage of what 
happened and what kind of technologies they have and what the 
procedures were of that – they don't dig too deep on what is happening. 
They report, for example, [on] the existence of another [police] 
surveillance system. They don't link that with [other] recent scandals so it 
is kind of a broken stor[y] of surveillance. Like a journalist announces that 
she has been followed and nobody says 'It has something to do with the 
systems these organizations were announcing and we should ask for more 
control' No, they only say like 'This happened. It was bad.' Then they move 
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on.  
 
In an assessment of the cooperation with media outlets interviewee O, an Eastern European 
privacy activist, noted that journalists would approach them if they needed input rather than the 
other way around. O’s organization still lacked the ability to influence the news cycle themselves. 
Outside of larger protest events, their input would usually be confined to provide sound bites for 
newspaper articles or television news:  
I think it is still very niche and we are still treated as experts who are 
invited to comment on these issues when they are raised by somebody else. 
You can imagine that there is a debate started by a prime minister or 
somebody in Brussels regarding privacy or surveillance and we will be 
asked to comment. But it is very difficult for us to set the framework, to set 
the agenda for the debate by ourselves. So in that respect we still have a lot 
of work in front of us to leave that expert niche and become more of a 
trendsetter or organization that shapes the debate.  
 
The irony here was that being consulted as experts and treated as such by the media 
organizations was not helpful to popularize privacy issues in the public. Surveillance was being 
treated as a topic that was debated between politicians and experts. As a consequence many press 
reports on privacy issues ultimately obscured the important overarching issue at hand: “The 
debate is (...) still seen as an expert issue, as an issue that only geeks can fully grasp or tech 
experts; as [something] more luxurious than other rights.” Despite frequent attempts by O and 
other activists, what was eventually lost in the mediated discourse was highlighting the general 
benefits of privacy. Very much in line with the Surveillance Studies critique of the ‘Privacy 
Paradigm,’ O tried to refocus the media attention on questions of power and surveillance:  
We really struggle with pushing the debate beyond privacy as a niche 
because for us it is not privacy, it is surveillance. The use of data as a tool 
of power, it is the use of data to control people. These are the stakes we 
want to discuss in the public debate not privacy. Still for the media, 
privacy is the only probable thing they can comprehend and as they said 
they will be more inclined to present it as something that needs to be 
compromised at the times of the war against terror or in the context of the 
internet services (…). So the debate is running but we are not really yet 
able to shape it the way we would like it to be. 
 
Political journalism v. tech journalism 
The individual background and expertise of a journalist reporting on surveillance activism was 
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crucial. In some cases the same publication would cover a campaign in different ways depending 
from which section their journalists are stemming. The aforementioned coverage by The New 
York Times of “The Day We Fight Back” was such an example: while the 'Tech' section praised the 
campaign, a journalist from the 'Politics' section was highly critical. The reasons were different 
backgrounds, trainings and expertise of each group of reporters. As interviewee A elaborated:  
A tech journalist or someone based in an international bureau like in 
London will do a great article on the encryption debate or net neutrality 
but then their consumer journalist from a completely different 
department talking about privacy will say some really silly things and 
mischaracterize the debate entirely because they are just not informed or 
interested. They will say ‘Oh I don’t care about privacy, I just care whether 
my iPhone works or not.’  
 
Interviewee E, an activist from Europe, echoed this concern about varying degrees of 
understanding between columnists and technology journalists:  
I would say that [negative coverage about privacy concerns] was more 
[prevalent] in the [opinion pages] – [arguments like] 'I have nothing to 
hide' etc. These kinds of arguments were really strong in the broader 
public opinion and so this also found a way into op-ed pages but the 
journalists themselves that are working on the economy pages or the more 
informative journalists they would know how to read our information. 
They would ask the difficult questions and seeing that we could respond 
to them – they would know how to carry that.  
 
However, tech journalism plagued a different problem when it came to reporting on privacy 
activism. Hence interviewee I offered a distinguished critique of tech journalism. While 
reporters from the technology pages of newspapers, websites, and magazines were able to 
accurately portray the technical side of privacy matters, they lacked understanding when it came 
to fully grasping the political, and most importantly, the organizational-sociological dimension 
of protest. When, for example, mentioning supposedly 'low' protest turnouts either on the 
streets or online, tech reporters were not able to appreciate the enormous amount of preparation 
and commitment that is the prerequisite for any activist campaign: 
[Surveillance] is something that tech reporters in the U.S. are consistently 
covering. Compared to some other issues reporters that cover surveillance 
are becoming more sophisticated and they tend to understand the 
technology better than many other reporters (…). One of the issues that 
tech reporters tend to not understand (…) is activism. One of the problems 
we run into is that tech reporters get the issue but they don't really 
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understand how activist movements work. And so they tend to report on 
these things and in the end they don't see the huge amount of work that 
go into building a campaign that is big enough and has enough 
momentum that companies the size of Google, Facebook, and Reddit want 
to add their name to it. And that always takes a huge amount of people 
power, it is grassroots, it is organizations, it is hustling, and that is a piece 
that the tech media tends to not understand because they haven't done a 
lot of covering a grassroots social movement. They cover startups and 
companies and tech products. That is one area where the tech press kind 
of failed to understand what is really happening here. They just don't 
totally grasp the way that activism happens in the interplay between 
grassroots activism and these tech companies that sometimes join our 
campaigns. 
 
In turn, journalists without a significant background in technology and Internet issues presented 
a different challenge. Increasingly some organizations, like the one interviewee M was working 
for, had to deal with journalists that seemed to have no clue when it came to the technical side of 
online surveillance. Worse, some journalists approached them with preconceived images of 
surveillance, hacking, and cryptography that had nothing to do with reality:  
Generally speaking the biggest issue we have with journalists is that they 
don't understand how the Internet works. They don't understand how 
encryption works. They have no basic whatsoever idea of what we do or 
what we are going to do. When they ask 'yeah but it is encrypted so is it 
safe or can you hack it' – you still have very basic beliefs of [TV show] Mr. 
Robot-type of hackers (...). It is not even like Mr. Robot, it is like 'yeah, you 
are good with computers you type some stuff and then you hack into 
someone's computer’ – that is not how it works.”779 
 
Reporting of anti-surveillance campaigns 
Whether media outlets were ultimately receptive to their work was often not in the hands of 
activists. For example, the release of reports about the current state of surveillance in a country 
or region – for many more advocacy-based organizations a key activity – had to be carefully 
timed with the political climate and current events in mind or otherwise its impact would not get 
noticed. As interviewee C put it: “We launched (...) reports (...) and [the media] were pretty 
                                                 
779 In the case of some European countries, many journalists who showed a genuine interest and combined this with 
good technological knowledge were foreign news organizations. But here activists had to be careful not to 
become pawns in a geopolitical game, as interviewee M explained: “The other issue is foreign media (...). For 
example we have a hard time with Russia Today, as the Russian soft power is very strong in [my country], trying to 
show how [our] government is bad (…) and Russia is great. We try not to answer too much, we try to be very 
careful (...) because sometimes it can be used against the [our] government and we become the kind of a Trojan 
horse.” 
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receptive and tried to communicate that. But mainly because of the political situation in [my 
country]. They sort of publish what they want depending on the political context and feel of the 
moment – the political thermometer.” 
When it came to launching campaigns what was crucial for privacy activists was both the 
quantity of factual media reporting the event generates as well as the interpretation and analysis 
in opinion pieces. It were often the latter that mattered more, because opinion leaders have the 
ability to retroactively spin the impact and feel of a protest campaign. For example, interviewee 
D, one of the organizers of the “Stop Watching Us” event in Washington D.C. not only “definitely 
wanted there to be more press coverage” and “thought it would warrant more coverage that it 
got.” But he  
remember[ed] two journalists in particular – I didn't like the story they 
wrote [referring to the blog piece penned by Olivia Nuzzi discussed in 
section 4.2]. [It] focused on one small group of fringy people that showed 
up and was pretty dismissive. But I don't know that she was necessarily... I 
guess she didn't say anything that was factually incorrect. I just didn't like 
her interpretation of things. (…) I didn't think it was particularly 
charitable but it wasn't exactly wrong.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of either technological or political understanding at least the anti-
surveillance campaigns generated some coverage. Even negative comments or contrarian 
accounts from columnists were not only minor, albeit expected nuisances but they ultimately 
validated a protest event. For example, interviewee J thought that negative coverage of “The Day 
We Fight Back” was simply reflecting “the state of journalism today.” As the activist elaborated, 
brushing off criticism from the media,  
Anytime something big happens there is going to be a bunch of articles 
about how the big thing happened and some journalist needs to make it 
their point to write their article about how the thing wasn't really that big 
because xyz. It is just clickbait, it is just kind of noise. And in my 
perspective when you start getting articles like that written about your 
campaign that tells you have succeeded if there are already naysayers that 
are going to paint any victory as a failure. (…). To me it is usually a good 
sign when you start getting these kinds of trolling articles that are 
critiquing your campaign. It means that everyone is talking about your 
campaign and that someone wants to add one of those trolling articles to 
the mix. That doesn't bother me. I usually see it as a good sign. 
 
Collective action frames deliberately chosen in the run-up to an anti-surveillance campaigns 
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rarely made it into the news either because they were too complicated for sound-bite-heavy news 
coverage, as interviewee H had observed. “Stop Watching Us” was a prime example for a 
simplified media portrayal of the culturally and historically complex issue of surveillance. As one 
of the organizers of the campaign, H, noted, the event “drove an international news cycle” and 
“got a lot of eyes on the issues,” driving “a cultural conversation”, and ultimately “responded to 
the right angles.” Yet the media “did not at all pick up on the history” [for the historical framing 
devices see sections 4.1 and 4.2]. At the time of the interview, the so-called 'Apple v. FBI' case 
dominated the headlines. Interviewee H saw in the coverage of the privacy activism surrounding 
the controversy the same “failure” at work that caused some of the distorting media coverage of 
“Stop Watching Us”:  
Here you see the same failure – media institutions are not at all getting the 
frame here. I mean the first news cycle here was terror, terror, terror. [That 
giving in to the FBI's demands] would undermine human rights around 
the world – that is barely talked about. I mean, we all talk about it when 
we have microphones but you don't see that reflected in the coverage. So I 
think to the same extent that the media failed in that area to fully depict 
the implication of the issues they are covering, I think, unfortunately, that 
failure is continuing. 
 
A more radical critique of the media's reaction, or non-reaction, that is, to “Stop Watching Us” 
was provided by interviewee L, an activist significantly involved in the campaign: “And you have 
noticed that only C-Span was the network that carried that information and that speaks volumes. 
[The other networks broadcasted soundbites] but [as soon as] Donald Trump starts talking they 
don’t show soundbites they broadcast his speech uninterrupted unedited and with no 
commercial breaks.” Instead of focusing on the historical frames, depicting surveillance as first 
and foremost targeting minorities, he accused the media of 'whitewashing' the event:  
They didn't put my face on anything. Did you see my face in the 
mainstream media? (...) I haven’t seen my face on there. Because they 
don’t want to promote anything that brings people together. If they put 
my face on there, then more black people, more brown people would have 
been interested in what was going on, more white people would have been 
honing in what I was saying. (...) Their job is to minimize and to find 
divisiveness for all costs. And that is why the mainstream media did what 
they did.  
 
Interviewee L also criticized the ritualized coverage of showing images of protest performances. 
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Rather than extensively look into the wider political implications of surveillance and adopting 
historical frame exemplars of “Stop Watching Us,”  
[The media mainstream] tries to clown you. Some just dismiss you. (...) 
They showed the puppets. They showed the theatrics. But they won’t show 
an angry black man (...) talking about Martin Luther King and how he was 
surveilled. That should be enough for everybody. You know, MLK has been 
surveilled should be enough for everybody. There is no possible 
justification for having MLK under surveillance (…) Are you serious? 
 
Interviewee Q, representing an organization that was involved in all four campaigns, provided a 
more nuanced explanation about a perceived uneasiness of journalists when it comes to 
reporting on surveillance issues and privacy activism. In the view of Q, it was the way in which 
the dramatic scope of the surveillance was revealed that discomforted veteran journalists and 
may have caused an inferiority complex. Not them, many of them indirectly aligned with party 
politics and existing power structures, had exposed the NSA secret spying programs but 
whistleblowers. As interviewee Q argued, the Snowden leaks were not only an attack against 
classified surveillance systems but indirectly a blow against the journalistic class of Washington, 
D.C. and around the world. The Watergate Scandal, whose exposure remains in the cultural 
memory as the 'finest hour' of investigative journalism, falsely suggested that journalists were in 
control of holding the powerful accountable – a notion that was shattered by the Snowden leaks 
and may explain why privacy activists and journalists are not always closely aligned:  
I think with surveillance the challenge is that to have that stuff resonate 
requires overturning an established narrative. And this is the narrative: 
that there was a lot of abuse, a lot of surveillance abuse under [FBI 
Director] J. Edgar Hoover, that there was a lot of it under [President] 
Nixon. Then there were the Watergate scandals and it was fixed. And [the 
media] said 'Yay us!' (...) because they are very proud of what the 
Washington Post did in the Watergate scandal, 'Yay us, we fixed things, we 
really had an effect'. There were an awful lot of senior journalists who got 
into journalism because they were inspired by what happened with 
Watergate. Then you have the problem that the people who have been 
articulating that a lot of this stuff continued, have been radical people 
who are not usually listened to in D.C., radical Black activists, radical 
environmental activists, radical Native American activists, people like 
that. And then you have the post-9/11 problem that the stuff (…) expanded 
greatly after that point. And talking about that inevitably involves 
pointing blame at people who are still powerful in D.C. Because the 
expansion may have been proposed by the Bush administration but most 
190 
 
senior Democrats colluded with the expansion of surveillance and where 
very anxious to be seen as patriotic, were very anxious to not criminalize 
politics. (...) When it comes to reporters in D.C. it is a difficult story to 
cover that surveillance has revived and expanded and that is a bipartisan 
thing. (...) That is a hard narrative for mainstream journalists, because it 
sounds conspiratorial. It sounds as if there is an anti-democratic cabal 
who runs things and that the politicians who mainstream journalists 
spend so much of their time covering are not always most important 
people to be covered. It sounds wacky. And that makes it hard.”780  
 
In transition countries with an authoritarian past the interplay between privacy activists and 
journalists was similarly complex. For example in the Maghreb, the nature of press coverage 
about surveillance matters and online privacy depended on the type of medium. While blogs and 
websites were receptive, private and government controlled media were either not interested or 
not to be trusted.  As interviewee F noted: “The gap between activists, bloggers, and journalists 
and mainstream media still exists. It won't change soon. You can find different points of view, 
different kinds of media content. The regular ones are back to propaganda but the online world 
is very different from the press and the journalists.” It is notable in this context that many privacy 
activists, including interviewee F, are both experienced frequent bloggers and privacy activists.  
Yet the greatest asset for privacy activists, as is was the case in the F’s home country, is that 
surveillance disproportionally affected journalists. F remembered a campaign where [t]he media 
supported [us] because we integrated them in our press release and recommendations. We said 
surveillance will be practiced first on journalists and media. That was smart and we had the 
support of the journalists union.” In addition the democratization after the Arab Spring opened 
media channels previously blocked by state censorship. While the state-controlled media still 
was not receptive “the private ones, (...) the internet media, (...) and also blogs etc. are in the 
opposition and [are against censorship and surveillance].” 
 In other contexts, however, the journalists themselves seemed to have accepted the 
fact that they were constantly monitored, making it harder to interest them in the work of 
                                                 
780 On September 17, 2016 a remarkable opinion piece was published by the Washington Post, that seemed confirm 
the analysis of interviewee Q. In it the editorial board of the newspaper argued that the Obama administration 
should not pardon Edward Snowden because he had created “'tremendous damage.'” The very same media 
organization which became famous for its Watergate reporting and reported extensively on NSA surveillance 
based on the documents provided Snowden now argued he should be imprisoned. “No pardon for Edward 
Snowden,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2016 (accessed January 23, 2017). 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/edward-snowden-doesnt-deserve-a-pardon/2016/09/17/ec04d448-
7c2e-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html?utm_term=.de84f64ab06d.  
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privacy activists. In the Latin American country interviewee K was active some  
journalists have (...) internalized the fact that they and their 
communications have been surveilled. They count on their 
communications to be intercepted. For example they have this kind of 
cruel game. [When they are on the phone] they say like '1,2,3, testing... [is 
this the] police, are you hearing me?' They know and they start not caring 
about that [anymore]. 
 
Other journalist were simply careless and not technology savvy enough to understand the 
current state of surveillance. Teaching them about the importance of communication safety for 
their job has indirectly become a way to enthuse them for reporting on privacy matters:  
One of the obstacles is digital literacy. They use cellphones and they use 
computers but they don't care (...) We engage in several digital security 
workshops and we start explaining for example how do [their laptops] 
work, how do cellphones work. And they are often very surprised to see 
that for example all the metadata that is collected with your cellphone.  
 
However, interestingly the same notion of having given up on the issue of surveillance was true 
for Western journalists as well according to European activist M. As he had found out sooner 
than later, some journalists had internalized the same anti-privacy sentiments reflected in the 
general audience that M’s organization was trying to change:  
Even journalists (…) say 'Oh I have nothing to hide, I have done nothing 
wrong, why should I be worried about surveillance.' Journalists are people. 
They are not someone else. Sometimes, for some of them, something 
clicks in their head and they understand. But for most of them they don't 
understand anything. They are at the very beginning of their 
understanding and they just want to do (...) another [article] on which 
tool you have to use against surveillance when most of our discussion is 
not anymore on tools but on behaviors.  
 
Finally, after the initial outrage period in the wake of the Snowden revelations had ended, some 
organizations had modified their media strategy. For example, interviewee P, head of the 
international arm of a major privacy advocacy organization, downplayed the importance of press 
coverage because in his opinion, the Snowden effect was already wearing down. Talking to people 
directly on Facebook and Twitter now seemed as a more effective strategy:  
We are more focused on social media users because one of the things that 
we have to recognize is that the Edward Snowden moment (...) is closing. 
(...) We don’t think the issues have been resolved at all. We really don’t. 
But there is only so long that we can carry on talking about Edward 
192 
 
Snowden. It’s coming up to almost four years away. I hope that there will 
be another Snowden, you know. But we need to move our messaging on. 
Snowden received a lot of coverage in some publications but the amount 
of media coverage is only going to decline.  
 
5.3 Transnational Cooperation 
Even though they were conceptualized and steered by the U.S. based organizations, “Stop 
Watching Us,” “The Day We Fight Back,” and “Reset the Net” – at least on paper – had featured an 
international roster of international participants who to varying degrees contributed to the 
strategy and framings. When I conducted interviews with activists from around the world, I was 
particularly interested in how this transnational aspect of their daily work looked like – 
including, practical details about the organizing process, intra-movement communication, and 
transnational framing. The overarching question was if indeed a transnational movement 
against surveillance had formed in the wake of the Snowden revelations – or if the varying 
degrees of transnational cooperation and solidarity were only glimpses of temporary alliances 
between national actors that came and went.  
A general answer to this question is ambiguous. As will be shown in this section, 
transnational framing is difficult for activists groups mainly concerned with fighting surveillance 
on a national level. However, as was hinted at in the case studies section, a great deal of activists 
actively sought out privacy activists from the 'Global South' to share their experiences with 
surveillance apparatuses in authoritarian contexts. In turn, groups from Latin America, the 
Maghreb region, or East Africa saw great benefits in joining U.S.-led, international privacy 
campaigns. Yet overall, when inquiring about concrete details about the degree of transnational 
cooperation, activists failed to give any compelling evidence that a highly organized, consistent 
transnational privacy movement really existed or was in the making. 
 
Cosmopolitanism and transnational solidarity 
From the outset, the international privacy activist scene had all the prerequisites for evolving 
into a transnational movement. For example, many of the interviewees saw themselves as global 
citizens and were heavily inspired by international protest waves that had rocked the world 
following the global political and financial crises in the late 2000s. Some of the more prominent 
and bigger digital rights groups frequently portray themselves as transnational institutions, 
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transcending borders by setting up international offices and branches as well as supporting local 
privacy initiatives around the world. Interviewee A stressed his “very global perspective” and 
work experience in “international areas” before joining the struggle against government 
surveillance. As A described his organization, “we were really founded out of the Arab spring and 
even before that the Green revolution in Iran [because we were] interested in how people were 
using social media and Facebook to push for social change [whether it] be journalists, (...) 
members of the LGTB community, (...) marginalized groups, [or] ethnic minorities.” Even 
though consisting of a relatively small team, A's organization’s scope was truly global in every 
aspect of their daily work, ranging from specific advocacy work for particular countries to 
international grassroots campaigns. Given its interconnectedness and international scope, digital 
rights activism was by definition transnational, A implied:  
We are working with people from all over the world all the time and we get 
that information and that feeds into our advocacy work and policy works. 
(...) [W]e have an operations team that coordinates our work across our 
international offices which is really challenging [especially] keeping staff 
in places [all over the world] when we’re a small organization (...) – it’s not 
easy for us. [A]nd then we look for ways to campaign – usually with 
partners from around the world. (...) [A]s a lot of human rights groups 
we’re trying to leverage what we have with other people and we really try 
to make it a two way channel. We build a coalition like the ‘Stop Watching 
Us’-coalition and we try to make our voice bigger that way. But then one 
thing that we really try to do is to get the input of people in countries of 
concern. 
 
One of the more enthusiastic accounts of a transnational privacy network was given by 
interviewee G, an activist from Australia. Responsible for “international liaison work,” G spoke of 
being  
part of a network of NGOs against data retention (...) and other sorts of 
privacy invasive policies. (...) And in that role we are particularly quite 
often involved in international privacy based campaigns and we are part of 
a very active network. (...) So something like 'The Day We Fight Back,' that 
was a campaign that was pretty much [U.S.]-led but we weren't just adding 
our name to it – we also tried to promote it nationally and encouraged 
people to join.  
 
This transnational perspective was partially influenced by the biographies and way of life of the 
activists I spoke to. They characterized themselves as cosmopolitans caring about the privacy 
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rights of all people not just from their home country or place or residence. The consensus among 
activists seemed to be that an attack on the privacy of a citizen from, for example Egypt, was 
ultimately an attack on the privacy of all citizens around the world. Due to interconnected nature 
of the Internet, ignoring privacy breaches far away would eventually haunt people from other 
regions. Interviewee Q, an activist with dual British/American citizenship explained:  
Many privacy activists who are active in the United States have some sort 
of immigrant background or their parents were immigrants. It is a fairly 
international bunch of people and so it is natural for them to extend their 
concerns that way. When it comes to the way that the intelligence 
programs are structured part of the issue is that if you don't protect 
foreigners' rights and you are not successfully protecting Americans' rights 
either – that is because of how the internet is structured and how the 
traffic flows across it. (...) That means that even if you are an privacy 
organization that really only cares about the rights of Americans the logic 
of the programs that have been set up means that you can't protect the 
rights of Americans successfully without incidentally protecting the rights 
of foreigners. That I think is why people have no choice but to care.”781  
 
Under those circumstances, as Interviewee A unmistakably stated, the current surveillance 
regime had to be tackled globally: “The idea is that these issues are so fundamental and it’s 
impacting so many places – especially the repressive governments but even places like the U.S. 
[Activists from different countries] are learning from each other and [reacting to] this short-
sighted response to new technology and evolving technology.”  
However, at the end of the day, even transnationally focused privacy groups relied on local 
initiatives. In the second part of his answer, interviewee A explained this dynamic. Instead of 
“hav[ing] a global stance that everyone agrees with, [countries around the world] need to have [a] 
conversation and push back against [surveillance] laws locally.” To come up with a ‘Western’ 
strategy and apply it globally was ill advised, A suggested:  
It very much involves conversations on the ground. I would say most of the 
policy is formulated out of the U.S. That’s where the frontlines of that 
                                                 
781 In addition, Interviewee Q offered a technological explanation, namely that surveillance algorithms and 
programs simply did not discriminate between domestic and foreign internet users: “The unreliable nature of 
how you identify somebody as a U.S. person on the internet. U.S. persons regularly communicate with people 
who are outside the United States anyway so when you are dealing with surveillance under section 702 which is 
the next surveillance fight that is coming up next year, then that deals with surveillance where the target of 
surveillance is somebody who is not a U.S. person. But most of the data that is collected by it, by these programs 
which are PRISM and Upstream, involve the contacts of that target and the contacts of the contact of that target 
and can implicate the rights of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Americans for each individual 
target.” 
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conversation are happening [but] we don’t have that U.S. conversation at 
[our organization]. We don’t have U.S. driven conversations become global 
campaigns because the context is so specific.  
 
An example for this approach was an ongoing campaign against state-sponsored censorship of 
social media users in a West African country. Interviewee A's organization greatly relied on local 
activist groups laying the groundwork while they in turn benefitted from the international 
pressure resulting from the involvement of a Western privacy activist organization:  
[W]e work with a couple of organizations [there] that are very smart. They 
understand the legislative process and they have people who can 
successfully use that process and can support bills. We work with them 
saying ‘What would be helpful, what would make an impact’ because we 
don’t have anyone based in [in that country] and the idea is there that they 
drive the tactics on the ground and we provide our global membership, 
our email campaigning membership, our thought leadership, and we 
provide that to them and work together to make an impact locally. (...) It’s 
actually an ideal situation where you have not just a couple of groups, 
there is momentum already, and we figure out what our added value can 
be to make a bigger impact and help. 
 
Especially if such endeavors were well publicized such a strategy usually succeeded:  
One of the things that we found out is that these campaigns in other 
countries they respond to coverage in Europe or the U.S. Even if the 
campaign is very local and about local things if they see an article come 
out in Forbes or New York Times or some major publication of record then 
it can impact decision makers in that country. Because they don’t want to 
be on the radar for the wrong reasons. 
 
Several other activists stressed that their concern for privacy was global and not only confined to 
citizens of their home country. To oppose domestic surveillance, interviewee J agreed, but ignore 
privacy breaches against other countries was hypocritical. Transnational solidarity, J said, was 
“incredibly important” – even if it came at the cost of losing domestic policy battles. J’s 
organization  
had consistently been an advocate within the U.S. privacy community 
pushing back against movements in the U.S. to push for legislation that 
primarily protects the rights of U.S. citizens at the expense of the rest of 
the world. [We] vehemently opposed the USA Freedom Act the first time 
that it came up because we felt that it [among other things] is primarily 
interested in ending the phone records collection program that affected 
U.S. citizens and had no problem with continuing to spy on people as long 
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as they are outside the U.S. borders. Personally I find that untenable. I 
think it is racist. So we did not participate in campaigns supporting 
legislation that I felt like was drawing a false differentiation between people 
in the United States and outside of the United States. 
 
 Likewise Interviewee O, an activist from Eastern Europe, stressed the universal character 
of surveillance which at least theoretically brought together privacy activists from countries 
around the world. Going on step further, O came close to denying any specific national context at 
all:  
I don't think there is any difference between our context and any other 
national context, right? I think it is exactly the same. I wouldn't see the 
context [in my country] as different from Germany or any other country in 
terms of why privacy matters; it is the same kind of society. (...) I don't see 
why privacy would be more relevant here than in [your country] or vice 
versa. It is just essential feature in data driven society, right? (…) We live in 
the same internet, we live in the same politics. In that way I don't see [my 
country] as different in any sense. 
 
Altogether activists supported international campaigns – not necessarily because there were 
perceived as being effective but rather for the simple reason they demonstrated transnational 
solidarity to the outside world. Their symbolic power seemed to transcend their ability to 
generate tangible legal results. Interviewees R and S, both working for an Eastern European 
privacy advocacy group, proclaimed:  
We support many activist campaigns which are going on internationally. 
We see these campaigns as a very important part of a ‘raising awareness’ 
strategy. We also see these campaigns as a good tool to bring other civil 
society organizations into the game and engage with them (...) But mainly 
it is raising awareness and, what is also important, bringing to people in 
[our country] and the region the idea that we are all across the globe 
sharing the same problems. So that we are not alone here in this and that 
we, on a global level, have to engage. 
 
Western organizers actively requested activists from outside Europe and North America to share 
their experiences of surveillance in their respective home countries. For example interviewee B 
from the Maghreb region remembered to be “requested to speak specifically about the global 
south” at an U.S.-based event. The reason was “to (...) let folks know that (...) this is a global issue 
and that people have suffered similar situations or similar circumstances all over the world.” 
 Interviewee J, an activist from a Scandinavian digital rights group, who, even though not 
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being involved in the design of specific campaigns, nevertheless felt to be a part of transnational 
network of likeminded privacy activists:  
[We are geographically quite isolated and (...) we have limited financial 
resources [so] we are less involved in participating in all sorts of 
conferences and so on so that leaves us a little bit isolated. (…) But I think 
generally it is a collaborative process. (...) [T]here are different groups that 
people follow where people are talking online helping each other out 
when it comes to data protection. (…). Those kind of collaborative and 
engaging discourses are frequent if something happens in one country 
where people want to get the opinion of others because they have the 
window of opportunity to present something. I generally feel like it is very 
supportive to one another and there are a lot of people who are doing it for 
the right reasons. I haven’t come across anyone who is not doing it for the 
right reasons. 
  
North-South dynamics 
In many cases European and U.S. privacy activist groups supported their counterparts in the so 
called “Global South” – both financially and logistically. Groups, for example those in Latin 
America, that interviewee K was a part of, greatly benefited from the regular input provided by 
those bigger organizations. Being experts in on the Western legal and public discourse, their 
activities were closely observed by activists from outside Europe and North America. Arguments 
and frames applied to the U.S. context, for example, would serve as the basis for tackling privacy-
related problems in the particular context of Latin American countries:  
We work very closely with [international and Western advocacy groups]. 
They are big supporters. It (...) is a lot of funding. (...) There are many 
organizations and we have kind of a network and we discuss our issues 
with each other and of course with organizations in the United States and 
Europe. We actively ask them for what is happening there, ‘what do you 
think of xyz?’ We know the debate is very advanced in the United States 
and the United Kingdom and we ask them 'what arguments do you use? 
What is happening there? What do you think about this? How do you 
think they are going to react?' We talk to them and we have to.  And they 
ask us [in turn] (...) to join their campaign. (...) We learn a lot from them. 
 
While some organizations downplayed the importance of international campaigns and only 
joined when they saw privacy benefits for their respective countries, for activists from the 'Global 
South' they presented immense opportunity. While a U.S.-based protest event certainly did 
nothing directly for the privacy of internet users they did have symbolic power, as interviewee F 
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pointed out with regard to their effects on the MENA region: “Everything is maybe ten times 
bigger than what is happening in our country. So I see this with big eyes. I'm inspired by this to 
start local campaigns [and] I know that [I] want to be that successful.”782 
For activists from the “Global South”, their standing and recognition in their home 
countries to a great deal depended on transnational campaigns. Without them there was no way 
to pressure their authoritarian governments. Indeed Interviewee U, an activist from an East 
African country with a long history of government oppression, pointed out that domestic 
activism in his country was largely ignored by his government and that instead transnational 
campaigns were the only means of raising awareness for surveillance:  
We join [international campaigns] whenever we can. First of all [you] have 
to understand from our national context (...) that campaigns will have an 
impact on issues here in [my country]. What happens is that, we draft 
some statements and we also contribute to the [campaign's] publications. 
[Usually, as result] a public letter is written about [my country] on the 
international level, we bring it down here and petition parliament and the 
agency that has got something to do with changing the status quo. So we 
petition and demand that they should really respond to the claims and 
[international] reports. (...) All the local campaigns we have participated 
in, all the letters that we have written here they don’t happen to evoke 
responses. (...) But [my country's] government [is more likely to be] held 
accountable on the international level. I feel, international [campaigns 
and publications] have made a big contribution on how to make our 
government really listen. We are seen as small in the context of the 
government but when our campaigns go beyond [our country], when they 
happen to talk about [the country] on the international level you start to 
feel that the government is starting to grapple with responding to claims 
or reports that have been released.  
 
Thus, transnational campaigns were prioritized because  
When representatives look at the number of opposition coming from all 
over the world (…) really any sensible government – will take it from there 
and say 'Ok what can we do.' We feel that our international engagement 
has to continue because you cannot be on the frontline alone [because 
then] the government [will not listen] to you. We believe that one day one 
                                                 
782 Unfortunately not only activists did carefully follow their U.S. counterparts. Tunisian politicians were also keen to 
emulate the surveillance practices of American intelligence agencies as well: “Our government and politicians in 
Tunisia or Morocco, in the Middle East, they are very inspired by the U.S. What happens in the U.S. they try to 
apply locally. When you have surveillance in the U.S. you will see the Tunisian government trying to implement 
the same kind of surveillance. [After] the Snowden scandal happened (...) a few months [later they] established 
[a] NSA-like agency. They keep following (...) U.S. practices and then build their own model.” 
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time our government will be taken on in a big forum like the UNCT 
(United Nations Country Team) to talk about privacy and the use of 
surveillance. We are also certain all this kind of work will one day lead the 
government to respond and we’re going to see serious changes. 
 
Limits of transnational cooperation 
However, despite all the praise for transnational campaigns and the self-descriptions as 
cosmopolitanism, over the course of the interviews a different picture emerged – that of a 
transnational movement that was rather imagined than existing in a tangible and sustainable 
sense. Despite enormous advancements in communications technology it appeared that little 
strategizing or planning was done neither in the run up to big protest events nor on a regular 
basis. The reasons for this lack of constant transnational exchange included limited capacities, 
internal disagreements, and an overwhelming focus on national campaigns. Interviewee A 
summed it up best:  
I do think [there] is a loosely organized movement of some sort. [But] (…) 
there is nothing that is super coordinated and even if you try to coordinate 
something on a global level it is near impossible. Or it just gets mired in so 
many politics and drama, things like that. That makes campaigns very 
difficult to run because they are competing goals from different regions 
and different countries. 
 
If anything, encounters between privacy groups from different countries were temporary and 
short-lived:  
As a result, from my experience, generally there is a trend of linking up 
with organizations when you need them for a specific campaign and they 
need you so it is kind of a win-win-type of relationship and you are 
working for the same goals [but] then you might not necessarily 
coordinate that same effort on another topic.  
 
Conferences, as was repeatedly noted by a majority of interviewees, were the main vehicles for 
getting together and at least rudimentarily discuss common strategies and goals. But, it seemed, 
little actually resulted from these conference encounters – even though a significant amount of 
paid staffers' jobs included reaching out internationally, as interviewee H, member of a major 
North American based group, explained:  
I think the international arena reflects many of the same dynamics we 
were (…) talking about in the domestic realm, in the sense that actual 
organizing beyond information sharing is difficult and takes a lot of 
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resources and focus. [Members of our international team] are around the 
world on the ground, in airports all the time meeting people. I think the 
challenge there is similar. They have limited time on the ground in each 
place. I don't want to say it is thin because it is not, there are very thick 
connections among the people who are most engaged. [But] I think there 
is not enough. Because part of the challenge here is (…) that people are 
encountering each other through telecommunications as opposed to 
having an opportunity to build relationships. 
 
While the network was in place and strong individual and inter-organizational relationships 
existed true potential were never fully realized. Frequent encounters on the conference circuit 
rarely translated into sustainable transnational coalitions between different organizations and 
individual activists, interviewees R and S pointed out:  
[T]his network is really functioning on the one side, it is very well 
connected. On the other side there are a lot of [conferences]. Every day 
there is some kind of conference related to Internet whatever – too many 
conferences going on. And sometimes you have the feeling that you are 
just... a lot of people from that scene are just like living on the 
conferences. So I don't think that (...) networking is a problem. I think it is 
more of a problem not to be over-networked and to have your own time 
and deal with your own problems and do proper research. 
 
Most of the interviewees talked about isolated incidents of regional cooperation rather than 
global strategizing or communication efforts. For example interviewee C, an activist from a Latin 
American digital rights group, explained that the main part of his international outreach was to 
neighboring countries as well as a handful of projects with international NGOs. Other than that, 
transnational cooperation was sparse and random:  
We basically talk mostly in conferences, when we have time to get 
together. Because it’s very difficult to get everyone together in the same 
room and talk face to face – I mean it’s hard. It depends on the campaign. 
Sometimes we just participate in social media with hashtags and 
sometimes we sign a petition and put our name as support for a request an 
organization has on the international level in their country. 
 
In the same way, interviewee P, a representative of a European privacy advocacy organization, 
gave examples of random team-ups. When I asked about a fixed, permanent transnational 
network P unambiguously stated “there isn't [one].” Such a network only existed on a national 
level where P’s organization was attending meetings with other civil society groups concerned 
about surveillance. But this was not the case on a transnational level even though P was well 
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aware of the international scene and had temporarily worked with many privacy organizations 
from other countries and regions before:  
We don’t have a mirroring international network that regularly meets 
under a particular banner. (…) We do nevertheless follow closely what 
organizations (...) around the world (...) do and where possible we sign on 
to their campaigns (...) – so I think there is a healthy relationship between 
NGOs all over the world, even if there is not a coordinated campaign 
internationally about surveillance. 
 
Other activists wanted to engage in transnational discussion about privacy legislature but were 
de facto barred from doing so because of their country's political geography. For example 
interviewees R and S, based in a Non-EU Eastern European country, were naturally excluded 
from taking part in any deliberation about EU privacy laws – even though the outcomes would 
eventually affect their country as well:  
[W]e are not an EU member state so we can't really be engaged on a 
Brussels level [but that would be the] most important thing for us 
regarding data protection (...). We depend definitely on EU regulation (...) 
but we don't have representatives in Europe, in [the EU Parliament] or the 
Commission. So we can't argue with decision makers here in order to 
make differences in Brussels. This is our handicap in these kinds of 
campaigns. 
 
While many activists may have deeply cared about the importance of protecting privacy rights of 
all citizens around the world, national legal barriers made it close to impossible to design 
international strategies and tackle with surveillance as global problem. There was simply not 
enough manpower and legal expertise to face the international surveillance regime. While 
interviewee Q acknowledged “efforts to be a transnational movement,” the difficulty was  
that the legal and policy context for surveillance differs very greatly 
between countries. (...) It is difficult for individual activists to get their 
heads around multiple systems. There were very few people who clearly 
understand [for example] how surveillance oversight works in the United 
Kingdom and how it works in the United States. (...) And that is just a 
capacity problem. These are secretive systems. It requires a lot studies to 
figure them out. For that reason I think there are limits to how 
international an organization can be unless it that organization has 
enormous capacities. (...) That being said it is important to work 
internationally because these surveillance systems themselves work 
internationally. 
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Under those circumstances, Interviewee N from North America agreed that the input and 
activities for international campaigns usually was minimal and merely amounted to sharing 
information among one's constituents: “Sometimes it is just 'Here is the campaign. Sign up to 
show your support.' Or ‘Here is a tool,’ or ‘Send in your letter – great!’-  in which case we send out 
notice to our members and say, 'This campaign, if you want to participate – here is where you can 
sign up if your organization wants to sign up as a supporter. Go for it.'” 
 For many activists, who did participate in international campaigns, their involvement was 
merely symbolical. According to interviewee O, representing an Eastern European privacy group, 
such campaigns had no real purpose other than simulating transnational solidarity that was 
otherwise nonexistent. When I asked O about the involvement in “The Day We Fight Back” 
because I had noticed they were listed as participants on the campaign's website I got this 
remarkable response:  
We don't do this. I wouldn't be doing this. It is our not our mission. It is not 
in our tactics. Yes, we joined the 'The Day We Fight Back' and they were 
using us because we had legal actions pending and they could be an 
inspiration for others. Frankly speaking, I think there are many goals that 
can be fulfilled by this kind of campaigns. But externally it is nothing more 
than communication. Internally it can be sharing know how. It can be 
inspiring others. It can be feeling stronger by saying that you are not the 
only one doing something. So [the organizers of 'The Day We Fight Back'] 
were probably trying to use that campaign to inspire some transfer of 
knowledge of good practices and that is why they used our example as the 
organization which did some legal action around the Snowden leaks. But 
that's it. There are differences between the internal goals and the external 
goals and I think externally it didn't really matter if it was us or somebody 
else on the press release.  
 
Granted, O continued, there was some form of exchange between different national groups such 
as “shar[ing] experiences,” “meet[ings] at conferences,” and “discussions about (...) legal cases” 
but  
[w]e don't coordinate in the strict sense because there is no joint 
management or operation or plan in the coalition. (...) People get involved 
in these kinds of campaigns that require nothing more than saying 'Yes, 
I'm part of it and I say something about it.' So it is not really coordinated 
action. It is mostly following a leader. There is a leader that says 'I want to 
do XYZ and this is how I will do it and I will need your signatures. What 
do you think?' And what you can gain is you can communicate in your 
country that you are part of it and you can use our press release or our cues 
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or you can use just the fact that we do something as an excuse to 
communicate with your media. This is how it works. There is a leader that 
organizes the whole thing but locally people join if they see, pragmatically 
speaking, their own business. 
 
O’s statement is so notable because it paints transnational campaigns, designed to demonstrate 
solidarity and unity as undemocratic, U.S.-centric operations that is based on a ‘take it or leave 
it’-mentality. It seems to suggest that such campaigns are essentially pseudo-events with no 
effects other than to exaggerate the degree of transnational contention.  
The problem at the center of transnational activism remained: Although surveillance was 
a global phenomenon it took different shapes and forms in different countries. While a 'common 
cause' certainly existed, this often ignored specific national country-specific conditions – a fact 
that of all things activists working in transnational context were all too aware of. There was, as 
interviewee B noticed, an enormous potential for transnational cooperation yet implicit 
obstacles that would make the creation of a true transnational movement extremely difficult. 
The transnational aspect of global surveillance was both a promise and an impediment:  
The one thing that we need to work on more is that we should understand 
that the issues that are important to EUNA (Europe and North America) 
are not important to MENA [the Middle East and North Africa]. I think 
there is a very rich and resourceful diversity to be found and all of the 
issues that are touched by surveillance or censorship. If anything that 
diversity can help make a so called global movement stronger and I think 
we should recognize that. It is unfortunate because sometimes even 
within the same organization there is a heavy focus towards one issue that 
may not be important for other countries. And I just want activists to 
realize that and to be more aware of it.  
 
There was a personal dimension to this conundrum as well. Establishing and maintaining 
relationships with a network of international activists proved to be difficult. Oftentimes 
transnational cooperation was the result of personal fondness between two individuals rather 
than necessarily rooted in the need to work together:  
I would say on a personal level, people (...) have relationships with trust 
and those relationships (...) work [differently in] most (...) organizations 
as well as the movement as a whole (...). So you could say like person X in 
this organization really has a long-term historical relationship with person 
Y in another organization. And as a result those two organizations are 
working together a lot. And the same also applies the other way around: If 
people don't trust one another and they lead two different organizations, 
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those two organizations will never work together.  
 
In most cases, encounters between privacy groups from different continents rarely go beyond a 
general interest in the other one's activities or request for funding, as activist F from the Maghreb 
noted. Even though the activists described the relationship between their organization and their 
Western counterparts as a “partnership” F remained skeptical about successfully working 
together for a common cause. While F was aware of and had privately endorsed campaigns like 
“Stop Watching Us” and “The Day We Fight Back” it seemed too far away from the reality on the 
ground:  
I don't know if we can compare between what is happening in [the MENA 
region] and how we campaign [here] and how it is done in the U.S. – I 
would say we cannot. Because in the U.S. [citizens] have direct access to 
Congress. [Here] we don't have this. Maybe the efficiency of these 
campaigns is about the proximity of activists [to their] political leaders 
and policy makers. Their voices are heard faster than ours. 
 
Given this complicated dynamic, some of the participants and organizers of U.S. based 
campaigns, remembered vivid discussions whether to include international perspectives at all. 
Opponents feared that opening up the campaign to voices from other countries would take away 
the focus on U.S. privacy legislation. Especially behind the scenes of “Stop Watching Us” there 
seemed to be a split among activists whether the campaign should be national or transnational 
in focus. In the end, organizers decided to include an international perspective (see section 4.2) – 
yet apparently not without a heated debate. Interviewee D remembered that whether to include 
voices from other countries  
was kind of a point of contention I think because it was such a big 
coalition. A 110 organizations had signed on to something very specific 
and I don't think there was any international stuff in the joint statement 
of principles or whatever.(...) I remember there being disagreement about 
how to balance the U.S. focus and nature of it versus international stuff. 
(...) I just know that there was tension about how much to focus on the 
U.S. specifically because there was definitely a (...) very like American 
Constitution focus. It is not necessarily the direction I would have taken if 
I had started it from scratch but that is how it got started, the framing of 
the group (…). There was at least a perception within our group that most 
people don't really care about spying on people in [the MENA region] 
unfortunately. And so it was like 'well, we don't think there is any chance' 
(...) And there were people like 'of course we're going to spy on other 
countries.' It was kind of like 'Do we want to take on, trying to tell people 
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that spying in general is bad because that seems like a definite lost cause. 
Or maybe we can at least get them to stop spying on us' – which is 
obviously a very problematic approach to take – I’m not defending that. 
 
Maybe because of the reservations voiced by some of the organizers, as interviewee D argued, the 
influence of international participants on the campaign was minuscule: Honestly, the 
international “groups of the 110 groups in the coalition a 100 or 90 of them probably weren't 
involved beyond signing the letter. I never talked to anybody. I never heard anything or saw 
anything on the email thing from anyone in Iceland or Brazil. (...) My impression was they just 
signed the letter and that was it.” Ultimately the national, U.S.-centric focused dominated over 
any international or global frames. 
 In Europe, the same dynamic was at work: While the EDRI (European Digital Rights 
Initiative, an umbrella organization for many of the continent’s most influential national digital 
rights groups) had a strong presence, cooperation happened through “sudden coalitions 
happening on an issue.” But first and foremost, as interviewee E declared unambiguously, the 
scope of each organization's work was national. E’s statement must be read as a damning 
judgement on the perceived ineffectiveness of transnational privacy activism as opposed to 
domestic efforts:  
Our focus is, we want to protect the privacy and freedom of 
communication of [our country's] internet users when they are 
communicating online. This is our focus. So when it is (...) Internet 
freedom in India, for example, (...) really interesting but we are not 
working on that at all. It’s just like we see the headlines, we read some 
documents and then we go on. Because our focus is on civil rights for [our 
country's] internet users. This means (…) we [only] work (…) on the 
European level, when it has an influence on the civil rights of [our 
country's] internet users. This is why although we would love to talk to, for 
example, I don't know, Russian organizations or maybe in Thailand... We 
do meet these people for example at conferences or at these places but for 
our work there is no relevancy to work together. (…) Also if you are doing a 
campaign like that – who do you want to reach? [Which] person[s], or 
institution[s], or organization[s] should change their behavior? Or should 
change the laws, should change their policies, should change their 
algorithms? I think for a lot of (...) global campaigns the actual effect 
might not be as big as doing it on the national level because politicians are 
much more susceptible for national news or national media, what do the 
polls say etc. The effect is harder on that level. 
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Almost the exact sentiment was voiced by interviewee O from Eastern Europe: “No, [we do not 
have a global scope]. It would be ridiculous to imagine that we started global campaigns, because 
it is not our mission. Our mission is to act in [our country] and to deal with issues that affect [our 
country's] society. (...) We cooperate with others but our mission is not to change U.S. politics 
because we cannot. It would be arrogant to think that way. So our mission is not to change global 
politics. It is to change local politics but because a way to do quite often is through the global 
ones we try to feed into the international movement but that is all. 
When activists were pressed for their involvement in transnational campaigns they 
oftentimes defended their relative lack of input by repeating the very same ‘my country first’ –
mantra. International surveillance issues were only of importance if they were related to 
developments in the domestic realm: “Do we work together?” interviewee N asked rhetorically,  
No, not really. If there are international days of recognition of access or 
privacy, sure, to increase awareness for the educational component of it. 
(…) [W]e talk about the international legislation events – but only things 
that will directly or indirectly affect [citizens of my country]. (...) So we do 
what we can. [But] there is only so many hours in the day though.  
 
In line with this reasoning N had only supported a campaign such as “The Day We Fight Back” 
not because of a general concern for the privacy of citizens around the world, but because the 
timing of the campaign coincided with a domestic legal controversy over surveillance. 
 During supposedly transnational protest campaigns, communication between activists in 
different countries was close to non-existent. An example would be the “Stop Watching Us”-
campaign that took place simultaneously in the U.S. and Germany (for the radically different 
framing devices applied in both countries see section 4.2). German and American activists did 
nothing jointly or in common beyond sharing the “Stop Watching Us” label. Consider this 
account by a German privacy activist, interviewee T, about the lack of cooperation between 
activists from both countries:  
There was hardly any communication. Afterwards, in December 2013, we 
met some of our American counterparts, who had somehow heard that 
there had been ‘Stop Watching Us' demonstrations in Germany. [But at 
the time of the event] there were some tweets [sent out by American 
activists] mentioning a German movement – I guess they wanted to 
promote that. But there was never any form of collaboration. I think they 
were happy that we had done stuff under the 'Stop Watching Us'-banner 
here in Germany and contributed to promoting the name. We, in turn, 
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when we heard that they are organizing a street protest in Washington, 
D.C., wanted to help them promoting their campaign because we thought 
that the topic of surveillance in the United States gets even less attention 
than in Germany. So we organized our own protest march referring to the 
U.S. counterpart. (...) But there was no consultation or talks. Instead we 
simply decided to stage demonstrations in Germany [without asking for 
permission]. Because they had announced their event weeks before, we 
just tried to have it taking place on the same day. Months later I got to 
know some of the American activists at a conference but we did not talk 
about planning a joint event or campaign in the future. It was rather like 
'Great that you guys are doing the same stuff.' But other than that there 
was nothing.” 
 
An additional challenge in addressing surveillance as a global problem was a perceived sense of 
indifference among the national publics. It was not only that most advocacy organizations were 
understaffed to look at surveillance from a transnational angle; it seemed that politicians and 
their constituents as well as the participants at protest events did not care about the situations in 
other countries. Interviewee Q summarized the immense difficulties for communicating 
transnational solidarity in a national context, in this case, of the United States:  
I can talk about how the international framing works or has worked in the 
years since that. The difficulty in U.S. particular terms is that the 
conventional wisdom in D.C. is that if you are not American you do not 
have privacy rights that the U.S. government is bound to respect. That is 
just the conventional wisdom. When it comes to getting data protections 
through Congress it is all easier to talk about the privacy rights of 
American citizens in particular. And you don't talk about the privacy rights 
of non-U.S. Citizens. 
 
Given the limitations of international campaigns pointed out above some activists, such as 
interviewees R and S, had begun to actively questioning the increasing number of temporary 
international coalitions:  
I see (…)a kind of inflation of these advocacy campaigns going on around 
the world. For example the number of invitations that we are receiving per 
month it is really huge – to join some kind of advocacy campaign or 
protest or to do something. I don't have a feeling that this inflation of 
those kinds of campaigns is bringing something [meaningful to the table].  
 
5.4 Historical and Cultural Frames 
As was detailed above with the exception of truly international digital rights focused NGOs, the 
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privacy advocacy groups operate first and foremost in in their respective national contexts. Thus 
they have to communicate to the public differently than when addressing a 'global public sphere'. 
'Privacy' has different meanings in different languages and cultural contexts. Surveillance as a 
cultural and political practice has historical and cultural connotations that vary from country to 
country. When I talked to activists from around the globe I quickly learned that national and 
even highly localized narratives exist that are used as framing devices against surveillance. One 
way to interpret these country or region specific narratives in the context of transnational privacy 
campaigns is to read them as complementing the more general transnational frames: connecting 
local concerns about surveillance to a greater common struggle for privacy that goes beyond 
borders. However, based on my interview data a conflicting picture emerges: National anti-
surveillance narratives are sometimes at odds with transnational frames, preventing the 
development of truly transnational communication strategies and deliberations (for the active 
refusal of some of the interviewed activists to care at all about the international dimension of 
privacy and surveillance see the previous section). 
 
National ‘Origin stories’ 
For one thing, the contexts in which surveillance and privacy are publicly discussed were rooted 
in the respective history of a particular country.783 For example, in Latin America with its long 
history of military coups supported by wide-ranging surveillance practices, intelligence agencies 
are seen by parts of the population as enemies of the people. There, the daily work of privacy 
advocates is informed by human rights violations conducted by the police and the military in the 
past. For instance, while advocacy groups from Western countries focus on the privacy of 
individual users or customers, organized resistance against surveillance in the home country of 
                                                 
783 Only two activists, one from Australia (interviewee G) and one from Scandinavia (J), were not aware of any 
specific national context that informed their work. “I don't think we have a national or particular cultural push 
for privacy [in Australia],” interviewee G said. “We are not particularly a [privacy-focused society]. I don't think 
there is a strong cultural push for privacy but we do tend to respect the privacy of (...) public figures somewhat 
more than some other nations. We do have a relatively strong privacy legislation but it really only applies to large 
institutions. But we have relatively limited legal right to privacy other than that.” Many activists, such as 
interviewee J admired a supposed, historically charged pro-privacy attitude among the German population 
against which their own national culture could not compete: “I wouldn’t say [there is a historically or culturally 
informed anti-surveillance sentiment in my country), no. You are from Germany? In Germany people are very 
aware of their privacy. [It is more rich and has ] more depth to it and I wouldn’t say it’s the same [here]. So for 
example in Berlin – aren’t there parts of Germany where people resisted against being photographed for Google 
Maps and Google Earth? I don’t think that kind of level of awareness exists in [my country] I think.” 
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interviewee C is explicitly political and thus deeply intertwined with other human rights 
discourses:  
[W]e had several military coups 30 years ago (...) that really marked our 
history towards how intelligence and how the law enforcement agencies 
and how security in itself and the defense of the nation in itself is treated. 
(…) Basically, our intelligence apparatus since its creation has been used 
mainly for political intelligence. They target political relevant actors for 
example from the opposition of the official political party that’s in power 
or for example journalists that are leaning towards some political party or 
some political ideology as well as for example members of unions (...).We 
try to give sort of a background how they have operated in the past and 
how the mentality worked. (...) So we try to address this when we talk 
about privacy and surveillance because we think the context in which the 
intelligence apparatus (…) worked in the past is relevant in the future to try 
to give the citizens the knowledge of how they thought or what was the 
thinking process on the intelligence activities, right? (...) If they want to 
for example snoop on internet connections nationwide we can bring that 
past into [the spotlight by saying] ‘Ok look the people that are working 
there [are] led by national institutions that were thinking in this way in the 
past so be careful this can take another course instantly.' That’s why we try 
to bring the history part into our discourse. 
 
Ironically, the troubled past of Latin America has not only sensitized the public, but at the same 
time devaluated the right to privacy.784 Interviewee K, in contrast, pointed out how decades of 
civil war, urban violence, and kidnappings had led to a society that is generally supportive of 
security measures, including widespread surveillance, at the cost of individual freedoms – even 
more so than in Europe or North America. In these countries, the mobility and interactions with 
others depended on measures that to a certain extend jeopardized privacy: “It is common for us 
to check in official and private buildings with our national identity number and we are 
accustomed now to have surveillance everywhere and to have our fingerprints there and to have 
all kinds of security measures that may not give us security but it makes us feel safer.” Giving a 
brief historic run down, interviewee K made clear how hard it was to generally advocate for 
'privacy' in a cultural climate dominated by memories of war and military rule:  
[W]e have a very interesting context. We have [had] guerilla leftist groups 
[for decades]. That allowed military interventions on certain parts of 
                                                 
784 For the expansion of surveillance in Latin America following years of authoritarian rule see Nelson Arteaga 
Botello. “Surveillance and Urban Violence in Latin America: Mega-cities, social division, security and 
surveillance,” in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, 259-266. 
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communications. Above all (...) it created a climate for surveillance and for 
(...) when they say 'security is the most important thing we need to 
protect' That is not completely unjustified. We have had several (...) 
bombings and terrorism attacks. This is our context. [We also] had this 
huge, as they call it, the 'War on Drugs' and (...) drug cartels that were 
shaking the establishment and shaking the constitution of states. [W]e 
still have this context of war and the military discourse over how human 
rights must be protected and how they should be applied in real life. So 
they say 'you have of course your right to privacy but there is the war 
context'.  
 
Operating as a privacy advocate in such a surrounding made activism at the same time more easy 
and hard. On the one hand government and military abuses of surveillance laws have made 
people more sensitive for their privacy. On the other hand, the pro-security sentiments are really 
strong:  
It is of course harder for us to advocate for privacy because you have to 
overcome the legal barrier, the political barrier and then you have to 
overcome the cultural barrier too. [Take for example the debate about the 
use of CCTV cameras in public spaces]: The major part of the comments 
section in the newspapers were [saying] 'We need these cameras. Those 
cameras are important for us.' So we have to very careful when we talk 
about privacy because (…) most of the time [we] don't have the public 
opinion on our side. 
 
In sum, in the Latin American case the security meta-frame has – even more so than in the West 
– completely won over any privacy concerns. In fact, security for many people threatened by 
urban violence is a prerequisite for any form of privacy. In contrast, the violent history of Europe 
– although vividly remembered – seems to be for the most part removed from the anti-
surveillance discourse. Granted, the Nazi occupation during World War II, for example, is used 
often to point out the devastating effects that sophisticated surveillance apparatuses had on 
ethnic minorities. For example, the opposition towards government surveillance in the 
Netherlands is partly informed by the destruction of Dutch Jews with the help of fine-tuned 
registration and monitoring techniques. The anecdote of resistance fighters setting fire to a 
registration office in Amsterdam to save Jews is nowadays taught in schools and treated as a 
warning against totalitarian surveillance. In France, resistance against surveillance is frequently 
discussed within the context of French collaboration with Nazi Germany, when thousands of 
citizens surveilled and denounced their Jewish neighbors. In the eyes of many French men, as an 
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activist from the Benelux region elaborated, World War II was when modern, albeit still 
analogue, surveillance started – in particular when ID cards where introduced to move between 
the free and still occupied parts of France. However, some activists pointed out the limits of 
national cultural-historical narratives when it comes to mobilizing people against current forms 
of surveillance. European activists refrain to actively evoke the history of the Nazi reign because  
[u]sing those kind of historical arguments tend to bias a lot of the debate 
(...) – actually we do understand it is much more complicated and it is 
difficult to advocate against surveillance and for privacy when you are just 
saying that it was [only a Nazi practice]...If you are saying [you quickly 
reach] the Godwin point and that is not very interesting. [referring to 
Goodwin's law which asserts that if an online discussion (regardless of 
topic or scope) goes on long enough, sooner or later someone will compare 
someone or something to Hitler]. 
 
American activists evaded these pitfalls of politically charged history by appealing to citizens 
from both the right and the left political spectrum. Offering different historical framing devices 
– colonial history for libertarians and conservatives and the history of Civil Rights to Liberals and 
Progressives – has been a promising strategy to reach across the political isle when promoting 
privacy issues (see section 4.2). The focus on the U.S. constitution which was embedded in the 
“Patriotism” frame was able to transcend political divides as interviewee Q explained:  
Obviously in the United States the Constitution is by default culturally 
treated as a sacred object. It is not that everyone knows everything that is 
in it or that everyone knows every part of the Bill of Rights but they know 
that they are supposed to be treated with reverence – whatever it says. (...) 
Having that constitutional talisman strengthens the hand of surveillance 
activists in the United States. Certainly it is very helpful to have that 
cultural practice here relative to the situation in the United Kingdom 
where [activists have] a more difficult time convincing people that privacy 
of correspondence is an important value that (...) people are bound to 
honor. We have had success in referring to and familiarizing people with 
the colonial practice of general warrants and therefore with the ideal if you 
are going to conduct surveillance it must be particularized. (...) And using 
the example of the Founders is important in that discussion. (...) Being 
able to refer to that makes it more likely that we are able to reach out 
across party lines. The reason for this is that on the right it is traditional to 
regard the Constitution as sacred and there are many right-leaning people 
who are willing to treat it in that way. (...) If it was not in the Constitution 
then it would be much harder for them to care. 
 
But interviewee Q made a point to equally focus the political communication strategy on those 
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citizens 
who are black politicians, who were active in the Civil Rights movement. 
They have an understanding of the history of surveillance as it was 
conducted [in the Civil Rights era] and the ways in which it continued to 
have a disproportionate impact on the lives of Black people and Muslim 
people in the United States. And that is a history that is important to them 
and so we find for example that in our public communications on social 
media it can be very successful to make the point that Martin Luther King 
was a subject of surveillance. When Muhammed Ali died it was important 
for us to make the point that Muhammed Ali was a subject of surveillance 
because these are figures who are broadly respected within American 
society but who tend to resonate more with the left wing. That provides a 
way for us to challenge mass surveillance practices that are conducted by 
the government whether the government is Republican or Democratic.  
 
Therefore to address a general public, it was crucial according to interviewee Q “to identify a 
whole spectrum of people with a whole spectrum of interests who have come under the eye of 
the surveillance state” – whether it be gun rights activists or Muslims. 
 In fact, tying contemporary actions against government surveillance to protests in the 
Civil Rights era was a natural thing to do. In fact, not referencing it to the activism from the 
1960s and 1970s would have made the privacy movement look to be out of touch with the way 
protests have been designed ever since, as interviewee B pointed out in regard to “Stop Watching 
Us”:  
Protesting in the United States never leads to anything unless you 
reference it to the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. It was kind of a 
necessity that you have to use that language because you can protest all 
you want, nobody will look at you. You have to link it to something that 
actually changed something in the United States. Whether it is White 
communities, Black communities, any type of community – if you are 
protesting that means you support social change through that channel 
and I think it was definitely the appropriate tactic to use. And you see this 
in different issues as (…) they will reference something about the 1960s. It 
is just natural. 
 
Still, the fact that Civil Rights activists had been under government surveillance and current 
activists still had a particular relevance. Belonging to an ethnic minority, interviewee L’s entire 
motivation in participating in anti-surveillance protest events was to establish historical links 
between what happened in the 1960s and the 1970s and what was exposed by Edward Snowden in 
2013: 
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[T]he reason why I was [joining 'Stop Watching Us'] was I wanted  to make 
sure that White America or White people around the world, ‘the West’ as 
they say, were put on notice that all of this is not new to Black people. 
We've been suffering this type of treatment since we got here. It was illegal 
to congregate more than two or three people at a time without a White 
person present. It was illegal to congregate outside of church. Since the 
dawn of coming across the shores of America it was always the church, the 
choir, and the FBI. That has always been a constant that Black people have 
been under surveillance like this since day one and there is this program 
called COINTELPRO that is still in effect. (...) And we had so many people 
killed because surveillance is not simple surveillance. It is a strategy of 
intelligence so that they can better plan their actions. People have been 
assassinated because of this surveillance. Fred Hampton comes to mind, 
Mark Clark comes to mind, the Black Panther party comes to mind. (...) So 
I just want to make sure that we understand how the system operates.  
 
The most frequently referenced historical figure in the U.S. anti-surveillance discourse has 
become Dr. Martin Luther King. After the Snowden leaks, Dr. King was rediscovered by privacy 
activists as the most prominent victim of government surveillance. If Nobel Peace prize laureate 
was under surveillance because of his human rights activism, then this was proof that 
surveillance could target anyone, not just criminals or terrorists. Interviewee L explained the 
Americanness of MLK but also the ongoing attraction in the United States to frame any form of 
surveillance as attacks on historically revered, almost saint-like figures such as the clergyman 
from Atlanta:  
Martin Luther King was probably the greatest American in history. (...) 
There is no founding father, there is no President, there is no other 
historical figure in American history that is more patriotic, more 
American than Martin Luther King. (...) Why is that? Because he was 
simply trying to get America to deliver what is on paper. (...) He spoke 
eloquently. He wore a suit and tie. He prayed before he went to bed. He 
was educated. He came from a middle class [family]. (...) DOCTOR Martin 
Luther King. How did the police treat him? How did the FBI treat him? 
(...) Martin Luther King was one of the most dangerous men in America to 
paraphrase [longtime FBI director] J. Edgar Hoover. (...) He and President 
Johnson (...) unleashed surveillance relentlessly on MLK 24/7 for thirteen 
years. He was under constant surveillance of course except for the day he 
was assassinated. (...) And the FBI also had tapes of his extramarital affairs 
and tried to blackmail him with that information [to commit suicide]. See 
how surveillance works? They are gaining data to use to further their 
agenda.785 
                                                 
785 When, in a follow-up question, I asked whether the strong focus on the Civil Rights history and surveillance of 
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Clearly, in the United States, colonial and constitutional history has informed campaigns such as 
“Restore the Fourth” or “Stop Watching Us” (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). However, at the same time 
J pointed out that a thin line exists between national and transnational discourses. There is an 
eminent danger that the former can come at the expense of the latter:  
Most of [the people involved in 'Restore the Fourth] are not opposed to 
recognize human rights of people outside the United States. They just 
have a specific frame of looking at things through the U.S. Constitution. 
That is a valid argument to make as well. There [are] people [who] are 
fighting for international human rights (...) while also (...) pointing out 
the specific harm in government spying on their own populations. (...) It is 
salient to make that sort of more libertarian, patriotic Fourth Amendment 
constitutionally based critique as long as you are not doing so at the 
expense of recognizing human rights of people outside of the U.S. as well. 
I think you need to do both. 
 
The pitfalls of historical frames 
Sometimes, however, decades-old history also worked as an impediment to reaching potential 
constituents. For one activist from Eastern Europe, interviewee O, the rich history of Soviet-style 
surveillance during the communist reign did not inform her communication strategy at all. The 
past did not seem to have any impact on the perception of privacy and surveillance in the 
country O was operating: 
Yes, logically speaking, [surveillance during Communist rule] should have 
some relevance or it should have some impact, I agree with this intuition 
(...). But (...) we (…) don't see any meaningful differences between the 
attitude of people [in our country] and people from other countries. If there 
is any it would be for the worse. [Here] people would be less inclined to 
seek privacy protection or consider this important than, say, German 
people. That is my personal perspective because I do work with activists 
                                                                                                                                                                       
ethnic minorities would alienate the general population, interviewee L had this to say: “F--- the general 
population. The general population likes Trump. The general population liked Bush. The general population 
thinks that Saddam Hussein had something to do with 9/11. Dr. Cornell West calls it the ‘Niggerization of 
America’. That’s what we’re dealing with. The Niggerization of America. Welcome to our world. You are starting 
to see – when you had the Occupy Wall Street protest – that was brutalized just like Black Lives Matters was 
brutalized. They weren’t killed – there was a line, but they were beaten they were arrested there were pepper-
sprayed. I’ve seen cops pepper-spray white girls right in their face. But, so, yes, if you talk about being popular in 
terms of being pop band popular, yeah – If I was running for office and it was dependent upon the popular vote 
like most of the candidates depend on the popular vote then, yeah, your concerns would be absolutely correct but 
I’m not. I’m not a politician and I’m just here to represent the truth. The truth is what it is. And he truth has 
always been described in a negative connotation – its ugly, its brutal, its painful, it hurts and all that. So I 
represent the truth (…) But yes, we are all black when it comes to surveillance because as you have seen it has been 
applied equally. It’s a time where you are treated as niggers.” 
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from other countries and I see differences in discourse but it is just my 
personal perspective not any kind of research that we have done. I don't 
think we can claim meaningful differences between countries [by] taking 
into account our past.  
 
Other activists from Eastern Europe, interviewees R and S also refrained from applying historical 
framing devices, arguing “that we don't have such nice examples from the past (as in the U.S.) 
that we can use related to [surveillance]. Or maybe we haven't found what could be interesting to 
communicate to the general public.” However, they eventually did suggest, that the Communist 
Era in Eastern Europe would be worth exploring:  
There was some kind of culture of surveillance (...) There is this one really 
common saying, 'For the five of us sitting in this room, one must be 
working for the secret service' (...) In [our region] in general, because of all 
of those events in our recent past (...) people always have this paranoia of 
that most of the people are working for someone. Most of the time it is 
really common that people are labeling other people as spies or working 
for some other government. (...) So everybody really think that they are 
subjects of surveillance. In most of post-communist countries during 
dictatorships everybody was surveilled in some matter as the Stasi in 
Germany and stuff like that. So practically here also everybody thinks that 
they are somehow subject to surveillance because they are so important 
(laughing). 
  
Accordingly – and in stark contrast to activists in the U.S. that regularly base their claims on a 
critical reading on U.S. surveillance history – interviewee O found that evoking history beyond 
recent years ago was ultimately counterproductive. To use historical framing devices would 
ultimately alienate their core constituents, who had never experienced authoritarian forms of 
oppression and surveillance:  
No, [evoking the years of communism is not a valid strategy for us], 
especially not with people we want to mobilize because people to whom 
we talk and we try to communicate with are mostly people in their 20s or 
30s which means that they were born [after the lifting of the Iron Curtain] 
– even myself: I was born in [the 1980s] which means that I don't 
remember (…) the old times. I have only heard how it was from my 
parents. Most of the people that we communicate with today, they already 
have the feeling that they live in free societies. Right now if we talk about 
Snowden, ACTA or these debates there were mostly affected, our target 
groups for these campaigns were younger people who don't see the 
relevance with (...) what was before. 
 
216 
 
In the Maghreb region, contemporary anti-surveillance discourse is framed within the context of 
the time before and during the Arab Spring, where, as interviewee F remembered, surveillance 
“was legal, it was mass surveillance, there was huge censorship, the worst one in the world.” 
Interestingly, transition countries in the region are examples, which that recent history only goes 
so far in informing people on the perils of government spying. Because now activists have to face 
a public that seemingly accepts surveillance in its new institutionalized and democratically 
legitimized form:  
There is a big difference [between] what was practiced before the 
revolution and what the authorities are during right now. The main 
difference is regarding censorship and the kind of surveillance they are 
doing. Before the revolution it was legal (...). By now they only practice 
surveillance based on legal demands from the judges. Regarding 
terrorism, counterterrorism – we as civil society played a huge role in this. 
(...) This new-born agency was established in late 2012 [and] until now 
they don't have a legal framework for what they are doing in terms of 
targeted surveillance. (...) So maybe as we won the battle of net freedom 
and freedom of expression in general this success resulted in less activism 
regarding surveillance. (...) [W]e worked a lot on strengthening and 
safeguarding our freedom of expression online and offline and the result 
was that as soon as we won nobody is really interested in following up. 
 
In East Africa, as interviewee U reminded me, there was no need to evoke a distant history to 
effectively frame resistance against surveillance and warn the public about the dire consequences 
of privacy infringements. The present situation was alarming enough. In U’s home country Nazi, 
FBI and Junta-style surveillance was an everyday reality:  
As far as East Africa [is concerned], we happen to be facing present 
regimes of repression (...). The (...) actions of governments will infringe on 
people's right to privacy under the guise of protecting national security. 
(...) [I know about] the campaigns that are carried out in the United  
States. (…) When you come to Africa it is completely different. Whatever is 
being done [here] is being done with impunity. [T]he violations of rights 
to privacy are being carried out in impunity because (...) they are 
disregarding processes that [should be in place] in [a formally] democratic 
government. (...) [W]e don't have laws that protect citizens’ rights to 
privacy. (…) Of course we've come from far what (...) the East African 
region is concerned. Because (…) we had a quite a number of civil wars. 
Since the independence of 1962 we haven't had a democratically elected 
government. We have seen governments coming into power through the 
use of guns and the current regime, has been in power for the last 30 years 
and there are no signs of leaving power. The current leadership is really 
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clinging on power. They are so much interested in really keeping 
themselves in power whatever they are doing they are doing in the name 
of regime survival. This tells you how dangerous this has become for us 
here (...). [T]he last two years we have demanded [a strong privacy law] but 
the government is not moving to put that law in place. We also fear that 
that the more the government keeps itself in power [through the means of 
surveillance] the more casualties will come up. Our government in 
partnership with China is targeting mobile phone users. (...) They have 
also infected hotels near the capital where numerous opposition leaders, 
human rights defenders, and activists have held meetings and the small 
towns near the capital or their WiFi has been infected. So that really tells 
you how dangerous it is coming down here. 
 
5.5 Offline v. Online Campaigns 
Of the four case studies analyzed in chapter 4, two, “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us,” 
while certainly digitally enabled, were traditional forms of collective action. The events were 
centered on physical exchanges between activists and build around protest marches. The other 
two were online protests, designed to building pressure and raising awareness among internet 
users. More specifically , as was the case with “The Day We Fight Back,” users were asked to post 
online banners and place calls to representatives, or, as proposed by “Reset the Net,” to promote 
the installation of encryption software.  
Over the course of the campaigns each mode of activism affected potentials for collective 
action framing. A newspaper article featuring a photograph of a protest crowd of 1,000 activists 
chanting and holding signs may be more effective in raising awareness and representing dissent 
than temporary blackouts of a handful of participating websites. On the other hand, street 
protests can be seen as ineffective and overrated as well: many of the interviewed activists voiced 
doubts if their street protests had any measurable effects at all. 
 When interviewing activists I was interested in their opinions on the effectiveness of 
offline and online protest campaigns and the implications that choosing one or the other had for 
the strategic political communication surrounding the events. The sum of their reactions to my 
question, as will be shown, revealed somewhat of a paradox: While, in principle, the activists 
agreed that collective action taking place in physical 'meet space' was important and desirable, 
after “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” they, for a variety of reasons, have more or less 
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ceased trying to bring people to streets for privacy matters.786 Subsequent online campaigns, on 
the other hand, which from a chronological perspective seemed to have substituted street 
protests, were not seen as being able to fully replace offline collective action either. An overall 
picture emerged where some activists have lost faith in both offline and online forms of 
organizing and have instead refocused their efforts on doing advocacy work behind the scenes. 
Others wait for another opening of a political opportunity window to rekindle any form of 
organized dissent. However, a majority of activists seemed to keep believing in a balanced 
interplay between offline and online campaigning in order to effectively address surveillance and 
privacy in the public realm. 
 
Taking it to the Streets 
In principle activists agreed that, as a first step, anti-surveillance street protests were necessary 
both for raising awareness and presenting a unified stance by bringing together a variety of 
groups. For example, interviewee B had positive memories of the “Stop Watching Us”-rally, 
stressing that  
[W]hat I loved most about that campaign is that it brought so many 
people together and they noticed that there was lot of synergy between 
different organizations all working towards the same goal. (...) So that was 
the most impressive thing for me but then also I remember it was just 
droves of people (…) that were just marching together. I haven't felt 
something similar to that since I was a college student and it wasn't even 
close. I mean, the number of people that I saw in the 'Stop Watching Us' 
protest was really impressive. And I thought the impact of it was – it might 
not have any concrete and measurable impact – but I felt like it really gave 
a voice to all of these people that are usually protesting online. To see their 
physical presence on the streets, raising awareness with other people who 
may not know anything about surveillance, within D.C. but also within 
Capitol Hill and the White House. It was good to let those people know 
that we're aware of these issues. 
 
Other activists agreed that physical protests were an indispensable element in the evolution of 
privacy activism in the post Snowden. Interviewee I in hindsight was enthusiastic about the 
effects of “Stop Watching Us,” as it established the privacy movement as a ‘real’ movement – a 
force to be reckoned with on the international activism scene: “I think those moments are really 
                                                 
786 A notable exception was the Apple vs. FBI case in early 2016, which is not part of my analysis. 
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valuable and important in that they solidify a movement. It was clearly a moment in history. 
There needed to be (…) a real physical protest in Washington D.C. for people to think 'this isn't 
just some nodes on the Internet – this is a real grassroots social movement like the ones we've 
seen before.'” Even campaigns that primarily take place online have to be supplemented with 
meaningful, highly visible street actions to unfold successfully, interviewee I argued:  
[We have] repeatedly employed a combination of creative street tactics 
with online tactics.(...) I think there will always have to be an interplay 
between online organizing and work on the ground – whether that protest 
in the streets or more militant actions or just community-based trainings 
and meetings and people coming together. There are certain things you 
can accomplish online and there are certain things that you can 
accomplish in person. (...) I think that digital organizers make a mistake 
when they are completely giving up on having people on the ground doing 
ground work. We don't need to recreate and do the same old protests that 
we have done since 1961 but you can do a lot by having people on the 
ground and then using the internet to amplify what they are doing. 
 
Based on his experiences with street protests such as “Stop Watching Us” and “Restore the 
Fourth” but also online only protest events such as “The Day We Fight Back,” interviewee H 
insisted that the latter missed the crucial element of ongoing personal contact between 
individual activists – an aspect that was also missing in transnational relationships between 
privacy activists (see section 5.3). What kept the network alive were not necessarily protest 
events themselves but a steady element of organizational meetings between events – a 
dimension that was particularly lacking in online protest campaigns:  
[I]n meet-space conversions you have two things I would describe as 
interpersonal and inter-relational that are very important for social 
movements. The first is trust which is very hard to establish online with 
people who you don't interact with at a layer of depth. And the second (...) 
is this sense of solidarity. Mutual accountability. That is very hard to 
establish online. I would say that it is one of the challenges (...) the 
difficulty (...) of establishing solidarity amongst people who related to 
each other [online] as opposed to the human beings they were in a 
physical space with potentially sharing legal risks, with organizing 
logistics, with that sense of shared collaboration. (...) [T]he 'Restore the 
Fourth' rally (...) or 'Stop Watching Us' were two big flashpoints and in 
between there were steady drumbeats both of behind the scenes backend 
organizing and connecting and planning and also smaller visual stunt 
actions that didn't require 500 or 1000 people. Those sorts of in between 
points both the smaller actions and the planning opportunities are 
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incredibly important because that is what enables everything from rapid 
responses to diversity in coalitions to just having the networks to pull in, 
whether it is media sources or policy makers or allies. 
 
But effectively mobilizing thousands of people to take to the streets required time and resources. 
The reason, for example why especially “Stop Watching Us” was able to mobilize a decent amount 
of protestors was that representatives of those coalitions had begun to attend regular meetings 
months before the Snowden leaks were published:  
[W]hen the rallies was happening, the networks on the ground before (…) 
– we had been hosting potluck gatherings (...) for six months before the 
Snowden leaks. And the effort in that organizing phase was very much to 
connect the different pockets of what you might describe as anti-
establishment organizing. (...) Building those relationships, when the 
Snowden leaks happened we were able to tap them.  
 
On the other hand, Interviewee H felt that the turnout for the various “Restore the Fourth” rallies 
was not as significant as for the “Stop Watching Us” because the activists had not planned the 
event in 'meet space'  before. “Restore the Fourth” in contrast, was not “built on established 
preexisting networks [but instead] people who knew the issues, usually plugging in from behind 
a Reddit browser.” 
In theory, activists were very well aware that authorities were afraid of large numbers of 
people on the streets marching for digital rights including privacy issues. For example, 
Interviewees R and S, activists from Eastern Europe acknowledged how the 2014 Hungarian 
Internet tax protests had instilled fear in the region's leaders of a possible outbreak of mass 
unrests. When R and S had exposed that the government of their home country had been 
working quietly on a similar law and released a statement on their website, the law was discreetly 
canceled. The reason was that “they were afraid of the Hungary scenario. (...) [W]e found out 
after[wards] that they have some form of paranoia related to these things. Changes related to 
Internet freedom can bring people onto the streets.” 
Some of the activists whose work was limited to lobby political representatives for privacy 
matters wished there was more pressure from the street to back purely legislative approaches of 
protecting privacy rights. An Australian activist, interviewee G, reminiscing about a campaign 
against domestic data retention, stressed that ideally advocacy work behind the scenes should go 
hand in hand with traditional means of collective action: “I think for a variety of reasons we 
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chose different tactics against [recent] data retention legislation. (...) We certainly did have some 
effect but I think we probably didn't have as much an effect as we wanted and maybe it would 
have been better to have at least some sort more of public protest.” However, due to a lack of 
resources, interviewee G's organization had no intention of making “purely physical campaigns 
(...) a core aspect [of our] campaigning strategy.” 
 Yet, for most activist organizations, while they were convinced that street protest were 
necessary, organizing something in the vein of “Stop Watching Us” required organization skills 
and money – resources that were notoriously scarce. As interviewee A noted:  
[Street protests] are still on the table. It’s a question of resources. It’s a 
different skill set. The skill set definitely exists and is very valid. (...) The 
conservative viewpoint [street actions such as Occupy Wall Street or Black 
Lives Matter] didn’t do anything, they didn’t have any objectives (...) but 
people are on the front lines right now, they are actually getting out and 
doing something and [they] are good at. As for us, we don’t have this skill 
set for our organization.  
 
Interestingly street actions often came at the expense of more traditional advocacy work. Not 
only was there not a single staffer in interviewee A's organization that knew how to rally people 
to take to the streets, organizing such an event would have drained resources for their general 
line of work:  
The question we ask is ‘What can we do to make the biggest impact? ‘ (...) 
[W]e know from the ‘Stop Watching Us’ rally that this is a huge effort (...) 
Could we do that or could we run five campaigns successfully in the EU 
and in Asia or this other place? (…)  When we look at an opportunity we 
look at a portfolio of tools available to us that vary from trying people to 
tweet to actually going to meeting with politicians in Brussels or Capitol 
Hill and talking to them and persuading them directly. So we’re making 
these choices and for us right now in terms of efficiency street protest 
rallies are the least efficient.  
 
Indeed, while rich in symbolic power, street protests in the eyes of many activists, including 
interviewee E, were simply not productive in a cost-benefit analysis:  
[W]e are hyper-focused on efficiency and we only do things if we really 
think they would make a difference in the process that we are working on. 
Doing a protest for [the sake of] doing a protest is something we would 
never do. If we saw that maybe a law proposal would be in a phase where 
we could change that direction by organizing a street protest then we 
would maybe consider doing it. 
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Consequently by late 2015, two and a half years after the initial Snowden revelations, the option 
of launching street protests against surveillance was all but off the table. The consensus was that 
privacy as single-issue would never mobilize a significant number of citizens. For example, 
interviewee P from Europe was not convinced that offline protests would be desirable or able to 
draw large crowds. Even though “there is considerable public concern over privacy issues [and] 
(...) a high level of response to campaigns (...) around the state of surveillance” P did not believe 
in the chance to mobilize people because “it is questionable whether there is sufficient and 
genuine public alarm in sufficient numbers to have people taking it to the streets. (...) I know in 
the US there have been some larger protests, I don’t know about the scale.” 
 Both organizing and participating in offline campaigns against surveillance seemed to be 
increasingly irrational, as interviewee H, noted. The contrast to his fellow activist (interviewee 
H), praising the importance of building physical relationships with other groups, is striking: 
[Street protests are] not a priority for anyone. (...) The scale of 
mobilization is driven by the outreach that precedes it. And outreach is a 
pain in the ass. It takes a lot of time. It doesn't seem lucrative in any 
meaningful sense. If you just do it for its own sake and you don't have a 
particular vision in mind it seems abstract and useless. Why am I going to 
waste my time running around the city meeting with other groups that 
aren't mine to talk to them about their issues and try to create a space for 
them to hear about ours and try to build some space for shared 
collaboration? It is very unglamorous work. (...) Another challenge at a 
similarly macro level are socioeconomic forces (…) Organizing is 
recreation effectively. Where do you find that time when you are working 
three jobs trying to feed your kids? 
 
Some activists, such as interviewee J from Scandinavia, found it to be illusionary to think they 
could mobilize to take people to the streets over the issue of privacy. However, if the privacy 
community would somehow be able to integrate privacy into a larger socio-political context (as 
activists partly had done in the case of “Stop Watching Us”), then it was more likely to happen. 
But given the adoption rate of self-surveillance through the widespread use of social media 
application this was improbable, interviewee J thought:  
[Street protests are] not something that we are focusing on. I think 
surveillance [as a topic] is not really [suited for that]. (...) [W]hat is really 
needed is civil engagement. (…) There are certainly people who are 
seriously concerned about it. But whether that becomes (…) a popular 
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issue, I’m not so sure of. But it would need to show its damaging impact 
on [our] citizens or something for people to emphasize with in order to 
make it real as it were. And I think (…) there is a very blasé attitude 
[towards] privacy in [my country]. (…) I would say the great majority of 
the population is on Facebook. The great majority uses all of these 
platforms that are not safe for private communications. So I think it would 
always be at this point in time a bit of a strange thing to have a protest 
against mass surveillance. 
 
In Eastern Europe, activists, such as interviewee O, did not even think about privacy-related 
street actions for one minute: “No, not at all. (…) We don't believe that there is any chance of 
mobilizing people in that form. If there is any possibility we can probably talk about some online 
mobilization but I don't believe in the possibility of street protests. (...) I don't really see that 
possibility.” Other Eastern European activists, such as interviewees R and S felt the same way. If 
widespread corruption and economic hardship could not bring people to the streets why would 
privacy matters be able to achieve that?  
[W]e don't really believe that there is enough to build anything on the 
streets (in our country] in any area because of the social and economic 
factors and political factors and so on. We have people living really hard 
here related to the economic situation and these conditions don't even 
produce enough reactions to do something on the streets. I think the level 
of problems that we have here are much deeper and I don't think that the 
issue of internet freedom will be one that will bring people to the streets.  
 
That is why their organization had abandoned any attempt at organizing collective action and 
gradually shifted to a legal approach: “[W]e decided that it is not our mission. We have a 
watchdog role, (...) when we see a problem, we start criminal proceedings, or we start strategic 
litigation or start any kind of legal procedure which can put this matter into the public space.” 
 In regions other than Europe and North America not even the Snowden leaks made 
people go to the streets and local privacy activists did not try to spark protests. For example in 
Latin America, a region in which the internet communication of whole populations had been 
monitored by the NSA “[t]here [had not] been any protests because of the Snowden revelations,” 
Interviewee K noted. “And when they revealed here what some part of the government was doing 
here with opposition leaders, journalists, and judges, there was some reaction (…) but never 
physical protests in the streets demanding this or that.” For several reasons, privacy as an issue – 
especially when compared to the economy, jobs, or education – just seemed not to have that 
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appeal:  
I guess [for privacy-related street protests] to happen you have to connect 
that to some broader issue, for example the fact that mass surveillance and 
state surveillance is against the idea of our constitutional state and the 
state of the rule of law. You have to have very concrete cases, which we 
have and still there have not been any protests. As far as I know we haven't 
thought about street protest or that stuff. You know people also feel 
exposed doing that. That is not to say that we don't have protests here. We 
have (...) but [f]or the purpose of demanding more privacy it is not 
happening.  
 
Soon it became clear, why some privacy activists refrained from participating launching street 
protests. When done right, such events represented a great chance to show the outside world a 
unified stance against government surveillance. But the costs of a failed attempt to mobilize 
people had dramatic consequences for the political communication of privacy concerns. Just like 
protests had the potential to strengthen a movement they were also capable of showing the true 
lack of interest, as interviewee E elaborated: “[W]e haven't been sure if we should try [street 
protests] because if there are only twelve people coming it is really hard to afterwards say 'Yeah 
but a lot of people think it is important.' (…) The risk of losing [is too big]. If we announced a big 
street protest, and nobody would come we would risk a lot.” Interviewee H agreed that street 
protests “can very easily be counterproductive to the extent that you host a rally and three people 
show up. It can set you back.” “Street marches”, H admitted, “are flawed because if you don't turn 
people out or if you don't turn out sufficiently diverse numbers or if you can't tie in media 
narratives they really can be counterproductive.” An activist from Germany, interviewee T, had 
experienced precisely such an experience. He had set up a demonstration in front of the former 
German NSA headquarters, which was now run by its German counterpart 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). Germany's biggest TV news show, Tagesschau, had sent 
reporters to cover the event. When only a couple of hundred protestors showed up, however, the 
coverage was “not very positive because they spun it like 'it is noteworthy that people took it to 
the streets but they are only a couple hundreds.' We lost some of our credibility with the media 
that day. Contacts with them declined rapidly afterwards and they never tried to contact me 
again.” 
 Interviewee H went on to share an interesting historical view on the privacy movement 
and their limited affinity for street protests. Not only was there no recent rich history and protest 
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network post-Snowden activist could draw from. But for some people concerned with privacy 
showing up at a public event being filmed by media outlets and police officers was the exact 
opposite of what they were trying to achieve: “[T]he digital rights community (…) [consists of] 
people who are very concerned about their privacy [and are] sometimes be less inclined to be 
around other people, particular work with them. So there is a bit of an existential challenge of 
the digital rights community as it relates to protesting power in meet-space.” Remarkably, one 
activist from an European country effectively declared that street protests were too 'political' for 
his/her organization to be a part of. Staging offline protest events would have clashed with the 
centrist (or apolitical) agenda of interviewee M's organization:  
We are a very small team. (...) Street protests are (...) not really part of 
[our] agenda. (...) [M]ost protests are leftist-type of action. We saw that 
when we protested against the state of emergency or the [national] 
surveillance law. (...) [We don't want] want to be identified [as being] too 
right-wing or too left-wing. (...) Everyone deserves privacy, everyone 
deserves freedom. And at some point getting too leftist is closing doors in 
the more right-wing realms – entrepreneurs, small companies, or bigger 
companies. If you are affiliated with trade unions sometimes it changes 
the way people see us (…) as an NGO. 
 
An interesting perspective on the lack of surveillance-related street protests was offered by a 
interviewee F talking about the situation in the Maghreb. In pre-Arab spring times, dissent had 
been clamped down using sophisticated surveillance technologies and the subsequent 
democratization had been the direct result of street protests. However, since the process of 
democratization was in full effect, street protests as an instrument of social change – including 
against surveillance – were mostly abandoned. The fight for privacy rights now takes place in the 
government and civil society institutions:  
I'll tell you why [there is no potential for street protests]. [W]e have by 
now multi-stakeholder committees which are in charge of all those policy 
issues regarding surveillance, privacy, [and Internet] freedom (...). It will 
contain any kind of protests because we have this open model for our 
governments. I don't think we will have protest regarding surveillance or 
any kind of ICT freedoms [here].787 
                                                 
787 In other African countries people did not take to the streets either but for different reason. In the context of 
authoritarian countries in East Africa anti-surveillance street protests were out of the question. The level of 
surveillance by the police authorities and general laws prohibiting almost any form of gatherings in public places 
made it impossible. As interviewee U elaborated: “If you want to have such fora in Uganda you have to get 
government permission from the police [which] is especially (...) fond of using surveillance tactics. (...) It’s hard 
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Raising awareness online 
What essentially remained, then, as means to raise awareness and reach out to the public were 
online campaigns. One activist, interviewee Q, suggested that dismissive media coverage of 
demonstrations and a lack of concerned citizens taking to the streets de facto demanded to focus 
on online campaigns. This, however, in turn endangered the cohesiveness of the privacy 
community because it alienated more traditional activists with an expertise in offline contention:  
We have not in fact done very much street protest work (…). And that is 
conscious strategy because we are aware of how the U.S. media tends to 
react to protests. Often the coverage is limited. Often the coverage is 
hostile. The main thing that they focus on is the size of the crowd and 
whether it is bigger or smaller than the size of previous crowds. In the 
place where we are three years out from the surveillance revelations' 
beginning it is unlikely in our judgement that we will be able to reproduce 
something that was similar or bigger than Stop Watching Us which in turn 
would mean that media coverage would be more likely to be negative. So 
what we have focused on has been more legislative and policy advocacy, 
more work at the local level to pass surveillance oversight ordinance, and 
more work on the litigation side and supporting online campaigns – 
making sure what is articulated around surveillance embodies the 
concerns of a wide spectrum of people, politically diverse, ethnically and 
religiously diverse. (…) In that sense 'The Day We Fight Back' faded in well 
with this change of direction but of course that doesn't mean that having 
only online campaigns or only campaigns that are focused around 
encryption or tech issues would be a valid way to do this. If we were to do 
this then we would lose of our coalition and a lot of the resonance of the 
issue because you are back to only the people who cared deeply about 
tech. 
 
Some of the activists who were involved in “The Day We Fight Back” or “Reset the Net” were 
enthusiastic about the potential of such online only campaigns. Interviewee I described them as 
“a grassroots social movement but it is not like the ones you have seen before. It is something 
new and we're coming to kick your ass.” Activists insisted that organizing such events was as 
complex and demanding as setting up a street march. In terms of framing online protest events 
may be not as specific, diverse and detailed as speeches and signs at offline rallies but they were 
able to reach potentially millions of people with simple, inclusive frames. The notion that online 
campaigns were ineffective and simplified was strongly rejected by activists involved, like 
interviewee I:  
                                                                                                                                                                       
to engage people in action in East Africa (…) in particular. It’s not really likely to happen soon.” 
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The other critique I hear of these online campaigns is like 'oh it is just 
clicktivism' or 'it is just the easy way to do activism'. I can tell you that 
there is nothing easy about getting tens of thousands of websites to do 
something or getting these campaigns out. It takes a tremendous amount 
of work the same way – having organized both protests on the ground 
with thousands of people and large protests online for millions of people – 
they both took a huge amount of work. It is just a different kind of work 
and both can have a huge impact, it is only a different type of impact. I 
don't think one is better than the other. They are just different tactics that 
are important for people to keep themselves open to. There is a degree to 
which we need lots of different currents of messaging. When it comes to 
online campaigns the goal is usually to come out with the broadest 
message possible to make the biggest umbrella that as many people as 
possible can get underneath.  
 
In addition, protests conducted online had greater chances of uniting privacy groups from 
around the world. Even when those campaigns had no real effect on policy and were “merely 
symbolic,” they at least demonstrated transnational solidarity. Thus interviewee J praised “efforts 
that have maybe a 150 different groups around the globe. (…) I think it’s important when it’s a 
global matter. (…) If it is global in intent, then that it is only strengthening (…) civil society 
operators from across the globe.” Yet as he pointed out, online activism had many of the same 
pitfalls as offline actions, namely if they failed to mobilize a number of participants the media 
and authorities deemed worthy. Regarding the collection of online signatures or emails to 
politicians, which were at the heart of many such campaigns, J noted that  
the only instances where I think any kind of efforts like that doesn’t 
produce the desired result is when its ill prepared. (...) If you do that pretty 
haphazardly and you don’t advertise it well but somehow people notice it 
but somehow it doesn’t pick up pace and it doesn’t get traction so maybe 
there a few signatures and then it is left and then people kind of read into 
that then [a pro-surveillance politician] could say ‘look at that petition 
there is hardly anyone that is signing it – my position is strong.’ 
 
Some privacy activists struggled with the notion that online campaigns could ultimately replace 
traditional organization on the ground.788 Especially after two offline campaigns, “Restore the 
Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us,” the shift towards internet protests felt different in terms of 
                                                 
788 One activist, interviewee N, reflecting on his/her past involvement in privacy-related online campaigns, noted 
the absurdity of having dissent against the surveillance regime take place within the highly monitored realm of 
social media. The reasons relatively few internet users participated in such campaigns was that “people have 
started to realize that if you say something or a comment is tributed to you online [they have to face] the court of 
public opinion, the court of social media. People are afraid to speak out.” 
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tangibility and sense of community, as activist B noted: “I have (...) supported [The Day We Fight 
Back] online in my own capacity. But I could tell you that it was not the same feeling, you know? 
You don't get the same rush of energy you get when you are out on the street.” When the primary 
mode of contention after “Stop Watching Us” shifted from marches in the streets to posting web 
banners, activists, such as interviewee H were disappointed:  
There is a discourse with (...) about the extent to which social media 
facilitate revolutions. There are very effective tools for sharing information 
but no social media platform is going to drive a million people into the 
streets. And the projection of more than merely influence, the projection 
of power that groups in meet space can project - there is no digital 
equivalent. The closes thing to it I think we have ever seen was the 
SOPA/PIPA blackout and I think 'The Day We Fight Back' was aspired to 
that but didn't reach that.  
 
Sure, “[o]nline campaigns are great for spreading information (...) particularly important when 
traditional media are not sufficiently engaged,” interviewee H concluded, reflecting on the Arab 
Spring. “But (...) it doesn't itself force attention in the same way that meet space resistance can.” 
 Interviewee E, an activist from Europe, made a distinction between good and bad online 
campaigns against surveillance. Positive examples included campaigns where participants had to 
actually engage on a discursive level with the issue at hand while negative ones required users 
merely to passively agree to a motion formulated by the advocacy organization in charge: “A few 
years ago [you would ask] people to send an email to representatives for example. And now 
because it has been done so many times it loses it effects so you have to find new ways. People are 
getting cynical about ‘clicktivisim.’” However, citing an online consultation promoted by their 
organizations, where citizens had to voice their opposition to surveillance measures in their own 
words, had been highly effective. Thus interviewee E believed “that these online campaigns 
which are completely different from 'Like' or 'Don't Like' and just click a button (...) can be very 
meaningful.” Interviewee P, going a step further, dismissed the notion of fundamental differences 
between both modes of contention:  
I personally don’t make a great distinction between online and offline 
protest. I think activism has grown, evolved, matured into being fluidly 
both offline and online and over the last two years rather than us thinking 
about online and offline campaigns. The best campaigns have very much 
been organized through online and offline action. I find it somewhat 
arbitrary to separate the two and both can be very impactful. 
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For interviewee O online campaigns against surveillance were merely symbolic. In O’s view it was 
illusionary to think that they had any impact regarding the improvement of privacy laws. The 
only reason to participate in such events was to raise awareness about the existence of one's 
organization, interviewee O implied:  
'The Day We Fight Back' [was] about communication, raising awareness 
about the issue by mobilizing people to click 'I like it' 'I share it' – nothing 
more than that. It is not engaging people in saying 'No, I object' or signing 
petition that can have some legal impact. (...) Sometimes we do this kind 
of symbolic actions but I don't see them as having direct impact on 
politics. I guess I'm trying to say that I cannot think of online campaigns 
that would translate into direct impact on how the political agenda is 
shaped or on the law itself. I much more believe in direct lobbying or legal 
actions (…). When we think of internet campaigns we think of them as a 
tool of communication – nothing more than that. Doing something online, 
having people clicking on that simply helps you to go to the media, get 
across the media and raise awareness of other people. Nothing more than 
that. 
 
Activist O then went on to downplay their own role in the “The Day We Fight Back” accordingly: 
“I think on 'The Day We Fight Back' we simply communicated [what we do] to the NGOs 
community. We probably worked with media. We send something to the media. (…). At least I 
don't remember that we did something more.” 
 Some activists, such as interviewees R and S from Eastern Europe had a realistic, if not 
cynical view on the potentials of online campaigns – one of the reasons why they had decided to 
abandon traditional activism and focus on behind the scenes work: “Let us start from this 
perspective,” R and S explained,  
We live in a very dysfunctional political system. So we are living in a 
country where you have one political party which is in power and then you 
have the president of that party who is the prime minister who practically 
controls the government, the parliament, and most of the judiciary. We 
don't have the rule of law. And we don't have institutions which are able to 
battle all these kinds of things. And we don't have political parties which 
are dealing with the real issues. We don't have functional democracy. In 
this stage of non-functional democracy it is really hard to believe that we 
can change something by putting a lot of signatures on some paper or 
some online platform and influence the policy-makers. 
 
Whether online or offline – if there remained a meaningful distinction between the two – 
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activists struggled with the lack of “political will to do anything about [surveillance] right now” 
as interviewee D put it. The privacy community, it seemed, had not yet found a recipe against 
indifference and ignorance. Neither online or offline campaigns for privacy resonated with a 
large parts of the citizenry. Ultimately, in the words of activist D, “no matter how clever a thing 
you do, there is just not enough people that are interested enough to amplify it very effectively.” 
 
5.6 Anti-surveillance Iconography and 1984 Metaphors 
In line with a visual turn in the communication practices of social movement organizations and 
surveillance (see section 3.1) activists were constantly searching for new sets of symbols to 
visualize the dangers of surveillance. Because privacy remained an abstract, intangible concept, I 
also inquired in my interviews about their assessments of the iconographical side of anti-
surveillance protests. At street protests such as “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” the 
display of protest art – along with the speeches and chants of participants – had been the most 
important communicative marker of the overall framing. Similarly, online protest events such as 
“The Day We Fight Back” or “Reset the Net” have relied even more so on visual aspects to get 
their point across – for example through web site blackouts, social media banners, or memes.  
 Overall, the activists that were interviewed were very aware of the importance of visual 
cues in their communication work yet struggled with existing iconographical representations of 
pro-privacy sentiments. Even though literature and popular culture offered a rich repertoire of 
references, it seemed that activists were still trying to find new ways to make surveillance more 
tangible during campaigns.789 While it was impossible to measure the success rate of visual 
media in regard to mobilizing constituents, the privacy community has collectively thought 
about improving and reinventing their iconography since the Snowden have been published. 
 If they have the resources, some activist groups have hired 'visual advocates' and designers 
                                                 
789 Only two of the activists, interviewee O, claimed not to work with images at all, rather focusing on narratives 
than imagery: “We don't have special iconography. (...) Graphics is not a major thing we would use in our 
communication. We probably use similar patterns. I cannot think of any particular iconography. We try to use 
case studies (...) that show how surveillance translates into lives of people. Because there is discrimination, 
exclusion, affect dignity, freedom to move whatever. It is mostly in our case by building narratives and stories 
based on facts (...) that happened to people and not only to terrorists but so called normal people.” Interviewee 
M admitted that he had never at lengths thought about the anti-surveillance imagery that was taken for granted: 
“We try [to come up with something new]. (...) [Basically] privacy iconography is [concerned] with keys, shields, 
locks - generally speaking secrets. When people see that they know what we are speaking about but I'm not sure 
if it is the best. I really have no idea. We should make a market study of that.” 
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with whom communication staffers are in close contact. The biggest challenge lies in creating 
relevant and lasting images that are able to attract global interest in the issues of surveillance and 
privacy. Especially in the social media ecosystem this can be a daunting task as interviewee A 
explained:  
I think language [and visuals are] super important. (...) We are often just 
brainstorming online by email [with the visual advocate] about what we 
think might work. It's something we are constantly reevaluating. There is 
no golden ticket. People's online (...) attention spans are really short. So 
you can have a hit and it's really popular and then if you run it the next day 
nobody cares. We are constantly trying to figure out how to describe 
things better, innovate and we watch what our partner organizations are 
doing what works for them. Especially in an international context it is 
really hard because it is weird – the things that seem to take off in Europe 
(...) are completely different from what works in the U.S. They are not 
popular at all in Europe but they work in the U.S. (...). A lot of times 
peoples seem to just care about different things. We just never assume that 
a tweet for the U.S will work in Europe. And then it usually doesn't 
anyways. 
 
In the same way, Interviewee H stressed the importance of protest art for the anti-privacy 
community. For example H praised “Stop Watching Us” for bringing thousands of people 
together not only to present to the public a unified anti-surveillance crowd but also because of 
the opportunity to display protest art work: “[O]ne of the other things (…) that was really exciting 
about the 'Stop Watching Us'-campaign was the use of visuals. It was a very visually impactful 
demonstration and that was not necessarily true for the other ones.” In fact, anti-surveillance 
protests, as interviewee H readily admitted, posed greater challenges when it came to visually 
mobilize people. These campaigns, by relying almost exclusively on online artwork and images 
would, in the worst case scenario, only simulate a campaign instead of bringing people together:  
Compelling visuals that are media worthy [are difficult] and I think social 
media campaigns that have worked around crowd sourced visuals – 'tweet 
yourself holding a sign says XYZ' (...) are attempts to circumvent that 
challenge, that tension. But they only go so far, particularly because it 
reduces social movements to visuals, to [merely visual] demonstrations of 
dissent as opposed to the thing itself. 
 
In general, activists felt that citizens were very receptive for popular culture infused anti-
surveillance frames given the abundance of movies and books depicting dystopian futures in 
which surveillance apparatus are out of control – “utopian projections and predictions of 
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algorithmic futures determining our lives,” as interviewee H described them.790 While overall 
“the culture has not responded in a way that we would have liked in terms of having a sustained 
discourse (...) there is some really compelling (stuff) in film and TV depictions,” which “have 
been very influential in helping cultivate a discourse.”  
 
Orwellian Images 
Naturally, 1984-type iconography and metaphors came to mind when activists discussed anti-
surveillance imagery.791 There was disagreement among the interviewees as to whether 1984 was 
the apt framing device to describe and analyze current NSA surveillance. For interviewee L, “1984 
by George Orwell was spot-on. We're in the midst of the book, we're in the midst of the book. 
That was the blueprint and they are following it to a tee.”792 Based on his experience as an 
organizer and being under constant police surveillance L believed he was living in a totalitarian 
surveillance regime as depicted in the book.793 
For others the reality of mass surveillance was much more complex than images and 
metaphors could illustrate. Still for the sake of simplifying the message and reduce complexity, 
                                                 
790 Interestingly one of the most discussed anti-surveillance frames in popular culture that was frequently discussed 
by privacy activists was an interview the British comedian John Oliver did with Edward Snowden where he in 
particular discussed the fact that intelligence agencies had collected thousands of images of the private parts of 
internet and smart phone users. As interviewee J put it: “I thought when John Oliver did that, first of all he 
connects with people because people like him. And then he did the thing with the dick picks and people can 
relate to it to a degree; at least a certain part of the public could understand ‘Uhh this could have happened to 
me’. And I think it just made [surveillance] a bit more real.” 
791 In non-western contexts, '1984' did not work as well. For example in Tunisia, the equivalent to 'Big Brother' was 
ammar404, the now infamous internet censorship authority in pre-Arab Spring times, named after the 404 Not 
Found error message displayed when a internet user follows a broken or dead link. After the end of the 
authoritarian rule of the Ben Ali regime (and the creation of a new NSA-like agency) the hashtag was changed to 
a2t. 
792 The only problem L had was with the term 'Big Brother': “It [is not] my brother. It should be big step brother.” 
793 Authorities monitored even relatively minor instances of protest, as L illustrated with the following anecdote: 
“We organized an [anti-NSA protest event on July 4th, 2013]. All right, that was the plan. Now that afternoon 
when I arrived at [my office] to launch the [event] I was immediately greeted by two detectives, four undercovers, 
six squad cars and about two or more three cyclists. It was about 9 or 10 cops at my [office] when I arrived. When 
I got out my car they came to me and I’m like ‘Oh shit’ and [the detective] said: “Are you [name of interviewee L]” 
“Yes” “I’m detective so and so. We’re here to escort you on your [protest event].” I laughed “Who the f--- invited 
you?”  They said “We’re here to make sure that you guys [go] through the streets safely.” Now, I’ve been doing 
festivals in the city for ten years prior to the event. I know how much it costs to pay for police. To shut down a 
street and sit on their ass in their car off duty making time and a half for a minimum of four hours. I know what 
that costs. Thousands of dollars and that’s for two cops and I had ten. And I didn’t ask for them. And I didn’t 
request them. And I didn’t provide any information to them. All I did was post invitations online. And they 
showed up. That’s surveillance. They showed up here to let me know that we’re watching you dude. And thought I 
was going to be intimidated. And all they did was make me go harder. Because I’m like now I got your attention.” 
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interviewees R and S accepted the current reliance on a set of Orwellian images – even if they 
personally could not stand them anymore:  
[When our] research [is] published by [magazines] they are [usually 
using] (...) photos to illustrate the story and most the time in the photo 
you have a guy who [is wearing a] hoodie. That is one photo. And another 
photo is an eye; sometimes you have these matrix-like numbers. And these 
are the three main pictures that are there probably when you google 
something on images (...). But I think reality is not like this. There are lots 
of different levels. So on the level of representation of reality you should 
not have these guys with the hoodies because probably they are not 
wearing hoodies, they are wearing some kind of business suites and like 
sitting in really fancy offices and so on. On the other side I really cannot 
stand this 'eye'-thing anymore. In some way I like (…) Orwell books and all 
of these things. I think it gives some kind of new relations to the thing. It 
is maybe overused for the moment. I don't think it is so bad. (...) I think it 
is normal. People need to find a common visual or story element, even if 
I'm sick of it. 
 
For a lack of better alternatives activists settled with 1984-metaphors and images because “it is 
natural to link [resistance to surveillance] to certain literary works,” interviewee B explained,  
It is natural because the people who are working in this field have read 
those books when they were younger. So it's a thing they can rely on and 
use to communicate different aspects of the negative implications of this. I 
cannot really criticize it. I can understand it. I still think there are more 
communications angles or iconography to use. 
 
Yet other activists, refrained from engaging 1984-iconographical references or visual imagery at 
all because they were afraid to distort their core message. The same reasons that make literary 
and visual framing attractive for some activists – their ability to generate individual 
interpretations and inspire discourse – have lead others to not use them. For instance, 
interviewee C was very careful not to alienate potential sympathizers with analogies and images 
they were not familiar with. Although Orwell's work is widely known, interviewee C noted, 1984-
inspired analogies were far from truly understood and would only work for  
a specific set of people that have read the books and know how the 
analogy works. I don’t think it’s a strategy that we use or will be using 
because we try to approach people in a most clear way we can. (...) It 
depends on what we publish and who we are targeting. For example, if we 
target everybody, [all] citizens [then] we try to be clear in our message and 
not use analog[ies] they won’t understand. Because then the message 
won’t be effective.  
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Although interviewee C did not “have a problem with [1984 analogies]” the activist thought it 
was overused and people were tired of hearing of it. Calling the NSA 'Big Brother' was “almost 
played out.” Rather than communicating a clear stance against surveillance these framing devices 
provided more questions than answers:  
I think we can come up with new strategies to communicate that resonate 
better with citizens who haven’t read the books or they have no context in 
which the analogy works – I mean, who is Big Brother apart from the 
[reality] TV show for example? How do I link it with how it affects the 
issue with my personal life? So I think we as activists can come up with 
better ideas and in [of] how we can approach citizens and each individual 
actor.  
 
Interviewee G noted that 1984 was not only confusing for people who were not familiar with the 
book but actually misleading as it was describing surveillance in totalitarian societies modeled 
after Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. What these grim metaphors seemed to imply was that 
surveillance was an indispensable part of authoritarian regimes, but what Western privacy 
activists had to realize was that surveillance also went hand in hand with regimes, generally 
considered to be free. Thus,  
the 1984 metaphor it is not really too appropriate for western democracies. 
(...) We are quite pleased with the basic metaphor behind our campaign 
because surveillance might be necessary sometimes doesn't mean it 
should be applied to everybody. It would really help to have better 
metaphors and stories to make the privacy message accessible to the 
general public. Some of those issues though are very complicated. (...) 
[T]his sort of prevailing 1984 image goes a little bit too far but most people 
don't take it seriously and we need ideas and metaphors that show the 
danger without implying that the privacy invasion is always associated 
with restrictive authoritarian state. 
 
Interestingly interviewee G was the only activist who voiced concern about the use of literary and 
popular culture references in general, thinking that fictitious portrayals of mass surveillance 
would ultimately lead to undermining the real issue at stake: “There have been quite a few films 
and things that have talked about it, where the image of the covert authoritarian state will hunt 
down dissidents is actually strong. There have been a lot of mainstream action films. It just 
seems to be that this theme is not taken too seriously as a metaphor.” Others expressed doubt, 
whether 1984 metaphors were able to reach younger audiences. As interviewee N stated:  
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These are good metaphors. The older generation still has some memory of 
World War II, East Germany, West Germany, Russia. [But] they are dying 
off or their memories are gone. History has not been taught in the 
intervening years to the degree where the younger generations even are 
aware of their history or that world history. So (...) '1984' - I don't know if 
it means a lot to a lot of people – which is unfortunate. 
 
Searching for a new Anti-Surveillance Imagery 
Some activists, such as interviewee E were disappointed with the lack of more fitting imagery 
other than the existing, 1984-heavy iconography. Often times, when publishing online texts and 
images went hand in hand, and a lack resources and ideas prevented messages from being 
disseminated widely:  
This is very frustrating. We are working too much in text only. (...)The 
images that we use are not good enough. This is one of the things I would 
like to change (...). Also try to use more video and everything but because 
it is so more complex and takes so much more time that we have (...). But 
if something happens now we want to write a blog post within an hour 
and you don't have time to ask somebody to make a nice image. [That is) 
the problem indeed. Our issues are so not tangible – the only pictures we 
know are of cameras. 
 
Similarly, interviewee J found 1984 analogies not drastically enough to really demonstrate the 
potential abuses of surveillance in real life. Rather “it would be quite interesting to see someone 
frame it through having everything you do being exposed. Whether that is through very 
interesting infomercials or a particular campaign or whatever but I’m sure there is way to frame it 
in a way that connects more with people.” 
 The most distinguished and radical critique of using Orwellian imagery and analogies was 
voiced by interviewee P. P’s organization actively avoided using 1984 inspired visuals because it 
was counterproductive:  
I think we need to get a lot better than this as a sector. (…) We don’t talk 
about George Orwell and I think that is a good thing. Because I think the 
Orwell concept even though we privately say to each other ‘Wow he was 
really on it, he really considered this’, we don’t say that publicly. It’s not a 
message that will resonate. It makes us look paranoid. It’s a message that 
people reject. If you read the book or if you have seen the film of it the 1984 
that Orwell predicted is an extremely tangibly, bleak place. And that isn’t 
what modern surveillance has created. What modern surveillance has done 
is something altogether more insidious than the 1984-model of 
surveillance. It really is quite invisible and extremely subtle. And it does 
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enable people to get on with their daily lives in a way they couldn’t in 1984. 
So in all kinds of ways it’s very different to 1984. The metaphor is rejected 
for some understandable reasons because modern day surveillance doesn’t 
feel like 1984 surveillance.  
 
In fact, P’s organization was in the process of creating a new anti-surveillance symbol that would 
resonate with audiences around the world and improve on the many shortcomings of the 
existing 'dark' and 'paranoid' privacy iconography:  
We are currently devising a new iconography. (...) What we don’t have now 
in our space is a counterpoint to the anonymous mask, (...) the Guy 
Fawkes mask. The anonymous mask represents the individual versus the 
states. There isn’t a similar image which is the state vs. the individual – 
what that looks like, who that is – a representation, an icon, a picture, a 
face. We don’t have that. (...) It’s not a dark or evil – I don’t think that 
states are necessarily evil and those kinds of tropes that you see in 
iconography about an all seeing spec. I don’t think that is how they see 
things. (…) I think the public rejects metaphors that imply that states have 
some evil intention. That kind of messaging only for works for certain 
segments of the population who are already distrustful of governments, 
even western governments. We fundamentally trust western governments. 
Yes [citizens] might see that there are problems. Yes, they may see 
elements of corruption. Yes they may see elements of states overreach. But 
they don’t fundamentally see states, or western states, as being corrupt or 
evil. The kind of messaging that our organization uses don’t resonate with 
that because we would inadvertently represent the state as something far 
more evil than the public accepts than they are.  
 
5.7 The Snowden Effect 
Clearly, the release of classified NSA documents by former contractor Edward Snowden in the 
summer of 2013 marked a turning point for privacy activists and impacted their communication 
strategies. As was shown in the case studies section, the emergence of Snowden as a 
whistleblower/activist on the anti-surveillance scene had three concrete effects on the political 
communication work of privacy advocates. First, by exposing secret government spying 
programs, Snowden confirmed the excesses of government (and corporate) surveillance, activists 
had been concerned with and warned against for years. Thus, in theory, the Snowden leaks made 
the public more receptive towards the issue of privacy and the activist work surrounding it. There 
is no doubt that Snowden has reinvigorated the privacy activist community in terms of relevance, 
funding, and purpose. For many organizations the Snowden leaks functioned as a rallying cry to 
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organize people on the ground. The leaks were a catalyst for months and years of preceding grass 
roots works behind the scenes. Now, as the political opportunity window was open they had to 
act. Looking back at June, 2013 interviewee I reminisced about the immediate reactions of 
his/her organization to the published NSA documents:  
I certainly remember the first Snowden revelations from before we knew it 
was Edward Snowden. At [my organization] we kind of were always 
keeping an eye on the news and what is happening and we talked about 
stuff that we wanted. It became clear from those initial stories (...) that 
there was something major in the process of happening but I don't think 
anyone realized just how huge it was going to be or exactly what was about 
to happen. But right away we sort of jumped on it and we were running 
campaigns and emails, starting right away (...). What's interesting is for a 
while for people this was like the first moment that they had thought 
about mass government surveillance. But we already had been actively 
working on these issues for years (…) and just being in this space.  
 
Secondly, Snowden himself framed the struggle against government surveillance along the lines 
of his personal beliefs and gave the fight for privacy a human face – which, as was shown in the 
case studies chapter, was readily used by organizers. Quickly Snowden, despite (or because) 
being exiled from the Western world, became a larger-than-life celebrity that has frequently 
appeared in television shows, was the subject of books, and even an Oliver Stone-directed 
Hollywood movie. Clearly, his initially voiced resolution of merely providing the public with 
information, were soon abandoned. Snowden became in many ways aligned with the privacy 
activist community.  
Thirdly, the Snowden leaks were not only a chance for activists to finally rally a highly 
sensitized public but also a test – if the immense scope of the revelations about the gigantic 
global surveillance apparatus provided by Snowden was not enough to raise awareness for privacy 
and push for legislative change – what else was left there? After all, in 2005, there had been 
similar revelations, albeit smaller in scope, exposing the collaboration between 
telecommunications companies and the U.S. government that were largely ignored, as 
interviewee A remembered. Back then  
it felt like a much smaller community. I think [government surveillance] 
came up every once in a while. I think [revelations about surveillance 
under the Bush administration] blew up and then kind of went away. And 
I think it was a kind of lonely idealized conversation that made a lot of 
sense and constitutional lawyers (…) really fought hard for but it didn’t 
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feel like it had really entered the public’s imagination. The Snowden 
revelations – and there is no question, you can even see there are [experts 
on privacy] who are now media celebrities, (...) now on CNN once a week. 
So you got these new voices who are elevated to take part in this 
conversation. People are being pulled on. It is part of the conversation (…) 
[and] on the whole it has been really great for the privacy advocates that 
they are taken seriously. 
 
The Snowden leaks as a political opportunity 
Years of organizing now seemed to finally pay off. The Snowden leaks not only put a spotlight on 
global surveillance but also on the network of privacy activists fighting against it:  
[T]he networks that ultimately enabled 'Restore the Fourth' and the 'Stop 
Watching Us'-rally preceded the Snowden leaks. (...) The Snowden leaks 
were in June and [‘Stop Watching Us’] was in October and in the 
immediate wake of the Snowden leaks there was [‘Restore the Fourth’] – 
this happens with every large news cycle, where the observers or 
communities who have not been very engaged in the issues come to the 
issues. And [as a result of] organizing sometimes (…) new channels get 
carved. (...) Building on those relationships, when the Snowden leaks 
happened – we were able to tap them. 
 
When the whistleblower responsible for the leaks revealed his identity to the public, it motivated 
digital rights activists even more in making privacy their top priority. The video of Snowden 
sitting in a hotel room in Hong Kong, filmed by documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras, and 
published on the website of The Guardian can be considered as one of the greatest moments in 
anti-surveillance political communication:  
[O]nce the video came out of Snowden himself talking about why he did 
what he did and what it really meant, I remember we watched the videos 
as a group or watched them one after another and then came together and 
talked about it and it was just super obvious to us that this is going to be a 
watershed moment in history. We needed to go all in and just make this 
our main issue (…). We're a small team so it is very difficult for us to work 
on three different things at once so we definitely made a conscious 
decision in the wake of Snowden like 'this is the moment for surveillance.' 
 
Activists, such as interviewee L, made clear that without Snowden – and what many observers 
felt was his personal sacrifice – there would have never been any large protests against 
government surveillance:  
Make no mistake about it – it was because of Edward Snowden that this 
had happened. (...) It was a hot topic. It happened at the right time. (...) I 
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think this is one of the things that mystify our government because they 
had given Edward Snowden this ridiculous amount of money to be in 
Hawaii with a beautiful girlfriend on the beach and he threw all of this 
away to tell the truth. They still are trying to figure out why he did this. 
(...) So hats off again to Edward Snowden for the fact we wouldn’t have this 
conversation.  
 
The timing for the publication of the leaks was impeccable because they seemed to confirm a 
general sense of unease about the state of politics that went beyond the issues of privacy or 
surveillance. Interviewee J from Scandinavia explained the immense impact of the Snowden 
documents by placing them in a general context of 'crisis' Western societies have been facing 
since the late of 2000s:  
The exposures by the journalists who got the documents from Edward 
Snowden have certainly shifted public opinion in [my country] and 
certainly globally. I would think that it does fit with the general demand 
which emerged (...) following the economic collapse of transparency and 
to some degree in business. (...) I think the window of opportunity was 
already open before the Snowden exposures and I think that happened 
during the economic collapse when people felt they had been defrauded 
and there was a sort of strong connection between business and politics 
and it created this vacuum (...). I don’t think that would have happened if 
there hadn’t been a great sort of lack of trust in parliament and in any sort 
of apparatus that has great power. 
 
Interviewee O also stressed the importance of the Snowden leaks. Not only did the leaks fuel 
public discourse about privacy but they also initiated legislative processes:  
[I]t was very meaningful because the topic (...) changed positions (...) 
from almost non-existing on the political and media agenda to something 
with very high priority. At least in terms of media coverage and the ability 
to discuss it with politicians (…) was extremely helpful because finally 
surveillance was in every public debate. (…) It was very meaningful in 
terms of politics and legal safeguards we were fighting for. 
 
What was equally important was that the revelations had not only raised awareness but also 
freed the surveillance discourse from a realm of conspiracy theories. Snowden had retroactively 
validated years of privacy advocacy work which was always on the verge of not being taken 
seriously:  
We kind of would sound paranoid when we talk[ed] about these kinds of 
things, states spying on us – they would call us paranoid before Snowden. 
But over the last three years this has been a real opportunity for us to talk 
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about surveillance and not in a paranoid way but in such a way that our 
narratives been able to move on to talking about holding states 
accountable. Prior to Snowden they didn’t have to be accountable. It was 
us making claims about state intrusion into privacy without much to go 
on, not getting a lot of public traction as opposed to post-Snowden when 
what we were doing is getting governments to be more accountable 
because we know now what they are doing. They can’t simply have a nerve 
to neither confirm nor deny approach. (...) It has changed the narrative.  
 
Similarly interviewees R and S stressed the heightened degree of legitimacy their work had 
gained because of Snowden: “On another level I think all of those suspicions that we had in our 
community in terms of researching surveillance or privacy issue became reality. We finally have 
facts and it is not just the facts that can be used in public communication but what is more 
important is that these facts are now also used for legal cases.” 
Thus, the Snowden leaks helped privacy activists especially in regard to their political 
communication and getting their message spread in the media. Prior to Snowden, privacy and 
surveillance were treated in the media primarily as technology issues whereas the scope of the 
NSA revelations made these political issues. All of the sudden privacy – and the organizations 
which were advocating for it – were featured in talk shows and on the political opinion pages of 
newspapers. Journalists were eager to learn about the technological and political side of 
surveillance (for the degrees of their eventual expertise see section 5.2) and became far more 
receptive towards the work of privacy activists, as interviewee E explained: 
[You would have these generational conflicts within media outlets – 
between the older journalists [who] would not really know how to use 
technology and have not much affection with it and the younger ones who 
[had not been] really taken seriously. The Snowden leaks helped the 
editors understand that 'ok we need people who understand this because 
apparently it is very important'. 
 
Interviewees R and S agreed that Snowden had dramatically improved their access to the media. 
All of the sudden, the expertise of privacy advocates became indispensable to journalists and 
politicians to understand surveillance related matters:  
One really interesting example was in 2012: our commissioner for data 
protection published a report about how the different government 
organizations are accessing meta-data related to the mobile internet 
service providers. And basically (...) no one was able to (...) understand the 
impact of that. Now, after the Snowden revelations, on one side the 
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general public and the other side also (...) experts in the field are really 
helping (...) to better understand the complex mechanisms and situations 
that are behind all of these stories. [Snowden has been] really important. 
 
Because of their global scope, the Snowden revelations also fostered the need for transnational 
cooperation, as interviewee C noted. For C the leaks were a “key event in the history of privacy 
advocates” and demonstrated the need to reach out to international partners:  
I think it made us have stronger relations with international organizations 
to work together in campaigns and to look at the subject on a more global 
scale. That was a positive, mind-opening event for all of us to try to work 
more globally and have an impact on a global scale. Regarding [our home 
country] – on a national level I’d say it didn’t have as much impact as I 
liked (...) but it did shine some light on how as a nation you have to 
protect yourself against other nations.  
 
Interviewee K, an activist also from Latin America, seconded the notion that the main benefit of 
the Snowden leaks were that they created global attention for the privacy community. Whereas 
the news cycle in K’s home country continued to be dominated by domestic political scandals, 
the leaks nevertheless connected the organization to a network of international privacy advocacy 
groups: “Snowden of course was important because in one way it put us in the position that we 
can participate in the international community with the same problems that Snowden has 
shined light on. So we can say we have surveillance too. (…) [Now] we can talk [to] the 
international community.”  
 Again, the situation was dramatically different in the context of the “Global South”. For 
example, in East Africa, the Snowden revelations had no other impact than connecting local 
initiatives to the global network of privacy advocacy groups. Domestically, however, the issue was 
deliberately ignored. In the country of Interviewee U, surveillance – as exposed by Edward 
Snowden for the Western world – had been in place for decades. Thus, given this repressive 
environment, U’s organization could not benefit from the Snowden leaks in any meaningful way:  
We are facing a government that is not [responsive], the officials in the 
government don't seem to understand to... first of all, and there are no 
clear conversations on the issues in regard to the results of the [Snowden] 
reports. (...) There are many people who have tried to go to parliament and 
get the attention of parliament but even members of parliament who are 
sitting on the committee for national security are not ready to listen to us. 
They are saying, “You guys, you are trying to bend our national security” 
and we are saying 'why don't you talk about international protests, why 
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don't you talk about the resolution of the United Nations?' (…) So the 
entire public service really gets quiet when you talk about these reports. 
 
While all interviewees stressed the importance of Snowden for their communication work, 
activist P offered the sole counterintuitive assessment. Paradoxically, now that the truth about 
the reach of the surveillance regime had been exposed and the initial wave of outrage had died 
away, it had also reduced the odds of ever mobilizing large parts of the global populace against 
mass surveillance, P suggested. Thus the leaks were not only a gift but also a curse:  
I think in some ways the revelations had an unintended consequences. 
They backfired in a sense. In that what Edward Snowden told us in 2013 
was in effect 'you all have been spied on in the last 12 years, your data has 
been scooped up without your permission, they have been watching you.' 
Now, on the one hand that has alarmed a lot of people in the public. But 
actually I think that consciously or indeed unconsciously the revelations 
backfired because what was really communicated was well ‘we have been 
spied on for the last 12 years, well, I haven’t noticed, it doesn’t have an 
impact on me (…) the police haven’t come knocking on my door, it hasn’t 
had any impact on my day-to-day life but actually the revelations have 
actually reinforced what the intelligence agencies and police say, ‘We’re 
not interested in you, we’re not interested in innocent people whatsoever.' 
 
Eventually, my questions about the effect of the Snowden leaks for communicating resistance 
against surveillance led to a damning evaluation by P of the shortcomings of the general post-
Snowden communication strategy. This included relying on a 'privacy for the sake of privacy'-
approach that did not seem to resonate with citizens:  
[W]e haven’t done enough of our job as a sector of being able to illustrate 
the harm of surveillance to go beyond the inherent harm that we see, the 
inherent intrinsic of surveillance is 'what right do they have to watch us?' 
So that ends up becoming somewhat an abstract and even philosophical 
argument about our relationships with the state. As in we argue 
[government institutions have] no right to interfere with [our data]; it 
doesn’t matter if they are not doing anything with it (...) that doesn’t make 
it ok.' Now that becomes a subtle point in public campaigning because the 
governments' narratives resolve around terrorism, serious crime etc. And 
when you have very real tangible reasons why you need state surveillance 
how should someone [support] abstract philosophical objections to the 
states oversight?" (…) [Instead] lots of people in the public may want one 
thing – 'I don’t care about the police they can have all my information if it 
helps them to identify criminality.' I can understand that viewpoint. I 
really do can - [even if] it takes us back into an almost medieval base of 
our relationship with the state where we are the subjects. 
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5.8 The Role of Online Companies 
How do see privacy activists the role that online companies play in the surveillant assemblage 
and how does it influence their campaigning and political communication? As was shown in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2, the first two major protest events “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching 
Us” focused on government spying and largely ignored the involvement of corporate actors – 
although the massive amount of personal data collected by Google, Facebook, and others will 
eventually land in the hands of the government as PRISM leaks had detailed. The latter half of 
the first post-Snowden years, however, in the form of “The Day We Fight Back” and “Reset the 
Net” did to varying degrees address the data gathering practices of online companies, yet 
somewhat different than one might have imagined. Instead of outright opposing corporate 
surveillance, privacy activist networks sought to include them in their campaigns and formed 
temporary coalitions. Although this section includes many comments from activists justifying 
this rather well-disposed approach, teaming up with some of the worst offenders in the 
Surveillance Society was astonishing to say the least. 
 As was shown in the sections 4.3 and 4.2, aligning up with corporate players like Google 
helped the campaigns generate a critical mass to be relatively widely covered in the media, but, as 
I have argued, the companies have ultimately benefitted more from this partnership than the 
privacy advocacy community. In my interviews I specifically asked privacy advocates about their 
thoughts on the impact the inclusion of corporate players in the anti-surveillance campaigns. 
Based on their answers two lines of arguments emerged: the first one stressed the necessity to 
uphold a constant dialogue with the companies rather than to alienate them. This would ensure 
good and professional relations and the possibility to create change by making use of that 
relationship. On the other hand however, individual activists revealed to be deeply disturbed 
about the ties between some activist organizations and corporate actors and feared that it would 
ultimately undermine their core message.794  
 In fact, most activists, such as Interviewee O, were very well aware about the controversial 
part tech companies played in the global surveillance apparatus:  
                                                 
794 It has to be noted, while this study is concerned with major anti-surveillance campaigns in the first year after the 
Snowden revelations, subsequently the privacy activist community has at times directly taken on online 
companies in some of their campaigns.  The most prominent example is the activists’ opposition to Facebook’s 
plans to expand its “Free Basics” service in developing countries. 
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[T]heir role (...) is essential. If [surveillance] wasn't conducted by private 
actors it wouldn't be available to (...) law enforcement and secret services. 
(...) The current model of mass surveillance would not be possible without 
these companies providing the raw data. [C]ertainly one fits into another. 
It cannot be ignored. Whatever the companies try to offer, they were still 
missing the very basic point, namely that they are collecting mass 
amounts of data and they are collecting more than what is necessary for 
providing service. If they stopped collecting these amounts of data it 
would be much easier to do the reform to curb mass surveillance and it 
would limit the capacity of intelligence agencies. It would be as simple as 
that. (...) [I]t is certainly not sufficient and companies seem to be missing 
the very core problem that they create themselves. 
 
Interviewee A, recalling several smaller campaigns against terms and conditions on platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter also readily summarized the troubling aspects of working with 
online companies. There was no doubt that A was aware of the “huge, (...) big impact” private 
companies have when it came to the internet safety of millions of users. The frequent defense 
argument of representatives of those companies – that activists should rather focus on 
government surveillance because what ultimately matters is what governments do with personal 
data – A would not let stand:  
[W]e really encourage not [only] those companies but the 
telecommunication companies that actually provide the internet 
backbone. We go after them. We see it as all interrelated and we do 
campaign on them. The thing is, and this is the first thing that a company 
will say, is '[We] don't have the ability to put someone in jail. [W]e don't 
have the power of the state so [we] can't lock you up if they disagree with 
you. The state can do that so you need to go after [them]', but [government 
and corporate surveillance] are all related.  
 
Cooperation instead of conflict 
The concise understanding about the interplay between companies and intelligence agencies 
however, did not translate into actions or campaigns directed at those tech firms. More often 
than not “going after companies,” as A put it, did not actually involve any public opposition. 
Instead, A explained,  
we really try to work hard with them and get to know their staff. (...) [W]e 
want to give them the benefit of the doubt. We want to know why they are 
making decisions; we want to help them formulate policies. Often times 
they just don’t have the time to think it through. Other times they don’t 
realize how it impacts people especially vulnerable people; it is not 
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something that they are aware of. Other times it is just about making 
money and they just tell us they are not going to do anything. But we really 
try (...) to get those people to come and talk to us (...). If we just go after 
them it can work but chances are it will work and then they don’t want to 
talk to us again. We negotiate all the time. 
 
The overall open-minded and cautious (but hardly confrontational) stance in working and 
talking with online companies was also echoed by interviewee P: “We could look at that very 
cynically and say this is about greenwashing (…) or (…) that they have some kind of hidden 
agenda to raise their bottom line – and that may well be true. But it may not necessarily be true 
and I would hate for us to simply say ‘the corporations are the enemy.’” Instead, P propagated 
market solutions that would align the interests of companies and activists: 
What Snowden has partly achieved is that he’s made privacy a sellable 
product. Privacy tools have become more sellable since Snowden. The fact 
that companies see that as an opportunity is a good thing. When they see 
that there is a market for privacy and they provide privacy that is a good 
thing. Of course we as an NGO structurally don’t care about supporting 
any corporate interest – it’s not our job to help people sell their products. 
But at the same time we are not going to criticize a company for 
potentially doing the right thing and making money from doing the right 
thing. We want responsible corporations. We want responsible 
corporations to sell good products to do good things that enhance our 
lives. So I can’t give a simple answer that we need to keep a distance from 
corporations, particularly when there are some that are trying to do the 
right thing.  
 
Interviewee G also noted a structural problem in publicly opposing companies such as Google. 
After all digital rights groups generally share a lot of policy preferences with them including 
regarding copyright legislation and net neutrality. Running a campaign against tech firms could 
endanger the alliances that were established in other digital rights fields:  
We are trying to build relationships with Google and Facebook and 
Twitter and so forth. We (...) make it very clear: we'll criticize them on 
some occasions. We'll definitely be strongly critical of them but we also 
have common ground on some other issues and we keep talking. And 
generally they are quite supportive of our work. It's a complicated 
question. One is to realize that for Internet organization, think tanks or 
activist organizations (...) privacy is only one of the issues we deal with. 
On some of the other issues Google is very strongly supportive. In that 
sense we talk to them. We are on friendly terms on some other issues very 
much. On other issues we're not.  
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Ultimately, interviewee G was aware of the problems a relationship with tech companies could 
create for privacy campaigns but hoped that the market would eventually bring them on the 
right track:  
I think (...) Google is a very complicated company (...) because they want 
to basically take personal information and turn it into data that they can 
sell. In that sense they have some incentive against privacy. Or another 
issue though they realize that if their customers don't believe that Google 
is defending their privacy their customers may leave. 
 
 As G concluded, the tech companies “in some ways they are great, in some ways they are terrible 
[but] you'll find that most times it is better to engage the company than be outright hostile.” 
 Interviewee O agreed that simply ignoring them was the wrong way to deal with corporate 
surveillance. Rather activists and companies had to find common ground and use it as the basis 
for fighting government surveillance – at least temporarily. While activists may not be able to 
change the business models of tech companies, at least by talking to them, they would learn to 
better understand their inner workings:  
[W]e do see very big value in talking to companies and just understanding 
better (…) why they operate the way they operate and having some 
convergence in our agenda. What we try to do here is of course to convince 
these guys both American and [domestic] companies to fight for similar 
stakes or solutions if they agree with us. The situation where we fight 
independently but we fight for this same thing, so we move in the same 
direction – this is a very good situation in my opinion because only 
moving like that we can probably have a meaningful impact on the market 
and on politics. 
 
Even some of the more grass roots oriented privacy activists to a certain extent appreciated the 
sway tech companies had over the government. “I think that it is often helpful to have them in 
the room,” interviewee Q noted, “because we know that tech companies have influence over 
members of congress and the administration. They can provide a unique perspective on the 
feasibility of solutions and (...) I'm not opposed to them being involved in the process.”  
However, more radical privacy activists understood their role as acting as a corrective to a 
debate dominated by corporate actors, government agencies, and moderate privacy advocacy 
groups. Because if radical groups were excluded from such conversations, ultimately pro-
surveillance arguments would prevail:  
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One reason that more radical perspectives can be useful is that radicals 
react against the idea that if the government and the intelligence 
community and the tech community got together with a few token privacy 
activists, then they would be able to come up with something that would be 
ok. We are very skeptical that what would come out of a process like that 
would be ok. We suspect that it would be something that would be much 
more likely to facilitate mass surveillance [than to reduce it.] We often find 
ourselves in these discussions, playing a somewhat skeptical and 
somewhat radical role trying to push for solutions. 
 
Other activists, such as interviewee B, also was critical of close relationships between activists 
and tech firms. The privacy community had initially focused on governments and the NSA 
because they provided easier, clear-cut targets but then “we started to look at the companies that 
facilitate this surveillance and their role in handing over data or letting the government access 
certain data. Actually (...) we don't look at the government as much as the companies anymore.”  
Interviewee I agreed. Having tech companies join their campaigns was not endorsing them, the 
activist pointed out. In the context of “The Day We Fight Back” and ”Reset the Net” it was not 
meant to validate them but rather to urge them to commit to a more privacy friendly code of 
conduct:  
'Reset the Net' and the other campaigns (…) have been informed by the 
reality that people understand surveillance and understand their digital 
safety and security as being not just related to the government but also 
related to these corporations and that any successful movement against 
mass surveillance will involve pushing on the government to policy but 
also holding these corporations to account and pushing them to do more 
to protect the customers' privacy and make it as difficult as possible for the 
US government or any other government to access their customers 
sensible personal information.  
 
Questioning the corporate-activist nexus 
Others were slightly more critical. Interviewee A, in his long response gradually shifted to a more 
critical stance about the corporate-activist relationship. A portrayed the institutional and 
financial support of tech firms as natural and necessary, yet at the same time was worried of the 
effects of sponsoring campaigns and possible 'revolving door' effects. When I mentioned that 
many digital rights and privacy-themed conferences were sponsored by big tech companies, A 
replied:  
There is no doubt about it that they sponsor many of the conversations in 
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that space. [I]f they are not supporting it nobody else is so who else is 
going to make these (...) these conversations happening? They are 
listening. They understand that civil society has a voice (...). It’s also a little 
bit of soft power that they know they can influence advocates by treating 
them well. (...). For example, we have taken money from [Facebook and 
Google] but as terms of taking that money we said 'We (...) have to be able 
to campaign against you. (...) If we go after you, you can't strip our funding 
away.' Every place handles it differently. [Other organizations] take a lot of 
money from these companies but you won't hear about it. (...) There is no 
question that it influences. It's a really sad but real thing that if someone is 
paying for you it’s going to influence the way you think even if they never 
ask you to do anything. Even if all they do is treat you to coffee. I think part 
human nature that's how discussions are swayed. And if you find out you 
like each other and you actually get along you might work for Google, you 
might work for Facebook. 
 
Interviewee C, from Latin America echoed this ambivalence stance. It was necessary to talk to 
them but receiving money from them created problems:  
We do talk with them. We do try to be in their debates with them. I think 
it’s necessary because we can’t (…) be completely oblivious to their 
participation because of their importance. We can’t leave them out of the 
debate. (...) The cooperation depends on how the organization works. I 
know several organizations in the region that do take money (...) from 
these companies. And they have percentages that kind of restrict how 
much money they can take so they don’t have a bias towards these issues 
and how they approach privacy concerns if they take money from Google. 
But I do think it’s a concern when you are fully funded by companies. They 
do lead towards a bias that you can’t avoid eventually.   
 
But interviewee B dismissed such concerns about problematic ties between activist organization 
and companies as there were based on a mutually beneficial relationship. The companies could 
boost their corporate social responsibility while the privacy NGO would receive an important 
round of funding:795  
So many different advocacy groups do receive funding from (…) Google or 
Facebook but it is usually (…) directed towards specific projects that 
cannot be used for other things. The relationship is always a very 
interesting one because whereas Facebook wants to say 'We champion X 
subject,' they don't want to be caught to go on to be under fire for 
something else. They would fund an organization for working on free 
                                                 
795 Of course, corporate funding of NGOs is not restricted to the digital rights realm. For an overview about the ties 
between NGO's and corporations see for example Dorothea Baur. 2011. NGOs as Legitimate Partners of 
Corporations: A Political Conceptualization, Heidelberg et al: Springer, 127-141. 
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speech in Bangladesh because they want to say that we champion free 
speech everywhere. But they don't necessarily want to support 
organizations that go against them in terms of net neutrality for example. 
They are more issue-based and if the company and the organization work 
together and work well on that issue I don't see a problem with it. In fact, 
it just makes the organizations work stronger. 
 
For some activists collaborating with tech companies had become a necessity. When asked 
interviewees R and S, two privacy advocates from Eastern Europe, why their organization 
received funding from a tech companies to partially pay for conferences in 2011 and 2012 they said 
they had practically no choice:  
[I]f you are making a big event then you have different choices. Are you 
going to fundraise from the commercial sector, or are you going to 
fundraise from the government, or are you going to fundraise from some 
foundation, or are you going to ask people to buy tickets? And in [our 
country] and the places we worked we didn't have these kinds of 
possibilities. Most of the places that we did events, people are like really 
poor and people cannot pay the tickets, 100 euros something like this, so 
(...) our choice was to try to somehow fundraise in a lot of different ways 
and to try to balance with that. 
 
When their organization's focus changed to from organizing campaigns to offering consulting 
work to private actors they became even more dependent on private funding – and had to set 
their own terms and ethical rules doing so:  
[W]hen we started working as a think tank and not as an activist 
organization (...), we [were in a] different kind of relationship with start-
ups, creative industry, and IT companies. [Now] we provide some of our 
services for them in the field of legal and technical support as one 
fundraising channel which leads to sustainability. (...) If you are a 
company and you want some of our services you have to accept that we 
provide you services which are in compliance human rights standards. 
We'll provide you advice in your best interest but still we want advise you 
not to break any human rights standards.  
 
If activists remained critical and adherent to their own standards, interviewees R and S were 
suggesting, then corporate funding was ultimately irrelevant: “One of the best events that I went 
to related to surveillance was something organized by [an American digital rights group]. My 
ticket was basically paid by Google. But it doesn't mean that that event was not really good but it 
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was also really critical towards Google. It is complex.”796 
 However, this is not to say that all major privacy advocacy organizations depend on the 
funding of private actors and tech companies. But precisely because most groups focus on 
government surveillance they cannot accept public funds. Figuring out from which companies to 
accept sponsoring while trying not to hurt ones credibility is a balancing act as interviewee E 
explained: “In our financial policy we don't want subsidies from the government and there are a 
few companies from who we wouldn't accept donations. This is because even if we still think we 
can work perfectly like we would do otherwise, (...) our trustworthiness is one of the most 
important things that we have got.”  
Ideally, even though intelligence agencies usually conduct their activities in secret, the 
data and privacy policy legislation process in democracies is to a certain extent transparent. In 
contrast, activists can sometimes only react retroactively when, for example, big tech firms roll 
out new products that are potentially damaging in terms of users privacy or change terms and 
conditions. Thus redirecting their efforts against online companies would require a substantial 
overhaul of their strategy, as interviewee E hinted:  
Due to the Snowden leaks we are now much more focused on government 
breaches of privacy. It has to do with proposals that have been known on a 
national level that we can fight. (...) This is why the last two years we have 
been focused on the government. But we (…) want to switch back to have a 
more balanced [take] also vis-a-vis companies. 
 
Focusing on government rather than on corporate surveillance then was the result of 
convenience and necessity. It was far easier to criticize the government for privacy breaches 
because the political system at least theoretically allowed convincing political representatives 
about problematic effects of particular surveillance programs. In contrast, most companies 
lacked such accountability. The only way to express dissent was by 'voting with your feet' and 
even that was increasingly hard due to the de facto monopolies these companies had established 
in their respective domains: “The reason I think the companies haven't been the same target,” 
activist H noted,  
                                                 
796 When we talked about the issue of corporate funding of privacy advocacy and digital rights research I casually 
mentioned, as an example, Germany’s leading Internet research institution, the Alexander von Humboldt 
Institute for Internet and Society in Berlin, which had received a significant round of funding from Google. The 
response from interviewees R and S, half-jokingly: “We would like to get that five million-grant, but 
unfortunately they did not offer it to us.” We all laughed. 
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they have no pretention of being democratic. (...) [T]heoretically, we can 
vote with our dollars but (...) in this context there is no way to vote as a 
consumer for these companies other than being a user of a different 
service. But there is nowhere to go (...). I think the biggest issue though 
with all that is that the government provides a cleaner target because we 
do have members of congress who can theoretically reign in the agencies. 
We have no equivalent with the companies. They just present harder 
targets.  
 
H pointed out, however, that his organization did not receive funding from the companies 
themselves but from some of their individual employees many of whom in principle agreed with 
the goals of the digital rights community, including privacy. In theory, they would be more 
receptive for online protest campaigns, which in part explains campaigns such as “The Day We 
Fight Back” and “Reset the Net”:  
I think you'll find a sense among the individuals, more than the 
institutions because these are typically pretty well resourced 
professionalized individuals. They are not the sorts to turn out at a rally. 
But they are the sorts to be engaged in social media campaigns. And I 
think those campaign opportunities have attracted some of those kinds of 
figures which is why 'The Day We Fight Back' you see companies starting 
to jump in because a) it is a lighter lift b) there is dissent at the employee 
and board level, and that was one way it could find expression with that 
upending their own theories of changes in business models. 
 
Others, however, outright rejected the notion of even talking with companies as strategically 
unwise. They felt it systematically undermined their anti-surveillance narratives. Interviewee D, 
a grassroots activists involved in the street protests of “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching 
Us” (which did not address the issue either but did not try to integrate online companies in their 
protest network either) was highly critical and argued that the privacy community had made “a 
huge mistake.” Ever since Google had been instrumental in the anti-SOPA online protest and 
temporarily blacked out their homepage, privacy activists had tried to once again get the 
company on board (Google eventually joined “The Day We Fight Back2 and “Reset the Net” as 
well). “But”, interviewee D rhetorically asked, “what happens when Google and Facebook are 
trying to fight environmental laws and they put something on their homepage and it gets seven 
million phone calls [to Congress]? I think it is short-sighted to see the tech companies as the 
heroes and defenders of liberty. I think it is very [cynical].” In D’s opinion, working with 
companies whose business model was to collect as many personal information as possible was 
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naive because ultimately the government would profit: “Clearly, (...) any information the 
companies get their hands on end[s] up going to the government. The companies are based in the 
United States. If they have information, the government will get it. You can't trust companies. 
They are not ethical or moral actors. [They] are taking advantage of their reach.”  
At the same time, however, it was difficult – financial and personal entanglements aside – 
to effectively address the privacy breaches of online companies. Instead of trying to change the 
companies’ terms and conditions or calling on people to stop using their services, privacy 
advocates had to lobby the government to regulate them, an approach that was not apparent in 
any of the four major privacy campaigns in the post-Snowden world:  
There is no way to boycott [tech companies] successfully I think. A 
common criticism was 'well, you're so upset about the government, what 
about Google?' And I think there are important differences but, yeah, 
somebody needs to be going after the companies and, honestly, the people 
with the knowledge about what is going on and the understanding of it are 
the people working at these organizations. It's very unfortunate that they 
don't have the time and capacity and ability to also tackle that. It's just 
weird that they are not also going after that.  
 
Interviewee L, a radical privacy activist, spoke of a “non-profit industrial complex” that had 
begun to infiltrate activism in general and the anti-surveillance struggle in particular: “What 
needs to be understood is that (...) history is best explained by following the money. If you look 
at (…) who is sponsoring these organizations then you are aware of what the limitations are and 
what the parties are.” Interestingly, L went on saying that corporate sponsoring of anti-
surveillance protest campaigns was in itself a form of surveillance. By giving money to privacy 
organizations, donors not only tried to subtly influence outcomes but to monitor the process:  
[W]hat I'm telling you is that they have bars and barriers and parameters 
that are established by their funders. Who they fund would determine 
who they are. I can tell you by their action who they are beholding to. And 
they have a line that they are not going to cross that has been created – 
and that is part of the surveillance. Because the grant process is a form of 
monitoring. The reporting process is a form of monitoring. The tax 
process is a form of monitoring. It goes on and on and on. They have to 
have this type of data and information to maintain this system.  
 
In sum, a majority of activists, like interviewee E, saw the financial stakes that online companies 
have in the privacy community as a problematic, yet unavoidable reality: “This is true for every 
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sector you organize a conference in – if you want private sponsoring what companies would 
sponsor that? These are the companies that are working in that field [like Facebook, Google, and 
Palantir]. A beer brewery sponsoring a privacy conference – that is not going to happen.” 
 In contrast in the MENA region, with its history of decades of authoritarian rules and a 
certain distrust in the current government, companies such as Facebook and Google were seen as 
allies that have shone light on the spying activities of their governments. Local activists were 
aware that social media companies collected data on them, but at least they were transparent in 
their dealings with the government, as interviewee F explained:  
I personally don't trust Facebook. I don't have a Facebook account. But 
you don't have the choice when you [live in] a country [that] practices (...) 
censorship, surveillance etc. [Because] you have the opportunity (...) to 
talk with such big companies as they have a kind of transparent process. 
You don't have the choice. Either you stay with your government and [deal 
with] opaque practices or to deal with this kind of companies [and] at 
least after six months you will [get] a transparency report. You will know 
how much your government asked (...) to have personal data accounted. It 
is very difficult. I'm not saying that we believe them. But between two 
devils...I [would choose] Google (...) because Google in the Maghreb is kind 
of an investor in our digital agenda. [And] with Facebook I'm very close 
(...) and I was present in two or three meetings regarding this kind of 
partnership. We don't really have the choice to go in another way. 
 
Activist U from East Africa echoed this notion. In U’s country, which had been a dictatorship for 
decades, he rather trusted the transparency reports published by Google and Facebook than 
statements issued by his government. The latter seemed to be more receptive to those companies 
than to his (rather small) organization. Because of a lack of transparency, the information 
publicized by tech companies about government requests for personal data on their users were 
effectively the only source of reliable information:  
[W]e (...) try to see what is first of all published in transparency reports for 
example coming from Google, Facebook which of course, I think, our 
government is reacting to. [For example] in 2013 our government 
attempted to demand (...) access [to a particular] account. [Beyond 
transparency reports] we don’t understand anything that is going on 
behind the backdoor [of the government].  
 
While online companies at least published some information about government breaches on 
their users privacy, their business activities and their dealings with the big African 
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telecommunications companies seemed to be happening in a black box: “[W]hat they do and 
what they agree with the telecom companies and the government is unknown. (...) [T]he 
government [doesn't] even respond. They [keep] quiet completely. (...) We have tried to engage 
them; we are waiting for them to get back. It’s a big challenge.” 
 When I finally inquired why activists had not done more to address the role of tech 
companies in the first four major campaigns, some activist explained that it was simply not the 
intended goal. From a communications standpoint focusing on government and corporate 
surveillance would have distorted the core framing, as activist I noted:  
The reality is if you want to win a campaign you often have to do one thing 
at the time. And (...) 'Reset the Net' (...) had a very specific goal which was 
to get as many companies as possible to take one step that will make it 
harder for the government to spy on their customers. (...) That doesn't 
mean that we celebrating them or that we are not going to fight them 
when they f--- up. 
 
 Asked about the backlash that, for example, teaming up with Google for the “Reset the Net” 
campaign caused in the media (see section 4.4), one of the key organizers, interviewee I, 
defended their approach and strongly rebutted critics:  
It is awesome when someone wants to build a campaign to criticize these 
corporations for their role – which we have and will continue to do – but I 
think the idea that every single campaign needs to be everything all the 
time is a failing of activism. Usually campaigns pick one specific goal and 
fight from there to achieve that goal. We had a specific goal for 'Reset the 
Net' and we executed it and it was hugely successful. There are critiques to 
be made and I've made them myself that discussions of surveillance need 
to include a critique of how Silicon Valley corporations have colluded and 
how their business model prey into it and we do that all the time. There is 
also nothing on the 'Reset the Net' website about like climate change 
either even though that is a very important issue and something to talk 
about because if you want to reach people and you want to have an impact 
you pick one thing and you focus on it and you go for the throat.797 
 
A final aspect of the highly complex relationship between privacy activists and tech firms was the 
use of social media services. One activist from Scandinavia, interviewee J, suggested that the 
                                                 
797 The notion that a campaign for online privacy can only be one thing, again from a political communication 
standpoint, makes sense. Yet as recurring inquiries from individuals – as interviewee I admitted were frequent in 
the aftermath of the campaign – along with the surrounding critical media coverage suggests, ignoring corporate 
surveillance is not the same as ignoring completely unrelated phenomena such as global warming. 
Contradictions about the ultimate goal of the campaign emerged precisely because surveillance by governments 
is by now so heavily intertwined with the business of online companies. 
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work his organization was doing was based on tools provided by the very companies that were 
part of the NSA surveillance nexus – a fact that made him admittedly uncomfortable and forced 
him to confront his own position in a communication infrastructure that was dominated by 
Google and Facebook: 
[M]aybe the key aspect of it is we are all using those platforms. I use 
Google and I’m talking to you on Skype. I have got Facebook open. So in a 
way I’m a complete hypocrite. If [there were existing] privacy aware 
platforms (...) that had the [same] level of popularity [...] then I would use 
those. But I’m a hypocrite for using those. (...) But the level of hypocrisy 
can vary and that we should try to bring down a notch. But I’m aware of 
my hypocrisy. It doesn’t rest easy with me. Maybe that’s part of it. Because 
we are using these platforms every single day and maybe that makes us 
turn a blind eye to them.798 
 
Interviewee T, a privacy advocate from Germany, struggled with the use of the social media 
applications for the organizing aspect of their campaigns as well. T was aware of the potentially 
damaging PR effects of conducting a privacy campaign in the ecosystem of Facebook. In the end, 
however, the protest network could not forego using these services without losing visibility and 
the means of effectively organizing the campaign:  
Many of us said, 'Facebook is a No-Go. There is no way that we are going to 
use it.' We had really, really long debates about the issue. Eventually we we 
settled on 'Okay, let us use Facebook as a way to promote our campaign, to 
raise awareness for the issue.’ (...) But it was long and hard debate for us. 
Up to this day it has been tricky, because, on the one hand, unfortunately, 
you can reach people that are otherwise out of reach. [But on the other 
hand I am] signaling to people '[corporate surveillance] is not that bad. I 
am using the service as well!' Somebody has to make the first step and 
abandon those services. (...) That would be important (...) and I support 
that. Next year, I am going to [do the same]. 
 
 
5.9 The Future of Privacy Activism  
The period in which I conducted my interviews (2015-2016) was a crucial one for the global 
privacy community: The Snowden leaks were at the same time still relatively fresh and becoming 
                                                 
798 Author’s note: When I sent out interview requests to individual activists, I offered to conduct the interview over 
the open-source and end-to-end-encrypted video chat service jitsi, believing privacy activists would shun more 
mainstream services such as Skype (which, as the Snowden documents had revealed,  was regularly being 
monitored by the NSA’s PRISM program). Yet, with the exception of one all interviewees preferred Skype or 
Google Hangouts. 
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increasingly less relevant each day. One the one hand, supported by new patches of leaked 
documents they continued to drive the conversation around privacy and surveillance. The issue 
remained a hot-button issue and was arguably as popular as never before in academic circles and 
at conferences. On the other hand, in the process of 'surveillance normalization' it was becoming 
notably more and more absent in the news cycle and political discourse. As outlined in the 
introduction in the U.S. Presidential race of 2016 the topic was ignored and in Europe, without 
much opposition from civil society actors, governments quietly passed a new series of 
surveillance laws that were in many respects more expansive and far reaching than before the 
Snowden revelations. 
 When I talked to activists I was finally interested in the following questions: What was the 
legacy of the Snowden leaks for them as privacy activists? What lessons did they learn in terms of 
communicating and framing resistance to surveillance? And – to go back to the hopes of a 
'Privacy Chernobyl_ laid out in the introduction – were the Snowden leaks the earth shattering 
mobilizing agent the activists had hoped for after all? The answers ranged from slightly 
optimistic to downright pessimistic. Some activists believed the political opportunity window 
remained open and it demanded continuing commitment and work to keep on mobilizing 
people for privacy issues. Others believed the window was already in the process of being closed 
and only a new series of leaks about the nature of the surveillance regime would keep it open. 
And some even believed the window was now forever closed and had moved on to focusing on 
other domains of the digital rights struggle or even completely abandoned activism. 
 There were reasons to be optimistic. For example, interviewee A was convinced that the 
topic would not go away soon and their work was as relevant as ever. Yet what the Snowden 
documents – and their subsequent reading, interpretations and framings by journalists, activists, 
and some politicians – had failed to do was to make consequences for individual citizens 
tangible. Thus A hoped for proof that would expose how everyday gadgets used by millions of 
citizens were infiltrated by surveillance technology:   
Just when you settled down and you’re like ‘I’m sick of hearing [all these 
stories about surveillance]’ [something new comes up] that is pretty 
horrible. They are still looking at the Snowden documents and finding 
revelations there. In terms of government surveillance it is possible for 
people to get tired about it but (referring to a news report about the 
hacking of baby phones) now it comes into your house and you know that 
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some stranger could be watching your baby sleeping and that means that 
the conversation is not going to go away. It’s one thing to have the 
government which is troubling enough but to have it coming into your 
home and your family is very different. (...) People get that being watched 
all the time is not a good thing. (...) But I think my feeling [is] that the 
privacy conversation will never really take off until it is starting getting 
into people’s personal lives. (…) I’m not saying it’s good for privacy 
advocates as a community I just think it’s a good way to force people to 
deal with these decisions and think about what these technologies 
mean(...) I think that that those gaps are being closed now and that the 
conversation isn’t going away. 
 
For many activists, such as interviewee B, after an initial phase of heightened alertness right after 
the Snowden leaks were published in the summer of 2013, it was now business as usual. In terms 
of their communication work, activists had to readjust their tactics from capitalizing on the 
public outcry in 2013 to the general mood of 2016, which some described as ‘surveillance 
fatigue.’799 In a nutshell this meant shifting their priorities from organizing public protests to 
more quietly working behind the scenes:  
The immediate reactions were all about sharp organization, different 
communities coming together and act against this or let's raise about it 
awareness right now and I think if there were more revelations of that 
sort, something similar might happen again but as of now just folks are 
working with the realities that they see in front of them and that requires 
a different type organizational strategy than what you saw [for example] at 
'Stop Watching Us.' 
 
In the post-Arab Spring world, surveillance had lost some of its relevance as a political topic. The 
current situation in the MENA region is a prime example of how crucial and at the same time 
ephemeral 'surveillance' as a discursive entity is. Before the Arab revolutions, it was arguably the 
most important issue for the citizens because excessive surveillance measures prevented citizens 
from gathering and discussing the 'bigger picture' of politics. But only a few years after 
establishing a democratic system surveillance has been relegated as a topic of discussion similar 
to Western countries, as interviewee B explained:  
I wouldn't say that people don't care anymore. I just think that the focus is 
different because before the only issue that unlock[ed] other issues [was] 
surveillance. Because you can't talk about the economy, jobs, development 
                                                 
799 Nick Kolakowski. “The NSA and Surveillance Fatigue,” Dice.com, October 15, 2013 (accessed January 11, 2017). 
http://insights.dice.com/2013/10/15/the-nsa-and-surveillance-fatigue/.  
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etc. because you are being surveilled. So [de facto]} the primordial issue 
becomes surveillance. Whereas now surveillance just became a topic 
amongst many that you can discuss openly. So there is very big difference. 
It is not the gatekeeper topic any more. [After the revolution] it just 
became one of many. 
 
Another MENA region activist, interviewee F, even declared the end of anti-surveillance 
activism now that democratic institutions had been set in place. She offered an even bleaker 
outlook on the future of privacy advocacy in the region:  
[The] problem is that we won the battle of freedom of expression online 
and offline. It was one of the revolutionary requests: jobs, respect, and 
freedom. We won the battle of freedom. That is why no one (…) really 
interested [in surveillance anymore.] You will find only [interest] from 
time to time when (...) a journalist is threatened or is persecuted by the 
government or whatever, [there will be a short-lived] campaign online. No 
one will [take to] the streets. (..) We have no more real activism like the 
one you can see in the U.S. or in Europe. You have to keep in mind that 
[here] Internet equals Facebook. The activism is to write a Facebook status 
and to share it and you can by chance be heard. (...) I will tell you we are 
about 20 people in the ICT and human rights community and when we 
think about activism we never think about going to the streets no more. 
 
The activists, who were still organizing and working in the field of privacy advocacy, vowed to 
continue their work and were convinced of the benefits for the public. Interviewee A was 
convinced: [Privacy activism] is important. (…) Keeping us focused on what matters and how it 
impacts our lives and the lives of others around us is very important and I'm really grateful to be 
part of that conversation.” For the future, activists hoped they could broaden their scope 
sensitizing more people for privacy issues. Even in a post-Snowden world they were aware that 
privacy and surveillance were still niche issues. The key was, and here almost every interviewee 
agreed, to make the issue of surveillance more tangible for individual citizens:  
[O]ur main goal [is to better explain how] these issues impact people. We 
are still dealing with that and still trying to get these issues better known 
in society. Because nowadays the group that understand the real impact is 
really narrow. So we are trying to tackle that by doing workshops, by doing 
events to open the debate with more actors involving them in the 
discussion. (...) What I like to see is better campaigns globally and 
regionally. I’d love to see that. We are working towards that objective but 
it’s going to take a while to have concrete effects. But I do think the future 
holds something positive. People are starting to getting involved more in 
these debates and I think that is really positive. 
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Activists R and S agreed that the leaks and the subsequent framing by activists had not clearly 
demonstrated how surveillance affected the individual. They were hoping this would change in 
the close future:  
I think that in the next couple of years there will be some change, which 
will be the result of some kind of risk we already have but we didn't see it 
coming so soon. Some kind of cloud burst or something like that because 
what still is the main problem of surveillance and maybe we should talk 
more about that...We don't have pure evidence how surveillance is 
changing the lives of the regular citizens. Everybody is asking us to 
provide them some proof how surveillance changes everything related to 
some person's life. Everything is very abstract still. But the amount of data 
which is gathered and the sensitivity of this data are definitely telling us 
that soon there will be some kind of burst that regular, ordinary citizens 
will feel damage on their skin. And I think that moment is soon, very soon 
(...). [T]he mindset of the regular people will start to change very fast and 
then I can see the political changes in the area. There will be political 
parties – not just parties but other political parties with the agenda against 
big corporations, big global surveillance. Maybe on the far right people 
will start bringing communities around the idea that the Internet is an 
extremely bad thing because they are surveilling everything and so on. But 
we’ve read all of that in SciFi novels already. 
 
Yet activists had no false hopes that the cause they were fighting for would ever be particularly 
popular among large parts of the population. Still they strongly believed it was a cause worth to 
continue fighting for, as interviewee K stressed:  
I think that, in my personal opinion, [resisting against] any case [of] state 
or centralized control over people's life through invasions of privacy, 
through interception of communications, [or] through population 
management [is important]. I think that is a fight you have to [fight], 
right? Maybe economic opportunities and professional opportunities [will 
not have] everybody doing that (...) but in terms of (…) what is right to do 
it is the right fight. I don't think someone should say that 'because we 
don't have privacy, we don't fight for it'.  
 
But while legislative battles in the future might be won, on a cultural level however, interviewee 
K, implied, it was close to impossible. Thus the following comment can be interpreted as 
describing the limits of cultural framing in actually convincing the public of the merits of 
privacy:  
We tried obviously a cultural framework but it is very difficult. The first 
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step would be to have rules and laws that protect human rights and that 
they are in accordance with the human rights. Culturally, we don't know 
what is going to happen. We don't have the recipe to [change] our 
security-concerned culture - maybe it is going to take a lot of time. At least 
publicly put out the opinion and the ideas that we don't need this mass 
surveillance and that we need some more controls of the intelligence 
[apparatus]. It is difficult to say that you are a pessimist or positive about 
what is going to happen. In any case we should do it and I'm willing to 
keep on doing it. 
 
From a communications standpoint the activists lauded themselves for making the issue of 
surveillance – especially in its technological complexity – more comprehensible to the public. Yet 
they remained highly self-critical and introspective. This assessment was best exemplified by 
interviewee E. Reflecting on the biggest successes and failures of the post-Snowden era, E stated:  
For me being a communications director [at my organization] I think what 
I really like to change that we are not good enough yet is being much more 
concrete and like to use language and the images of the internet user. A 
few years ago our issues were the issues of a few niche groups like the tech-
savvy, young start-up developers or young lawyers. It were very small 
groups of people who thought it was interesting and now you can really 
see that it started to touch large groups of society. People who don't by 
definition have a huge understanding of the technology, of how things 
work or the legal framework (…). So what we should do is [adapt] to their 
world and their problems, to their perspective. (…) I think that we could 
change our perspective (…) by bringing those people into these issues. 
That would be the most important thing to do in the future. 
 
Clearly, individual activists and advocacy organizations were able to raise their own profile by 
communicating and informing the public about the scope of the leaks. The Snowden leaks had 
created a new set of experts that had made themselves indispensable for the ongoing technology-
heavy digital rights discourse: “Scientists would think that we should do more papers. Old school 
activists think we should do more protests. People in the start-up world think that we should 
develop much more alternatives to services that already exist,” E summarized the current 
standing of the privacy activist community,  
But one thing they all said is that they think we really have expertise in our 
field. That we do know what we are talking about and I think for me this is 
really important because it shows that we can reach out to all these 
different groups and have relevancy for all of them. So I thought this was a 
really big success (...) You can see that important policy makers are [now] 
paying attention to what we are doing. Every day you are working and you 
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don't know exactly what it does to the outside world because we are very 
much in our bubble. But [now] (..) at least they know that we are to be 
taken seriously. 
 
Even though the immediate political opportunity window following the Snowden leaks may have 
been closed by 2016, surveillance as a cultural practice was so widespread by now that the work of 
privacy advocates would remain relevant in the years to come. Their primary objective of their 
everyday work would be to keep on raising awareness and upholding a discursive counterweight 
to the dominant pro-surveillance stance: “[C]op cams, (...)self-driving cars, and (...) fit bits – all 
of these things slowly are creeping into the public's conscience and [people] are starting to get 
more and more concerned. The more aware they are the more vocal they can become (…) the 
more they can and will (…) push for change.” 
 Quitting, for most activists, was not an option. The fight had only started, as interviewee 
O explained, arguing for the ongoing importance of privacy activism:  
I can only hope that we will maintain motivation and we still have 
financial resources to carry out that fight because it is very far from 
winning. But we have to carry on nevertheless. There must be somebody 
who keeps reminding people why these values that they don't want to think 
of on a day-to-day basis are relevant, are important before it is too late. [In 
my country and globally] the situation becomes much more difficult, 
much more complicated. ISIS [and] the war on terror entering the new 
phase (…) means that we are very far from ending mass surveillance 
domestically not even mentioning international surveillance. I'm sure 
they will do everything to increase capacity in terms of international 
surveillance (…). So the situation will only be more complicated, more 
tense, more challenging in terms of human rights. So activism is essential. 
I'm pleased to [be involved in] awareness raising at least to make sure that 
there is any debate happening beyond the mainstream arguments. It is 
more important than ever but it is also more challenging than ever. 
 
The only activist that indirectly challenged the notion of the importance of activists raising 
awareness was interviewee P. When looking back at the effect of the Snowden leaks he noted 
that governments, too, had learned from the revelations. Their main lesson was that they had 
been wrong in secretly establishing surveillance programs. As a consequence governments were 
beginning to simultaneously introducing transparency and stricter surveillance regimes. But 
even though the scope of surveillance programs was now potentially known to the public a major 
outcry from the public was missing:  
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So interestingly we would have hoped that in response to Snowden 
development the government would have said ‘We’re holding our hands 
up. We have gone too far. There is public disappointment about this level 
of surveillance; we’re going to institute new legislation which is all about 
safeguarding against this.' Instead what they have done – they have played 
an evil trick – what they have done is actually using their secret 
surveillance being exposed as an opportunity to say ‘yeah we’ve been doing 
this since forever now that you aware of it, let’s do this properly. And this 
is what we want to do now. And, hey, look, you can’t accuse us of being 
secretive. We’re putting this out, we’re being transparent – what you 
wanted. We’re giving you transparency now.' (...) On the one hand saying 
‘there is nothing new here’ but at the same time they are wanting to 
expand their powers with this. (...) They are trying to give us a post-
Snowden reassurance that what was happening won’t happen again – we’re 
being more transparent and there are more safeguards. But what’s actually 
happening? They have given themselves more power than they had before. 
  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The first year of the post-Snowden world saw several protest events, during which activists made 
sense of the revelations about the NSA programs, presented solutions to reclaim their privacy, 
and mobilized citizens to oppose the global surveillance regime. Without these publicized 
campaigns the surveillance discourse would doubtlessly have been much more one-sided. By 
staging street demonstrations, sharing imagery online, and blacking out websites, the activists 
opened up discursive spaces that had been dominated by politicians, journalists and intelligence 
officials.  
At the same time, organizing, advocating, and communicating on behalf of privacy 
concerns remains incredibly challenging. While all social movements must grapple with 
indifference and futility of the general population, arguably privacy activists are involved in one 
of the most difficult, complex, and demanding struggles for a social cause there is at the 
moment. Whereas, for example, environmentalists can at least point out the first geological 
manifestations of impending doom caused by global warming, or peace activists can count on 
the daily media coverage of the carnage unleashed in war zones, privacy activists have a crucial 
disadvantage: In their communication work against surveillance, they must address a 
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phenomenon that undeniably exists but which for a vast majority of people does not feel 
threatening or consequential. 
 This study set out to be the first systematic look at anti-surveillance frames articulated by 
privacy activists. Notwithstanding a political and cultural environment that has devalued 
privacy, activists have developed sophisticated collective action frames against surveillance to 
make privacy concerns more tangible. Based on my reasoning of the evidence presented in the 
previous chapters I have identified overall ten different frame packages applied over the course of 
four anti-surveillance campaigns. According to the typology of core framing tasks of social 
movements introduced by Benford and Snow (see section 3.1) the two main “diagnostic” 
instruments in the anti-surveillance context have been cultural.  
The “History of Surveillance” package framed government surveillance as a constant 
feature that has traditionally targeted political dissidents and minorities, attempted to stifle 
progressive social change, and supported political oppression. The activists tried to warn the 
public against surveillance in the present by reminding it of the grave consequences surveillance 
has had in the past. On the other hand, the second major “diagnostic” and cultural frame 
package was mainly concerned with the possible role surveillance apparatuses will play in the 
future. Within the “Orwellian Totalitarianism” frame package activists warned of a 1984-like 
dystopia that as a result of an expanding and unchecked surveillance would emerge soon, or was 
already at our doorsteps.  
Both the historical as well as the Orwellian frame are naturally suited to form the basis on 
which to warn against the perils of losing one’s privacy. U.S. but also European history provides a 
rich backdrop to depict the enormous costs societies pay when individual privacy is harmed. 
Likewise its ongoing popularity and sales number are proof that 1984 remains the prime piece of 
literary fiction to critically engage with the phenomenon of surveillance – whether its depiction 
is in line with contemporary forms of monitoring people or not. It is, however, noteworthy, that 
the two main forms of diagnostic anti-surveillance framing are mainly concerned with the past 
and the future and not directly with the present. The abundance of historical and fiction-based 
frames suggests a lack of contemporary frame examplars that could make the political 
communication work of privacy advocates even more poignant and immediate. 
 The “prognostic” articulations of solutions against surveillance (in the Benford and Snow 
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model) were articulated within legal, transnational, and technophile frame packages. According 
to the “Constitutionalism” package, the most effective way to improve the privacy of citizens is to 
call for respecting existing privacy laws (most notably, in the U.S. case, the Fourth Amendment) 
or creating new privacy safeguards. As was discussed in section 2.5 this 'Privacy Paradigm' is the 
most popular framing device to raise awareness against surveillance. Granted, if every country 
would adhere to a strict set of privacy laws the problem would disappear. But not only may the 
legalistic 'privacy for the sake of privacy' argument be dissuasive for audiences but the Snowden 
leaks have shown that even preexisting checks and balances are circumvented in order to expanse 
surveillance. Even more problematic is insisting on privacy laws in the context of transnational 
campaigns. While there have been attempts at transnational deliberation and articulation of 
universal privacy rights, ultimately national legislative efforts prevail. While slogans such as 
“Restore the Fourth” are easy digestible solutions for scaling back government spying they 
ultimately adhere to the much criticized privacy rights mantra, which obscures causes and effects 
of 21st century surveillance.  
 The second prognostic frame package, “Global Dimension”, was based on the coherent 
notion that in order to change the increasingly global and decentralized surveillance society 
people around the world must come together and collectively voice their opposition. At times the 
international privacy community indeed tried to present, albeit orchestrated from the U.S., a 
unified front against government surveillance. The importance, especially for privacy groups 
from the so-called 'Global South”, to take part in such campaigns should not be understated. For 
them presenting their case in the transnational arena is an indispensable tool to evoke reactions 
from authoritarian governments who are generally not responsive to domestic civil society 
claims. In turn, inviting activists from non-western countries to talk about privacy breaches in 
their national contexts were used as warning signs against unchecked surveillance in Europe and 
the U.S.  
Overall, however, the degree of transnational framing and cooperation was 
underwhelming given how the Snowden leaks have affected the world as whole. Notably, the first 
response from civil society actors, “Restore the Fourth” was not transnational but instead, 
somewhat surprising, a hyperpatriotic celebration of the United States. But even with regard to 
the following transnational campaigns, backed by evidence presented in the interview chapter, 
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the actual degree of transnational deliberation and collectively articulating anti-surveillance 
frames was minuscule (perhaps best demonstrated by the lack of any communication between 
German and American “Stop Watching Us”-activists; however, more in-depth studies on the 
relationships and movements between organization and countries, perhaps in the form of social 
network analysis or other ethnographic approaches, is necessary). This is particularly remarkable 
in an age of ICTs that would in theory make the planning of truly transnational protest events 
easier. Of all things, one would have expected digital rights-centric campaigns to utilize stronger, 
ICT-fueled “communication power.”  In the end, and in line with Tarrow's assessment of the 
limits of transnational activism, local– or even hyperlocal – anti-surveillance claims were 
brought to the international level and vice versa but no unified and lasting global anti-
surveillance claim was made. While the scope of this study is limited it does raise serious 
questions about social movements and their ability (or inability) to strategically employ their 
repertoires of communication in a transnational context. 
 The last two prognostic frame packages which occurred in the campaigns were noticeably 
technophile. The “Encryption” package, relatively lately introduced into the protest cycle, 
presented technological solutions to once and for all deal with the problem of government 
surveillance. As my analysis of the “Reset the Net” event has shown, encryption was presented as 
a cure to unresponsive governments and ineffectual forms of protest, as well as transcending 
national borders. Thus, it evoked, although organizers strongly deny this, a partial 
depoliticization of anti-surveillance activism. The notion that the use of widespread encryption 
would make it too expensive for a government to conduct mass surveillance is a plausible claim 
(even though the frame ignores recent reports that have detailed how governments will 
ultimately circumvent encryption technology and people who use encryption are more likely to 
come under intense government scrutiny). But the “Encryption” frame package is also a partial 
rebuttal of the frames discussed above: when encryption is presented as the most promising 
strategy to counter surveillance, there is no need to come together on a transnational level, fight 
for privacy rights or critically engage with the political and cultural – other than the 
technological – surveillance infrastructure. Certainly, using encryption can be seen as an explicit 
political act. But it can also be seen as a resigning from the public into the private. 
 Emphasizing market driven solutions for surveillance was epitomized by the second 
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technophile frame package, “Intersectoral Cooperation.” Only in concert with the private sector, 
mass government surveillance could ultimately be defeated, the frame suggested. As pointed out 
in my analysis of “The Day We Fight Back” and “Reset the Net,” the prominent role big tech 
companies have played in campaigns against privacy was a highly controversial one. By forming 
temporary alliances with Google, Facebook and Co., privacy activists gave them a platform to 
show the world that they are allegedly concerned about their users' privacy – rather than to 
actively challenging their business practices and informing the public about the essential part 
they play in the NSA's regime. It is true that such companies have an intrinsic interest in keeping 
the data they have collected on millions of people away from the government. But that all four 
major anti-surveillance campaigns in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks have largely remained 
silent about the central place of corporate actors in the surveillance apparatus is remarkable.  
There is no evidence that any individual privacy advocacy group has been in any form 
compromised or influenced by receiving funding from or collaborating with tech firms. But, 
based on evidence presented in the case studies and interviews section, the overall 
communication strategy of the privacy community was affected by a process that the social 
movement literature  generally refers to as 'co-optation,' or 'appropriation:'800 Reacting to 
Snowden's concrete evidence of collusion between the NSA and internet companies, tech firms 
sought out to redefine privacy as 'absence from government surveillance' (rather than ‘absence 
from government and corporate surveillance,’ for a discussion of whether such a distinction still 
exists see sections 4.4 and 5.8); gain legitimacy by adopting an asserted concern for privacy; and 
offering privacy activists publicity and a stake in transforming their conduct of business – albeit 
all without overhauling their surveillance-based business model in any meaningful way. Not 
choosing to problematize corporate surveillance at all suggests ignorance or willful rejection of 
the key topics discussed in surveillance studies, notably the existence of public-private 
partnership that forms the core of the modern-day surveillant assemblage.  
 On the other hand, aggressively attacking those companies or even calling for a boycott of 
their services (which, like encryption, would make it harder for the NSA to collect users' data) is 
not exactly a viable option either. As champions of privacy it would make sense for activists to 
                                                 
800 For an overview on various concepts and dynamics of co-optation see Jon Burchell and Joanne Cook, “CSR, Co-
optation and Resistance: The Emergence of New Agonistic Relations Between Business and Civil Society,” Journal 
of Business Ethics, 115 (4), Special Issue on Organizing CSR (2013), 741-754.  
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clearly distance themselves from Google, Facebook and others. But since the lives of their 
constituents heavily rely on social network communication (and the activists themselves use 
applications and products by these companies to organize their protests) this creates a paradox. 
According to Gamson's typology of social movement's targets, the targets of influence (online 
companies) and targets of mobilization (internet users, citizens) become one. This results in a 
contradiction for privacy activists, which is on the edge of being unsolvable. Calling out 
Facebook would include calling out Facebook Users. Or as Gamson has put it: “[W]hat really 
stands in the way of success for the ambitious challengers is not diffuse objectives but targets of 
change who are unwilling to cooperate in their own demise.”801 
 Finally, while the heavy focus on technological solution can be interpreted as signs of 
depoliticizing the anti-surveillance struggle, the motivational frames applied in the four 
campaigns were, at least partially, politically motivated. A recurring motif applied to mobilize 
supporters was that surveillance not merely threatens your privacy but will eventually lead to a 
loss of freedom. In the “Freedom” frame package a concept of Panopticism was evoked which 
painted NSA surveillance as a subtle disciplining force which would ultimately prevent people 
from living out their real personas both offline and online. It is a conscious effort to counter the 
Privacy Paradigm so prevalent in a lot of privacy activism and based on the understanding that 
defending privacy for the sake of privacy is not sufficient to withstand pro-surveillance 
arguments in the discourse. In fact, explaining the political and social consequences of a loss of 
privacy was a core task for activists involved in all four campaigns, who literally created bullet 
points for voicing anti-surveillance arguments in every day debates.  
 The concept of 'freedom', especially in the context of US-centered campaigns discussed 
here, was tied to two other frame packages, namely “Non-Partisanship” and “Patriotism.” In part 
because the historical frame examplars such as the Revolutionary War and the Civil Rights era 
each usually attract supporters of the right or left spectrum, the organizers went a great lengths 
to portray opposition to surveillance as a non-partisan and patriotic duty. Both frame packages 
managed to mobilize radical leftist, progressive, liberal, centrist, conservative, Muslims, and 
Christians to come together to take a unified stance against surveillance – a rare sight and 
undeniable achievement in these politically extremely divided times. 
                                                 
801 Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 49. 
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 Yet the greatest motivational frame exemplar was centered on the whistleblower who had 
exposed the scope of the NSA's surveillance activities, Edward Snowden. With the exception of 
“Restore the Fourth,” the “Celebrity Activism” package was the dominant motivational frame in 
all campaigns. Evolving from a mere purveyor of information, Snowden quickly became an 
activist himself, by actively joining “Stop Watching Us” and “Reset the Net.” Thus, he not only 
became the Che Guevara-like iconographical marker of any surveillance protest, but also heavily 
involved in framing resistance against surveillance himself. Without Snowden not only would 
not there be any proven facts about excessive state and corporate surveillance but, it is safe to say, 
the communication strategy would have never gained traction as it did with him heavily 
involved. In many ways Snowden, due to his well-publicized accounts of his political 
motivations, his escape from the United States, and his technological expertise, ultimately 
embodied many of the key anti-surveillance frames, namely the patriotic, the global, and the 
technophile frames.  
 Overall, based on this taxonomy of anti-surveillance frames, over the course of four 
campaigns one can see an evolution of framing choices and interrelated protest tactics. The first 
such dynamic is from offline to online forms of protest. What started off as grass roots, albeit 
digitally enabled, street rallies evolved into online protest days. Nowadays activists rely on a 
mixed arsenal of both offline and online means of protest, but in the case of privacy activism the 
latter (“The Day We Fight Back,” “Reset the Net”) drew conclusions about the former (“Restore 
the Fourth,” “Stop Watching Us”). As of 2017, street protests against mass surveillance are 
completely off the table. As my interview data suggests, most privacy advocacy organizations 
consider offline demonstrations as too costly and politically risky, given the comparatively low 
amount of people willing to take to the streets for privacy matters. But the switch from offline to 
online actions influenced the framing opportunities as well. Because of their grass roots nature, 
“Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us,” mainly through their speakers and attendees, 
utilized more nuanced and rich framing examplars rooted in history, literature and political 
theory. Their online counterparts, “The Day We Fight Back” and “Reset the Net,” on the other 
hand, evoked more centralized and streamlined framings that were rather instructional than 
complex and emotional. 
 The second noticeable direction was a shifting focus from opposing all forms of 
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(government) surveillance to ultimately excluding targeted surveillance from criticism. Granted, 
even early iterations such as “Restore the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” demanded to stop 
“mass suspicionless surveillance” after Snowden had informed the world about the 
indiscriminating nature of the NSA's various programs. But the campaigns’ dominant frames 
were in fact mostly concerned with the government's targeting on minorities, dissenters, and 
pro-democracy activists in the 'Global South'. In contrast, “Reset the Net's” declared goal was to 
push governments to retreat to only using targeted surveillance, while largely ignoring the 
consequences for those most vulnerable to surveillance. This discursive turn has attracted 
scholarly critique arguing that this ultimately obscures the racial, class-based, and imperial 
underpinnings of the activities of intelligence agencies, even though it ignores the explicit 
political frames applied in the campaigns prior to “Reset the Net.” 
 Lastly a third dynamic was visible when comparing the four campaigns. Tied to the shift 
from mass to targeted surveillance was also a shift from political to technical solutions. “Restore 
the Fourth” and “Stop Watching Us” were embodiments of months of meetings between various 
groups and individuals to discuss the implications of the Snowden revelations and come up with 
explicit (legal) demands. In contrast, “Reset the Net” was a centrally administered campaign that 
offered solutions for people to hide their political beliefs and retreat to an encrypted safe zone. 
 Included in the analysis of each case study was an assessment how the collective action 
frames resonated in the media. In general, despite the limited overall effects of social movement 
frames on public opinion,802 the activists were nonetheless successful in providing the public 
with argumentative tools against surveillance. There is no definite answer as to whether 
mediated reports of the campaigns may encourage citizens to engage in collective action against 
mass surveillance in the future. Yet, by featuring activist voices and reporting on their action, 
media coverage of activism certainly is “making a difference.”803 However, the extent to which 
particular frame packages were adopted by journalists and media outlets varied greatly. As 
previously mentioned the “Celebrity Activism” package centered on the personality of Edward 
Snowden was widely echoed by articles reporting on the campaigns. Without Snowden’s active 
involvement and the organizers decision to use Snowden's persona and story to inspire citizens, 
                                                 
802 Cf. Gamson and Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion,” 2. 
803 William A. Gamson, “Promoting Political Engagement,” in Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of 
Democracy, ed. W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 59. 
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the campaigns would have never gained significant coverage. The same can be said about the 
“Intersectoral Cooperation” and “Encryption” frame packages. The involvement of big tech 
companies guaranteed a great level of exposures to the campaigns – despite posing questions 
about the commitment to also problematize corporate surveillance. Finally, the “Patriotism” and 
“Constitutionalism”-frames prevalent in the US-only “Restore the Fourth” were also widely 
adopted by media outlets and thus managed to portray surveillance as an urgent matter that 
affected every American and was at the very heart of the United States legal and its historical 
foundation. 
 However, the remaining frame packages were largely ignored by newspapers and blog 
sites. References to the ‘origin stories’ of surveillance taking place in Colonial America and the 
Civil Rights era were not reproduced widely, presumably because “media producers are … 
generally inhospitable to key aspects of the collective action frame, such as the structural analysis 
implicit in many injustice claims,”804 as previous social movement communication research 
suggests. Cultural and literary frames did not fare better: the relatively low adoption rate of 1984-
type framing devices suggests, new and more poignant cultural narratives may be needed. And 
the “Global Dimension” package also did not find its way into news and opinion articles. While 
both campaigns managed to evoke participation from activists from around the world, it was 
national discourses over privacy legislation—particularly in the United States—that dominated 
media coverage. The focus on national surveillance laws made it difficult for the “Global 
Dimension” frames to be widely reproduced by media outlets.805  
 Then, and this touches on my third research objective, how transnational is the current 
struggle against mass surveillance? Although certainly only a snapshot of the period from 2013 to 
2014 and, due to language barriers and geographical proximity, focused on U.S. and European-led 
campaigns (more in-depth research about privacy activism in the 'Global South', both on the 
national and transnational level is needed), my study has shown that there is no permanent 
transnational privacy movement yet. Instead of a real, permanent, and highly organized 
transnational movement there have been only imagined, temporary, and uncoordinated 
                                                 
804 John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston. 2005. “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective.” In Frames of Protest: 
Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, edited by John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston, (Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers), 1–33. 
805 However, I hope this pioneering study invites more systematic attempts, perhaps in the form of content analysis, 
at illuminating the highly complex media dynamics between activists, intelligence officials, and journalists. 
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transnational alliances. While the Snowden leaks attracted temporary and short lived 
transnational coalitions and the campaigns described here functioned as important 'flashpoints,’ 
national debates over privacy and surveillance persist. However, to frame resistance against 
surveillance in transnational terms has an important symbolical function as it links together the 
many different cultural understandings of privacy that exist in each region or country. Even 
though transnational solidarity articulated in the campaigns was more of a communication 
device than reality, the relatively easy and cheap way to join a campaign (even if it only involved 
signing a petition or sending out an email) made it possible for activists to be part of an imagined 
global front against the international intelligence apparatus. 
 Given these points, how effective has been the overall communication strategy of privacy 
activists? Although this study was mainly confined to portraying and analyzing how activists 
interpreted the Snowden leaks, some, albeit generalized, conclusions about the overall success of 
the anti-surveillance campaigns can be made. Gamson has claimed that a social movement is 
successful if it produces two outcomes. The first one is the “acceptance of a challenging group by 
its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests.”806 Here the privacy 
community clearly succeeded. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, privacy activists as 
challengers of the global surveillance regime used the political opportunity window to champion 
privacy and other related human rights. In times of proven mass surveillance, activist 
organizations have emerged as an important voice for increasingly legitimate privacy claims. 
Thus they were accepted, to varying degrees, as valid spokespersons in the discourse, even from 
spheres that are not primarily concerned with privacy. Politicians, intelligence officials and 
corporate executives may disagree with some of their demands, but – thanks to a communication 
strategy appealing to the common sense of a politically heterogeneous group of constituents – 
hardly anyone would openly dismiss the important role digital rights groups have played in the 
surveillance and privacy discourse. 
 Gamson's second criteria, however, namely “whether the group's beneficiary gains new 
advantages during the challenge and its aftermath”807 is much harder to assess. As was pointed 
out in the introduction, the privacy activist community has celebrated some wins but also 
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suffered losses in the legislative realm since the Snowden leaks.808 NSA surveillance especially on 
foreign citizens around the world proceeds without any meaningful checks. Millions of internet 
users continue to share personal information in exchange for convenient social media services. 
Studies and polls suggest that encryption technology is still neither well understood nor widely 
used.809 The new advantages citizens have gained as the result of the campaigns analyzed in these 
pages are discursive and informative rather than concrete and legal.  
 But whether people will act on the basis of the anti-surveillance frames and their 
representations in the media and start resisting surveillance more forcefully remains in question. 
Based on my frame analysis and backed by comments from the interviewees, activists still have 
not found a way to frame surveillance and privacy as issues affecting citizens personally. As some 
of the activists have conceited themselves, they are still searching for effective rebuttals of the 
dominant security meta-framing prevalent in the surveillance discourse. They have not been able 
to repair, as one activist described it in section 5.2, “the broken story of surveillance” – an anti-
surveillance narrative that is unable to articulate comprehensively, what surveillance really 
means for the individual, for the public, and for the political system.  
The inability to show the personal consequences of mass surveillance may not be a 
communication failure but an axiomatic feature of the surveillance society. Notably some of the 
activists argued themselves that in democratic countries, unless you are planning a terrorist 
attack, the government, while still collecting data on you, will probably leave you alone. True, 
mass surveillance targets everyone but the consequences remain different among, say, a white 
college student, a black lives matter organizer, and a Muslim living in a European capital. 
 As of 2017, the international privacy movement has arrived at a crucial stage. The initial 
outrage the Snowden leaks created has noticeably cooled off. Part of the success activists had in 
raising awareness against surveillance were existing grass roots networks that in the span of a 
                                                 
808 One of the self-declared goals that “Stop Watching Us” and “The Day We Fight Back” achieved was the passing of 
the USA Freedom Act. While it replaced the old system of surveillance with a significantly less intrusive 
collection of domestic phone data, in 2016 the NSA still created more than 151 million phone records of 
Americans. Cf. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), “Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of 
National Security Authorities For Calendar Year 2016” (accessed May 31, 2017). 
https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2016.  
809 Cf. Amir Nasr, “Poll Finds Encryption Isn’t Widely Used,” Morning Consult, February 22, 2016 (accessed May 31, 
2017). https://morningconsult.com/2016/02/22/poll-finds-encryption-isnt-widely-used/; Lorenzo Franceschi-
Bicchierai, “People Can’t Tell What Apps Use Encryption, And Don’t Really Care, Study Finds,” Motherboard, June 
27, 2016 (accessed May 31, 2017). https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/people-cant-tell-what-apps-use-
encryption-and-dont-really-care-study-finds.  
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year managed to launch a series of protest events that provided alternative voices for the 
surveillance discourse. While many of the involved organizations have retreated into different 
approaches than protest campaigns or focused their energies on other digital rights issues, 
surveillance as a social justice and human rights issue will stay relevant. If there is ever another 
series of revelations (especially ones that further demonstrate the consequences surveillance has 
on individuals) a similar network of privacy activists must be in place. During one of the 
interviews, looking back on the post-Snowden years, interviewee I further explained his analogy 
between surfing and activism:  
“You might conceptualize social change (...) in a polity in terms of waves. 
And there are often events that are outside of our control – the Snowden 
leaks would be an example of that. (...) If you are on the board and a wave 
hits you can ride it into shore. (...) If you are not on the board yet and the 
wave is hitting you (...) you tumble around a lot, you come up for air, you 
are in the exact same place you were before. The wave is gone. Hopefully 
you are still holding on to the board. 
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